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ABSTRACT 
Women playwrights have been erased; and it is my thesis 
that erasure is one of the most powerful yet least visible 
tools of dominance in the intertextual field of discourse, 
since its product is manufactured absence—not just of 
difference, but of dialogue with a difference that demands an 
end to dominance. In this field of textuality where 
representation shapes our perception and belief systems, 
absence by its very nature is something one might not notice 
in the formation of dominant social paradigms. Yet erasure 
in representation reflects a way of thinking which leaves 
traces in language that we can detect and guestion. I feel 
it is important that we become fluent readers—not victims— 
of erasure, by studying its methodologies and philosophical 
structures, and the politics of those who use it, so that 
when we critigue dominance we do not mimic it, nor embody it, 
but instead transform it by our very practice. 
The work of tracing erasure has led me to ask guestions 
about the structures of representation itself; how has it 
been controlled to produce the authority of tradition such 
that some subjects have been promoted while others are 
excluded; and what effect has this had in the construction 
and maintenance of "naturalised" ideologies (e.g. women don't 
write plays)? During the course of my investigation, I will 
argue that the absence of women playwrights and their plays 
from representation within the canon of great western drama 
is neither due to nonexistence nor to "bad" writing. Instead 
it can be traced to erasure, an historical process of what 
amounts to nonreception—sustained negative reception coupled 
with anthological exclusion—where prejudice and the power to 
support it has resulted in the exclusion of plays by women 
from the discursive formation of Knowledge, even when they 
meet publication standards, achieve public success, and 
manage to win a few distinguished awards, I will show that 
the nonreception of "women's plays" can be traced to gender 
biased critical practices derived from Aristotelian rules, 
logic and interpretations of "Nature" that have privileged 
masculinist experiences. Here dominance has been justified 
by bias built into the structural principles of institutional 
standards, or what Derrida refers to as Law, in effect 
creating a (hu)man discourse. However, the erasure of 
prominent award-winning women playwrights—who have 
presumably fulfilled dramatic criteria—is more startling 
evidence of nonreception in this system of critical 
judgement, exposing dominance as an exclusionary move beyond 
the support of accepted institutional standards. The 
persistence of such dominance—despite ongoing ideological 
critiques of institutionalised patriarchy by women artists 
and feminist theorists, and despite subsequent changes in 
legislation—indicates what Bryan Turner refers to as 
"patrism", or dominance based on mental prejudice, 
discrimination and "paternalistic beliefs about the 
inferiority of women", in The Body and Societv. In this 
climate, women's response to erasure has also been subject to 
nonreception in the form of reductionism, a lack of serious 
dialogue, and the negative representation of feminists as 
"whinging, bra-burning man-haters". Although feminism has 
engaged in a diverse theoretical and political analysis of 
social dominance involving gender, race, class and sexuality, 
the reductionist representation of these critiques as 
"women's equality" and "women's issues" has historically 
shifted the problem onto women's shoulders; a marginalising 
tactic that both limits dialogue and resists feminist 
criticism of the gender and socioeconomic power structures 
which affect everyone. Thus we can read the evidence of 
erasure as a politics of power as dominance or might is 
right, where exclusion operates with and without the support 
of institutional standards, by those who have used "power 
over" as control of representation—and not merely 
"objective" standards for assessing literature—to preserve 
a dominant presence through the erasure of texts, the 
repression of dialogue, and the resistance to critique via 
marginalisation; all practices in discourse that (re)produce 
and sustain the dominance of particular worldviews over 
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others. 
The philosophical structures of erasure as justified 
dominance can be detected by reading deconstructively through 
the historical interposing of an academic "can(y)on" 
separating hiiman and woman. In this "dramatic" gap, 
successful plays by women have been excluded from the canon, 
represented directly or indirectly as "women's plays" 
(domestic, trivial, sentimental), while plays by men, 
regardless of topic, are not commonly known as "men's plays 
in a men's discourse" but are represented as universal in a 
human discourse. This representation is a false notion of 
universality as it excludes the dialogue and texts of women. 
It also masks what I see as the limiting perception of a core 
binary opposite between Man and Woman that has been 
overshadowed by gender bias to produce a (hu)man/woman 
dichotomy. This dichotomy is supported by Aristotelian logic 
in the construction of meaning and knowledge. His law of 
non-contradiction and the identity principle assures that the 
(hu)man drama discourse is not only dependent upon socially 
constructed opposites such as male/reason/public and 
female/emotion/domestic, but also the exclusion of them from 
defined spaces to avoid contradiction in the construction and 
preservation of identity. Therefore in the language of 
reviews, anthologies and literary criticism, I have traced 
the (op)position of the female artist/theorist and her plays 
as sites of contradiction and hence subjects for 
nonproduction in the (hu)man discourse; along with the 
marginalisation of her texts as "women's" or "feminist", as 
if to be dealt with only by a women's discourse. This leaves 
her caught in an impossible position between the definitions 
of two seemingly opposite discourses, where, as Derrida says 
about Women's Studies in the University, her success in one 
is her risk of failure in the other. However, these 
discourses are not opposite but oppositional, and erasure is 
indicative of a (hu)man discourse that not only excludes 
contradiction, but does not receive nor dialogue with 
critiques from "others" perceived as inferior opposites—a 
Vll 
belief system resulting in male dominance that is evident 
across the various economic, racial and political spectrums. 
Thus the standards and prejudices which erased women's texts 
from the (hu)man discourse meant that women had to mobilise 
separately as a strategy to gain strength for the 
articulation of a critique of social dominance, as well as to 
express and read difference in a more receptive environment. 
Nevertheless, the name and location of these critiques, 
texts, and dialogues as "women's" studies in a separate 
discourse within the academy has become the marginalisation 
of pluralism that Spivak refers to as the "last bastion of 
democracy", resulting in a continuing lack of reception and 
dialogue with men. 
In reading the evidence of erasure as exclusion from 
"objective" structures that supposedly represent the dramatic 
field, my practice of deconstruction and philosophy of 
poststructuralist feminism are informed by an intersection of 
discourses that critique objectivity and articulate the 
limitations of structures. These discourses in various ways 
emphasise interconnectedness, or what I call field theory, 
including feminism as a critique of the interrelatedness of 
gender and power structures; poststructuralist theories of 
representation where the intertextuality of language 
problematises the notion of "real" experience reflected in 
"literary" representation; and quantum physics by way of 
analogy where as Louise Crossley says, "relationship and not 
object is the central metaphor". Field thinking offers a 
perception shift that includes light as particle but sees the 
wave; includes either/or but allows the "and"; includes 
structure but depends on the margin; metaphors that give up 
the opposition to locate the third value of a nonAristotelian 
logic which Ulmer in Applied Grammatoloqy refers to as "the 
excluded middle way". I have used poststructuralist 
theories, therefore, to unravel the simple binary 
oppositional logic of traditional critical assumptions and 
good/bad judgement strategies that have erased women and 
others from the (hu)man discourse; however, as Barbara 
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Johnson writes in A World of Difference, deconstruction does 
not necessarily operate "in a simple, binary, or antagonistic 
way". My practice then has been not only to find and 
redefine the erased plays of women, or to argue that erasure 
is only due to men, but to inhabit the structures of both 
discourses as a bridge of dialogue within my text; reading 
difference, sameness, and traces of erasure. In this 
deconstructive reading I see not men's and women's issues, 
subjects or discourses, but rather seek a "beyond gender" 
approach to position that acknowledges the experience of 
difference, without using it as a platform from which to 
exercise power through critical judgements that deny the 
experience or imagination of others. 
The social construction of male and female as opposite 
humans, built upon the "essence" of opposite sex, 
theoretically can be undone and the gender gulf bridged, but 
to wear away false opposites requires long term production 
and dialogue in the intertextual field of discourse. 
Although as Madonne Miner points out in Radical Teacher. 
Women's Studies needs to achieve a wider audience in the 
academy, the risk is to incorporate, challenge and transform 
within the established structure and practices of the 
institution, rather than mimic the essentialist gender 
principles and power politics of "authoritative" experience 
that underlie the canon. I submit that to achieve 
transformative dialogue with men, it will be necessary to 
integrate the "oppositional" texts of women into a full human 
discourse that values feedback rather than erasure, and as 
such would look different precisely because of a dedication 
to constant examination and self-reflexivity versus 
protecting itself from critique. Here the marginal can be 
repoliticised by reading why they have been erased, not just 
as "bad writing" or "nagging" sites of contradiction to be 
excluded from a (hu)man discourse, but rather as women 
artists/theorists who employ the strategy of contradiction. 
These texts can be included as useful critiques of dominant 
dramatic and social structures in that, as subjects for 
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production, they can perform the cultural work of increasing 
the collective awareness of dominance by (re)presenting 
problematic social contradictions, theorising different 
definitions of reality and power, and/or utilising innovative 
styles of dramatic construction. However, altering the power 
structures of the (hu)man discourse to achieve a full human 
discourse will require more than logical argument, inclusion 
via separatism, or equality legislation to address mental 
belief systems about the inferiority of women, and hence the 
low motivation of men to read and study, and dialogue with 
women. The additional challenge here is the erasure of 
erasure that requires a paradigm shift in oppositional 
thinking, expanding beyond the definition of power as 
dominance and, as director Pam Brighton suggests in Women and 
Theatre. "of reviving and reconstituting whatever is left of 
our abilities to combine rather than to compete". In 
addition to altering hierarchical structures, there must also 
be a mental and emotional growing up that evolves beyond 
dominance as the historical reaction to difference—a way of 
thinking reflected by erasure and socioeconomic structures 
that produce and reproduce dominant ideologies which colonise 
human imagination and social practices. As Alice Jardine 
suggests, though it seems impossible, we need to "rethink 
difference without aggression or defensiveness, or it will 
continue to think us". Foucault wrote that it is necessary 
"to give up loving that which dominates and exploits us, 
power"; yet the largely unreceived suggestion from many 
feminist theorists is not to give up power but to transform 
its definition and resulting socioeconomic ideologies, from 
dominance over others and hierarchy, to strength with 
cooperation and equal participation. Such an attitudinal 
change within discourse can be reflected in a radical 
textuality that is not afraid to encourage dialogue and 
embrace contradiction in the continual process of 
transformation; where shared power can be defined within the 
worldview of an interconnected field, where the chain is only 
as strong as its weakest link. Perhaps then a reimagining 
X 
can be represented of male and female, not on opposite sides 
of a canyon, but as different yet similar bridges across the 
same river. 
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PART ONE. Introduction: The Traces of Erasure. An Historical 
Process of Nonreception 
The essence of tyranny, as Orwell remarked, is the 
persistence of a certain world view. 
Veronica Brady, Australian Societv 
The physicist Fritjof Capra sees three imminent transitions 
which will shake the very foundations of our lives: ^the 
reluctant but inevitable decline of patriarchy', the decline 
of the fossil fuel age, and a ^paradigm shift' in our basic 
way of perception. 
Robin Morgan, The Anatomy of Freedom 
In Part One, I introduce and develop a strategy for 
reading the traces of erasure as evidence of dominance in 
discourse. The product of erasure is the manufactured 
absence of women playwrights and the repression of dialogue, 
practices in discourse that (re)produce and . sustain the 
dominance of particular worldviews over others. Through 
examining critical practices of reception and the 
representation of women playwrights in the dramatic 
discourse, as well as in the academy, I will show that the 
absence of women playwrights and their plays from the 
dramatic discourse is neither due to nonexistence nor to "bad 
writing". Instead it can be traced to erasure as an 
historical process of what amounts to nonreception—sustained 
negative reception coupled with anthological erasure—where 
essentialist definitions and prejudiced assumptions, and the 
power to support them, have resulted in the exclusion of 
plays by women from the discursive formation of Knowledge. 
I have found that although plays by women are prolific in 
text, and a few award winning, they are mostly absent from 
public places of textual production, including the academy. 
Although a few appear in early anthologies, they disappear 
from successive anthologies that constitute the mainstream 
drama canon, while more recent plays appear in a minimal way 
within feminist collections or on the curricula of Women's 
Studies courses. This historical lack of sustained 
representation has led me to trace the way women and their 
texts have been represented over time, just as confronting 
their absence and nonproduction in the academy has led me to 
trace the erasure of women as a feature of textual production 
through methodologies and theoretical assumptions of the 
dramatic, philosophic, and literary critical discourses. 
However, the primary purpose is to investigate erasure as 
evidence of dominance in discourse, rather than as an 
analysis of the plays themselves. 
In Part One, Sections (A) and (B) , I demonstrate the 
evidence of erasure as nonreception by reading the 
representation of plays by women, and of Women's Studies in 
the university. This textual evidence provides three main 
areas of investigation: 1) it exposes a (hu)man/woman 
dichotomy and the exclusion of women from dialogue that 
challenges the notion of human universal experience as 
represented in the canon; 2) it reveals gender biased 
critical practices in the language of reviews and 
anthological comments, based on Aristotelian standards, with 
consistent binary opposites clustered around a core opposite 
of essentialist male/female gender definitions; and (3), it 
demonstrates that the erasure of most published women 
playwrights is evidence of a prejudice which operates with 
and without institutional support, exposing power as control 
of representation, not merely "objective" standards. Thus in 
Part One I explore the evidence of what erasure is and how it 
is achieved through critical practices and theoretical 
assumptions of the dramatic discourse, and the evidence that 
suggests why its politics can be identified as dominance in 
discourse. In Section (C) I present the theoretical 
framework that has informed my philosophical position and 
methodology for reading the erasure of women playwrights. 
Here I discuss the intersection of several discourses i.e. 
feminism, physics and poststructuralism, which all point to 
a shift in perception as they emphasise interrelationship, or 
what I call field theory, to critique objectivity and 
articulate the limitations of structures. 
Erasure includes, but is more than, the study of absence 
and its effects in the intertextual field of discourse. 
Erasure also differs from exclusion via a system of 
institutional standards since it must account for the 
dramatic "rubbing out" of almost all women's texts, including 
those few plays that have achieved critical success. In my 
thesis I am most interested in this manufacturing of absence 
in what really amounts to the nonreception of women's texts, 
where erasure has left traces in the negative language and 
gender biased critical practices of what has been represented 
as the human discourse, but which in effect has the identity 
of a (hu)man discourse. 
As Part One is functioning as a long introduction to the 
historical problem of erasure, each section in this first 
part will also have a Preamble to clarify its relationship to 
the thesis argument. Thereafter, there will be one 
introduction to each Part, with Part Four functioning as a 
conclusion. 
(A). The Canon Canvon: Human Plavs and Women's Plavs 
Preamble 
In Section (A) , "The Canon Canyon: Human Plays and 
Women's Plays", I introduce the reader to the location and 
perception of plays by women as an opposition between human 
and woman within the academy, reflecting a problematic 
(op)position for the woman playwright. By discussing two 
articles which in different ways question the success of 
Women's Studies in the University, I will investigate this 
representation of plays by women and Women's Studies in the 
University. I do this for the purpose of locating and 
challenging the notion of universal human experience as 
represented in an academic canon where texts by women and 
dialogue with women have been repressed. While plays by men 
are regarded as human and not "men's" plays, yet many 
successful plays by women have been excluded from the canon, 
being historically represented directly or indirectly as 
"women's" plays. Such a representation signifies a 
metaphorical canyon whereby these plays have not been equally 
received for inclusion and dialogue within a so-called human 
discourse. As we shall see in the language of the reviews 
discussed in Section (B) , this false notion of human 
universality also masks the core opposition between Man and 
Woman that has been overshadowed by prejudice to produce a 
(hu)man/woman dichotomy in a gender biased (hu)man discourse 
that has found it necessary to exclude published, successful 
texts by women. 
In the first article, "Another Woman's Play? Doesn't 
that make like niimber 6?", Madonne Miner, presents her 
experience with teaching plays by women within a mainstream 
drama course. A male student complained about reading plays 
by women as "yet another woman's play", while discussion 
revealed that the students regarded plays by men as human. 
Miner's article raises questions about the perceptions of 
universality and importance of men's texts, and the 
difficulties of achieving a broader appreciative audience by 
Women's Studies within the academic institution. Derrida's 
article, "Another Cell in the Beehive", takes the issue of 
incorporation further by posing the difficult position of 
Women's Studies within a masculinist institution where he 
suggests that its success in one is its very risk of failure 
in the other; he points out that as Women's Studies proves 
its necessity it also becomes part and parcel of the 
institutional power structure without being able to transform 
it. These are interesting comments suggesting that Women's 
Studies has not been received as another perspective within 
the human discourse which can successfully achieve 
transformative dialogue in the university, but rather is 
perceived and nonreceived as an opposite, separate discourse 
that can only succeed somewhat ambiguously within an 
institution defined and dominated by a (hu)man discourse. 
The standards and prejudice which resulted in the 
erasure of women's texts from the (hu)man discourse meant 
that women had to mobilise separately as a strategy to read 
and express difference, as well as to articulate a feminist 
critique of social dominance. However, the name and location 
of this critique as "women's" studies in a separate discourse 
has inadvertently followed what I will show in Section (B) to 
be an historical pattern of nonreception and marginalisation 
of plays by women as "women's plays" and "women's issues" 
(domestic, emotional), resulting in a pluralistic 
marginalisation and the lack of transformative dialogue with 
men in a human discourse. Such representations of plays by 
women and Women's Studies provides the investigative map of 
my research where I will trace the erasure of women 
playwrights as it has constituted the impossible position of 
the female artist, who is caught between the theoretical 
definitions of the (hu)man discourse and the representation 
of her texts as "women's" or "feminist" as if to be dealt 
with only by a supposedly opposite, separate women's 
discourse. 
6In her article, "Another Women's Play? Doesn't that make
like number 6?", Madonne Miner exposes the perception of a
(hu) man/woman dichotomy, when she tried to integrate 'Women f s
studies' within the mainstream curriculum of an institution
largely centered around a male-dominant canon. Miner relates
that fifteen weeks into a Introduction to Drama course, after
reading eleven plays by men and one by a woman, Glaspell's
Trifles, a male student responded with what became the title
of her article, when asked to read Marsha Norman's Getting
out:
And yet here's this response paper asserting that
Norman's drama is 'yet another women's play' and
implying that my particular reading list is
biased, unbalanced, askew. I'm dumbfounded; and
I'm angry ... As I calm down, I realize I must
think about my response along with my student's
response. (Radical Teacher, 1)
Arguing over why they weren' t getting "the real thing" Miner
asked them to define a "women's" play. Finally they agreed
that it was one which "focused on issues of interest
primarily to women" (3). When asked "is there such a thing
'as a 'men's play'" a female student replied, "of course not.
There are just women's plays and human plays" (3). The next
time Miner taught this course she adopted a different
strategy: 1) she selected "an anthology which at least
allowed for issues other than those specifically coded 'male'
to arise; 2) she supplemented the anthology with plays that
focus on and raise questions about women; and 3) she raised
questions in class discussion "about gender and its effects--
on characters, on actors and actresses, on playwrights". She
exposed the intertextuality of text and social practice by
bringing in copies of women's critical texts, excerpts of
prefaces, Ibsen's speech to the Norwegian Association for
Women's Rights, etc. Also I- .....in...,.the attempt to avoid plays
focusing mostly on men, like Oedipus, Hamlet, or Tartuffe,
she had:
resorted to plays Which evidenced an interest in
male/female interaction, plays which often used
this interaction as structural basis from which to
raise other questions: about interpretation,
justice. honesty, human rights, classism~ and so
on. In order to accomplish their purposes, these 
plays allowed major speaking roles to women. 
Unaccustomed to such a rout of noisy females, my 
students rebelled, (emphasis mine; 2) 
However, when the students began asking questions about 
gender, they also asked "with a fair amount of hostility in 
their voices: ^are all of our plays about male/female 
conflict?'" (3). Miner challenged the students about this 
perception, asking "did such a description accurately reflect 
the concerns of these plays?" (3). Though Miner points out 
that the plays raised questions about many other social 
issues, when raised within what students perceived as 
"women's" plays, they were reduced to "male/female 
conflicts", of interest primarily to women, while other 
social issues were overlooked and ignored. I would argue 
that the students were simply mimicking the dominant critical 
attitudes and reductionism of a society that separates the 
public and private sphere into male and female realms; that 
regards things which women do or things that affect women as 
being of interest primarily only to women; and thus 
disregards other things women may be representing about the 
broader social picture. We will see this phenomenon 
consistently in the reviews discussed in Section (B). 
Afterwards, Miner's class was able to address its own 
biased belief system that assumed men's experiences were 
universal human experiences but female experiences were not. 
This led to why plays by women were not included in drama 
anthologies, and even moved them to cjuestion why plays should 
be classified as ^women's' or ^black' or ^gay' plays "while 
white men's plays are just plays?" (4) . Miner's last 
question was about what really caused her students' 
discomfort, "the sustained presentation of male/female 
conflict OR the sustained presentation of females as main-
stage characters" (3) , and they never got around to answering 
it, though she feels it may have been important: 
as it might have encouraged students to consider 
how our readings differed from what they were 
accustomed to, and what that difference might tell 
us about their education—past and present. (3) 
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The students' discomfort does indicate that false 
representations of universality in education as well as in 
the larger social sphere have affected their perceptions of 
dominant social paradigms like gender, resulting in negative 
and restrictive connotations for women playwrights. With 
these misperceptions of universality, the situation for a 
woman playwright is thus a crisis of reception and 
representation between two perceived discourses: 1) the 
human, or (hu)man as dominated by male defined traditions in 
which critics and readers may ignore themes or overlook 
certain dynamics represented in "women's" plays; and 2) the 
feminist, or the representation of the text as a woman's play 
to be worked on only within the discourse of feminist 
literary criticism, also engaged in its own definitions. 
The next point Miner considers is how women have 
responded to transform this concept of universality and the 
educational structures that have produced it. M i n e r 
comments that though universities, individual teachers, and 
publishers have begun to make more texts by women available, 
the fact that Women's Studies is not a core curricul\im means 
that there is a different response from students who have 
more practical considerations: 
While we, feminist faculty, have been proposing 
and developing courses, testing and adopting new 
texts . .. while publishers have been integrating 
women and minorities into standard texts 
republishing ^lost' texts; students—reacting to a 
sluggish economy, a tight job market, a more 
stringent set of graduation requirements—have 
begun demanding a more ^traditional' education. I 
am not speaking here about students who register 
for Introduction to Women's Studies ... or 
^Feminist Theory'. No, I'm speaking about students 
who quickly skip past such offerings in the course 
catalog, focusing instead on required courses, 
courses which presumably provide a standard, 
identifiable ^product', courses which define the 
status quo and assure students of its 
attainability after a semester's work. (2) 
The issues surrounding the location of women's work are 
multiple: first, there is Miner's concern that mainstream 
students simply do not read it; second, women writers as 
theorists posit different strategies of reading that could 
inform and revise dominant institutional practices if 
integrated in a receptive fashion; third, there is concern, 
however, that if women's texts are absorbed into an unchanged 
institutional system which depends on traditional canonistic 
standards, they will be read as ^inferior women's' texts. 
Miner feels that there is a need to address this if Women's 
Studies is to succeed: 
we must engage in audience analysis; we must 
assess the clientele and modify our presentation 
accordingly. I'm not suggesting that we sell 
ourselves out; I am suggesting that we sell 
ourselves in. (2) 
However, what is the definition of success for Women's 
Studies? Is it the continuation and strengthening of it as 
a satellite department within the traditional university 
model, or is it the integration of women's texts into 
traditional courses, or is it perhaps the transformation of 
the university's practices of education based on hierarchical 
structural principles, the canonical selection and exclusion 
of texts, and author centered courses, and are these 
questions really a matter only for feminists? 
In "Women in the Beehive" from Men in Feminism. Derrida 
writes that" if Women's Studl.es does not question the 
principles of structure in the model of the university, it 
risks being just another cell in that beehive (191). Given 
that feminists have questioned social power structures, the 
more pertinent question may be why these feminists texts are 
not more significantly received for serious dialogue within 
mainstream courses? Derrida regards the research work of 
Women's Studies as both radical and positive, that is: 
one discovers all sorts of things, one exhumes new 
corpuses, one studies women's literature, one 
uplifts from under the repression, from out of the 
realm of the forbidden all sorts of feminine 
signatures, feminist discourses which were 
obscured, one brings out not only literary but 
anthropological, political, and social dimensions. 
All that is very positive, certainly. (191) 
The findings of this "positive" Women's Studies research has 
revealed the exclusion of women from the canon and the 
conspicuous absence of women from positions that organise the 
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University from within, which has led feminists to question 
the structural laws of social power structures including the 
university model; although Derrida comments otherwise with 
respect to Women's Studies in America: 
the effort to put back into question the 
structural principles which I mentioned before, 
which construct the university law, the academic 
law, that is to say, in the end, the social law in 
general—because the university is not a separate 
bloc, it represents society, society represents 
itself through the university—one has the 
impression that the questioning of this principle 
is unequally developed in comparison to those 
studies which we could call ^positive', (emphasis 
mine; 191) 
Looking back to some early writings on the ^second wave' 
feminist movement from 1969, it is rather evident that the 
"questioning of this principle" Derrida refers to, that is, 
critiquing the structural models which reproduce power 
inequities, has been a very important issue in the women's 
movement right from the start of its ^second wave' both in 
socialist/Marxist feminism and in radical feminism. 
Documenting the textual evidence of this would produce a 
bibliographical monument, though I will give some examples 
below. However, I argue that if Derrida perceives it as 
"unequally developed", this perception is more likely due to 
the fact that this critique has been uneouallv received. 
because the feminist demand for structural change, and the 
acknowledgement of men's problematic gender definitions as 
raised bv feminist theorv. are precisely those aspects that 
are resisted and excluded from serious dialogue by those who 
have assumed power and dominance within social institutions. 
Several examples from Michelene Wandor's recent 
collection of interviews. Once a Feminist^ give some idea 
about the extent to which women in the second wave of 
feminism also addressed themselves to structural changes. I 
will underline these specific comments in the following 
series of quotations, such that all emphasis is mine unless 
otherwise indicated. Rowbotham writes in "Women's Lib and 
the New Politics" from 1969: 
The so-called women's question is a whole people 
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question. It is not simply that our situation can 
only be fundamentally changed by the total 
transformation of all existing social relations, 
but also because without us any such 
transformation can be only partial and 
consequently soon distorted. The creation of a new 
woman of necessity demands the creation of a new 
man ... The domination of women is at once the 
most complex and the most fundamental links in the 
chain. Accordingly in moments of acute social 
unrest the question of our position leaps to the 
surface. Our uprising is the most terrible to the 
conservative, precisely because it is so important 
for the revolution. The opposition to the women is 
always more intense than that towards any other 
group, and it is alwavs expressed in the most 
hysterical terms. Now while the Left has always 
included ^the women problem' and ^equal rights for 
women' on the agenda, it has placed them rather 
far down. There is a hesitancy and a hopelessness 
about the issue, a tendency to ^if and ^but' and 
o^f course'. This is expressed in a curious fear 
that the subject is ^diversionary'. Of course it 
is diversionary. It is one of the largest 
diversions that could possibly be made—the 
diversion of one half of the human race towards 
social revolution. (11) 
In "The Beginning of Women's Lib in Britain" Rowbotham quotes 
Irene Fick in Shrew as an excimple of other women who felt 
that the struggle was structural, but divided between the 
public and the private: 
While fighting for economic and social equality in 
general, under the present capitalist society, 
women must oppose male chauvinism and domination 
in personal life. Only with the ending of ^class 
society' was women's liberation possible. (20) 
Another woman from a different issue of Shrew makes a similar 
comment: 
We have to make it explicit from the start that 
women's common problems can only be solved by 
means of a radical social change in the framework 
of the existing system. (21) 
Sandra Peers discusses a union meeting on equal pay: 
One thing that rather surprised me was the extent 
to which the women accepted without any show of 
concern that monogamous marriage and the present 
family structure are on the way out,, and supported 
abortion on demand. About half of them agreed with 
it. (qtd. in Rowbotham 26) 
In the same collection, Raya Levin writes as a contemporary: 
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I think there has been little impact on men in 
general; superficially, men have realised there 
are certain things they can't permit themselves 
any longer. But there is still basically the main 
culture intact ... To achieve egualitv with men in 
the present structure means to adopt their values. 
You enter a man's world. If you want to compete 
with them, there's no way they'll let you compete 
unless it's on their terms. (53) 
As Rowbotham notes, even among various groups on the Left, 
the position of women is considered as a question, a problem, 
or as a matter of ^equal rights' but no mention is made of 
the ^gender question' or the *man question', or the ^equal 
rights for men' platform. Such historical phrases about 
women precisely indicate the perception of the male subject 
as dominant, and in the position of deciding the position of 
the sub-dominant woman as a problem against a neutral 
background and structure where men are equal, rather than as 
a mutual problem of oppression as an item of broad social 
concern. An older feminist, aged 78, provided the link with 
the historical women's movement and their experiences with 
the lack of male participation: 
It has been pointed out that no exercise of power 
is ever relinquished voluntarily. It always has to 
be overcome by overwhelming force—not necessarily 
physical force, but the force of public opinion. 
In my view it is futile for women to rely on men 
to fight their battle for them. They must do it 
themselves—even at the risk of being dubbed 
^battle-axes' or any of the traditional moves to 
discourage revolt, (qtd. in Rowbotham 21) 
It seems obvious that certainly some early and more 
contemporary feminists have been fully aware of this tendency 
of the male subject—even those on the Left—to ignore their 
own complicity in the domination of women. Rowbotham quotes 
several different feminists from some early issues of Shrew: 
I do not intend to ask permission from Peking 
before proceeding. I do not intend to neurotically 
consult Marxengelslenin before baring my teeth or 
my teats. I do not intend to give ladylike (read 
suck ass) reassurance to radical chauvinists 
during the course of this struggle, even if it 
means losing their friendship (ie patronage) . (20) 
In Sally Alexander's interview, she and Rowbotham remember 
with embarrassment a 1968 History Workshop with mostly male 
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students, academics, and unionists: 
We were in the hall at Ruskin, both the hall and 
the platform were packed, a bunch of us—^us' 
meaning women—on and around a table on the 
platform and Sheila made this announcement, and 
she said, ^We thought it would be a good idea if 
anyone here who was working on women's history ... 
'—and there was a roar of laughter. There were 
shrieks of laughter. (81) 
At the same History Workshop, Rowbotham remembers: 
A trade-union man got up and said, ^the trade-
union movement is to prevent women having these 
terrible conditions. What we want is for women to 
be able to stay at home and not have to go out to 
work'. I got up and contested that, saying I could 
understand the feelings of opposition to 
exploitation, but at the same time it had been 
very important for women to earn an independent 
wage, and that this protective attitude was wrong 
and the point was to improve conditions of working 
women. Well, this was met with patronising 
laughter. I think it was from that response we got 
the idea of having a meeting of women. (28-29) 
Women within the feminist movement have been aware of the 
relationship between the structure and methodology practiced 
within organisations and the resulting production of power 
differentials; and that therefore the battle for ^equality' 
in an unchanged hierarchical system was fraught with 
problems, as Levin points out: 
I still believe in Soviets and believe in grass-
roots participation, but I don't believe, and 
never have, that we can capture the state in a 
parliamentary way. It's a fallacy to think one can 
change a state by votes. In order for women to 
penetrate into the position of power they have to 
adapt themselves to the structure. And that's what 
they've done, and that's why they've lost a lot of 
what made it tremendously exciting in the 
beginning. I don't pretend I have the solution to 
the problem. But it definitely is a problem. Anv 
kind of movement that allows itself to be 
channelled into existing structures is doomed to 
failure. (52) 
Finally, American feminist, Andrea Dworkin, writes on the 
historically constructed structure or model of power for 
sexuality suggesting: 
an absolute transformation of human sexuality and 
the institutions derived from it ... Equality 
within the framework of the male sexual model. 
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however that model is reformed or modified, can 
only perpetuate the model itself and the injustice 
and bondage which are its intrinsic consequences. 
fOur Blood 12-13) 
Although the women's movement and Women's Studies have 
questioned fundamental social power structures and the 
policies of the university, the ^success' of Women's Studies 
becomes very relative to its reception as Derrida notes: 
In that sense, the risk of failure of women's 
studies is the risk of its very own success. The 
more it proves its positivity, its necessity, and 
brings proofs to the masculine directors of the 
university—masculine, whether women or not—the 
more it legitimizes itself by this power; the more 
then, it risks to cover up, to forget, or to 
repress the fundamental question which we must 
pose. (Men 191). 
With this comment Derrida seems to suggest an opposition 
between a masculine institution and a feminine discourse, 
where Women's Studies has not been received as another 
perspective within the human discourse that can achieve 
transformative dialogue, but rather is perceived and 
nonreceived as an opposite, separate discourse that can only 
succeed somewhat ambiguously within an institution defined 
and dominated by a (hu)man discourse. However, when Derrida 
claims these directors are "masculine, whether women or not", 
he insinuates power is essentially masculine, when in fact 
the directors are only representing what has been 
appropriated for the definition of masculinity, that is, a 
patriarchal form of power as male dominance, I would argue 
that this form of ^power over' others is just a structural 
mode of power that is dominating and restrictive, but it is 
not essentially ^male' nor is it essentially masculine nor is 
it the only definition of power available. What is more 
important is that the fundamental question being asked of the 
university model is not one simply for feminists to ask, 
since as Derrida writes, "the fundamental question we must 
pose". By this "we" perhaps he acknowledges that a much more 
significant and equal participation in serious dialogue must 
occur between men and women, not only about "women" in the 
university but about the university model itself; and it may 
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well concern questions about structural transformation, and 
the kind of power differentials that are achieved through its 
hierarchical structures, where the selection of canonical 
texts is by authoritative positions and not say, students. 
The issue of structural transformation brought up by feminist 
theorists has been excluded through a lack of reception and 
serious dialogue with the "women's" discourse, and the 
marginalising technique which focuses the debate on 
^equality' within an unchanged masculinist system—and not 
because of a lack of development within the feminist 
discourse, as I will argue later in Part Three, The Response 
to Erasure. 
The debate on where and how to locate Women's Studies 
may center around whether feminism's theories for alternative 
structures and practices can actually deconstruct a 
hierarchical power model from within a university modelled on 
patriarchal structures and values or whether, as Miner 
argues. Women's Studies needs to "sell itself in" to the 
mainstream further because it has been marginalised within 
the structure by a form of ineffective pliiralism. Derrida 
poses this question for Women's Studies as a certain kind of 
risk: 
This would include, for example, whoever suggests 
that we do not need Women's Studies departments at 
all, and that it's not necessary to construct 
institutions of this sort, that it is necessary 
that the concern finds other routes outside the 
universities where departments are established on 
the old model. Those—whether men or women—who 
risk that question, also risk in one form or 
another being rejected by that which calls itself 
Women's Studies. (191) 
Though these questions may risk rejection, yet the more 
difficult task for feminism and the Women's Studies 
discourse, when defining its own practices, will be to 
incorporate, challenge and transform this model without 
mimicking the structural and power principles of the (hu)man 
discourse. Women's Studies within institutions may have 
become part of the beehive, but this does not mean that as a 
discourse it must become parcel to the university's power or 
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structural tenets. The research itself can have an impact on 
people who, in their social movements, do transgress beyond 
the boundaries of the university structure. Further, as 
feminist studies also incorporates social practices through 
various women's political and social organisations at a grass 
roots level, there are other strategies outside the 
university model being employed to raise awareness of 
discriminatory and oppressive power structures as they 
impinge upon people. 
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(B). Appearance/Disappearance: On the Trail of a Core 
Opposition 
Preamble 
Opening night seems a triumph. But I know better. I look into 
people's eyes for the Truth of my immediate future. I am an 
anticipatory ghost of that future. Tomorrow, a few hours 
hence, will find the congratulatory screams frozen into 
sneers. My fear paralyzes my brain, immobilizes my will. The 
reviews, the reviews as yet unready fill my mind. I have been 
through this before and I know ... I see myself forevermore 
as a writhing mass of entrails, an involuntary invertebrate, 
a non-cerebrate, a creature of patterns, of reflexes, of all-
encompassing terror. And I cut my own throat in response, and 
I amputate mv own breast, and the poisoned milk of mv 
amputated breast backs into mv cattleslaughtered throat, and 
bile spills from the widely-grinning mouthslash of my 
butchered throat, spills burning on the fresh wound of my 
amputated breast. 
Myrna Lamb, Woman as Writer 
... New York Times critic Walter Kerr, and Newsday's George 
Oppenheimer felt that Lamb's work was merely a puritanical, 
anti-sex lecture. And Dick Brukenfeld, reviewer for The 
Village Voice, took an ambivalent stand. Praising the 
playwright's courage and wit, Brukenfeld nevertheless found 
little satisfaction in the story, which for him, proceeded by 
a logic that was neither masculine nor feminine. ^ just 
dangerous'. 
Judith Olauson, The American Woman Plavwright: A View 
of Criticism and Characterisation 
The profound political intervention of feminism has indeed 
been not simply to enact a radical politics but to redefine 
the very nature of what seemed political—to take politics 
down from its male incarnation as a changeseeking interest in 
what is not nearest to hand, and to bring it into the daily 
historical texture of the relations between the sexes. The 
literary ramifications of this shift involve the discovery of 
the rhetorical survival skills of the formerly unvoiced. 
Lies, secrets, silences, and deflections of all sorts are 
routes taken by voices or messages not granted full 
legitimacy in order not to be altogether lost. If 
writerliness is defined as attention to the trace of 
otherness in language, as attention to the way in which there 
is alwavs more than one message, then it is hard to see how 
a true instatement of the power of the other voices is 
possible without something like a writerly apprenticeship... 
It would thus probably never be false to say that to 
privilege writerliness is conservative—though I'm not sure 
it would always be true—but writerliness itself is 
conservative only in the sense that it is capable of 
inscribing and conserving messages the radicalitv of which 
may not yet have been explored. 
Barbara Johnson, A World of Difference 
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In Section (B) , "Appearance/Disappearance: On the Trail 
of a Core Opposition", I pursue what Barbara Johnson refers 
to above as an "apprenticeship in writerliness", seeking to 
pay attention to the critical judgements that might provoke 
the words of women playwrights like Myrna Lamb above, and to 
explore the "radicality" of messages that may have been lost 
to erasure. This section focuses on the traces of erasure to 
discover what erasure is apart from the appearance and then 
disappearance of plays by women. I will look at reception to 
give some answers as to "how" and "why" erasure is 
accomplished through critical practices and prejudice in the 
dramatic discourse. (Later, Part Two will deconstructively 
analyse the philosophical foundations of those practices to 
explore more deeply the "how" and "why" of erasure as a tool 
of dominance in the intertextual field of discourse.) 
In a discussion of the reviews, anthologies and 
articles, I will remind the reader of the gender biased 
critical practices that are so often negative towards the 
plays of women and women authors, whose gender identity is 
clearly a problem when it comes to satisfying the 
requirements of producing "good" drama. Reading with a 
deconstructive eye, the critical language and assumptions of 
the (hu)man drama discourse reveal consistent interpretive 
and authorial judgements based on a multitude of binary 
opposite definitions, the most endemic being logic/emotion, 
public/private, and professional/amateur. These are all 
clustered around what I call the core binary opposite of 
essentialist male and female gender definitions that 
privilege masculinist experience, and are incorporated from 
the social text into the literary critical texts of the 
dramatic discourse. Based on this core opposition, the 
critics frequently attack style and construction; ignore or 
explain away innovations in dramatic technique; undermine the 
author's authority, experience or imagination; trivialise or 
exclude "publicly" related themes while emphasing domestic or 
romantic features; and directly or indirectly classify and 
reduce women's texts to "women's" plays and "women's" issues. 
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The reviews and anthological commentaries give a picture 
of erasure as a historical process of nonreception, where 
prejudiced assumptions and the power to support them, have 
resulted in the exclusion of plays by women from the 
discursive formation of Knowledge, even when they meet 
publication standards, achieve public success, and manage to 
win awards. (In Part Two I will go on to trace the gender 
biased standards as derived from Aristotelian logic, rules, 
and definitions that in effect created the identity of a 
(hu)man discourse, where dominance has been supported by 
prejudice built into the institutional structures.) However, 
the erasure of award winning women playwrights is a more 
startling discovery of nonreception in this system of 
critical judgement because it is an exclusionary move beyond 
the support of institutional standards, exposing a dominance 
based on mental prejudice and discrimination. Thus we can 
begin to identify a politics of erasure as might is right, 
where exclusion has operated with and beyond institutional 
support, by those who have used "power over" as control of 
representation, and not merely "objective" institutional 
standards. We can conclude that the western great dramatic 
tradition as represented in drama anthologies is not 
therefore mimetic of the best of the field as it claims to 
be, but rather has created the reality of dramatic greatness 
through selective representation according to the prejudices 
and power structures of the (hu)man discourse. 
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How is it that despite successful performance runs, 
publications, Pulitzer Prizes, Obie and other dramatic 
awards, the historical representation of plays by women has 
largely been characterised as long term absence from drama 
anthologies and educational curricula^ in the face of 
continuous and prolific writing by women playwrights? A 
study of the Cumulative Drama Index lists many published 
plays by women, including award winners and plays such as 
Susan Glaspell's Trifles which was (for a short time) 
considerably anthologised in small drama collections. 
However, the drama indexes indicate that these texts drop out 
and in fact are only rarely collected in the definitive 
survey drama anthologies. 
The examination of various drama anthologies which 
follows depicts the limited numbers of women playwrights 
represented, comparing unfavourably to the nvimbers of 
published authors recuperated by feminist researchers.^ 
Anthologies that seem to have large niambers of women are 
marked with an asterisk and explained after the Table; 
basically it reflects small nximbers of women within very 
large anthologies. 
^ For example, in 1989 my own survey of colleges and 
universities in Australia for numbers of women playwrights taught 
in the drama curricula, revealed that most institutions included 
zero to very few women. In the minimal representation situation, 
the most frequently included authors were Dorothy Hewett and 
Katharine Prichard. If the curriculxim included more than these 
two, there were occasional combinations of authors such as Betty 
Roland, Jill Shearer, Hannie Rayson, along with more modern 
playwrights such as Jennifer Compton, Alma De Groen, Caryl 
Churchill, and Pam Gems. Several instructors stated that they 
changed authors from year to year. There was one inclusion of 
Aphra Behn and Maria Fornes, and one black American playwright, 
Ntozake Shange. Wandor's Methuen Series, Plays By Women, was 
cited once as an included volume, as was Sullivan and Hatch's 
Plavs By and About Women. At two universities there were courses 
entitled ^Women and Theatre' and ^Drama and Feminism' with 
markedly substantial representation of women playwrights and 
feminist critical writers. 
^ For lists of women playwrights see the books of Chinoy and 
Jenkins, Debra Adelaide, and Rachel France. 
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Table of Anthologies 
American Modern Drama Women Authors 
20 Best Plays of Modern American Theater, 1939 1 
25 Best Plays of Modern American Theater, 1949 2 
Discussions of Modern American Drama, 1966 2 
American Playwrights: A Critical Survey, 1980 4 
Australian Drama 
Eight Plays by Australians, One-Act, 1934 5 
Five Plays by Australians, 1936 1 
Best Australian One-Act Plays, 1937 7 
Six Australian One-Act Plays, 1944 2 
•Towards an Australian Drama, 1953 10 
Australian One-Act Plays, v. 1-3, 1962-67 2 
Six One-Act Plays, 1970 2 
*The Making of Australian Drama, 1973 19 
Five Plays for Stage, Radio, TV, 1977 0 
After ^The Doll', 1979 1 
Contemporary Australian Playwrights, 1979 3 
•Australian Drama 1970-85, 1987 
Australian Contemporary Drama, 1909-82, 1985 13 
•Contemporary Australian Drama, 1987 11 
British Modern Drama 
Modern English Playwrights, 1927 2 
Modern British Dramatists, 1968 0 
Revolutions in Modern English Drama, 1972 0 
50 Modern British Plays, 1982 0 
World Drama. American. British. European 
A Treasury of the Theatre, 1951 2 
Modern English, European & American Drama, 1964 0 
•Modern World Drama, 1972 20 
•Modern Drama in America & England, 1950-70, 1982 24 
The Crown Guide to the World's Great Plays, 1984 3 
Types of Drama 
Modern Poetic Drama, 1934 0 
Thirty Famous One-Act Plays, 1949 4 
Theme of Loneliness in Modern American Drama, 1960 1 
Experimental Drama, 1963 2 
Theatre of Revolt, 1964 0 
English Dramatic Form, 1660-1760, 1981 , 1 
Modern Australian Styles, 1982 0 
Transformations in Modern European Drama, 1983 0 
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Drama to Restoration 
A History of Restoration Drama, 1660-1700, 1923 2 
Restoration Comedy, 1660-1720, 1924 1 
A Bibliography of English Printed Drama to Restoration, 0 
1959 
Annals of English Drama, 975-1700, 1964 4 
English Drama of the Restoration and 18th Century, 1968 4 
Restoration & 18th Century Theatre Research, 1969 2 
English Drama to 1710, 1971 0 
English Drama, 1660-1800, 1976 0 
Critics, Values & Restoration Comedy, 1982 0 
English Drama: Restoration and 18th Century, 1988 2 
Modern Drama 
A Study of the Modern Drama, 1925 2 
Essays on Critical Appreciation of Modern Drama, 1931 0 
A History of Modern Drama, 1947 0 
Modern Drama, 1952 0 
Drama: from Ibsen to Eliot, 1952 0 
Masters of Modern Drama, 1962 0 
Directions in Modern Theater & Drama, 1965 2 
Modern Drama: Authoritative Texts, 1966 0 
^Modernism' in Modern Drama, 1966 0 
The Moral Impulse, 1967 0 
Modern Drama & Social Change, 1972 0 
Modern Theater & Drama, 1973 1 
Drama from Ibsen to Brecht, 1973 0 
Fields of Play in Modern Drama, 1977 0 
Language of Modern Drama, 1977 0 
Metafictional Characters in Modern Drama, 1979 0 
Essays on Modern Drama, 1987 0 
Most often, the same authors are included from one text 
to the next by historical period, so that you might find 
Rachel Crothers, Susan Glaspell, Sophie Treadwell, Lillian 
Hellman, Lady Isabella Gregory, Alice Gerstenberg, and 
Elizabeth Baker represented here and there in the earlier 
anthologies. As can be seen, they disappear in the later 
modern drama texts which cover drama from Ibsen onwards, but 
you occasionally find more recent authors such as Megan Terry 
or Rochelle Owens. Lillian Hellman seems to survive as the 
most often anthologised women playwright, although she never 
received a Pulitzer prize, as did other American playwrights 
Zoe Akins, Zona Gale and Susan Glaspell. 
In Australia, of the five women authors who won the 
distinguished Playwright's Advisory Board Competition from 
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1945 to 1960, only one had her play published in 1945, with 
a second finally collected in the Penguin Anthology of 
Australian Women Writers in 1988. The authors most often 
anthologised are Dorothy Hewett, Alma de Groen, Jennifer 
Compton and, less frequently, Dymphna Cusack and Katharine 
Prichard. The production history of Prichard's play. Brumby 
Innes. is of interest since it was not performed until forty-
five years after its writing when it was finally received 
with success in Melbourne. The 1987 anthology. Contemporary 
Australian Drama, only discusses Hewett in depth but does 
briefly mention eleven other playwrights. In his large 
histories of Australian drama, Leslie Rees always included a 
chapter on women dramatists saying: 
In Australia women do at least as well as men, whether 
in tragedy or in any other form. In a country where 
stage playwrighting is largely a self-indulgence, 
possibly women have more spare time than men. They 
certainly have as much talent (Towards 112) 
In his most recent book, Rees discusses Hewett, de Groen and 
Compton in depth, mentions about ten others and then 
questions why there were so few successful women writers in 
the 70s. Successful may be the key word as there were at 
least twenty-two authors who had their plays performed, 
besides the three he discusses.^ 
Under the world drama section, Modern World Drama stands 
out with the highly unusual number of twenty women authors, 
but this was a very large dictionary type anthology of one 
thousand pages and vast entries, so proportionately the 
representation is extremely small; this is also the case with 
Modern Drama in America & England which has several hundred 
entries. The most recent American drama listing includes 
four women playwrights, but this text had two editors, and 
all four articles on women were written by the female editor. 
In the Restoration Drama area, there is a core group of women 
included, namely Aphra Behn, Mary Pix, Catherine Trotter, and 
^ From a thesis in progress by Gayle Poole, as well as 
published plays from my own research work, including plays from 
The Women's Theatre Group, and work done by the Women's Theatre 
Proj ect. 
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Susan Centilivre. However, Nancy Cotton's book Women 
Playwrights in England 1363-1750, lists thirty-four women 
authors, with numerous plays, six unacted, and several 
consigned for the Court. 
Early Erasure 
Overall, women dramatists are represented in a piecemeal 
fashion, with historical and specifically modern drama 
anthologies sadly lacking in their texts, creating the 
impression that great drama has only been written by men. 
Selection itself is a limitation to be sure, but the 
construction of historical anthologies that exclude the 
innovative work of women while all innovations in drama are 
ascribed to men, creates the myth that men initiate and women 
consolidate or imitate if, indeed, they write at all. As my 
own and other feminist research shows, not only is this 
inaccurate, but it is based on subjective assumptions of 
value within the drama genre such as privileging high drama 
over folk, the classic over the popular, and the three-act 
over the one-act. 
In the area of innovations, American author Alice 
Gerstenberg's play Overtones (1913) , is anthologised in Plays 
by and About Women with the editorial comment that "she was 
probably the first expressionistic playwright in America, 
using the technique of inner and outer characterization a 
decade before Eugene O'Neill" (423). In 30 Famous One-Act 
Plays. 1949, Richard Watts, Jr. comments in the introduction 
that this play "has been described as a sort of forerunner of 
O'Neill's Strange Interlude. although that is true only in 
the sense in which it can be said that The Drums of Oude 
foreshadowed The Emperor Jones" (xxi). Investigation shows 
that Drums is a little known text about an Indian uprising, 
used by the U.S. War Department in 1918 as part of training 
camp activities, while Emperor is about a Negro taking power 
in the West Indies. I see this is a "sort of" denial about 
origins as Watts shifts from talking about being forerunner 
of a similar technique, to foreshadowing only by virtue of 
similar textual setting. 
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Another example of lost distinctions would be Millay's 
verse play Aria da Capo (1918),* referred to by Watts as "an 
anti-war work, which belongs distinctly to a post-war period" 
(xxi), In Discussions of Modern American Drama, Donna 
Gerstenberg says: 
Only Aria da Capo seemed to the author to have any 
enduring value—a modest judgment which most literary 
historians may yet feel an overestimation. Aria da 
Capo has the distinction of being one of the first (if 
not the first) plays in the twentieth century to use 
the verse stage for political comment, a use which 
almost wholly occupied the important writers of verse 
dramas in the late twenties and the thirties (cf. 
Auden and Isherwood, Spender, MacLeish, and Maxwell 
Anderson; even Murder in the Cathedral has its 
political comment to make (39) 
She then discusses Millay's considerable wisdom for refusing 
to publish a collection of her dramatic works, admitting that 
"for all their conventionality, several of Millay's plays do 
succeed in creating a conflict and engagement of human 
emotion" (38). Yet conventions become the focus of 
Gerstenberg's critical admiration when she discusses a point 
in the play where the shepherds object to the Masque of 
Tragedy, saying that "we cannot act/A tragedy with comic 
properties!" and they are answered, "try it and see. I think 
you'll find you can./One wall is like another" (Millay 715) . 
Here Aria is referred to as: 
successfully breaking through the never-never land 
atmosphere of the majority of the verse dramas of its 
period by frankly accepting the stage as stage and the 
stereotyped characters as conventions, with the result 
that the form and the structure of the play, its frank 
theatricality, work together to make a significant 
comment on human experience (40) 
This "frank theatricality" and political comment in 1918, 
would have been prior to Brecht's work in the later 1920s. 
* This is a musical term for composition in 3 parts, the 
last repeating the first, and this play opens and closes with 
scenes of Pierrot and Columbine's traditional frivolities. In 
between is a scene of two shepherds, supervised by the Masque of 
Tragedy, who break the pastoral harmony with a division of the 
stage by a wall of woven coloured ribbons. Their individual 
possessions cause them to plot each other's murder, 
counterpointed by off-stage cries of Pierrot pursuing Coliimbine. 
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Yet it is his work, known as epic theatre, which became 
famous for the alienation technique, (unconventional lighting 
and staging with actors speaking to the audience), a style 
that demands the audience see the stage as a stage. 
Lady Isabella Gregory was an Irish playwright who along 
with Yeats founded the famous Abbey Theatre, and wrote 
numerous short political plays based on local events; yet 
they are devalued as folk drama rather than great drama about 
a certain kind of folk. Gassner describes them as 
"flavorsomely colloquial and realistic, and abounding in 
peasant types and rural backgrounds" in A Treasury of the 
Theatre (620). A few of her plays, usually The Workhouse 
Ward, are sprinkled in the older anthologies, but I have also 
found Rising of the Moon and The Gaol Gate, the latter 
described by Gassner as "a masterpiece in miniature" (620).^ 
While Gassner admits to Yeats' praise of Lady Gregory: "^and 
now' Yeats remarked in his Dramatis Personae, ^all in a 
moment, as it seemed, she became the founder of modern Irish 
dialect literature'" (620), he goes on to say that: 
What Yeats may have overlooked, however, is that in 
Lady Gregory's opinion it had become absolutely 
imperative to create such a literature if the Irish 
theatre was to capture national interest instead of 
shrinking into a closed circle for esthetes. Yeats' 
own plays were beautifully spiritual and poetic, but 
they could not be expected to root the drama in Irish 
soil. (620) 
Gassner overlooks Yeats description of Lady Gregory as a 
founder, by implying that she really wasn't the single 
originator of modern Irish dialect, because it was a sort of 
necessary social discovery—already there waiting to be 
delivered—to give Irish theatre a national interest for its 
people. Whereas John Synge, famous for Playboy of the 
Western World, is described as being completely absorbed in 
^ The Gaol Gate depicts a mother and wife, visiting the 
rebel hero in jail who has been hanged the day before for 
refusing to betray his comrades, though the neighbors gossip that 
he has informed. Rising of the Moon shows a police sergeant who 
refrains from arresting a rebel who carries a tempting price on 
his head. 
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his own dream, Gassner says "Lady Gregory's dream was not her 
own but that of her fellow creators and of Ireland" (621) . 
In this kind of language. Lady Gregory disappears as an 
individual innovative writer and becomes a kind of anonymous 
social service for the lower classes. Further, Gassner says 
that: 
It was one of the marks of Synge's genius that he felt 
impelled to go beyond peasant drama, that he 
transfigured folk material into a highly personal 
creation. (621) 
This statement not only directly contradicts the usual 
requirement of universality for art and good writing, it 
suddenly tries to separate and then privilege the personal 
style over the socially inspired, political ^folk' dramas of 
Lady Gregory. With respect to politics as a lesser form of 
drama, in the introduction to Modern Drama and Social Change. 
editor Robert Raines questions whether a play can be 
effective propaganda and great drama. Referring to the work 
of Brecht and Shaw he concludes: 
Yet all these plays do more than plead for specific 
and transient political causes. It is this ^more' that 
moves them beyond the range of propaganda . . . Although 
Shaw's plays did not bring about a humane and 
equitable socialist world government, they cannot be 
termed failures. They remain interesting and 
challenging because of the language, the 
characterization, the power to make audiences feel and 
think which universalize them, (emphasis added; 7) 
One can only wonder whether the mere peasant characters of 
Lady Gregory made their audiences feel and think, thereby 
rendering them universal and candidates for great drama; but 
it is clear that in the hands of male playwrights such 
characters can move beyond propaganda, beyond mere folk 
drama, into a highly personal and yet universal masterpiece. 
It is also obvious that high drama, regarded as spiritual, 
poetic (and often highly personal) , has survived as great and 
universal, while the so-called folk plays inspiring national 
interest and rooted in Irish soil are all but lost, despite 
Lady Gregory's prolific contributions. 
The Crown Guide to World's Great Plays includes only three 
women playwrights. Joseph Shipley writes in his preface that 
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the definition of great is subjective and flexible over time, 
but he also notes that popular plays with lengthy runs "while 
not perhaps intrinsically great" have been "at least a great 
success and may call for inclusion on the grounds of history" 
(v) . Thus there is a difference set up in editorial 
judgement between what ^the people' (commonly known as the 
general public) find enjoyable versus what the critics 
consider to be "intrinsically great". After their time, as 
he puts it, these kind of plays may be omitted as lapsed in 
significance. and so a time limitation is placed on the 
value of the popular. In his discussion of Lillian Hellman, 
he says she presented "humans pressed in the throes of 
perverse passions—jealousy, hatred, greed". He observes 
with dismay "that the public favors such figures may be 
judged from the fact that out of six plays ... five have been 
hits" (299) . This kind of comment could be made about so 
many plays that it hardly stands as a criticism of Hellman. 
What is interesting is the labelling of her characters' 
passions as perverse, while perhaps William FajQlkner or 
Eugene O'Neill present figures whose jealousy and greed are 
noble, or tragic. Despite Hellman's popular success, she is 
included in this anthology of great plays. 
Treadwell's Machinal (1928), also makes an appearance. 
Shipley describes it as a "sensitive character study 
expressionistically conveyed" (781) that had, he says, the 
high praise of reviewers, though people didn't flock to it. 
Nevertheless, the fact that it ran for ninety-one 
performances in New York in 1928 does indicate successful 
audience attendance. This play seems to be included due to 
its "intrinsic greatness": 
Machinal is a superbly constructed study, a poignant 
drama of a woman's bewildered struggle for happiness, 
which rises to gruelling horror in the closing scenes 
of the prison and the pitch-dark death house. Its 
final triumph is that it rises above the machine 
philosophy it seems to illustrate, and leaves us with 
the chastening thought that violence, even sought as 
a path to freedom, does not lead to freedom; freedom 
and peace reside within. (782) 
The play generalises a notorious murder case, representing an 
29 
unnamed character. Young Woman, who escapes a complaining 
mother through marriage to an obnoxious employer. She then 
finds she loves an adventurous Young Man but, after 
consummating the love affair, discovers she is only a passing 
interest to him. She endures a miserable job, a 
disappointing honeymoon, a horror-filled hospital childbirth, 
and finally after returning from her Mexican liaison, she 
kills her husband and is sentenced to die in the electric 
chair. This play, described as the "most successful play" of 
the late expressionistic movement in America by the Herald 
Tribune (Shipley 780), features recurring sounds underneath 
the dialogue such as typewriter clatter while the woman 
wonders about marriage, jazz music outside her honeymoon 
hotel, and steel riveters outside the hospital during 
childbirth. While Shipley seems comforted by the thought 
that violence is not the path to freedom, in Moscow, 1933, 
Alexander Tairov praises the violence in Machinal which was 
a huge success in 1933: 
Machinal is undoubtedly a considerable event in the 
domain of western theatrical literature. It sums up 
the various efforts to represent in an effective and 
condensed form the mechanized life of a large 
capitalistic city, its soulless movement in a circle, 
its standardized existence, its empty dynamic, 
syncopated rhythm .., the hypocrisy of its sacred 
institutions, the deathly grip of its blindly moving 
wheels.... (Shipley 781) 
Apparently the British reviewers rose in defense of personal 
responsibility rather than addressing the social construction 
of female victims, with the Observer (19 July 1931) noting: 
Really, young women cannot be allowed to despatch 
their husbands because they happen to dislike them, 
and my sympathies were wholly with the victim of the 
crime and not at all with the heroine of the play and 
victim of the law-courts and gaol. (qtd. in Shipley 
781) 
Machinal meant different things in different places,"but it 
could hardly be called only a character study and certainly 
has not lapsed in social relevance. Although included in 
Shipley's collection, I do not think it has been revived 
since the 1930s. Reading through other older plays by women 
which were published and had successful performance runs like 
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the above, I found their subjects both historically 
interesting and still relevant—not only personally, but in 
comparison to recent topics of contemporary women 
playwrights. 
Like most drama anthologists, Shipley leaves out one-act 
plays which might explain the exclusion of Glaspell's Trifles 
(1916) . It is based on her short story called "A Jury of Her 
Peers" and unfolds into the still timely and widely 
represented subjects of male dominance in marriage, domestic 
violence, and the isolation of women. In this apparently 
simple plot, a woman is suspected of murder by detectives who 
lack a convincing motive, while two women neighbors think 
they discover it when cleaning up in the kitchen. They 
notice the sudden irregular mistakes in the woman's knitting 
and begin to talk about how her husband was difficult; that 
he had stopped her outside activities, including singing in 
the choir, and so she had bought a bird instead. The women 
begin to realise, somewhat guiltily, that they didn't visit 
her very much. Finally, they find the woman's bird cage and 
the dead bird with a broken neck stuffed under the cupboard; 
in a mutual glance they realise what has happened. Though 
tense and fearful, they decide to hide the bird in a pocket 
before the detectives, who cannot be bothered investigating 
such ^trifles', can see it. Trifles enjoyed audience 
success, was widely published and anthologised before 
disappearing from modern collections. 
One-act plays have historically been discriminated against 
and are usually only collected as a specialty. This is 
indicative of the privileging of the standard three act 
^well-made' play which, according to Aristotle, used to 
necessitate a full five acts. Brander Matthews in A Book 
About the Theater (1916) argued that there really was no 
artistic justification nor logical necessity for the five-act 
play, but that if one accepts: 
the Unity of Action as a general rule, binding upon 
all artists, we can hardly deny that the most 
obviously natural arrangement for the story is to set 
it forth in one act, without any intermission or 
subdivision whatsoever—a single action in a single 
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act. (59) 
Yet he immediately goes on to say: 
Yet it is the play in three acts which we are bound to 
recognize at once as possessing the ideal form, since 
it enables the dramatist to set apart the three 
divisions, which Aristotle declared to be essential to 
a well-constructed tragedy—the beginning, the middle, 
and the end—each presented in an act of its own. 
(emphasis mine; 59) 
However, Elizabeth Everard, editor of The International One-
Act Play Theatref (1934) argues that one-act plays have 
always been popular and that, in the 18th century, audiences 
would digest four or five plays in one evening. She feels it 
is only the twentieth century which has denigrated the one-
act play: 
In conclusion, it cannot be too often reiterated that 
the one-act play is not a mere curtain-raiser, a 
handmaiden to the play of several acts. It has, on the 
contrary, a separate and authentic form of its own—a 
form which, with its strict economy, makes for 
intensity and strength. One critic of the one-act play 
has pointed out that as an art form it has its 
limitations. True. But does that not apply to all 
forms of art? Is it not the function of form to limit? 
And is it therefore a valid reason for neglecting one, 
any more than the other, form of dramatic art? 
(emphasis added; 6-7) 
Both contemporary and earlier women playwrights have written 
more than a few longer plays, but it is also true that a 
great deal of them have employed the one-act play, with 
serious consequences in terms of anthological selection 
committees who view great drama as a three act construction. 
Everard points out that most famous playwrights have written 
one-act plays but only their longer works are remembered. 
Her observation indicates critical standards which privilege 
the more classical style, but the denigration of the one-act 
play also signifies a short/long opposition where longer is 
perceived as better because it must be more structurally 
complex, and therefore more potent drama. An alternative 
argximent Everard poses is that the one-act play, like poetry, 
has a complex economy of form with its own difficulties and 
intensities that make it different, but equally as valid as 
the three-act play. 
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I have been exploring the few texts that do include women 
authors as a means of providing information on the 
anthological construction of the dominant notion of ^good' 
drama, and how this has affected the interpretations of plays 
by women. However, these texts are also worth investigating 
for the underlying assumptions made about the identity of 
women writers, which leads to ferreting out not only what is 
supposedly great dramatic form, but also who can achieve it. 
Successful women playwrights are often dismissed as amateurs, 
their subject matter and characters are reduced to the dull 
and ordinary, and their plots are seen as minimal or are 
summarised in such a way as to exclude social issues about 
women's lives. Further, the recurrent criticism that they 
are deficient in logic, and thus in the construction of plays 
is based on an essentialist construction of the feminine 
gender with women as biologically emotional creatures. This 
has led to a series of criticisms based on women's ingrained 
melodramatic tendencies, their lack of realism, or their poor 
morals, such that women's social gender definitions were 
being imposed both upon them as authors and upon the 
interpretations of their plays. 
It is interesting to note the various editorial references 
to the women as amateurs in three older anthologies edited by 
very influential men in the theatre of the early 1900s, which 
have included the internationally successful British 
playwrights Elizabeth Baker, Gertrude Robins, and Githa 
Sowerby. Despite Baker's continued successes with nine plays 
from 1907 to 1921, John Cuncliffe refers to her as an amateur 
in Modern English Playwrights (1927), saying "that she wrote 
plays in her leisure hours for her own pleasure" (emphasis 
mine, 161), In A Study of Modern Drama (1925), Barrett Clark 
also declares he has evidence from one of Baker's letters 
that she writes plays in her leisure hours, but then makes a 
quantxim leap to define amateurism: "Baker is an amateur in 
the true sense: she writes plays because she likes to write 
them" (emphasis mine, 306), From these statements we might 
surmise a perception that the professional artist/writer 
33 
worked at only their art, perhaps even suffered from it, and 
probably disliked it. Since Baker was a full-time London 
clerk before becoming a private secretary, it would obviously 
be necessary to write after working hours. But this is also 
the case for T.S. Eliot who was, of course, a bank clerk. 
Since her play. Chains (1909), (which among other things 
represents the oppression of the clerk class and the lack of 
career options for women) was seen in most repertory theaters 
of Great Britain and New York (Clark 306) , it hardly seems 
she was writing merely for her own pleasure. However, the 
fact that she used the term "leisure hours" signified 
pleasure (and her own) according to Clark and Cuncliffe's 
professional/amateur opposition, where their logic dictates 
that if she did it in her leisure, then she must have liked 
it. And since she was paid to be a clerk, she couldn't be a 
professional playwright. 
A similar definition of amateur appears in reference to 
Gertrude Robins, with the added dimension that professional 
playwrights must only write plays. In Clark's Representative 
One-Act Plays of British and Irish Playwrights (1921) he 
states that "her plays, which must have been the products of 
her leisure time, were written to fill certain definitely 
felt needs" (324). Clark then tries to construct her as an 
amatetir by emphasising her wide range of other activities. 
He quotes from an interview with Robins where she admits "I 
lead a very active life, and my interests range from Small 
Farming and Aviation .,, to the Art of the Marionette" (323) , 
He goes on to say that she was really better known as an 
actress than a dramatist, even though she wrote fourteen 
successful plays from 1908-1914, while ^only' playing the 
lead in five productions. That she thought of herself as a 
playwright is obvious from her comment, "after all, variety 
is the spice of life and the pursuit of experience is the 
Playwright's prerogative" (emphasis mine; 324). That she 
felt innovative and successful in her work is evident when 
she speaks about her plays in the provinces, noting the truth 
(for her) of an adage that "what Manchester thinks today. 
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London does tomorrow" (323) . She went on to say that her one-
act play. Makeshifts (1908), (representing the stifled lives 
of two sisters, one a teacher and the other a houseservant 
looking after their ageing mother), had played over a 
thousand times in Great Britain, Australia, Canada and 
America. Her reason for entering the theatre was as follows: 
At the outset I thought I would take up one of the 
learned professions, but I discovered that for a woman 
to follow such a career the drawbacks of sex are 
strongly defined. I ultimately decided that the 
theatrical profession offered a wider and fairer scope 
for a woman's activities. (324) 
In addition to the representation of women playwrights as 
amateurs, both Cuncliffe and Clark as critics seem trapped in 
the dilemma of reconciling the popularity and dramatic 
success of these plays with their departure from traditional 
notions of great drama. Choice of characters seems to be a 
vital issue. Writing about Sowerby and Baker, Clark says 
that "both these women have gone to everyday life for their 
material, both have cared and dared to write about dull, 
ordinary people" (Study 306), Sowerby's Rutherford and Son 
represents the intellectual and emotional exploitation 
wrought upon a family in a town dominated by a tyrannical 
businessman who clawed his way up from the working class and 
now sacrifices people's lives to the Rutherford Works, 
Cuncliffe admits to the success of Rutherford. but he 
diminishes the power of the script by emphasising the actors, 
saying "it was a powerful middle-class play which made a 
great impression on both sides of the Atlantic, partly, no 
doubt, owing to the excellent acting of Norman McKinney" 
(164), Cuncliffe describes Sowerby's play as "her one 
masterpiece" (169), but in doing so he must also elevate the 
status of the characters, even though they have described 
themselves as common in the text: 
Rutherford, Janet and Mary are real people without 
being common-place, and in the conflict of their wills 
and passions there is an emotional interest which the 
vain and fitful struggles of the mere flies caught in 
the spider web of industrialism cannot evoke in us. 
Her technique is no less masterly than that of her 
con-temporaries dealing with the merely weak and 
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obscure.... (emphasis added; 169) 
Cuncliffe remains trapped in an Aristotelian mandate that 
tragedy and high drama are only for the great characters of 
the nobility and upper class. With Baker's Chains he also 
tries to cope with plays about "the lower-middle-class sort" 
(161) whose lives do not seem to have good plots: 
The characters illustrate precisely what Gissing 
described as the life of the ignobly decent; they have 
no vices—at any rate none of those interesting from 
a dramatic point of view; they are simply dull, some 
of them absolutely inane in their colourless virtue. 
They read cheap papers, and sing silly songs on 
weekdays, and on Sunday chant vapid hymns. (162) 
In addition to situating the characters as dull and ordinary, 
both editors attack the lack of dramatic plot by referring to 
William Archer's work in Playmaking. He defines the dramatic 
and undramatic, describing the "young naturalistic" movement 
as "the type of play that presents a broad picture of a 
social phenomenon, but that in it no attempt should be made 
to depict a marked crisis" (emphasis added; Study 3 06). The 
problem for these critics is trying to prescribe great drama 
standards in the new naturalistic mode, because they are 
caught between the classic description of great tragedy as a 
marked crisis for the noble class, versus the perception of 
what therefore must be limited crises in the lives of the 
working class. Archer's definition of naturalism is thus 
based on an essentialist opposition between the upper and 
lower class, leading to a separatist perception where the 
upper class sees the lower class as somehow suffering less 
than themselves, perhaps to lessen any guilt for the 
oppressive conditions of the working class. 
Regarding Baker's Chains, Clark cites Archer fully, and 
I will as well, in order to show another strategic gap in 
Archer's observations about playmaking, this time involving 
the lack of plot and dramatic subject matter: 
There is absolutely no ^story' in it, no complication 
of incidents, not even any emotional tension worth 
speaking of ... A city clerk, oppressed by the deadly 
monotony and narrowness of his life, thinks of going 
to Australia—and doesn't go; that is the sum and 
substance of the action. Also, bv way of underplot, a 
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shopgirl, oppressed by the deadly monotony and 
narrowness of her life, thinks of escaping it by 
marrying a middle-aged widower—and doesn't do it. If 
any one had told the late Francisque Sarcey or the 
late Clement Scott, that a play could be made out of 
this slender material, which should hold an audience 
absorbed through four acts, and stir them to real 
enthusiasm, these eminent critics would have thought 
him a madman. Yet Miss Baker has achieved this feat, 
by the simple process of supplementing competent 
observation with a fair share of dramatic instinct, 
(emphasis added; Study 307-8) 
With the dismissal of the clerk and shopgirl's lives as 
deadly and narrow, the play's representations of monotonous 
work, long hours, and low pay with textual references to 
socialism are obviously missed areas of thematic interest to 
Archer. He ignores another centrally important theme, 
property rights and marriage, by labelling the shopgirl's 
story an underplot, which Cuncliffe also does by calling the 
shopgirl a "small side issue" (162). The actual text, 
however, represents both the city clerk and his wife's 
sister, Maggie, (the shopgirl), as being equally inspired by 
the clerk's lodger who has quit his job to emigrate to 
Australia. This causes a marked crisis for both of them as 
they debate about the deadly monotony of their jobs and their 
limited possibilities for freedom. Though the clerk secretly 
plans to go and send for his wife after he gets a farm, he 
gives up in despair when his wife makes the timely 
announcement that she is pregnant, Maggie, however, decides 
in the end that she cannot use marriage as an escape from her 
job because she would lose all her individual freedom as an 
English wife. She observes that women have different ways of 
showing their courage and, therefore, it is not that Maggie 
simply doesn't get married, she actually demonstrates her 
choice of freedom by keeping her job with the hope of 
eventual emigration to Canada, Of the two characters in an 
interwoven plot, it is Maggie who emerges as the heroine of 
Chains. For Archer and Cuncliffe, their criticism about a 
lack of plot and dramatic subjects more accurately reflects 
their own subjective perception of the story as uninteresting 
since they readily admit that audiences were interested. 
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while their critical appraisals exclude themes, emphasise 
male characters, and trivialise female characters. Clark 
goes on to wonder whether Chains is a well-made play, 
discussing Russian dramatists who reject action as a 
necessary requirement. But then he dismisses her innovations 
saying that "Miss Baker, who doubtless has no definite 
theories, allows her ^ordinary' characters to work out their 
own destiny, without the aid of explanation" (emphasis mine; 
Study 308) . He concedes that Baker "has shown it was 
possible to write a successful play without utilizing the 
ordinary and timeworn conventions" (Study 307). Similarly, 
Archer refers to Baker's achievement of holding the 
audience's interest in ordinary people and the "deadly 
monotony" of their lives as a "simple" process, which merely 
combines "observation" with "instinct". The thought and 
skill as a dramatist required to construct such a play is 
displaced, and almost seems the result of an intuitive, 
leisurely whim. 
Finally, Clark actually notices that he has only included 
two women authors and asks why there aren't any "great or 
near-great women playwrights?" (Study 309). After musing on 
the lack of European women writers he addresses British 
women, saying "Besides Miss Baker, there [is] Githa Sowerby 
(with her one play)" (Study 309) when, in fact, Sowerby wrote 
and published seven plays from 1912 to 1924. He admits that 
in the United States: 
there is a host of clever women who have, on the 
whole, written just as good plays as all but two or 
three of the men ... And yet there is none among them 
who has approached the tragic irony of a Galsworthy, 
the poetic and imaginative power of a Benavente, the 
satiric irony of a Shaw. (Study 309) 
After this negative conclusion, he wonders whether there is 
any reason why "a woman should not be as good a playwright as 
a man" (Study 309). He turns to another theatre expert, 
Brander Matthews, and his chapter on "Women Playwrights" from 
A Book about the Theater for some answers: 
Women, it is said, are not lacking in powers of 
observation; they can write well and with great charm, 
but they are deficient in the sense of structure. 
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without which no dramatist can succeed ... women are 
likely to have only a definitely limited knowledge of 
life, and second ... that they are likely also to be 
more or less deficient in the faculty of construction. 
(Study 309-310) 
Matthews quotes Henry James in support of women as successful 
novel writers "because it demands little or no definite 
structure while the play must have it or cease to be" (Study 
310). Says Clark, quoting James in Matthews: 
Says James: ^The novel, as practiced in English, is 
the perfect paradise of the loose end' . . . whereas the 
^play consents to the logic of but one way, 
mathematically right, and with the loose end as gross 
an impertinence on its surface and as grave a dishonor 
as the dangle of a snippet of silk or wool on the 
right side of a tapestry'. (Study 310) 
Looking at the original chapter on women playwrights, 
Matthews actually locates the "charm" of women novelists in 
their "persistent ingenuity . . . little miracles of 
observation, and by little triumphs in the microscopic 
analysis of subtle and unsuspected motives" (emphasis added; 
122) . He refutes the real success of women novelists by 
arguing that "the works of female storytellers not only lack 
a largeness in topic, but also a strictness in treatment" 
(120), Here he homes in on the real reason for the lack of 
female dramatists, which is: 
in the relative incapacity of women to build a plan, to 
make a single whole compounded of many parts, and yet 
dominated in every detail by but one purpose. The drama 
demands a plot, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, 
and with everything rigorously excluded which does not 
lead from the beginning through the middle to the end. 
(120) 
His arguments about plot construction and life experience are 
actually rooted in an essentialist discourse that attributes 
qualities to an organism based on biological structure and 
function. He uses the autobiographical writings of former 
actress Fanny Kemble who said it was "absolutely impossible 
for a woman ever to be a great dramatist, because ^her 
physical organisation' was against it" (116). He quotes her 
further: 
After all, it is great nonsense saying that intellect 
is of no sex. The brain is, of course, of the same sex 
39 
as the rest of the creature; beside the original 
female nature, the whole of our training and 
education, our inevitable ignorance of common life and 
general human nature, and the various experiences of 
existence from which we are debarred with the most 
sedulous care, is insuperably against it. (116) 
Although Matthews is using Kemble because she can be read as 
capitulating to the nature of woman argument, there might be 
an element of irony in her statement since her inclusion of 
social conditioning and limited careers for women also 
implicates severe discrimination. Matthews entertains the 
possibility of prejudice but is reassured by several examples 
of successful women playwrights, including women who have won 
competitions: 
These examples of woman's competence to compose plays 
with vitality enough to withstand the ordeal by fire 
before the footlights are evidence that if there 
exists any prejudice against the female dramatist it 
can be overcome. (114) 
This is like saying that there is a ghetto but a few 
persistent ones will rise above it. Yet he retracts this 
statement immediately by saying "but to grant eguality of 
opportunity is not to confer equality of ability" (114), a 
statement that denies the long term effects of prejudice and 
discrimination on women writers. As final proof of women's 
lack of ability, he cites the obvious absence of historically 
famous women playwrights. This is a simplistic and familiar 
position that argues women are incapable playwrights 
(artists, etc.) since there aren't any great women 
playwrights. Feminist research has undermined this position 
by recuperating women writers as well as analysing the social 
factors which have limited their expression and production. 
These anthologists' comments represent an identity of 
women playwrights as amateurs who can observe details but 
can't really construct good plots or dramatic subjects, where 
successful plays arrive almost by whim or instinct. It is 
clear that these critics are leaning on the faculty of logic 
as a precursor to the construction of a good play and, since 
this is a quality they assume women are biologically "more or 
less" deficient in, it is not simply the construction of the 
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play which is attacked but rather a denial of women having or 
using logic. Yet Cuncliffe calls Rutherford "close-knit", 
"with concentrated force", and with "no straining of 
probability" as "the tissue of the play unfolds itself 
inevitably and arrives at an inevitable conclusion— 
unforeseen, but felt to be right and necessary after it has 
been unfolded" (emphasis mine; 169), And Clark actually 
praises Baker for writing a successful play without "timeworn 
conventions" (Study 307), while Shipley calls Machinal "a 
superbly constructed study" (782). What seems problematic 
to them is the dramatic success of these plays despite 
"ordinary" characters and "undramatic" subjects in boring 
plots that critique social issues which the critics never 
mention. 
The underlying problem for these and other editors is more 
than a real absence of logic and reason in women's 
dramaturgical construction (for some admit that women do 
write well and with charm) , The problem is rather the 
perceptions about gender identity which polarise the realms 
of reason and its definitive opposite, emotion, into two 
supposedly opposite sexes, combined with social definitions 
that locate these qualities into two supposedly separate 
domains: public and private. We can see from the critics' 
comments that they define women as emotional; they confine 
her imagination to the private sphere and thus limit her 
authoritative representations of life experience, and then 
they label these shortcomings as melodrama. Clark says that 
women do not approach the "tragic irony", the "poetic and 
imaginative power" or the "satiric irony" of the great male 
dramatists and by this he refers to qualities beyond the 
intellect which come from the realm of life experience—where 
there is general agreement, as Matthews declared, that women 
"are likelv to have only a definitely limited knowledge of 
life" (124) , In other words, if you as a woman aren't the 
actual owner of a factory which crushes people, you simply 
haven't got the authority to write about or criticise the 
situation in a great dramatic fashion because you "lack the 
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inexhaustible fund of information about life which is the 
common property of men" (Matthews 118). Again one might 
question what inexhaustible experiences of life T.S. Eliot 
had as a bank clerk. In addition to the criticism of women's 
limited life experiences when they wrote plays about the 
public sphere, American critic George Nathan (1941) extends 
the reason/emotion opposition into a dichotomy by labelling 
women as naturally melodramatic. In The American Woman 
Playwright—A View of Criticism and Characterisation,, Olauson 
says that his opinion was that women playwrights were 
"generically unable to write as well as men" (9) and this 
explained their secondary status. His three authoritative 
reasons were that they could not master an economy of 
emotion, they could not view characters with objectivity, and 
they could not allow for a dispute of reason. According to 
Olauson, Nathan's belief was: 
that it was almost impossible for them to present a 
theme which did not represent a commitment to an 
absolute right or an absolute wrong ... women writers 
were incapable of finding a moral middle ground . . . 
Their prejudices were transparent and judgements 
arbitrary, that being the way, he stated, of 
^ingrained melodramatic emotion'. (9) 
Where a critic could say the play takes a tough stand on an 
issue, Nathan perceives women writers as making arbitrary 
judgements (i,e, emotional and not reasoned), By his 
oppositional logic they must be generically deficient in 
reason and, without reason to provide logical economy, 
women's emotions must be uncontained and excessive, leading 
to emotional or "arbitrary" judgements that lead to the plays 
naturally lapsing into melodreona. However, Nathan's 
criticism that women have "ingrained melodramatic emotion" is 
not textual but only seems to come from his supposed 
knowledge of authorial intent. Therefore his unprovable 
assertion that women playwrights make arbitrary judgements is 
actually an observation based on his gender assumptions about 
women. 
This perception of women as naturally melodramatic pursued 
them even when they wrote about subjects which could be 
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situated in the domestic or emotional realm, where they had 
not only the constructionists and their subset, the realist 
critics, to contend with, but also the moralist critics. 
While the constructionists wrote lavish emotive attacks upon 
women's dramatic form sprinkled with accusations of 
melodramatic sentimentality, the realist critics attacked 
what they perceived as contrived characters or irrational 
elements in the structurally and psychologically experimental 
plays of Hallie Flanagan, Jane Bowles, Gertrude Stein or 
Susan Glaspell; works which offered an alternative to the 
"well-made" play formula that dominated dramatic realism. As 
Rachel France notes in her introduction to A Century of Plavs 
by American Women: 
Response to the avant garde, not only of critics but 
of the general public as well, is rarely favorable at 
first, even to well-established playwrights. Despite 
its often dubious results, the tendency has always 
been to place particular emphasis on the importance of 
realism in the theatre. (16) 
Bowles' play In the Summer House featured "unusual" 
characters, fantasy scenes to depict a rather suffocating 
mother/daughter relationship. It was criticised as having 
its own style, but too little of its own substance, which 
Olauson says was a "typically negative criticism directed 
toward many of the followers of the ^new drama'" (162), 
Olauson argues that Bowles' fiction had characteristics of 
"subtlety, sensitivity, economy of style, and originality" 
that "were harmonious with the ^new drama' trend", and where 
"style took precedence over movement and form" (161-2), 
Flanagan's style integrated what is now called a cinematic 
technique, incorporating slides in between rapid scene 
shifts, while Stein applied innovative and repetitive poetic 
language to her characters' dialogues. In Gerstenberg's 
earlier play. Overtones, she used double actresses for the 
two female characters in order to represent the inner 
feelings as opposed to what they were saying in the play, an 
innovative expressionistic technique that concentrated less 
on proper form and dialogue and focused more on the 
characterisations both as conscious and subconscious 
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subjects. With Bowles, Freudian analysis was appropriated to 
explain the appearance of such characterisations. However, 
more realistic plays such as Glaspell's The Verge, or 
Crother's A Man's World, which represented women characters 
who were nervous and openly disturbed by the confinement of 
their marriages, were criticised for "contrived" 
characterisation. Olauson says: 
But Bowles, like other writers who embraced this new 
dramatic form, was concerned chiefly with establishing 
her characters from the center of their sub-
consciousness. Clurman perceived the technique as a 
means of getting directly to the primitive impulses of 
human beings which he described as essentially a 
poetic approach, as valid as, if less understandable 
than, the more than rational elements of 
characterization found in realistic drama, (emphasis 
mine; 162) 
Although Clurman acknowledges the new drama by calling it a 
valid but less understandable poetic approach, he 
nevertheless locates these characterisations in an 
essentialist "primitive" impulse. He and other critics did 
not consider them as a study of the adverse effects of 
socially constructed and problematic institutions. 
The moralist critics were also constructionist and 
essentialist in that they argued for Woman's natural superior 
moral status in society, and demanded plots which reinforced 
dominant notions of sexual and religious morality. For 
example, Rosa Franken's Outrageous Fortune, in 1943, 
sympathetically examined a number of social issues such as 
"anti-Semitism, homosexuality, marital coldness and other 
^erotic vagaries'", according to Rosamund Gilder, a 
prominent theatre critic. But in an interesting euphemism, 
she demanded more "internal resolution" because "the 
playwright had failed to resolve the emotional discords which 
she had originated with such boldness" and thus the play was 
defective dramaturgically. In other words, the "resolution" 
did not punish the homosexual and the harlot so it must be 
faulty construction again (qtd. in Olauson 14) . Another 
moralist critic, Euphemia Wyatt, also criticised Franken for 
writing a play where a "harlot ... is held up as a 
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torchbearer", and that the playwright had "stretched charity 
to a^ very dangerous scuffing of standards' in offering this 
mixture of tolerance and sentimentality" (qtd in Olauson 15) . 
Wyatt led other critics in a similar judgement against 
Lillian Hellman for her references to lesbianism in The 
Children's Hour saying she "touched upon a subject which ^we 
have always felt should be taboo'" (qtd. in Olauson 15). 
Such criticisms, mostly articulated by female critics, did 
not concern themselves with the plays per se but were more 
concerned with women's accepted gender definitions which 
included being the moral guardians of society. Since a major 
aspect of morality represents the containment of excessive or 
homosexual sexuality, it seems ironic and illogical to 
entrust such "emotional" women with being the guardians of 
morality. But then perhaps they were only represented as 
such, for the institutions of marriage and church were the 
actual authoritative vessels of containment. Thus the gender 
construction of women as emotional creatures bled into the 
literary criticism of their plays as being deficient in 
dramatic subjects, plots, logic, reason, realism and morality 
while characterised by excessive melodrama, sentimentality, 
and contrived or irrational characters. 
Australian drama critic Leslie Rees, discusses these myths 
about women writers as recently as 1973 in The Making of 
Australian Drama. He quotes St. John Ervine from 1933 who 
said that "women are less apt in drama than men and they 
cannot cope with tragedy" (185), a style which, according to 
Aristotle, requires the strict containment of emotion in a 
tight construction. Rees summarises the various reasons he 
has heard for women's inferiority: 
... that women are discursive by literary nature and 
not happy under the iron economy of the stage-play 
form, that the emotional detachment and appearance of 
impartiality required of a good playwright in 
presenting argument is foreign to woman's temperament, 
that the shock tactics and frankness associated with 
some aspects of the stage have run counter to woman's 
need for modesty, that women, as agreed, have had 
access to the theatre as writers for a shorter time 
than men, (185) 
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Since women playwrights have frequently used the one-act play 
which, Matthews himself admitted, was the perfect form to 
achieve a unity of action, their mythical inability to write 
with an "iron economy" should be dispelled. That women 
writers haven't had access to the theatre "as writers" is a 
partially inaccurate assvunption based on anthological absence 
and critical disregard, in that there were far more women 
playwrights than generally known, even in the Restoration 
era—though it is true women were not granted equal access or 
production in theatres. As for the shock tactics and 
frankness of the theatre, the situation may be the reverse in 
that women's plays suffered many criticisms of moral 
unconventionality and stylistic irregularity. Although Rees 
states that, despite these factors, women did write plays of 
quality in Britain, he does not recognise any great female 
American dramatists except possibly Lillian Hellman. In 
relation to Australia, he writes that women were equally 
talented as men in writing about the public or private 
spheres, yet he still separates life into masculine and 
feminine areas: 
Nor could it be said that they worked in separate 
worlds—that the men playwrights had a monopoly of 
forthrightness, social-political sense and raw vigour, 
while the women exhibited only delicacy, feminine 
frailty and intuitive understanding ... Women writers 
sometimes treated masculine areas of life without 
self-consciousness or affectation, as Katharine 
Susannah Prichard and Henrietta Drake-Brockman did; 
while some men writers probed sensitively into the 
nerve-centres of the feminine psyche ,,. Both sexes 
regarded the whole of life as their oyster, (186) 
Sounding a hopeful note for women playwrights however, 
Matthews said that though the lack of worldly experience and 
a deficient faculty of construction were disabilities, things 
could improve: 
The first of these disabilities may tend to disappear 
if ever the feminist movement shall achieve its 
ultimate victory; and the second may depart also 
whenever women sxibmit themselves to the severe 
discipline which has compelled men to be more or less 
logical, (emphasis mine; 125) 
Although he does not admit that there are any problems with 
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masculinist interpretations and gender biased criticisms of 
women's plays, he does concede, in his inimitable style, that 
gender is a social construction. 
In summary, the representation of women's identity in the 
critical discourse of drama anthologies reveals that the 
qualities attributed to women's gender have been linked with 
criticism of their plays, such that in various ways their 
plays are regarded as "women's" plays, (domestic, emotional, 
trivial, sentimental, etc) and therefore concerned with 
issues that are of interest only to women. In their 
interpretation of plays by women, critics have emphasised the 
domestic themes as central and then deemed them undramatic; 
they have called the characters dull, ordinary, or contrived 
and then evaluated them on the basis of realism and moralism. 
This extreme focus on women's identity has clouded the texts 
of editors and critics who have overlooked or ignored certain 
social themes like poverty, prostitution, economics, gender, 
or class. In particular they seem to ignore the 
contradictions which are highlighted when the plays represent 
problems for women and men related to traditional gender 
definitions and associated social institutions like marriage. 
Critics have identified women writers as being naturally 
melodramatic and therefore incapable of sufficient 
rationality to be objective. They have criticised women's 
lack of adherence to the well-made three-act play and blamed 
this on women's natural lack of logic, and they cite 
historical absence as proof against women's writing ability. 
The major problem of superimposing gender onto literary 
criticism is twofold: women's gender qualities do not fit in 
with standard notions of good dramatic writing, and the 
various themes they represent which might be unfamiliar, 
contradictory or socially unacceptable for their sex are 
overlooked and not taken seriously. 
Between the text and the critical evaluation, is the 
demand for authoritative—meaning experiential— 
representations of subjects centered around masculinist 
experiences of the world that confirm the traditional 
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definitions of gender. If women writers do not adhere to the 
literary and social codes of this unspoken demand but are 
also successful, this could be seen as a threat to the 
dominance of male writers—and thedr representations—in the 
theatre. As we have seen from the comments regarding women 
playwrights, the critics prefer (following the Aristotelian 
tradition) that playwrights represent great crises, noble 
passions and important characters, yet with emotions 
contained by the three-act mathematical construction, so as 
not to lapse into melodramatic sentimentality.^ This turns 
out to be anything that is written by women and thus 
perceived as domestic, since by ^natural' definition they 
belong to the private realm of experience. When women 
playwrights were becoming too prominent in the United States 
in the 1930s, the New York critic, Whitney Bolton, said 
theatre was becoming "feminised" which was bad because women 
playwrights were "transforming male characters into ^pallid 
shadows' for the stronger women characters ... present[ing] 
women in dominant roles while men ... served merely as 
puppets" (qtd. in Olauson 8). According to Olauson: 
Bolton contended that an unprecedented reversal had 
happened: the male qualities of strength, decision, 
firmness, and control had been seized by women and 
were out of place in their hands" (emphasis mine; 9) 
Women playwrights were challenging the feminine gender myths 
simultaneously in several ways. They crossed gender 
boundaries by the obvious exercise of reason in order to do 
playwrighting, they produced critical social commentaries 
through plays that represented subjects outside of the 
domestic experience, and they portrayed characters who also 
displaced gender qualities. This was a double exposure of 
the myth that these so-called male qualities were simply 
available only to men but, as I have shown, these issues were 
overlooked and ignored by the critics. 
Sentimentality is defined by the Macquarie Dictionary as 
weakly emotional, while sentiment itself is defined as a mental 
feeling or thought influenced by or proceeding from feeling or 
emotion. 
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What then is the price of this writing and of this 
critical exclusion? Gerald Rabkin writes in The Politics of 
the American Theatre of the Thirties, that some plays 
produced by the Federal Theatre Project under the leadership 
of Hallie Flanagan were so controversial that they were 
stopped by more than negative reviews by critics. Flanagan's 
play. Can You Hear Their Voices, confronted government 
exploitation of starving farmers during the Depression. In 
this play an educated daughter of a Congressman disrupts her 
debutante ball in the face of national poverty, attacking her 
father for doing nothing to help the farmers; in a bitter 
dispute with her father about ladyhood, he condemns 
university teachers as people who can't earn very much money. 
This was an example of the Project's work "which affirmed the 
necessity of facing social issues, but which avoided a 
dogmatically consistent political position upon these issues" 
(Rabkin 102-3). Although the project had its own autonomy 
whereby workers' theatre and black units developed on their 
own, Hallie Flanagan was considered to haVe a "^subversive' 
penchant for theatrical experimentation" (102). While 
Flanagan sent out letters insisting that the Federal Theatre 
did not adopt any one viewpoint "beyond presenting a new and 
vital drama of our times, emerging from the social and 
economic forces of the day," she was still called to answer 
charges of Communism before the Senate Committee (102). The 
Federal Project was stopped by an Act of Congress ostensibly 
due to economic reasons, but Rabkin argues: 
All the Arts projects used less than three-fourths of 
one per cent of the total WPA appropriation, and the 
appropriation was not cut one cent by the termination 
of the Federal Theatre; the money was simply 
distributed among other WPA projects, (121) 
The calibre of the attack on Flanagan and the Project is 
clearly illustrated from the transcript of her interview: 
Congressman Starnes: (quoting from Hallie Flanagan's 
book, A Theatre is Born) ^the workers' theatres ... 
intend to remake a social structure without the help 
of money and this ambition alone invests their 
undertaking with a certain Marlowesque madness.' 
You are quoting from this Marlowe. Is he a Communist? 
Flanagan: I am very sorry. I was quoting from 
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Christopher Marlowe. 
Starnes: Tell us who Marlowe is, so we can get the 
proper reference, because that is all we want to do. 
H.F.: Put in the record that he was the greatest 
dramatist in the period of Shakespeare, immediately 
preceding Shakespeare. 
Starnes: Put that in the record, because the charge 
has been made that this article of yours is entirely 
Communistic, and we want to help you. Of course we had 
what some people call Communists back in the days of 
the Greek theatre. I believe Mr. Euripides was guilty 
of teaching class-consciousness also, wasn't he? 
H.F.: I believe that was alleged against all of the 
Greek dramatists. 
Starnes: So we cannot say when it began. (122) 
As Rabkin discusses, implicit in the demise of the Project is 
the moralist critical notion that "art, in puritan eyes, is 
eternally suspect, eternally an instrument of the devil" 
while the plays were accused of being vulgar and profane. 
(122). An individual play could be critically dealt with, 
but a collective project with money behind it recjuired the 
intervention of the United States Government for its 
elimination. 
Bolton directly implied the power of critical analysis to 
affect successful women playwrights of the 30s when he 
threatened that "the vogue would not last nor would it 
continue for . . . few contemporary women playwrights were 
^powerful and flawless and strong enough to make the plays 
stick'" (emphasis mine; qtd. in Olauson 9). In other words, 
they could be stopped by a continued critical reception that 
rigorously demanded flawless adherence to a great drama 
tradition based on essentialist, structuralist, and gender 
biased standards. However, the methodology of ensuring that 
plays do not "stick" also relates to the overall process of 
textual production. In this process, the erasure of women 
playwrights is achieved through gender biased critical 
practices whereby sustained negative reception coupled with 
anthological and institutional exclusion, amounts to what is 
really nonreception and thus dominance in discourse. The 
most obvious contradiction to the logic of "sticking" are the 
few plays by women that won very distinguished awards, as 
presumably these plays did fulfill dramatic standards, and 
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one would expect to find them reproduced in anthologies. 
Since they are not, it is therefore reasonable to ask why 
aren't women who have won the Pulitzer Prize or the 
Australian Playwright's Advisory Board award more widely 
known for historical or intrinsic greatness? Why haven't 
their plays "stuck"? In the following pages I will examine 
the reception of these plays whose erasure indicates an even 
more startling degree of nonreception; where critical 
authorities have excluded the plays of women even when they 
manage to win prominent and distinguished awards, exposing 
dominance as an exclusionary move beyond the support of 
accepted institutional standards. 
In Australia, several winners of the Playwright's Advisory 
Board Competition from 1945 to 1960 remain unpublished; 
Marien Dreyer's Wish No More (1960), Lynn Foster's And The 
Moon Will Shine (1946) and Dorothy Blewett's The First Joanna 
(1947). Catherine Duncan's Sons of Morning (1945) was 
published by Mulga Press in 1946. However, Oriel Gray's The 
Torrents (1954), which shared first prize with Ray Lawler's 
Summer of the Seventeenth Doll, remained unpublished until 
1988. Leslie Rees tries to explain why so little had been 
heard of this play: 
At the outset, the Trust had shown no enthusiasm for 
backing a full professional production, in fact had 
refused to do so. When minor presentation was mooted, 
the sensitivities and doubts of the author were a 
factor in delay. Naturally enough, comparisons with 
The Doll would be made, and if these were based on a 
theatrical showing that was inept, or only fair, the 
damage to amour propre and name might be unpleasant. 
Several offers from smaller groups were refused and 
apart from an A.B.C. radio performance, The Torrents 
was not available for public assessment until a 
considerable time had passed. (Making 272) 
Torrents represents a woman who gets a job at a newspaper by 
using only her first initials and surname on the 
applicatioin; and of course upon arrival the deception is 
revealed and she must deal with open hostility and resentment 
of her sex. While Rees at least recognises that this play 
attempts to confront the hximan relationship problems in "the 
age of the ^new' woman" he stereotypically describes the lead 
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character Jenny as "a sturdy but entirely feminine 
representative, determined on her right to earn a living in 
a man's way" (Making 272). The play also revolves around a 
major problem for the Torrent family newspaper, which is 
whether or not to support the new irrigation schemes of a 
"young idealist who believes the day of gold is nearly over" 
with the future based on "conquering the dry spells and 
harnessing the torrents" (Making 272) . Jenny plays a major 
role in advancing his radical ideas by substituting a 
conservative article written by the father for a leading one 
written as an exercise by the son. Like plays from the 
Suffragette era and the 30s, Torrents gives a textual 
representation of a woman who argues not only for equality in 
an unchanged world, but rather the opportunity to change 
society, but Rees did acknowledge Jenny's role: 
In the process she proves her own capability as a 
forward force, with her dream of working for the 
world, ^not to perish but to work for it, not to weep 
for it but to change it! That takes a man—or a 
woman'. (Making 273) 
None of the reviewers saw a thematic link associating the 
future of the new woman with a new era of irrigation, and 
most only saw the story as it related to the men. Kevon Kemp 
reviewed The Torrents eight years after it won the PAB award 
and commented that it hadn't had anything like the success of 
the Doll, "nor one may make bold to say, will it" (Bulletin. 
18 August 1962, p 36). Kemp admits that the Doll underwent 
so much rewriting that one of the judges hardly recognised 
the play when he saw it, but he pins the main difference 
between the two plays on theme, which for Kemp means missing 
several themes in Torrents. He argues that "at the least. 
The Doll had a central notion that was at the same time 
topical and universal" but the "strong story line" of 
Torrents has "little in the way of a fundamental idea—except 
the statement that men with money sometimes tend to oppose 
moves that will deprive them of their money" (36) . He 
entirely dismisses the subject of women entering the public 
sphere—to change it—calling the female lead as "a Sylvia 
Pankhurst type female reporter" (36). He finishes up by 
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saying there was an "unnecessary solution of all plot 
details" which contradicts the usual notion of plot 
resolution for great drama (36). The other published PAB 
winner was Duncan's verse play. Sons of the Morning, an 
allegorical representation of war based on Gallipoli which 
questioned the heroics of self-sacrifice. One reviewer, 
Allan Ashbolt, had this to say: 
Miss Duncan's arid, pedantic, generally ten-syllable 
iambic jingle and the inanimate bores who speak it 
bear no relation either to Aristotelian demands for 
tragedy or the awful evacuation of Crete which 
purports to be her subject. If Miss Duncan had written 
in straightforward, down-to-earth, literate prose she 
might, too, have constructed the play with a little 
more theatrical craftsmanship. (Focus, Dec-Jan, 1946-
7, p 32) 
Again, the peasants who play a prominent part in the play are 
referred to as "inanimate bores" (32) and the verse 
construction of the play is attacked, (though it reads very 
much like prose) while the representation of the politics of 
war remains undiscussed. 
In America the Pulitzer prize is the highest honour, 
though none of the plays by women which won the award are to 
be found in modern drama anthologies. The award brings a 
wide recognition to the playwright and winning the Pulitzer 
is said to: 
... tickle the pride and fill the wallet ... often 
sells 25,000 copies of a novel or 1,000 of a volume of 
verse; will jam a theatre with customers.,,, 
(Newsweek, 18 May 1935, p 25) 
In this context I would like to examine the critical 
reception of a few American women who have won the coveted 
prize. In this Newsweek editorial entitled "Pulitzer Awards: 
The Prizes Arouse the Usual Yearly Furor", it is reported 
that critics were questioning why Akins' The Old Maid won. 
Veteran drama critic, Clayton Hamilton, "fumed at the choice" 
because the play was adapted from Edith Wharton's novel and 
therefore was not original (25). However, Miss Akins 
"refreshed his memory" by reminding him that he had voted in 
1930 for Marc Connelly's play which was taken from a story by 
Mr. Roark Bradford (25). The Old Maid represents the 
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conflicts of a woman who wants to retain her career as a 
childcare provider for poor working women, but is forbidden 
by her future husband to work. It is a double dilemma in 
that this is her only access to her illegitimate child which 
she has anonymously entrusted to the care of her former black 
nanny. In the introduction to this play from Best Plays of 
1934-35, Burns Mantle says the critics were against the play 
with their rightful charge that "this drama of maternal 
yearning and mother love is definitely sentimental" though he 
also says enthusiastic supporters are "equally right in 
insisting that it is a human and substantial drama, 
skillfully and intelligently adapted" (145). It was labelled 
a great woman's play and a sure matinee attraction with women 
"dragging a small percentage of their menfolk with them" 
(144). In Theatre Arts Monthly, Edith Isaacs said the play 
"sentimentalized the plight of a woman, lonely and growing 
old, who dares not claim as her own the illegitimate child 
that she loves" (19 March 1935, p 176). In my contemporary 
reading of the play I saw none of the stylistics that 
typified the excessive sentimentality of melodramatic theatre 
as a style. However there was a substantial amount of 
dialogue that involved cutting attacks on the restrictions of 
women in and out of marriage. As for motherly yearning, it 
was effaced by the strict anonymity agreed upon and 
maintained when the protagonist gives the child to her 
wealthier cousin to raise with "married" respectability. In 
the American Mercury, critic J. Nathan directly attacked 
Akins saying that she was an exeunple of "what affectation can 
do to a real talent" and further (118): 
While it is no part of a critic's business to venture 
beyond a playwright's work into the playwright personally, 
there is one such critic who can't help believing that 
Miss Akins dramatizes not her elegant characters so much 
as her own elegant aspirations and eimbitions. She seems 
to be suffering from a suppressed desire to have a butler, 
(May 1928, p 119) 
Glaspell's play Alison's House won the Pulitzer in 1930 and 
in a rare moment of praise Barrett Clark predicted in Drama 
magazine that it would outlast several Pulitzer Prize 
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winners, though he said it was "very little besides a study 
in character" (January 1931, p 13). In this play, based on 
the life of Emily Dickinson, Glaspell examines the issue of 
national versus family ownership of a writer's manuscripts; 
specifically, love poems discovered after the death of a poet 
and the conflict this caused between family members trying to 
preserve the work and those trying to destroy them in the 
interest of protecting the family's reputation. Clark 
reports that most reviewers criticised it for being too 
"literary" and he admits it could be improved by cutting out 
unnecessary repetition "and in spots a little too much ^ fine' 
writing", but overall he praises it for its unity of theme 
and universality of "certain problems of living" (14). A 
review called "A Delicate Matter" in the New Statesman was 
not so generous, and said that "it was impossible to be 
interested in the conventions of a past age unless they are 
exhibited as the background of real people" (22 October 1932, 
p 483). The realist criticism was pushed further x}\ Theatre 
Arts Monthly, where John Hutchens ignored the us^al demand 
for unity complaining that "even more thoroughly dominated by 
one unrelieved and highly abstract idea is the play which has 
brought Miss Glaspell back to the theatre" which "sensibly, 
for the sake of contrast ... is grounded in reality, set in 
the sturdy background of a house of half a century ago" 
(February 1931, 101-102). Though he characterises Glaspell 
as coming "baffingly near to realisation" of a "far, high 
goal" and admits moments of perception and even brilliance, 
he too calls it a "literary play" which is too lacking in 
"tactile points of narrative" (102). 
In Judith Louise Stephens' article called "Women in 
Pulitzer Prize Plays, 1918-1949", she does an interesting 
character analysis on representations of women in such plays. 
In her study of these characters she looks for traits 
associated with women in fiction such as 1) a preoccupation 
with love; 2) irrationality and emotionality; 3) selfishness 
or selflessness; and 4) passivity. She notes the following: 
In considering the four literary traits, then, the 
female dramatic characters conform to one on an 
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unqualified basis: most tend to be preoccupied with 
love. The characters conform to two of the traits on 
a qualified basis: most tend to be emotional but not 
necessarily irrational, and most are, in certain 
respects, passive. Although there are some examples of 
the Eve-Mary Syndrome, the female dramatic characters 
do not tend to conform to this one trait. (Women in 
American Theatre 249) 
It is likely that the dominance of these characteristics 
might explain some of the difficult reception and eventual 
erasure of plays by women that won the Pulitzer prize, but 
offered broader female characterisations. She also points 
out that: 
In comparing the women characters in one decade to the 
others, it appears that the women in the plays of the 
first decade (1918-29) possess a stability, 
independence, and strength not generally found in the 
later decades. Out of the eleven plays studied for 
the first decade, all but three have a female 
protagonist. (249) 
Perhaps the first wave of feminism did have an impact on 
representations for women in this decade, however: 
Chances of the female character's having the status of 
protagonist tended to decrease after the first decade 
(1918-29). This suggests that the central female 
characters in the Pulitzer Prize plays, 1918-49, have 
generally received limited development, which accords 
with the assumptions that women are primarily 
interested in love, are emotional, and are passive. 
(251) 
By looking at the critical "reception" of these few award 
winners, it is apparent that not only traditional dramatic 
definitions, but personal prejudices regarding gender, were 
operating through critics whose reviews set the stage for 
their exclusion from anthologies of great drama—even though 
this was their likely destination since they had been 
considered great enough for exceptional dramatic awards. One 
can only speculate as to how they managed to win even a few 
awards; perhaps the members of the committees were not 
"professional" dreima critics and therefore reacted more 
favourably as did audiences, or perhaps the awards 
represented a type of compensation for the lack of 
recognition afforded to women playwrights. Nevertheless, the 
awards were not enough to ensure publication, nor 
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performance, and certainly not the "sticking" of anthological 
inclusion. However, the important underlying assumption to 
be questioned and examined in the dramatic discourse is not 
simply that men are the good playwrights because men are 
logical and women are emotional, but the belief system that 
reason as part of the writing process can and should be 
entirely separate from feelings and emotion. (In Part Two, 
I will go on to look in greater detail at the historical 
tenets of great dramatic form, to evaluate the philosophical 
construction of gender biased criticism in the evaluation of 
plays by women.) 
Modern Erasure 
This next section will examine modern erasure by reading 
contemporary critical responses to more recent successful 
plays by women, as well as by considering problems of 
production for women playwrights. Here the "nonreception" of 
critics continues to show how the historical construction of 
the great drama genre depends upon an interrelationship 
between literary standards and social gender definitions, and 
that these essentialist, structuralist, realist, moralist, 
and gender biased standards continue to impinge upon 
contemporary women playwrights. Additionally, the historical 
representation of plays by women as "women's" plays now 
becomes linked with the feminist movement, providing another 
location for attacking women's writing as prescriptive, full 
of uncontrolled rage, and really better dealt with by the 
feminists. 
Olauson laments that, despite the fact that modern 
American playwrights such as Adrienne Kennedy, Megan Terry, 
Rosalyn Drexler, Rochelle Owens and Myrna Lamb have: 
written at least one play which has maintained a 
substantial audience on a New York stage over a 
considerable length of time ... it is surprising that 
so little attention has been paid to them, how little 
serious analysis, or even tribute, they have received. 
According to some contemporary women playwrights, 
women's works have often been met with biased 
criticism, unswerving traditionalism, lack of 
encouragement, and even total disregard. (American 7) 
This may not seem so surprising in that the critical 
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methodology of structural dominance used earlier in the 
century can be traced in its evolution by looking at a few 
reviews of contemporary award-winning plays from 1964-1984, 
as well as those of recent plays from a few better known 
modern women playwrights. In 1964, Adrienne Kennedy won the 
Obie award of Distinguished Play for Funnvhouse of a Negro, 
which represents the last hours of a young black girl before 
she commits suicide. Howard Taubman of the New York Times 
commented on the play's structure: 
By the standards of routine drama, the work ... is 
much less a play than a vividly illustrated short 
story. Nothing happens much except that the nightmares 
of the girl, Sarah, are partly visualized, and the 
figures that haunt her days and nights take form and 
give expression to her secret resentments and guilt. 
(15 January 1964, p 25) 
The fact that Jesus, Queen Victoria and the Duchess of 
Hapsburg are some of Sarah's visualisations is mentioned only 
later when they are referred to as ghosts also "tormented by 
revealingly kinky hair"; instead of a discussion on the 
obvious theme of the colonisation of black people's culture 
by white authority figures, Taiibman reverses the situation by 
calling them "her secret resentments and guilt" (25). He 
goes on to grant some believability to this work as "Miss 
Kennedy, herself a Negro, digs unsparingly into Sarah's 
aching psyche", but dismisses the pain represented by saying 
that Sarah "is in extremis in her suffering, and it may even 
be suggested that her visions are those of one who is 
deranged" (emphasis mine; 25) . Almost as an afterthought, he 
then says "But one cannot doubt that in her intensity she 
reflects what it is to be a sensitive Negro", no doubt hoping 
that most blacks are not sensitive, as he "recalls Countee 
Cullen's ironic line about how curious it is that God should 
make a poet black and let him sing. Only Sarah laments" 
(emphasis mine; 25). Edith Oliver's review in the New Yorker 
also follows the usual pattern of structural criticism 
combined with accusations of excessive emotionality: 
It is hard to separate the facts about the girl from 
the fancies, since most of the evidence about her is 
her own, and she is in no shape to give it. Much of 
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the play consists of her raging, haunted monologue, 
from which we can at least tell that she once wanted 
to be a poet.... (25 January 1964, p 76) 
After describing the wild set she decides to label the play 
"an Expressionistic attempt to reproduce the girl's madness 
and anguish", before finally collapsing into a critique of 
the content as uninteresting: 
I don't take to Expressionism, partly because its 
built-in weirdness and distortion tend to make the 
material it deals with seem more important than it 
really is. The material here couldn't be much more 
important to begin with, so that's all right. I guess, 
and the style does seem appropriate, (emphasis added; 
76) 
Here one sees the subjective position of the critic asserting 
what is "really" important, overlaying her structuralist 
criticism of "weirdness" in style onto lier rascist 
interpretation that what the black girl says couldn't be 
important anyway. 
That year Rosalyn Drexler also won the same Obie for her 
play Home Movies, which was described by Henry Hewes in The 
Best Plays of 1964-65 as "the carryings-on of a lot of 
strange people" with a "patchwork of blasphemy and kooky 
quality" (qtd. in Olauson 115). But Olauson argues that this 
play purposely "consist[s] of a series of farcical interludes 
by which the playwright satirizes surface morals, manners, 
and customs, and the false behavior of the people who create 
them" (116). While most critics refused to treat this and 
other avant-garde work of women playwrights seriously, in 
Richard Gilman's introduction to Drexler's book The Line of 
Least Existence and Other Plays, he has offered a reading of 
her work that does not assume female mindlessness regarding 
the rules of conventional theatre. About her characters who 
are "armed to the teeth with language", he says they "make up 
new worlds of farce whose highly serious intention, as in all 
true examples of the genre, is to liberate us from the way 
things are said to be" (xi); and as for plot, "denouements, 
after all, are for plays which progress from a question to an 
answer, whereas Drexler's is exactly the other way around" 
(xi). Perhaps foreshadowing or coinciding with 
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poststructuralist concepts, he further states that: 
Imagination equals style equals play; until we learn 
that this is so, we are going to go on hunting like 
demented ferrets for the truth underneath the surfaces 
of the plays we see ,.. and never experiencing what is 
there to be experienced, (ix) 
In 1967, Rochelle Owens won the Obie Award of Distinguished 
Play for Futz. which represents the violence of an American 
rural community when a farmer has sexual relations with his 
pig, Amanda. Futz is hounded for his actions by the village 
whore, Marjorie, who sends her male family members to seek 
vengeance; another villager who observes Futz commits a sex 
murder on a young girl; but ultimately it is Futz who is seen 
as the instigator of violence in the community and while in 
jail he is killed. Olauson says that some critics defended 
Futz as the non-conforming individual, but John Simon argued 
"her ideas, characters and even language were not 
dramatically legitimate, nor were they ^couched in a dramatic 
event'" (emphasis mine; 124). The illegitimacy of these 
characters is that they are not capable of being classified 
as ^good'. Walter Kerr of The New York Times called Owens' 
work a "fiasco" and uses every standard structuralist and 
gender-biased criticism against it: 
I am scandalized that such slovenliness should be 
permitted to masquerade as new art ... The play's 
structure—if one may use such a conventional term in 
these outlands—is aimlessly disproportioned ... the 
issue is hypothetical, undramatized, ungraphic, 
without immediacy ... it seems remarkably sentimental 
... Probably Miss Owens' play is an unimportant one in 
any case. (30 June 1968, Sec 2, p 1) 
Again we have the usual critique of structure, and the 
familiar accusation of sentimentality overlaying the 
subjective critic's interpretation of the play as 
unimportant. 
In London, Sharman McDonald won the London Standard Drama 
Award for Best Play of 1984 with When I Was A Girl. I Used To 
Scream And Shout. Michael Billington of the Guardian said 
"the worst thing about it is its title which itself screams 
to be cut" while Michael Coveney of the Financial Times said 
the title "is not only too long but also too suggestive of 
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the girlish Victorian reminiscences of E. Nesbit" (London 
Theatre Record 5-18 November 1984, p 1028). Title aside, 
most male critics labelled it as concerning mother-daughter 
relationships and resentment, with Billington hinting at "the 
complexity of female sexuality" (London 1028). In an 
interview with Diana Hinds for Books and Bookmen, the author 
said, "the idea for the play came from seeing a view of 
female sexuality put forward—by a man—that made me very 
angry" (June 1986, p 29). One female critic from Time Out. 
Ann McFerran, said the play "recounts with sympathy and a 
deliciously rude detail, the sexual misadventures and 
misconceptions of Fiona, growing up with her repressive 
mother ... in fifties Scotland" (London 1028), while Ros 
Asquith in City Limits said that: 
this gently unassxoming play says much about the 
constraints of conventional sexuality, in addition to 
taking in the tyranny of teenagers over their parents 
and the veiled resentment felt by women who've buckled 
down dutifully to those who have not. (London 1033) 
While McFerran praised McDonald for her refreshing candour, 
noting that these "tell-all reminiscences" are usually the 
"stuff of semi-autobiographical women's novels" (London 
1028), John Barber of the Daily Telegraph was unimpressed 
with the audience response to this display of female 
sexuality: 
Judging from the delighted sniggers from women in the 
audience, they found something peculiarly satisfying 
in so much talk about menstruation, masturbation, 
pubertal body changes, the details of impregnation ,,, 
and soon, the situation when sex games are overtaken 
by the real thing, (emphasis mine; London 1033) 
Here Barber rather crudely denies that female sexuality on 
its own can even be seen as "the real thing", implying that 
the normative description of sexuality as male-defined 
requires the presence of a penis. A litany of familiar 
criticisms emerges from the reviewers (all quotes from London 
Theatre Record) such as: 
The play is by its nature a bit hermetic and 
remorselessly concerned with private lives ... I would 
like to see her tackle wider social themes. 
(Billington 1028); The writing is not so much feminist 
as intriguingly feminine. (Coveney 1033); I salute the 
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verisimilitude but not the self-pity in the new 
author's study of adolescent distress and more mature 
pain. (Barber 1033) 
One critic blatantly refers to gendered writing while the 
playwright is condemned for writing about the personal sphere 
and asked to address "wider" social themes; yet women 
playwrights are relentlessly attacked for their lack of 
authority when writing about the public sphere. Finally, 
Asquith's review in the Observer perceived a more 
"contemporary edge" from McDonald's setting, but then refers 
to the rigidity of the dramatic unities where the setting 
must not mix public and private realms: 
As for the fact that a nuclear reactor now threatens 
the shoreline that Fiona once played on, it is 
something that the author notes in passing and is the 
kind of device critics are supposed to dislike in 
plays of domestic values. (London 1028) 
Michael Coveney exemplifies this typical critical dislike in 
his comment about the reactor: 
The contrast between best friends' fates nearly leads 
to a disastrous, analagous spiel about nuclear 
reactors, but Ms MacDonald's instincts are strong 
enough to rear back to what she writes best about: the 
pain of people who love each other and expect too 
much, (emphasis mine; London 1033) 
That a woman playwright might be asked simultaneously to 
write about wider social issues but then again remain writing 
about what she must know best—the ^narrower' issues of 
domesticity and love—entails a catch-22 still maintained in 
the literary standards for women writers that involves 
several outdated assumptions. Firstly, that domesticity and 
love are are not ^wider issues' or that they are entirely 
separate from them, and secondly, that writing needs to be 
about ^wider' social issues in order to be classified as 
great. However, the contradiction is that when women 
playwrights do represent the connections between personal 
situations as interrelated with ^larger' socio-political 
issues, these themes will be ignored, the domestic will be 
highlighted and trivialised, while the authors will be 
criticised as lacking experiential authority. It is 
precisely the standards that prescribe the authority to write 
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combined with the privileging of certain experiences which 
need questioning, as MacDonald says in her interview, "people 
round here are talking about writing—about areas of life 
that haven't been written down before. And if my small 
success has contributed to that movement, I'm pleased" (gtd. 
in Hinds 29) . 
Megan Terry won the Obie Award for Best Play of 1970 for 
Approaching Simone. a biographical drama about the French 
writer Simone Weil, who starved herself to death in 1943 at 
the age of 34. Keyssar notes in Feminist Theatre that the 
focus on one transcendent woman is unusual in Terry's works, 
but argues that Terry's goal this time was to "place Simone's 
heroic spirit, her enormous will, in front of other women: 
^Then people will say, "My God, it is possible; women are 
free to do this and can"' (Terry gtd in Keyssar 70). In 
Simone Terry did employ her technigue of transformational 
drama with the cast repeatedly changing into various 
characters from Simone's life, but while her other work is 
usually criticised as superficial or confusing, Simone met 
with critical appreciation. The most likely explanation is 
that the play was perceived as a return to more dramatically 
conventional writing. I quote Arthur Sainer from 
Contemporary Dramatists in full: 
And we come to Approaching Simone. and a breakthrough 
for Terry. For in this tribute to the life of the 
French philospher, Simone Weil, Terry finally 
confronts a private life which is tremulously charged 
with character. Weil is constantly challenging 
herself, looking into her life, tearing at herself in 
the fight to become a better, more responsible being. 
Here is no victim but an existential heroine who is 
making her life through moral and intellectual 
bravery, through harrowing insights she refuses not to 
see. She wants to see deeper and in seeing deeper use 
her life for the good of humanity. And appropriately, 
the play slows down the quivering business that is so 
much a part of Terry's earlier work, slows down 
significantly. For she is looking in a breathing life, 
not a symbol^ into a courageous being, not a victim, 
and the richness of this challenging iDeing demands a 
new measure of tranquility, (emphasis mine; 755) 
Another obviously pleasing factor was the publicly heroic 
quality of the central character's life, which exposes the 
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common critical perception of the other characters in Terry's 
plays—angry mothers, lower class prostitutes, and senile, 
rebellious old ladies—as "victims". 
The Pulitzer Prize had not been awarded to a woman 
playwright for twenty-three years (Ketti Frings received it 
for her play Look Homeward, Angel in 1958) until Beth Henley 
finally won the distinguished prize for her play Crimes of 
the Heart, and she was followed by Marsha Norman in 1983 who 
won the award for ^night Mother. Crimes depicts the 
relationship of three daughters who are reunited in their 
family house when one of the sisters gets in trouble for 
shooting her husband. Mother represents a daughter who is 
tired of her life and plans to commit suicide that evening 
after she informs her mother and finishes up. last minute 
details. Jill Dolan's essay in Making a Spectacle (1989) 
examines the critical reception of these plays with respect 
to the Prize and canonisation, arcfuing that some critics 
"attempted to obscure Norman's gender under an Aristotelian 
mantle of respectability. Other writers ... made her gender 
an issue" (335). Though Norman's play and subsequent movie 
was "contextualised as ^art'" (326), Henley's play was not 
reviewed as making a universal statement and both play and 
film were promoted as entertainment; a regional comedy that 
distanced the real desperation of the sisters with their 
eccentric antics of comic relief. Even though both plays 
deal with problematic female lives and suicide, Dolan 
suggests that the classification of Crimes as a comedy and 
Mother as either a classic Aristotelian tragedy or 
melodramatic kitchen drama, may explain why critics grappled 
with the canonisation of Norman's play, but not Henley's. 
Apparently the critical argviment revolved around the 
criterion of uniyersality, and the ambivalence of male 
critics "about the gender subtext and their comparison of the 
play to canonical standards" (328). Dolan points out that 
while Arthur Miller's plays are generally classified as 
domestic drama "in that they deal with family issues in which 
father/son relationships are privileged" (333), Mother can 
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also be seen as domestic drama though this "assumes different 
connotations when the writer is a woman and the 
mother/daughter confict is foregrounded" (333) . Dolan 
chronicles the reception of Jessie's mother, Thelma, who is 
referred to as "the ^fuddled mother', ^scatterbrained but 
decent', ^not too bright', a ^fussy, silly woman with a 
frumpy wardrobe and an insatiable sweet tooth' and a ^lonely 
flibbertigibbet of a vacant mother'" (328) with Robert 
Asahina saying: 
Thelma is not so guietly deranged . . . prattling on 
inanely about hot chocolate, knitting, television and 
a host of lowbrow concerns with which Norman has 
burdened her in order to let the audience know that 
this is a drama about Real People, (qtd. in Dolan 328) 
Reviewers' responses alternated between praising the play 
"for its ^moral inquiry' and trivialising its ^domestic 
clich§'" (333); others saw the play "as ^suspense melodrama' 
or ^resolutely domestic'" and Dolan concludes: 
In the change from male writer to female and 
father/son focus to mother/daughter, domestic drama is 
reduced to kitchen drama, which is considered specific 
rather than universal, and melodramatic rather than 
tragic. (333) 
Dolan presents the argximent of Robert Brustein, director of 
the American Repertory Theatre, who wrote that Mother did 
pass the universality test because "Mother is 'chastely 
classical (emphasis Dolan's) in its observance of the 
unities', particularly time, which is measured synchronously 
onstage and in the audience" (334), with Brustein saying 
further that: 
this helps explain the enduring strength and validity 
of the Poetics ... Nothing reinforces one's faith in 
the power and importance of the theatre more than the 
emergence of an authentic, universal playwright—not 
a woman playwright, mind you, not a regional 
playwright, not an ethnic playwright, but one who 
speaks to the concerns and experiences of all 
humankind. (335) 
The standard definition of universality as "that which can 
apply to the whole" (Macquarie Dictionary, p 1896) renders 
the concept of universal tragedy impossible as the classic 
definition of tragedy is that which happens to great or noble 
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people, who fall because of a tragic, fatal flaw, and whose 
suffering is somehow more meaningful than that of the masses. 
While the structure and "unities" of Norman's play may confer 
some aspect of universality according to Aristotle, as Dolan 
rightly points out: 
For 'night. Mother to be a tragedy according to the 
dominant culture's criteria, Jessie should have been 
played by a performer with the body size and 
appearance of Farrah Fawcett. The death by choice of 
an unsuccessful, homely, overweight woman is 
considered melodrama because its implications do not 
resonate enough to be considered tragedy by the 
generic male spectator. (332) 
Although in Norman's text Jessie is an ordinary woman who is 
flawed by epilepsy and has lost her job, her husband, and her 
juvenile delintjuent son; critics concentrated on describing 
the actress who played Jessie as being unattractive and 
overweight, and thus "the production's received flaw, which 
provides the cause of Jessie's ultimate demise, is fat" 
(emphasis mine; 329). Dolan notes that Douglas Watts, the 
Daily News reviewer, belittles the individual character: 
the troubling aspect of the play is that Jessie is not 
a truly tragic figure. Her self containment as she 
busily sets things in order about the house suggests 
one dedicated to her awful purpose, true, but also 
suggests a congenitally deranged woman, (emphasis 
mine; 334) 
The strategic work of the play which questions the social 
construction of such female gender roles, via the 
representation of an individual who manifests contradictory 
side-effects, is ignored through continual critical reference 
to the person rather than her social situation. As Alan 
Wallach in Newsday describes it, "there is no awkward stretch 
for imagery or universality ... [the play] doesn't develop to 
reveal a deeper truth" (qtd. in Dolan 334). Variety is 
quoted as having "called 'night Mother a 'non-box office 
subject'" that: 
lacks universal application ... There's pity but no 
terror, no purgative release for the audience. The 
heroine's action, as the author no doubt intended, 
remains a private, isolated instance of human failure. 
The audience isn't a partner, (emphasis mine; qtd. in 
Dolan 334) 
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One can only ask: what audience? The analysis is always 
revolving around the play's representation within the context 
of a dramatic standard, and if it—the play—cannot meet the 
criteria for universality, then the problem of the heroine is 
"hereditary and therefore individual" (Watts gtd. in Dolan 
334) . The play is consequently depoliticised and the 
audience can be dismissed from entertaining thoughts of 
social responsibility. Dolan's essay explores the issue of 
dominant great drama standards with respect to mainstream 
canonisation and the feminist canon, and I will discuss this 
argximent further when examining methodologies of feminist 
literary criticism. 
The reviews of other well-known contemporary women 
playwrights also follow the typical pattern of structuralist 
and gender-biased critical reception. Dorothy Hewett would 
have to be one of Australia's most famous female playwrights, 
and her play The Chapel Perilous, first produced in Perth in 
1969, caused "vehement divisions of emotional reaction and 
opinion" according to Leslie Rees in his chapter on "Female 
Sexuality and Self-Assertion" from A History of Australian 
Drama. He says this was not because it was written by a 
woman but rather: 
for the first time it attempted to project, in a kind 
of leapfrogging dualism, both the lively sexuality and 
the social idealism of a woman born without any fear 
at all of formerly rigid restrictions on conduct and 
explicit statement. (History 147) 
The lead character, Sally Banner, is called a rebel at school 
for not bowing down at the altar, a slut for trying out sex 
with boys, and punished for her lesbian affair which the 
headmistress breaks up. The style of the play is a series of 
shorter scenes in prose or verse, documenting key moments in 
Sally's personal life along with contemporary world history, 
as she is tried by various authority figures—father, canon, 
headmistress, and Communist Party. Rees surveys some of the 
critical reactions to this play by asking: 
Is it all so much personal feminine display, a hectic 
nostalgia of pain and pleasure, an emotional-
histrionic splurge, emotion recollected in continuing 
turmoil, a stew of lyrical feeling boiled in words, a 
67 
paean of abandonment of any restricting disciplines, 
a too individual philosophic romp not serving but 
using social-political crusades to its own self-
indulgent ends? (148). 
He looks at some responses from "persons who ought to know a 
play when they see one" (148) , including that of Romola 
Constantino, a critic for the Sydney Morning Herald: 
the paper which in Sydney has traditionally been the 
intelligent playgoer's guide found Sally Banner 'a 
monumental bore ... The vision of Sally, for me, was 
nearer to The Perils of Pauline or Sally Banner, her 
Life and Loves, in a permissive edition'. (148) 
Rees also includes Patrick White's defense of Chapel who: 
wrote to the Herald that it was 'for all its 
incidental, but relevant, crudity, a very subtle, 
thoughtful play ... an introspective theme brilliantly 
externalised as theatre by the author and director ... 
a work of art universal in its appeal, and it is 
fitting that it should make its Sydney appearance in 
that Cathedral Perilous at Bennelong'. (148) 
Thematic criticism remained close to the personal and, 
quoting D.H. Lawrence from the play, he argues that even 
though: "the play was about a girl who says at the outset: 'I 
believe strongly in the blood, the flesh, as being wiser than 
the intellect', and 'all I want is to answer to my blood 
direct'"; she is not "merely a child of hot impulse" since 
she "also looks to the hope of socialistic liberation and 
peace" (emphasis mine; 147). His assumption, of course, is 
that female sexuality unbound from intellect (or male-defined 
institutions) is "hot impulse" and further, that what 
elevates Sally Banner is her intellectual idealism. He 
thinks the play is memorable for dismantling the assumption 
by playwrights that "a woman has to be either profane or 
sacred, but never both", and for illustrating that a "rich 
and exploring sexuality in a woman is not inconsistent with 
a reforming intellectual idealism in respect of the moral-
social state of the world and its people" (148-9). Basically 
he still maintains the duality of definitions such as profane 
and sacred but merely says it is now dramatically correct for 
women to be both within the same play. Regarding this 
duality he notes that "a wise commentator" namely Sylvia 
Lawson, "has summed up this situation aptly—and how much 
68 
better that a woman, rather than a man, should do so" (149) . 
Lawson begins by (juoting from The Female Eunuch concerning 
the "element of quest in her sexuality which the female is 
taught to deny" then says (149): 
It is exactly this that Sally will not deny, just as 
in the school chapel she will not bow down ... Dorothy 
Hewett's real audacity is that she summons up the 
whole rich tapestry-field of heroes and heroic 
guesting, and by implication insists that a demanding, 
gifted woman's confused and confusing experience in 
the twentieth century can actually be its living 
equivalent. If the idea is flamboyant, it is also 
essential to the play's meaning. There is something 
more urgent here than metaphor. (emphasis added; 
Lawson gtd in History 149) 
Even though Rees finds this play memorable for reasons stated 
above, he does not analyse the play's critique of the 
supremacy of intellect nor the authority of social 
institutions who rule by the repression of everything else to 
rationality and religious dogma. Instead he chooses to stand 
by the traditional dramatic definitions which not only 
separate intellect from emotion but restrain anything 
resembling the latter by accepted dramatic conventions such 
as high tragedy; all in the name of morality: 
For me, 'thinking with one's blood' is an 
individualistic-subjective, non-rational approach to 
solving the world's problems, though it may appear to 
solve one's own for a while. It does not sufficiently 
admit of the exercise of what Bernard Shaw called 
'moral passion' in art, or what T.S. Eliot called 'the 
moral imagination'. (148) 
By way of explanation for such conventions as "moral 
passion", I might preempt my later discussion of their 
dramatic historical basis by quoting John Dennis in his 
Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry (1701), writing 
on the three things involved in the perfection of poetry 
which was an integral part of the debate in the construction 
of the great dramatic standards: 
The first is nature, which is the foundation and basis 
of all. For nature is the same thing with genius, and 
genius and passion are all one ... The second thing is 
art, by which I mean those rules, and that method, 
which capacitate us to manage every thing with the 
utmost dexterity that may contribute to the raising of 
passion, (emphasis mine; qtd. in Herrick 26) 
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While the erection of passion is thus contained by the 
methodological hand of Art, Rees finally redeems Hewett for 
her "naked passionate commitment to the truth as she sees it" 
(149) by referring to Aarne Neeme, the play's original 
producer in Western Australia who quoted Hebbel, "all 
dramatic art has to do with impropriety and incomprehension, 
for what is more improper and uncomprehending than passion?" 
(emphasis mine; 149). At this point, one can only wonder, 
whose? 
Alma De Groen is another of Australia's most well-known 
female playwrights, but her plays endure similar criticisms 
and distribution problems which contribute to eventual 
erasure. She told me in an interview that her play The Joss 
Adams Show was still in demand for productions, yet it went 
out of print along with Going Home and Perfectly All Right. 
Joss Adams confronts the issue of baby-battering and critic 
Leonard Radio in The Age calls this play "a gesture in the 
right direction—that is all" (2 Oct 1972, p 2). He agrees 
that De Groen is a "writer of individuality and immense 
promise" and that her interest in the baby battering syndrome 
"goes well beyond the journalistic" since her play asks what 
"precipitates such a monstrous action" (2) . However, he 
regards the play as "too slight to provide more than a 
glimmer of an answer" and does not say more about the 
representation of surrounding social factors other than 
calling the husband character "ineffectual", the parents 
"well-meaning" and the doctor who delivered the child as 
"having an existence only in relation to her" (2). In yet 
another critique of form he concludes that: 
While Mrs. De Groen has a sharp and profound insight 
into the female psyche, she lacks the technical skill 
and control of form to convert her intuitions and her 
understanding into a work of real power and 
originality. "(emphasis added; 2) 
Jack Clancy of the Nation Review gives a slightly better 
description of the play: 
The brutal indifference of the husband, the apathy and 
incomprehension of well-meaning but not-wanting-to-get-
involved parents, and the insensitivity of the doctor are 
framed by the impersonal voyeurism of the television 
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interviewer. Yet the pathetic figure at the centre of it. 
Joss Adams, manages to touch on the kinds of insights 
which have a genuine ring. (21-27 Oct 1972, p 20) 
He concludes that such insights are merely touched on in 
forty minutes and that this "is a pity for there is a 
tantalising sense that more could have been said" (20). He 
probably doesn't realise that if any more was said the play 
would almost certainly lapse into sentimentalism. In spite 
of his perceptions of external relationships impinging on the 
young mother. Joss, he describes her as "effectively touching 
and in the old sense 'touched'—so unable to cope that she is 
finally a little mad" (2) , thereby rendering Joss as the 
problem for not coping with her social expectations. Ken 
Healey of the Canberra Times gives a short review praising it 
as "a play that needed to be written" but refers to Joss as 
"demented", "disastrously a mother" and unable to 
"communicate at all with her husband and only superficially 
with his parents" (29 August 1980, p 11). He concludes his 
review with a gender classified statement that "only a woman 
could have produced this series of scenes which are at once 
terrifying and for a man at least, a little guilt-inducing" 
(11) , A "little guilt" is not necessarily a very useful 
emotion here whereas the widespread acceptance of public 
responsibility for the baby-battering syndrome—which is 
represented in the play as part and parcel of the socially 
acceptable lack of male participation in childcare—might 
have been not only useful but lifesaving. By far and away 
the most disturbing review of this play was by Kevon Kemp in 
the National Times entitled "A Women's Night Out at the 
Nimrod" (30 June-5 July 1975, p 25), He credits the Nimrod 
Theatre as "generously paying its dues to 1975, the Year of 
the Woman" by staging four pieces by Jennifer Compton and two 
by Alma De Groen, saying that they add up into ''a broadly 
washed-in slick documentary of some obvious man-woman 
situations. One or two of them carry a mild ration of wit" 
(25). His summary of Joss is as follows: 
Fanfared'by a spectacular dress up of a TV show. The 
Joss Adams Show displays a young wife with a lout 
husband, who is driven by isolation and lack of 
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affection into killing her infant. As well, this 
documentary also gets off some scores against 
repressed and ignorant parents, overbearing doctors, 
quite a few of the more often expressed woman's 
grievances of the day. (emphasis mine; 25) 
Rather than intelligently regarding the play as raising 
serious social issues which affect everyone, Kemp manages to 
contrive the play as a woman's whinge, full of "scores" and 
"grievances". Maggie Humm argues that instead of heeding 
male critics who talk about the distortions of women writers, 
we need to "identify the way male readings are themselves 
full of specific defences and distortions" and specifically 
to: 
demolish the whole argument of male criticism in which 
the perspective of a non-aligned male critic is 
assumed to be sexually neutral while a feminist is 
seen as a case of special pleading. (Feminist 
Criticism 12) 
Kemp manages to describe a fictional character as driven to 
murder by social isolation within a typical institutionalised 
relationship, and then in an almost unbelievable turn of 
phrase, labels the play a documentary instead of a dramatic 
production in a theatre. This allows him to compare the play 
with the documentary form so that his concluding statement 
becomes an obvious critical diminishing of Joss as important 
playwrighting: 
Despite some sharp design from William Passmore ... 
and some very driving production from Mr. Richard 
Wherrett, the lasting impression of the entertainment 
is lightweight and luckv dip. The problems aired are 
those already notably covered by the weekly magazines 
and in some outstanding television studies, (emphasis 
mine; 25) 
It could be argued that it is a theatrical impossibility 
simultaneously to describe a performance as a "driving 
production" implying similar dramatic qualities in the play 
such as well-structured, strongly paced, and hard-hitting, in 
the same context as "lightweight and lucky dip" entertainment 
with which one might associate bingo or horse-racing; and my 
conclusion is that he simply wanted to praise the two male 
participants in the show under a thinly veiled contempt for 
women writers in the theatre of 1975. 
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Contemporary Australian playwright, Alison Lyssa, received 
much critical acclaim for her play Pinball. which represented 
a custody struggle between a lesbian mother and her ex-
husband, although in the Bulletin. Brian Hoad dismissed the 
first production as "yet another piece of crude and tedious 
female chauvinist piggery" (29 Sept 1981, p 85) . Critical 
reception for her play. The Boiling Frog, however, was 
extremely negative. Frog's main character, Joan, moves 
through several centuries from the Great Plague and horrible 
housing conditions in the 17th, to the coal mine cave-ins and 
the English enclosure movement of the 18th, and lastly to a 
culture preoccupied with the death threat of nuclear 
holocaust in the 20th. According to Lyssa: 
Joan is my own version of Joan of Arc. My Joan is not 
trying to lead an army into battle to save a kingdom 
but to be a part of a new way of looking at things. 
That means redefining hero. (Belles Lettres, Sept/Oct 
1986, p 4) 
In her review of the play from the same issue of Belles 
Lettres, Rosemary Curb describes the title which comes from 
a science experiment: 
If you toss a frog in a pot of boiling water it will 
jump right out; but if you toss the frog in room 
temperature water and slowly heat it, you can boil the 
unwary frog. The play suggests that we (all life on 
the planet) are the frog haplessly and without 
resistance getting cooked. (4) 
Paul McGillick of the National Times credited Nimrod with "an 
enormously energetic production" which was "very pacy and 
entertaining" but said that the play "contributed little to 
a genuine dialectic" (20-26 July 1984, p 33). This was 
because he felt that Frog gave "the opposition an airing, but 
[fell] far short of taking it seriously"; which according to 
McGillick's interpretation of English playwright, John Arden, 
is necessary for political theatre: 
If you didn't take the opposition's views seriously, 
you wouldn't bother writing a play attacking them. 
Therefore, political theatre—the theatre of conflict-
-should take both points of view seriously. The fact 
that Arden has since forgotten his own advice doesn't 
alter the fact that true dramatic conflict comes out 
of opposing the views of people 'whose integrity and 
strength of mind one can respect', (emphasis added; 
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33) 
He never even says exactly why he thinks the "opposition" 
wasn't taken seriously, but goes on to say what a pity it is 
that there is no doubt as to "who is the Big Bad Wolf and who 
is Goldilocks" since this apparently "detracts from some 
otherwise good writing" and "undermines what is in many 
respects a top piece of dramatic invention" (33). McGillick 
doesn't bother to discuss Brecht's political theatre which 
also left little doubt about the sides of an issue being 
critiqued, nor does he explain why critics don't take the 
plays written by women seriously. Some reasons for his 
discomfort might be gleaned from the comment that he thinks 
the first two acts work best because of: 
historical settings which act as a distancing device. 
There are some strong dramatic images, plenty of 
laughs, and deft punctuation with songs commenting on 
the action. But without historical distance. Lyssa 
starts laying it on with a trowel in the third act and 
the results are frankly maudlin, (emphasis added; 33) 
It is possible he is calling the Carpenter/Soldier character 
maudlin when he lays down his weapons and shelters a baby in 
the Third Act; then again it could be helicopters shooting 
what are thought to be demonstrators near the nuclear 
reactor; with such an unspecific review it is difficult to 
tell. H.G. Kippax of the Sydney Herald calls this play "the 
most off-putting title of the year" offering an evening of 
"unrelieved tedium", "tired Brechtian directorial devices" 
and the kind of "silly anti-intellectual dogmatism" that 
loses the anti-uranium lobby intelligent support, Kippax 
moves through the usual structuralist criticisms quickly: 
What has to be emphasised is that its parade of poor 
abused hximanity down through the ages never begins in 
its preaching against sin to give us even the elements 
of drama ,,, There is not even the beginning of 
conflict in drama's sense of the term—only wailing 
and gnashing of teeth about the black death, 
witchhunting and superstition, about capitalism, 
religion and industrialism, and finally about science 
generally, modern technology, and one gathers, 
government of all kinds, (emphasis mine; 13 July 1984, 
P 10) 
Kippax also took a swipe at the Theatre Board while 
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questioning why Nimrod would stage such a terrible play, and 
guessed it could be "because the author was for a year or so 
Nimrod's playwright-in-residence with Theatre Board support 
and that Nimrod did not want to prejudice a commendable 
scheme by admitting failure in this case" (10) . He states 
that this play will not "convince the Theatre Board" and in 
a cxirious interpretation of audience reaction—similar to the 
disparaging remarks about audience "sniggers" in the John 
Barber's review of When I Was A Girl—he goes on to say: 
Nor, on the first night, did it convince an audience 
many of whom, I would guess from their laughter, would 
have welcomed satire of force against the uranium 
industry as relief from this week's decision in 
Canberra, (emphasis added; 10) 
Lyssa confronts the issue of critical reception and said that 
Hester Eisenstein told her why she thought the critics could 
praise Pinball but rip Frog to pieces: 
As long as you're writing about what they see as 
women's issues, they can be patronising and pat you on 
the head and say, 'that's a nice curiosity'. But you 
dare step into the political arena and write about the 
whole world! You dare challenge the entire political 
structure! No wonder they got angry with you. (Belles 
Lettres 4) 
Again there is the reference to the domestic realm, now as 
"women's issues" versus the more "political" public sphere. 
Curb said that "holding a Brechtian mirror up to the 
necrophilia of the patriarchal system did not, however, win 
the critical praise that a mother's struggle for her child 
did" (Belles 4). 
Brian Hoad, writing in the Bulletin, used his pallid 
review of Frog as a mouthpiece to attack the Australia 
Council's policy as docximented in "Women in the Arts: A 
Strategy for Action". His review is called "Disaster from a 
'committee'" and begins by warning that the Australia Council 
is going to "persist with, indeed insist on, the sexual 
democratisation of the arts" despite the fact that women have 
dominated such areas as dance or crafts and "no draconian 
action is as yet being considered to force more men to take 
up ballet or basket-weaving" (24 July 1984, p 60). Perhaps 
if Hoad had paid more attention to the global recognition of 
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discrimination based on sex within the U.N.'s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, he would not have 
referred to affirmative action as draconian.^ Thus Hoad 
ignores the historical presence of gender bias that 
discriminated against women by restricting their freedom of 
choice in the first instance, relegating them to ballet and 
crafts, so that he can ignorantly have a go at the 
affirmative action plans designed to remove this previous 
discrimination, and to improve the long term successful 
participation of women in musical performance (where they 
comprise only fifteen percent of the work force). He argues 
that: 
through the natural course of events, women and men 
are now more or less equally represented when it comes 
to the performance of classical music. But the council 
is not prepared to wait for the natural course of 
events in other fields. (60) 
Without theorising what that "natural" coxirse of events might 
be, he then attacked the Council's "sexist" approach to the 
arts with respect to the Women in Theatre Project in 1980-81, 
which centred on Sydney's Nimrod Theatre. Hoad says that 
women made up 46 percent of the acting force and 31 percent 
of directors and designers and thus theatre was not a 
sexually imbalanced area in the arts. However, Chris 
Westwood, who organised the project, claims in Australasian 
^ Following the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Hximan 
Rights in 1948, one of their main activities was to define the 
general issues in the Declaration, by making Conventions which 
have the full force of law, and from 1948 to 1960 they adopted 
a series of Conventions regarding the status of women. In 1967 
the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, with a 
Convention outlining its general scope being adopted in 1979; 
thus far 99 nation States have ratified this Convention, In a 
Keynote address presented by Mrs. Mona Mcikram Ebeid of Egypt, at 
the Inter-Parliamentary Symposium on The Participation of Women 
in the Political and Parliamentary Decision-making Process^ she 
says that "Article 4 of the Convention provides that 'adoption 
by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not 
be considered discrimination'". (Series "Reports and Documents," 
No, 16, Geneva, 1989, p 31), 
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Drama Studies that, though some attention had been paid to 
women in theatre during 1975, "nothing had succeeded in 
making 'women' an ongoing and permanently integrated part of 
Australian theatre" (Oct 1982, p 40), The focus was on 
Nimrod as the "landmark professional theatre" and Westwood 
pointed out that their more readily available statistics 
showed: 
it had produced the work of only four women writers: 
Jennifer Compton, Alma de Groen, Eleanor Witcombe and 
Moya Henderson. It had used 214 actresses compared 
with 544 actors, thus reflecting the proportion of 
available female and male roles. There had been no 
female directors at all; 33 male composers/musical 
directors compared with 8 female; and only 2 6 female 
designers compared with 133 men. (40) 
Hoad has obviously calculated 214 actresses against 544 
actors to argue his 46 percent which masks the lack of roles 
for women, while he lumped zero directors in with 26 women 
designers against 133 men in order to produce his figure of 
women as 31 percent of directors and designers. Following 
his claim to balance in the theatre he argues that the 
project and the stage: 
proved particularly attractive as a soap-box for the 
militants involved. They took advantage of it. The 
results of that tumultuous experiment threw Nimrod 
into a state of financial and artistic chaos and 
little else of dramatic interest was achieved. Now, 
just as it seemed the company was settling down again, 
up pops The Boiling Frog.... (60) 
At this point, Hoad finally gets around to mentioning the 
play which this article is supposed to be reviewing. After 
calling Pinball a "shouting match for a couple of lesbian 
mothers" he then describes Frog as taking on a broader theme 
which "attempts to explore the uses and abuses of technology 
through the eyes of a team of time travellers . . . They try to 
lighten their burden of socio-scientific concern with song 
and dance along the way" (60). After writing only this 
briefest of summaries, he lists the sex of the characters and 
the production team, sliding in and out of the play and the 
Council's docximent on sexism: 
And to make up the correct numbers, according to the 
dictates of the Australia Council, a couple of wicked 
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modern male scientists ... are dragged into the action 
from time to time ... Despite such ideological 
correctness, everybody concerned is seen to bog down 
from the start in the self-conscious earnestness of 
the writing and the grotesgue contrivances of the 
plot. (60) 
Hoad considers that the explanation for this "theatrical 
disaster" is provided by the playwright who "takes up two 
pages of the program to thank a host of helpers including 
members of her 'writers' group'" (60). In a final gesture he 
brings his grand metaphor together—(remember, "Disaster from 
a 'committee'")—by uniting his review of Frog, his attack on 
the Arts Council, and government politics: 
It seems that neither the women-in-theatre movement 
nor the Australia Council nor even Nimrod itself is 
aware that, despite endless efforts in such places as 
Russia or China to prove otherwise, art cannot be 
created by committee, (emphasis mine; 60) 
This attack on collectivity is simply another version of 
traditional criticism which defines art as an individual 
creation—though this is an obvious myth in drama as 
playwright Marsha Norman points out: 
Most [critics] can't tell the difference between the 
play and the production. They don't understand that 
the director is the author of the production. It is a 
myth that playwrights have total control ... Of 
course, ultimately you end up taking full 
responsibility for the production, (qtd in Dolan 323) 
Although there is a set of words and stage directions in the 
script, the director has the power to alter, cut, or 
otherwise heavily impinge on the playwright's text through 
many modes such as the stage, lighting, costumes, make-up and 
acting directions. In the process of production, a play also 
moves through a collaborative effort involving director, 
actors, producers, dramaturgs, and sometimes the playwright. 
As Case points out in Feminism and Theatre: 
The written text is only one of these and is not 
necessarily the definitive one. There is the text 
printed in a book and read as literature, the text the 
director reads preparing for rehearsal, the rehearsal 
text the actor uses, and the production text the 
audience receives as it watches the play. (115) 
What is happening in Lyssa's program is that she is actually 
acknowledging this collaborative process and giving away her 
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central position as author; and what Hoad really wants to say 
is that no matter how much government money or attention is 
given to women playwrights, he will not see them as capable 
of creating good dramatic art. 
While Hoad and other critics react with hostility towards 
any 'unnatural' efforts to increase opportunities for women 
in theatre, and no apparent 'natural' erosion of gender-
biased criticisms in traditional definitions of drama is in 
sight, it obviously creates an almost impossible barrier to 
overcome, not only for writers but for all aspects of 
production. In the section of the 1984 London Theatre Index 
where critics review the year, only one even mentions When I 
Was A Girl (which took out the award for Best Play) , and that 
was Jack Tinker of City Limits, who also noted that it was 
the Fringe which got on with "nurturing new talent and taking 
risks" and "provided the real theatrical fireworks" (15) . He 
commented further that: 
the major contributions of the year, and surely the 
phenomenon that will leave the greatest long term mark 
upon British theatre was the remarkable upsurge in 
writing by women. Not that they haven't always been 
there but 1984 was the year that women really made 
their voices heard. (15) 
Despite the participation of women playwrights in the Fringe, 
the review did take account of the fact that "apart from 
Caryl Churchill's intriguing and infuriating Softcops for the 
RSC . . . the two major subsidised companies kept the doors 
firmly shut to women" (emphasis mine; 15). Austin Quiqley 
notes the simultaneous existence of an official National 
Theatre in England, opened in 1976 to honor the "best in 
canonical English culture", with an alternative theatre 
emerging from communities (Brater 25): 
One stands on the South Bank of the Thcimes, cost 16 
million pounds to build, is subsidised to the tune of 
2 million poxinds per year and will eventually employ 
500 staff and just over 100 actors. The other exists 
in workshops, community centres, and short-life 
premises all over the country. It performs everywhere 
and anywhere from parks and art galleries to schools, 
trade union halls and art centres, taking theatre to 
people where they want to see it, helping them to 
celebrate, to organise campaigns, to enjoy themselves. 
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bringing old and new ideas to their notice. This 
national theatre, using existing buildings often many 
years old, is subsidised to the tune of 700,000 
pounds, employs over 1,000 people and is still 
expanding, (qtd. in Brater 25) 
This strategic gap was explored further by the Conference of 
Women Theatre Directors and Administrators in London who 
commissioned a twelve month survey in England and Wales on 
women's participation in theatre. The results are discussed 
in an article called "Why Can't a Woman" published in the 
London Theatre Record, which observes that: 
the more money and the more prestige a theatre has, 
the less women will be employed as directors and 
administrators; the less likelihood that a play 
written by a woman will be commissioned or produced, 
unless that woman is Agatha Christie; and the less 
women there will be on the board. (9-22 April 1984, p 
282) 
Statistics reveal that "the higher you go, the fewer women 
you find in authority" and the evidence suggests that women 
are not involved in planning or controlling what is produced 
in Britain's major theatres. This is considered an absence 
which "is in painful contrast to their majority in higher 
education arts courses, in audiences, and in the supporting 
roles in offices" (282). The figures also show that in the 
largely unsubsidised area of alternative and community 
theatre, the percentage of women administrators and directors 
is forty-four percent. With respect to women playwrights, 
out of one thousand and twenty-four plays produced dxiring the 
survey year, only a hundred of them were written by women. 
While they supplied a quarter of plays produced in Fringe 
theatres "they were responsible for only 46 of the 700 put on 
at regional and national level in producing repertory 
theatres" (282). The article concludes that: 
A picture emerges of a lot of presumably talented 
women swimming strongly in the lower reaches of the 
theatrical stream, very few of whom make it upriver to 
the big pools of subsidised resource and cultural 
influence ... At a time when playwrights such as Caryl 
Churchill, Sarah Daniels, Pam Gems and Louise Page are 
starting to hack out a place for themselves in the 
commercial as well as the subsidised theatre, it would 
appear that a lot of other bright female hopes are 
being thwarted in their theatrical ambitions. (282) 
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The combined effects of institutional dominance by 
traditionalist and gender-biased perceptions results in what 
British playwright Bryony Lavery relates as good work "being 
stopped by lack of money, lack of vision" (qtd. in Hinds 28-
29). A writer trying to gain experience is thwarted by the 
catch-22 described by Australian playwright, Marien Dreyer, 
in Theatregoer: 
It all boils down to this—you can write a play . . . 
But, you can't get that play produced because you 
haven't a name as a playwright and unless you can get 
a play produced you can't learn from errors and, until 
you do get a play produced, you can't get a name as a 
playwright—which is where we came in. (Dec-Jan 1961-
2, p 40) 
Although her play Wish No More (1961) won the Playwrights 
Advisory Board Competition for Best Play, she still was 
unable to get the play produced or published. She describes 
the reactions of producers "who cry 'But you've got too many 
people—too many sets—and that wardrobe....' Words fail 
after that" (40-41). These responses to her play, which has 
"24 people in the cast (six major characters), several scene 
changes and requires—for four of the characters—an 
elaborate wardrobe" (40), at first made her feel apologetic. 
When she questioned producers about plays like Auntie Mame 
and The Women which both have large casts and costumes, she 
was told "oh, but that's different—that was successfully 
done overseas" (41). Her further research on American plays 
performed in Australia revealed that there were at least 
forty plays with casts ranging from fifteen to fifty-nine, 
and NIDA had staged You Can't Take It With You (cast 19) and 
Our Town (cast 28) , with no problems about cast size, sets or 
wardrobe costs. Dreyer wryly concludes: 
Of course, the obvious solution is to write a play set 
in the Simpson Desert with a cast of two (lm,lf) both 
of whom wear barrels, which would solve the problem of 
cast, sets and wardrobe. (41) 
Her satirical remark refers somewhat prophetically to the 
minimal set plays of Samuel Beckett, such as Happy Days or 
Waiting for Godot. 
Another issue involved with continued production is 
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publication. It is obvious that women who are participating 
in the "fringe" areas of theatre rarely receive attention 
from prestigious companies who possess the necessary capital 
to stage more publicly available larger productions, a factor 
which coincides with imminent publication. Bryony Lavery 
comments that though she has thirty pieces of work behind 
her, she does not have anything published and "I've recently 
come round to the idea that having my plays published would 
make them more available—so I feel I have a duty", but she 
adds that her problem with this is that newer work gets 
ignored in favor of the already published text (qtd. in Hinds 
28) . However, publication is important as a record since 
plays are rarely produced exactly as the written published 
text. Wandor, both playwright and critic, argues that it is 
critical for women to have their work published, "you don't 
have a history as a writer unless you're published, and if 
you don't get into history your work doesn't get done again" 
(qtd. in Hinds 30) . However, I have shown that even if women 
playwrights win awards or achieve publication, their texts 
still remain outside the drama discourse as constructed by 
anthologies and institutional curricula and, although 
publication does provide easier access to textual 
recuperation, texts often go out of print and are hard to 
locate in libraries or bookstores, so that the plays 
eventually stop being produced. Because plays by women are 
not represented as achieving sufficient recognition at the 
educational curriculum level, they do not become part of the 
common knowledge about theatre and fall into erasure. As 
Wandor says: 
We've got Shakespeare on our backs—great playwrights 
have always been very important to this country and 
they're all men. It needs a huge imaginative shift to 
allow women to take a place here, with the weight of 
such a tradition against them. (qtd. in Hinds 30) 
Such an imaginative shift is going to require extensive and 
imaginative analysis that examines tradition not as an 
essentially 'male' thing but as a predominantly male-defined 
structure which can be analysed and questioned; possessing a 
certain identity, philosophy, and methodology that has 
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constituted the standards of good form and dramatic subject 
in great drama. 
I am interested in studying the response to plays by 
women, not with women as a unifying category that functions 
to exclude others, but as a collective thread characterised 
by nonproduction, and erasure as a tool of dominance in 
discourse. The fact is that published plays by women have 
been successful and received distinguished awards and yet 
still remain out of the long term production in the 
intertextual field of discourse afforded by participation in 
the dramatic anthologies and educational curricula. This 
signifies a problem in how representation is controlled, not 
only for award winning plays but also for those that were 
successful in performance but never published, remembering 
also that the vast majority of plays by men in anthologies 
were not prize winners. This exclusion also signals the 
necessity to expose the crisis of representation itself as a 
dominant mode operating in language and the formation of 
traditional literary and social standards, since it has been 
used to proclaim objectivity, when in fact it is a mask for 
the subjectivity of those who control representation in 
various institutions of social production. The example of a 
lack of inclusion of recognised plays into the anthologies 
indicates that such representation is not simply mimetic of 
the field as it claims to be but, instead, creates the 
reality of modern drama history as chosen by those who 
control such selections in a mimesis of the identity inherent 
in a set of historical standards that the critics reproduce 
in their judgements. This offers a site of analysis which 
shifts the emphasis from the individual text to the process 
of nonproduction in the intertextual social field. The work 
of tracing erasure has led me to ask questions about the 
structures of representation itself; how has it been 
controlled to produce the authority of tradition such that 
some subjects have been promoted while others are excluded; 
and what effect has this had in the construction and 
maintenance of "naturalised" ideologies, for example, women 
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don't write plays? The continued use of the historical 
absence of women's texts as proof of lack of ability 
obviously ignores the assumed power of social institutions to 
define standards, prescribe ability, and then provide 
selective access to texts. Open to speculation is the degree 
to which anthological/curricular absence affects the 
construction of gender and the possibilities for writing 
ability, such that appearance begets erasure begets absence 
until absence becomes the dominant rule, with appearance the 
exception. 
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C). Reading Erasure: Field Theorv and Bridging the Canyon 
Preamble 
What is not there conditions what is, as surely as though it 
too were present. 
Christine Froula, "Quantum Physics/Postmodern Metaphysics: 
The Nature of Jacgues Derrida" 
In Section (C) I will summarise the traces of erasure from 
Sections (A) and (B) as the evidence which led me to certain 
theories of poststructuralism that I found relevant for 
utilising a deconstructive practice, and developing my 
philosophy of feminism. I have placed my discussion of 
practice, philosophical position and the poststructuralist 
theories of representation which have infonmed them at this 
point in the thesis for several reasons. On a theoretical 
level, I wanted to present the reader with the evidence of 
erasure first to show how the texts depend upon philosophical 
structures that lend themselves to deconstructive analysis, 
as well as to a critigue of prejudiced gender assumptions. 
As deconstruction is actually not a new form of literary 
criticism but a series of tactics and devices for analysing 
the structures and prejudices of philosophy, it is not a 
"position" per se from which one criticises art or determines 
meaning. As Ulmer points out in Applied Grammatology. 
Derrida deconstructs philosophical works, but he mimes 
literary or artistic texts (x) . Thus I did not choose a 
critical position first, for the purpose of applying it to a 
body of literature that I would call arttexts, like the 
plays. Rather it was the discovery of erasure that motivated 
me to investigate what makes erasure possible, using 
deconstruction to reread the philosophical literature which 
foinns the basis of the critical practices we read in the 
reviews and in the discourses that have affected women 
playwrights. To write an extended piece of work one must 
articulate a philosophical position early. However, it was 
not until I had actually read the plays; studied literary 
criticism, feminist theory and poststructuralist theories of 
representation; read the reviews and located a core 
opposition; and then employed a deconstructive reading 
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analysis through both the (hu)man and women's discourses that 
I arrived at a philosophical position in feminism in this 
text. My practice reflects an intersection of theories 
dealing with a critigue of language and gender that most 
closely aligns with poststructuralist feminism, which has 
implications for the practice of literary criticism and the 
defining of a feminist genre of drama that I will discuss 
further at the end of Part Three (C), "The Position Mission 
and the Anti-Canon". 
Secondly, I wanted to document the evidence of erasure as 
nonreception and how this has left traces in critical 
language and philosophical structures we can question, 
because this evidence has affected how I locate myself to do 
work in this text. Erasure is indicative of a (hu)man 
discourse whose identity is partially defined by the 
manufactured absence of women's texts and dialogue; a 
discourse that not only excludes contradiction (opposites) in 
the construction of identity but through its dualistic logic 
also excludes the middle way. Erasure indicates a refusal to 
dialogue across boundaries in a discourse that does not 
receive nor dialogue with women who are defined as inferior 
opposites. This discourse preserves a dominant presence 
through the erasure of texts, the repression of dialogue, and 
the resistance to critique via marginalisation, all practices 
that (re)produce and sustain the dominance of particular 
worldviews over others. My strategy for "reading erasure" 
then is a deconstructive practice of analysing the 
philosophical structures in the (hu)man discourse that 
underlie the prejudices, the dominant definition of power, 
and the way of thinking erasure reflects. However, for me, 
reading erasure also means to understand and theorise beyond 
erasure, and philosophically and imaginatively to dissolve 
the gender dichotomy it has produced. Though this dichotomy 
rests upon a metaphysical canyon of opposites, erasure occurs 
in a field of discourse where the very notion of opposite is 
questioned by interconnectivity and relativity; accordingly, 
in locating myself in this field of intertextuality I will 
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inhabit and read through the structures of both "sides". My 
work of bridging this dichotomous gender gulf is 
deconstructively to read and show that they are not opposite, 
but oppositional, as well as similar. Hopefully my text will 
establish a dialogue to bridge the representations that, by 
exaggerating difference, have excluded the resemblance which 
reminds us of the connectivity of this field. 
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The Evidence 
At this stage I will summarise the evidence and the 
picture of nonreception presented so far as it points to the 
necessity for a strategy to read erasure, and then discuss 
the theories that I feel offer a useful practice for 
addressing the structures which produce erasure and hence 
dominance in the field of discourse. The traces of erasure 
can be summarised as follows: 1) consistent gender biased 
language in reviews, based on binary opposites that privilege 
the masculine polarity and experiences, that classify plays 
by women as "women's", and that exclude reference to many 
themes represented in the plays; 2) a notion of universality 
that depends on a (hu)man/woman dichotomy, with the 
subseguent existence of two separate discourses that 
represent the academic canon canyon and the obvious 
repression of dialogue in the so-called human discourse; and 
3) the indication of power as control of representation 
instead of only "objective" standards. I see these traces as 
evidence of what Nelly Furman calls the "prejudices which 
create the authority of tradition in the first place", in her 
article "The Politics of Language: Beyond the Gender 
Principle": 
An unfortunate conseguence of the critics' efforts 
towards a separate, but equally valid, literary 
tradition is that they leave unquestioned some of the 
prejudices which create the authority of tradition in 
the first place. Among those notions unchallenged are: 
universal human experience, and reflection of 
experience in literary representation, (Making a 
Difference 63) 
The main prejudices that I will challenge in this thesis from 
the evidence are the masculinist notion of universal human 
experience, the notion of "real" experience as reflected in 
literary representation, and also the notion of power as 
dominance. These notions in philosophy have created the 
tradition of authority including erasure and the repression 
of dialogue in the formation of Knowledge, and this is the 
environment of the impossible position of the female artist 
who is caught between the definitions of two supposedly 
opposite discourses, the (hu)man and the women's. 
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The evidence of erasure as presented in Part One (A) and 
(B) supports the existence of a gender canyon in language 
that exists across the spectrum of literary, sociological, 
and philosophical discourses, where gender definitions from 
the social realm have been incorporated within the gender 
biased standards for judging "good" drama in literary 
critical practices. In this field of textuality where texts 
compete for production, the control of representation through 
biased standards and erasure means that certain 
representations of "reality" and "meaning" have been produced 
without full dialogue, effecting distortions not only in the 
academic "literary" discourse but also in the broader 
"sociological" discourse as they interrelate and (re)produce 
each other in what is represented as the intertextual field 
of human discourse. Thus the gender canyon—as reflected in 
the academic canon through the manufactured absence of 
women's texts, and by the representation which differentiates 
human plays from "women's" plays,—has established a false 
tradition of universal human experience that excludes 
dialogue with women as inferior opposites. 
As we have seen in Sections (A) and (B), the evidence of 
erasure as nonreception involves gender biased critical 
language and binary oppositional logic; these reflect 
philosophical structures in language and philosophy derived 
from Aristotelian western metaphysics that (re)produce a 
certain way of thinking about meaning and identity in the 
(hu)man discourse. However, it is also prejudice that forms 
the (hu)man/woman dichotomy; and it is the use of power to 
control representation in the support of gender biased 
assumptions, that makes erasure a tool of dominance in the 
manufactured absence of successful women playwrights from the 
dramatic discourse. Absence therefore is not only due to 
structures; the act of erasure reflects invisible 
discrimination and acts of power that are dispersed 
throughout the intertextual field of discourse. Thus finding 
a strategy for reading and removing erasure is like 
physicists finding the invisible, uncertain particles that 
89 
leave ghostly traces in bubble chambers. I have shown that 
gender bias and power moves exist because of the appearance 
and disappearance of successful plays by women, but due to 
the slipperiness of prejudice and dominance as thought 
patterns and belief systems, one can only get at these 
through the traces of the absent presence left behind in the 
process of manufacturing absence. This process can be 
detected as it occurs in the intertextual field of discourse 
through philosophical structures in language that attempt to 
exclude the field in various ways, one of which is to exclude 
contradiction (opposites) in the construction of identity and 
meaning. Here we can trace an(other) dimension of erasure as 
the refusal to dialogue across boundaries. However, the 
identity of the (hu)man discourse can be illuminated by 
comparing the manufactured absence of women from this 
discourse to the presence/absence theme of Derrida's trace, 
about which Christine Froula comments that "what is not there 
conditions what is, as surely as though it too were present", 
in her article "Quantum Physics/Postmodern Metaphysics: The 
Nature of Jacques Derrida" (300). Thus the (hu)man discourse 
is defined by its very acts of erasure, preserving a 
masculinist presence that includes the manufactured absence 
of women even when they are very successful; indicating a 
certain fear about identity, indicating a certain concept of 
power that we are long overdue to be rid of—dominance. 
To help eliminate dominance, we must be aware of its 
forms, its structures, and how these inhabit us, and here 
Froula quotes Barbara Johnson on the deconstructive ethos, 
"it's not what you don't know that can or cannot hurt you but 
what you don't know you don't know" (309). In this sense if 
we read through a drama anthology or a course curriculum and 
do not notice the manufactured absence of women playwrights, 
if we think it is natural, then we are unconscious victims of 
the dominance of erasure. We do not know we are being harmed 
because we do not know our thinking is being shaped by this 
manufacturing of absence. However, Froula goes on to say, 
"But it is not clear how, if at all, knowing that you don't 
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know what you don't know can save you, either" (309) . It may 
not be clear how we might be saved by knowing that erasure 
has occurred, but whereas once we might not bump into 
absence, by learning to read for erasure, we can recognise 
when we bump into a tool of dominance and have the 
possibility of mobilising to remove it, which might save us. 
Given that we are all affected by the intertextual field of 
discourse which we enter through language, where everything 
participates in textuality, and where everything can be read 
as a text, then understanding the control of language and 
representation is of the utmost importance in addressing 
dominance. In this field of textuality where representation 
shapes our perception and belief systems, it is necessary to 
understand the structures that we inhabit, that inhabit us, 
that form social paradigms and notions of reality, so as not 
to be victims of invisible dominance but to be aware of the 
structures that produce dominance. I feel it is important 
that we become fluent readers and not victims of erasure, by 
studying its methodologies, philosophical structures, and the 
politics of those who use it so that when we critique 
dominance, we do not mimic it, nor embody it, but instead 
transform it by our very practice. 
Reading the Evidence 
In addressing the evidence of nonreception where erasure 
means exclusion from "objective" structures that supposedly 
represent the dramatic field, I have employed an intersection 
of theories from the discourses of feminism, 
poststructuralism and quantum physics in developing a 
philosophical position and a strategy for reading these 
structures. In various ways these discourses have offered a 
critique of strict objectivity, articulated the limitations 
of structures, and emphasised interconnectedness, or what I 
refer to as field theory, an approach that supports 
poststructuralist feminism and deconstruction as a useful way 
of reading structures, erasure and dominance in the 
intertextual field of discourse. However, this intersection 
is a largely unacknowledged interrelationship in 
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poststructuralist thought that I will discuss later in Words 
Across Discourses. 
FTP-Id Theorv 
In physics, field is defined as "an area over which a 
force or influence is exerted" but with quantum physics, the 
limits of this concept have been expanded to include the 
notion of a larger interrelated field. In the sciences, this 
has led to a shift in the dominant mechanistic worldview from 
object to relationship, which, by analogy, has affected 
conventional thinking in philosophy as well as informing 
other discourses. Thus the metaphor of field has been used 
to describe the intertextual field of discourse which affects 
us through language, and it has been applied within a 
feminist analysis that describes the field of interrelated 
gender and social power structures. 
Ulmer points out that both Derrida and physicist/poet 
Bachelard were influenced by theories of quantum physics. 
According to Ulmer, Bachelard from the early thirties was 
stating that the new physics "rendered conventional thinking 
in philosophy obsolete" (Ulmer 26) . Ulmer goes on to show 
that in "White Mythology" Derrida allies his operation with 
Bachelard: 
Derrida's borrowing, by way of analogy (as he 
stresses), of Godel's notion of undecidability to 
characterize his own "guasi-concepts," not to mention 
the Einsteinian or fourth dimensional (space-time 
synthesis) tone of differance itself, which at once 
"differs" (spatial) and "defers" (temporal), indicates 
his sympathy for Bachelard's project. (26) 
Ulmer goes on to say that Bachelard's favourite examples were 
the microphysics of Heisenberg and Bohr which concern: 
the uncertainty principle and the complementarity 
principle—having to do with the nature of light, 
which behaves sometimes as a particle and sometimes as 
a wave. Keeping in mind that light is the philosophic 
metaphor, any change in our understanding of its 
nature should affect its analogical extensions in such 
concepts as form and theory, (emphasis mine; 26) 
Thus the change from a concept of light as a particle to the 
concept of light as simultaneously possessing the ability to 
transform into either a particle or a wave, has affected "the 
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philosophic metaphor" with respect to form and theory, 
shifting from object to interrelated field. In her talk, 
"Women in Science" on ABC Radio, Louise Crossley, who has a 
Ph.D. in Physics and in the History and Philosophy of 
Science, quotes physicist Fritjof Capra from The Tao of 
Physics: 
To the naive realist the universe is a collection of 
objects. To the quantum physicist, it is an 
inseparable web of vibrating energy patterns in which 
no one component has a reality independent of the 
whole and included in this whole, is the observer. 
(Ockham's Razor, 14 June 1987) 
Crossley also discusses the nature of light as being crucial 
to a change in our understanding of objectivity, replacing 
the subject/object duality of the observer with the 
subjective participator as the key figure: 
Far from being a mechanical clock, or a set of 
building blocks whose parts add up to the whole, this 
world is more accurately described as a network of 
relationships in which the observer is a key figure. 
No longer can the scientist stand on the outside, 
objectively looking on. To see anything of this world 
the observer has to become part of the experiment. 
Depending upon what questions the observer asks about 
light, he gets a particle or a wave answer, (emphasis 
mine, Ockham's) 
Crossley, along with the work of Bachelard and Ulmer, concurs 
on the analogical implications for changes in our mechanistic 
worldview, suggested by the findings of quantxim physics: 
So quantum physics has made two fundamental changes to 
the dominant mechanistic worldview of science and 
technology. It has made subjectivity respectable, and 
shattered the myth of objective consciousness, and it 
has restored relationship not object as the central 
metaphor. (Ockham's) 
Ulmer and Bachelard also point to the implications for a 
different way of thinking, particularly with respect to 
logic: 
Thinking in Einstein's universe, Bachelard stated, 
requires a new logic that breaks with all absolutes, 
whether Newtonian or Hegelian but especially a logic 
that frees itself from the identity principle (the 
principle of noncontradiction and the excluded middle) 
of Aristotelian logic. The basic feature of this 
nonAristotelian logic (to accomplish for the concept 
what nonEuclidean geometry and nonNewtonian physics 
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accomplished for the object) would be a three-valued 
operation, including, in addition to the usual "true" 
and "false" values, a value labeled "absurd". (26) 
In Aristotelian logic, identity or meaning constructed 
according to the law of noncontradiction eliminates 
contradictions, defined as opposite or oppositional, in order 
to mcOce a "true" or meaningful proposition. However, with 
field theory, there are no strict opposites, only 
interrelated and relative positions in the field. Therefore 
identity is recognised as not unified, but multiple, not just 
conscious but unconscious, and always evolving through 
interaction in a field of relationships. Thus the qualities 
that are regarded as opposites are seen to co-exist within 
entities, appearing and disappearing according to cultural 
conditioning, through the use of repression or encouragement. 
As Johnson puts it: 
While traditionalists say that a thing cannot be both 
A and not-A, deconstructors open up ways in which A is 
necessarily but unpredictably already different from 
A. (World of Difference 14) 
Additionally, a logic that "breaks with" all absolutes 
exposes a crisis in a theory of representation that claims 
its authority from a dependence upon absolutes. However, 
with or without the illusion of absolutes, representation 
cannot reflect the 'Real' because the act of re-presenting in 
and of itself can only participate in constructing partial 
'realities'. In this sense, then, all representation is a 
fiction of sorts with an inevitable quality of subjectivity 
in the most objective attempts at representing 'reality'. 
And in another sense, all representations are real, in that 
they are valid textual constructs. Therefore, Bachelard's 
theory of representation is one that does not abandon, but 
reorients away from, empirical or experiential reality; 
asking that representation reflect not only "as if" but give 
way to a practice of reflecting "why not", thus dissolving 
the prejudice of "real" experience over "mere" imagination. 
Ulmer believes this might lead to a different organisation of 
pedagogical and social practice: 
Indeed the lesson of the new science,..suggests that 
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theoretical fictions organised into a pedagogy that 
would collapse the distinctions separating teaching, 
research, and art might have also the power to guide 
transformations of the lived, social world. (Ulmer 27) 
Thus field theory points to a way of thinking that does not 
negate but "breaks with" the limitations of structures, like 
objectivity, identity, and Aristotelian logic, because the 
concept of field is a principle that adds onto and goes 
beyond the limitations of dualistic thinking and oppositional 
logic to include the "excluded middle". Erasure, on the 
other hand, reflects a way of thinking that manipulates 
meaning and "reality", by controlling representation such 
that certain texts are circulated in the intertextual field 
and contribute to "reality constructs", while others do not, 
with the subsequent dominance of particular worldviews over 
others. 
Using the analogy of field theory then, poststructuralism 
can be seen as an attempt to become conscious of the notion 
of relativity and subjectivity in language as a field, where 
representation as a structure participates in constructing 
rather than reflecting "reality". Understanding language as 
a field also displaces the location of meaning, such that 
representation does not contain meaning but produces it in 
the process of communication. The major limitation for 
representation is that as a structure it restricts what is 
multi-dimensional by locating in a static form that which is 
in fact a dynamic process of dialogue and interaction: i.e. 
communication. But the static view of meaning as concretely 
located in language and representation rather than as 
produced through dialogue and communication is only due to a 
particular framework of communication, according to Michael 
Reddy's article "The Conduit Metaphor": 
English has a preferred framework for conceptualizing 
communication, and can bias thought process toward 
this framework, even though nothing more than common 
sense is necessary to devise a different, more 
accurate framework. (285) 
He goes on to argue that certain phrases like "try to get 
your thoughts across better" or "you still haven't given me 
any idea of what you mean" (286), suggest that communication 
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is transferring thought processes "somehow bodily" using 
language. If language does transfer thoughts to others, then 
the logical container or vehicle for these thoughts is words 
and word groups like sentences. This language construct 
implies that words have insides and outsides, with the two 
areas of communication difficulty being the insertion and 
extraction process: 
After all, if thoughts can be 'inserted' there must be 
a space 'inside' wherein the meaning can reside ... A 
moment's reflection should nudge anyone into 
remembering that 'content' is a term used almost 
synonymously with 'ideas' and 'meaning' ... Numerous 
expressions make it clear that English does view words 
as containing or failing to contain thoughts, 
depending on the success or failure of the speaker's 
'insertion' process. (288) 
This inner/outer definition of meaning as being "in" words 
reveals that problems in communication then are attributed to 
the fault of the writer/speaker who has not inserted the 
meaning correctly, or the audience/reader who has not 
extracted the meaning correctly. By this definition the 
successful transfer of exact thought in language has failed 
due to either faulty transmission or reception. But this 
view of language reduces communication and the production of 
meaning from a back and forth process of dialogue to a simple 
linear transfer. Derrida discusses this linear definition of 
communication in Of Grammatology: 
We have seen that the traditional concept of time, an 
entire organization of the world and of language, was 
bound up with it (the linearity of the symbol) . 
Writing in the narrow sense—and phonetic writing 
above all—is rooted in a past of nonlinear writing. 
It had to be defeated, and here one can speak, if one 
wishes, of technical success ... but that was not done 
one single time, A war was declared, and a suppression 
of all that resisted linearization was installed, (85) 
Representation is not in fact communication itself—and 
without the associated process of dialogue—it is simply a 
reductionist activity that endlessly reproduces its own 
structural limitations, regardless of who or what uses it as 
a mode of communication. It is therefore important to have 
free dialogue in the human discourse in order to construct 
dynamic meanings by collaboration in the intertextual field. 
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rather than the repression of dialogue by erasure. 
In summary then, the field theory approach to philosophy 
offers a critique of traditional notions of representation, 
objective authority, identity, logic, meaning, position, and 
power which I apply in my deconstructive readings of Part Two 
(the (hu)man discourse), and Part Three (the women's 
discourse), to address the following. Firstly, a tradition 
that privileges masculinist interpretations, definitions and 
experiences of "reality" in the assumption of authority 
indicates a prejudice of gender, but also depends upon a 
notion of objective reality where experience can be reflected 
as "real" in literary representation. This can be addressed 
by a poststructuralist critique of "objective knowledge" 
which expands beyond a theory of representation.that depends 
upon reflecting a "real" or "essential" Nature of Absolutes, 
to one where representation constructs rather than imitates 
"reality" in a competing field of intertextuality. Secondly, 
discourse means to hold forth and to converse "in a back and 
forth movement" (i.e. dialogue), yet the (hu)man discourse 
has defined itself by the manufactured absence of dialogue 
with women. Again, this indicates gender prejudice, but the 
structures which limit and control meaning in discourse can 
be addressed by poststructuralist theories that critique the 
limitations of representation in language; these theories 
dislocate meaning from containment in the word to a more 
nonlinear process of communication where dialogue becomes a 
necessary feature in the ongoing process of producing meaning 
in any field of discourse. Thirdly, the core opposition 
between (hu)man and woman can be addressed by using 
deconstruction which I will discuss as a nonAristotelian 
critique of philosophical structures like the identity 
principle and the law of non-contradiction; structures that 
depend upon a metaphysics of binary oppositional logic which 
excludes the field through the elimination of contradiction 
(opposites), and the excluded middle. Finally, as for the 
prejudices that produce dichotomy by privileging one so-
called opposite over another, and the notion of power as 
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dominance to support these prejudices, these depend upon an 
emotional way of thinking that exaggerates difference rather 
than resemblance in the construction and preservation of 
identity and meaning. As Alice Jardine writes, this is a 
historical reaction to difference that needs to be rethought: 
At this point it seems impossible to think difference 
without thinking it aggressively or defensively. But 
think it we must, because if we don't, it will 
continue to think us, as it has since Genesis at the 
very least, (qtd. in Johnson, emphasis mine; 1) 
In reading erasure of difference, I sought a philosophical 
strategy which did not mimic the power structures nor the 
critical practices that have produced the aggression/defense 
response; a practice that not only analyses or critiques the 
prejudices, but transforms the way of thinking reflected by 
erasure as the manufactured absence of dialogue with 
difference that demands an end to dominance. While I use 
deconstruction as a strategy of reading that unravels the 
metaphysical assumptions of philosophical texts, it is the 
field theory of interrelationship as it occurs across several 
discourses (including feminism, physics and 
poststructuralism) that allows us to think beyond dominance 
as the historical reaction to difference and to evolve beyond 
the concept of power over others based on a notion of 
separateness. Field thinking allows us to theorise a broader 
concept of identity and ideology, in order to develop a 
definition of shared power based on interconnectedness, which 
merges with aspects of feminist theory that challenge the 
dichotomies of gender construction, critique hierarchical 
structures and the public/private split, and theorise 
collective forms of power. 
My philosophy of feminism is concerned with social and 
philosophical structures, and how they produce dominance, 
with an emphasis on, but not limited to, the oppression of 
women as it involves gender, race, or class. For this 
reason, in my definition of feminism anyone can "be" a 
feminist or participate in the "work" of feminism, since I do 
not link being a feminist with an essential prequisite of 
being female. For the purpose of "reading" the structures of 
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erasure I am most interested in a poststructuralist critique 
of language, philosophy, and ways of thinking. However, my 
understanding of feminism has been informed by aspects of 
socialist feminist theory which critique structures of 
gender, race and class, as well as elements of radical 
feminism that also suggest a transformation of power 
structures. Because of my focus on structural transformation 
I am not interested in women having only an equal share of a 
hierarchical pie, although to change structures it is often 
said that one needs to work from within. However, it could 
be equally said that starting one's own structures or models 
of organisation may be easier, as long as they don't mimic 
the very forms of oppression which feminist thinkers have 
spent so much energy analysing, like the weight.of tradition 
for example. As for the move to establish a female 
tradition, I think it is necessary to recuperate the texts of 
women to address the imbalance of the (hu)man discourse, but 
I will also argue in Section Three that to set up a woman's 
or feminist canon based on the structural principles which 
established the judgement strategies of the masculinist 
tradition is a move that mimicks rather than transforms. I 
support any movement to redefine gender in more positive and 
balanced ways, i.e. through dialogue, and not dominance, in 
discourse. This will probably not occur in a discourse where 
women's voices have been silenced, and it may not be able to 
occur in a discourse where women have tried to create a more 
receptive environment, but I do feel that to bridge the 
gender canyon such dialogue will have to occur some where, 
some time, in order to eventually give up the opposition 
between men and women as opposite humans. 
I assume a practice/position in this text then that most 
closely aligns with poststructuralist feminism which I 
understand as a "beyond gender" perspective of language, 
engaging in critiques of structures that produce dominance, 
but without naming everything as if it had a sex, e.g. "male" 
theory, "women's" plays, white "male" text, power is 
masculine, etc. This approach is also involved in a critique 
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of the practice of literary criticism itself, as it seeks to 
avoid the essentialist gender principles and power politics 
of the (hu)man discourse that have privileged biology and 
"Nature" to claim superiority and power, as will be discussed 
in Part Two. My practice in this text, as informed by the 
field aspect of these intersecting discourses, suggests a 
methodology of reading through both discourses in the work of 
analysing and addressing nonreception, the gender canyon, and 
erasure. Confronting this gender canyon has in a sense 
required me to be a bridge, whereby I can analyse and 
dissolve the prejudiced binary opposites surrounding the 
(hu)man/woman dichotomy by tracing the philosophical 
methodologies in discourse that have affected the reception 
and nonreception of women playwrights. To do this I use 
deconstruction as a strategy of rereading certain 
foundational texts in the dramatic discourse, since 
deconstruction participates in a critique of western 
philosophy that reveals the limitations of its oppositional, 
essentialist metaphysics. By reading deconstructively 
through both discourses, my text provides a dialogue that 
questions the definitional boundaries of these seemingly 
opposite discourses; clarifying their difference, locating 
their sameness, and questioning the essentialist and 
dualistic philosophies as they occur, both in the gender 
biased standards of the (hu)man discourse, and in the 
positions and judgement strategies of the "women's" discourse 
where they mimic the structural principles of the (hu)man 
discourse. 
As there seems to be no real consensus on what 
poststructuralist thought is, other than referring to the 
works of certain people, and there is probably similar 
confusion around the term poststructuralist feminism with 
respect to position and practice, in the next part of this 
chapter I will address this confusion through a discussion of 
my understanding of poststructuralist thought as a phenomenon 
related to field theory that is occurring across several 
discourses. This will be done through a reading of what 
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Johnson calls "the simplified understandings" and 
misrepresentations which have reduced and marginalised the 
politics of deconstruction as an adjunct to, rather than a 
transformation of, literary criticism; in much the same way 
that feminism has been homogeneously reduced and its 
political implications marginalised as an adjunct to, rather 
than a transformation of, power structures. Lastly, I will 
define deconstruction and parasitical readings, not as a new 
form of literary criticism, not as a critical position to 
authoritatively judge art, but as a strategy to reread the 
textual structures of philosophy and literary criticism that 
have judged art, and specifically for this thesis, the plays 
of women. 
Words Across Discourses/Feminism, Physics. Poststructuralism 
In Nothing Mat ft)ers by Somer Brodribb, she offers a 
"feminist critigue of postmodernism" and early on claims: 
There is no clear conception of the meanings of 
poststructuralism and postmodernism, their relation, 
distinction or significance. Profoundly elusive, 
purposively ambiguous, these are terms which are not 
used systematically, and about which there is no 
consensus. Yet they have come to dominate the 
critical and cultural landscape. (8) 
Although what Brodribb says may be true, I don't think it is 
true of only poststructuralism. One of the main points of 
poststructuralist thought is that there will be a lack of 
clarity in any form of static representation since meaning is 
an ongoing process, and that it is only dialogue that helps 
us to overcome this limitation. I agree there are texts that 
mystify, and negative representations that sxirround, 
poststructuralism which I think do dominate the landscape— 
e.g. it negates feminism or any position, it is nihilistic 
quietism, it is apolitical, or it involves only a few male 
writers in literary theory— representations that I will 
address throughout this thesis. The misperception that 
poststructuralist thought is only occupied by males in the 
discourse of literary theory, is due to the lack of 
recognition of a shift in thinking which is occurring across 
several discourses in the intertextual field; this is brought 
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about by a lack of dialogue, one of the salient signs of 
erasure and dominance in discourse. 
In her critique of postmodernism, Brodribb points out 
several common misunderstandings of poststructuralist 
thought, starting with the obvious lack of consensus except 
for a few men's names. Young in his Preface to Untying the 
Text writes: 
There is no a great deal of consensus about what, if 
anything, post-structuralism is, apart perhaps from 
the recognition that it involves the work of Derrida. 
(gtd. in Brodribb 8) 
As I argued earlier, this lack of consensus would be true of 
most discourses, however. Young is highlighting the lack of 
understanding that does surround poststructuralist thought. 
For instance, Brodribb guotes Elspeth Probyn on the 
definition of postmodernism as: 
the end of history; the implosion of meaning, the 
negation of totality and coherence; 'the body without 
organs'; the death of the referent; the end of the 
social; and the absence of politics" (qtd. in Brodribb 
11) 
Yet these rather dramatic statements represent an almost 
hysterical reaction to what is, after all, people talking 
about theory. Froula, Johnson and Young try to ground 
poststructuralist thought, not as a negation or death, but as 
a critique of the limits of structuralism and the binary 
metaphysics of philosophy. Froula describes Derrida's work 
on metaphysics: 
Derrida's project in Of Grammatology is to expose 'the 
closure. I do not say the end' of western metaphysics 
by means of a critique of the sign, the word, and 
writing, (qtd in Froula 289) 
This closure is not the end of all history, meaning, or 
politics but a closure of the way metaphysics has been seen 
which thus expands our concepts of representation, meaning, 
history, and politics beyond a dependency on the binary 
structure. 
Similar criticisms attack textuality and theories of 
representation, equating the death of the 'real' referent 
with the end of the world as we know it. There is still 
obviously a notion of 'reality', but there is a 
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misunderstanding between giving up an 'absolute' objective 
reality, and acknowledging subjective, relative 'realities' 
which are constructed through the control of representation 
and belief systems in the intertextual field that we are all 
connected with through language. As Johnson points out: 
To say, as Derrida has said, that there is nothing 
outside the text is not to say that the reader should 
read only one piece of literature in isolation from 
history, biography, and so on. It is to say that 
nothing can be said to be not a text, subject to the 
differance, the nonimmediacy, of presence or 
meaning... (Johnson 14) 
Here Johnson alludes to the way texts are subject to 
differance, a term that reflects the process of meaning as it 
is never quite closed but always being deferred and always 
differing in the ongoing process of dialogue and intertextual 
play. Yet Brodribb sees this as "masturbation" and the end 
of sense: 
Deconstruction is a certain masturbation with the 
text, playing with the terms at hand. Derrida 
demonstrates the careful, contingent manipulation of 
meanings and the endless deferral of sense. (Brodribb 
8) 
In a critigue of the way philosophical structures determine 
meaning through rules of logic to make "sense" and order, it 
is part of Derrida's operation on these structures to expose 
"sense" as an ongoing process of evolution and not closed up 
by logic; also that there are different kinds of sense, more 
related to poetry and association, like nonsense, or 
commonsense, etc. It is not that language never means, it is 
just an understanding of it as a process. It is possible to 
perceive the history of literary criticism as a struggle 
going on for the location of a unified site of meaning in 
language, which has alternated between confining the place of 
interpretation to the text, and/or the author, and/or the 
reader, or the structure and form of the writing, but always 
with the dualistic setup of object (the text) and subject 
(the interpreter). However, the process of producing meaning 
through communication and dialogue goes beyond object and 
subject, intersecting with the field of language in ways we 
may never understand. As Johnson argues, language is a 
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process in a field, and resists the strict dualistic 
interpretability which functions as the essence of criticism: 
This does not mean that language never means, but 
rather than beyond the apparent meaning, and even 
beyond the suppressed or hidden meanings (unconscious, 
poetic, ideological, counterdiscursive), there can 
always be a residue of functioning—which produces 
effects—that is not a sign of anything, but merely 
the outcome of linguistic rules, or even of 'the 
absolute randomness of language.' (6) 
Brodribb finally attacks deconstruction as being against 
feminism, which is a misunderstanding of poststructuralist 
thought around the notion of position: 
But mostly, deconstruction means never having to say 
you're wrong. Or a feminist. As Derrida likes it: 'I 
am not against feminism, but I am not simply for 
feminism'...Deconstruction hopes to endlessly defer 
feminism. (Brodribb 9) 
I will talk more later about deconstruction as a practice 
that is less involved with right/wrong or good/bad judgement 
strategies and more concerned with critiques of structural 
limitations. However, it is simplistic to say that 
deconstruction means never having a position, or never being 
a feminist. We cannot help but have positions in the field 
of discourse and ideology, it is just that we are more than 
one fixed position, and this interrelatedness is never just 
a simplistic binary opposite position. I think Brodribb 
makes too harsh a judgement since the way I read Derrida is 
that he is not against feminism, but he is also not "simply" 
(here read only) for feminism either. This is perhaps why 
you get some critics describing people like Spivak as 
Marxist, Feminist, Deconstructionist critics; they find it 
hard to "box" them into an easily recognisable position. 
Yet in the midst of all this negation Brodribb does 
acknowledge that Young finds an expansion beyond rather than 
a nothingness, a critique of fundamental concepts that 
indicates a shift to a broader awareness of the field of 
language and meaning, as opposed to the nothingness or 
Nothing Mat ft)ers that titles her text: 
Poststructuralism, then, involves a shift from meaning 
to staging, or from the signified to the 
signifier,,,Broadly, however, it involves a critique 
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of metaphysics (of the concepts of causality, of 
identity, of the subject, and of truth), of the theory 
of the sign, and the acknowledgement and incorporation 
of psychoanalaytic modes of thought. In brief, it may 
be said that poststructuralism fractures the serene 
unity of the stable sign and the unified subject. In 
this respect, the 'theoretical' reference points of 
poststructuralism can be best mapped via the work of 
Foucault, Lacan and Derrida, who in different ways 
have pushed structuralism to its limits and shown how 
its most radical premises open it up to its own 
deconstruction. (emphasis mine, qtd. in Brodribb 7) 
I agree with Young that poststructuralism represents a shift 
rather than a negation, but here we can also see traces of 
erasure, in that poststructuralist thought, although 
occurring across contemporary discourses, is nevertheless 
attributed to the works of three people, as if they were the 
only ones pushing structuralism to its limits. What Derrida 
has done with language and the metaphyics of philosophy as 
structures, Ulmer argues that the life sciences, mathematics, 
and quantum physics have also done, expanding beyond the 
absolutes and mechanistic concepts of an "objective" reality 
to the interconnectedness of systems theories and an 
interrelated field; as indeed feminism or the "discourse of 
Woman" has also done by developing a critique of the 
interrelationship between gender and social power structures. 
I see poststructuralism as referring to structure and 
including the field beyond structure—and though these 
discourses are different, they are interrelated in that they 
critique the limitations of structures which have excluded 
the field, asking: on what premises, what notions of 
authority or tradition, what assximptions or claims to 
"objective reality", what prejudices, and what effects have 
these structures had in the intertextual field of discourse? 
Their common thread is the "beyond structure" or 
Interconnectedness aspect of what I call field theory as it 
occurs across various contemporary discourses. So we do get 
a mix of words from other discourses which Derrida uses as 
forces to be applied to his project in language; for example, 
the feminine force, the life science force, the quantum 
physics force; but what has not been developed is the 
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dialogue that would acknowledge the interrelationship of 
these theories as they occur in other discourses. 
Meaghan Morris points out in The Pirate's Fianc6e that 
female theorists do not appear in literary theory collections 
but are congregated within their own feminist collections, 
which I discuss in Part Three as the separatism of feminist 
literary criticism and men. However, it is worth mentioning 
here to indicate the separation between male and female 
theorists, and therefore the lack of dialogue which could 
have led to an understanding of how these theories have 
developed in context with each other. Froula points out that 
Derrida was influenced by the discourse of quantum physics, 
and borrows freely from its "force" with his "trace": 
Further, I am arguing that both the concept of the 
trace and its metaphysics are extrapolated from 
quantum physical descriptions of subatomic events, 
i.e, that Derrida's is a metaphysics in the most 
literal sense—a situation to which he alludes in 
saying that his choice of the word trace (from the 
"trace" of the electron moving through the cloud 
chamber) has been imposed by 'a certain number of 
contemporary discourses whose force I intend to take 
into account,, ,the word trace establishes the clearest 
connections with them', (gtd, in Froula 312) 
Although Ulmer states that Derrida uses quantum physics by 
analogy, he was also motivated by the life sciences, as well 
as the discourse of Woman where Derrida says: 
We need to find some way to proceed strategically. 
Starting with deconstruction of phallogocentrism, and 
using the feminine force, so to speak, in this move 
and then—and this would be the second stage or second 
level—to give up the opposition between men and 
women, (emphasis mine; Men in Feminism 194) 
Although Derrida is "using" the feminine as a force so to 
speak, we might ask questions about how that use occurs. 
Where is the location of the theoretical discourse of Woman, 
i.e. the discourse of feminism, as it has been trying to 
dismantle male dominant hierarchical structures for quite 
some time? Has there been a borrowing, i.e. a serious 
dialogue, with the force of that discourse? Leslie Rabine 
argues not, saying that theory has been appropriated as male 
defined, privileging itself by the exclusion of women's 
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participation in the discourse of theory: 
My examination of the implicit deconstructive notions 
in Chodorow's work suggests a double conclusion. It 
suggests, on the one hand, that certain deconstructive 
concepts and strategies might lead us to new and 
deeper insights in feminist analysis. It also on the 
other hand, raises questions about our academic and 
intellectual institutions, in which deconstruction and 
other male poststructuralist theories receive general 
credit and recognition for discoveries when parallel 
discoveries, developed in feminist theory, but couched 
in a different code and, more pertinently, written by 
women, go unnoticed and unknown, (emphasis added, 16-
17) 
In this sense of using the feminine as a force, Derrida has 
also used other forces from contemporary discourses in 
constructing his own strategic practice, now referred to as 
deconstruction, but this "use" does not necessarily recognise 
a theoretical interrelationship. Spivak, who first 
translated Derrida into English, also suggests there is an 
unspoken interrelationship: 
Over the last few years, however, I have also begun to 
see that, rather than deconstruction simply opening a 
way for feminists, the figure and discourse of women 
opened the way for Derrida as well. (In other Worlds 
84) 
While Froula is mainly concerned with the interrelationship 
between quantum physics and deconstruction, she also suggests 
that poststructuralist thought is a model that is occurring 
across many discourses: 
"Quantum physics is the scientific prototype—as the 
movements toward abstract forms for painting, 
sculpture, music, and poetry along with such 
theoretical texts as Wilhelm worringer's Abstraction 
and Empathy and Ernest Fenollosa's The Chinese Written 
Character as a Medium for Poetry are aesthetic 
prototypes—for Derrida's critique of the western 
writing founded upon belief in the logos, in the logic 
and reason of linear writing/language". (288) 
The important point here is to understand how words across 
discourses become forces, metaphors, or prototypes as Froula 
terms it, not to prove an absolute truth, but to highlight an 
interrelated process of 'reality' constructions—ways of 
thinking—as they are occurring across the field of 
intertextuality. 
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Poststructuralist thought is a prototype that is shared 
by several discourses, yet Brodribb attacks poststructuralist 
feminists, such as Meese, who are making these connections by 
accusing them of betraying feminism: 
There is an identity politics to feminist 
poststructuralism: an identification with the (white) 
male text. Elizabeth Meese, for example writes: 'When 
gender is the focus of examining difference, 
deconstructive criticism might even be said to be 
identical with the feminist project' (gtd. in Brodribb 
xxiv) 
If poststructuralist thought and deconstruction point to the 
closure of a binary metaphysics in the field of language and 
philosophy, if feminist writers and physicists are also 
engaged in pointing to the interconnectedness of the field of 
interrelationship with different definitions and structures 
of power, it would be far more positive to dialogue and 
colloborate rather than engage in the need to prove origin or 
superiority of project. There is a need for feminist study 
and criticism to undo the foundations of thinking that 
produce erasure and dominance, but not so that we reproduce 
those very structures ourselves or ignore others who are also 
attempting the same project. 
Brodribb presents a well documented case that within 
poststructuralism and postmodernism there is a lot of talk 
about no absolute referent, no meaning, death of this and 
death of that, if no opposition then no position and no 
politics, if no essentialism then no grounding ourselves in 
our female experiences of oppression. Yet I maintain these 
are all either/or arguments and predictable 
misrepresentations of poststructuralist thought which is 
attempting to go beyond a logic based on a metaphysics of 
binary opposition. It is hard to give up opposition if that 
is our only experience. For the sake of clarity, there is 
essence, there is nature, there is biology; I don't think 
even Derrida would deny this if indeed he has been motivated 
from the life sciences. The point is that we do not use 
essence or biology or experience to claim superiority and 
authority, i.e. "natural" white male dominance, or its mirror 
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reversal, female superiority. We have and must continue to 
articulate our experiences in the daily struggle to transform 
oppressive social structures, but our politics doesn't have 
to be organised only around a woman's body, or the colour of 
skin. Our experiences are not only based on biology but are 
also culturally constructed, so we can have a politics that 
critiques oppression wherever, whenever and through whatever 
structures, it occurs. Theory is not male, representation is 
not patriarchal per se, they are tools and anyone can use 
them, but we do need an understanding of their structural 
limitations and a different logic of the field to go beyond 
binary oppositional judgement strategies. I submit that to 
give up the gender opposition in language and in our heads, 
we need a nongendered analysis to move beyond a platform of 
sex, race, or class as an essential, or natural claim to 
power over others. In bridging the gender canyon we probably 
have to continue creating the chain across one link at a 
time, but these links must come from both sides in the 
process of giving up the belief system of males and females 
as opposite humans. 
Deconstruction 
In this section I will present the relationship of field 
theory to poststructuralist thought as it supports the 
practice of deconstruction, and discuss my application of 
parasitical readings using deconstruction as a strategy that 
inhabits and unravels the text as opposed to a methodology of 
literary criticism to be applied to art. 
In the field of intertextuality, the boundaries of books 
are transgressed through the acts of reading and memory, such 
that in writing there is constant reference to the field, 
with quotations, footnotes, etc. Therefore any original 
location for "thought" becomes problematic, as does regarding 
the text as totally separate from the field of other texts. 
In Applied Grammatology Ulmer points out that as a strategy 
for analysing philosophical texts, deconstruction questions 
and unravels the binary opposites and dualistic logic of 
textual structures that exclude the field through 
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contradiction, in order to support their own assumptions, 
meanings, and identity: 
The philosophical work is treated as an object of 
study, which is analytically articulated by locating 
and describing the gap or discontinuity separating 
what the work 'says' (its conclusions and 
propositions) from what it 'shows' or 'displays' (its 
examples, data, the materials with which it, in turn, 
is working). (xi) 
With the understanding of field theory as connectedness, and 
that structures by their form and identity attempt to exclude 
this connectivity with the field, the purpose of 
deconstructive practice is to show up the limitations of 
these structures, as they attempt to exclude the field in 
order to set themselves up as a separate or unified, and 
usually, privileged, identity. As Derrida writes: 
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy 
structures from the outside. They are not possible and 
effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by 
inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a 
certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the 
more so when one does not suspect it. Operating 
necessarily from the inside, borrowing all from the 
old structure...the enterprise of deconstruction 
always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. 
(Of G-raTfiTTiatology. p 24, italics in original) 
When Derrida refers to deconstruction using words like 
"destroy" or "take accurate aim" I believe the intentions of 
deconstruction can be misleading, since my interpretation of 
its purpose is not a desire to destroy them as texts but to 
inhabit them for their boundary limitations. When Derrida 
talks of inhabiting the structures from the inside, to me 
this means that once one is in language, one is within the 
mediating structure of representation, and so one is also 
subject to the structures of philosophy in the field of 
discourse. However, when Derrida says that in deconstruction 
one inhabits the structures in a certain way^ my 
understanding of this is that one inhabits, but not to mimic 
its structural principles and metaphysics. The project of 
poststructuralism is not to negate structure or binary 
opposites but to critique their limits, so that if 
structuralist thought establishes meaning through form and 
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content, deconstruction does not negate form but looks at 
meaning as form and process; if structuralism operates with 
a metaphysics of binary opposites and a logic of 
noncontradiction, then deconstruction points to the field 
beyond that metaphysics, where interconnectedness and 
relativity disturb such philosophical structures and the 
critical practices based on it. This is what Johnson refers 
to as the very radicality of deconstruction: 
In other words, if not absolute, then relative; if not 
objective, then subjective; if you are not for 
something, you are against it. Now, my understanding 
of what is most radical in deconstruction is precisely 
that it questions this basic logic of binary 
opposition, but not in a simple. binary. or 
antagonistic way. fA World of Difference. 12) 
Johnson writes about deconstruction which as a word resists 
the opposition of destruction/construction: 
Instead of a simple either/or structure, 
deconstruction attempts to elaborate a discourse that 
says neither either/or, nor both/and nor even 
neither/nor, while at the scime time not totally 
abandoning these logics either. (World, 12) 
With field theory we can describe deconstruction as 
developing a nonAristotelian logic that adds the wave 
principle and the uncertainty principle. The wave principle 
critiques the separatist "object" nature of Aristotelian 
logic which excludes opposites as contradictions to determine 
meaning, while the uncertainty principle adds the third value 
which is the excluded middle between opposites, e.g. 
true/false and the absurd or unknown. 
While some critics may understand deconstruction as a 
strategy applied to philosophical texts rather than as a 
practice of literary criticism, there may be some confusion 
about the implications of the theories that inform and 
motivate this practice. Elizabeth Grosz says: 
Deconstruction is neither a destruction of prevailing 
intellectual norms and theoretical ideals, nor their 
replacement or reconstruction by new, more acceptable 
forms. Deconstruction in its technical sense refers to 
a series of tactics and devices rather than a method: 
strategies to reveal the unarticulated presuppositions 
on which metaphysical and logocentric texts are based, 
(qtd, Brodribb, p 9) 
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Thus deconstruction is a close reading practice that unravels 
rather than a methodology of literary criticism that gives a 
judgement or interprets the meaning of literature. However, 
while deconstruction as a practice may not set out to destroy 
prevailing norms and ideals, nevertheless the theories it 
derives from do suggest a change in these norms, going beyond 
the assumptions of their philosophical structures and the 
ways of thinking that (re)produced them. As Johnson says: 
The question, then, is how to use history and 
biography deconstructively. how to seek in them not 
answers, causes, explanations, or origins, but new 
questions and new ways in which the literary and 
nonliterary texts alike can be made to read and rework 
each other. (Johnson, p 15) 
Although deconstruction has been received by some as a new 
form of literary criticism, or a methodology, locating it as 
another position from which to judge art or determine 
meaning, nevertheless Ulmer writes that for Derrida, 
deconstruction is used only to analyse the structures of 
philosophy, this being quite different from how he treats 
artistic texts: 
Literary or plastic texts...are not analysed but are 
adopted as models or tutors to be imitated, as 
generative forms for the production of another text. 
(emphasis mine; Ulmer xi) 
As Ulmer points out, Derrida has also moved on to an 
affirmative project in his fiction which is referred to as 
writing, and in Applied Grammatology Ulmer privileges this 
affirmative project of Derrida as compared to the 
deconstructive project of philosophy that has received more 
attention. Ulmer argues that these affirmative texts are 
ignored in the attempt to focus on deconstruction as literary 
criticism, instead of deconstruction being used to transform 
the practice of literary criticism as we know it through 
serious discussion of what Derrida does with art which he 
mimes by writing another text. Derrida's treatment of art 
therefore is not interested in a judgement of good/bad, but 
is a self-reflexive position involved with "I like or don't 
like", and if I'm inspired then I mime and generate another 
creative art text, Deconstruction is designed to infiltrate 
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the linear structures imposed by philosophy on writing which 
is a nonlinear process. And it shows how these structures 
can impose themselves in the practice of literary criticism 
upon art texts or plastic texts which, unlike philosophical 
texts, do not necessarily have the goal of a structured 
argument. Deconstruction analyses philosophical texts 
because they are not plastic but more strategically bound by 
the rules of reason and the logic structures of philosophical 
discourse. To say then, that deconstruction is a new form of 
"literary" criticism is to totally misunderstand the work, 
and more importantly to miss its political implications for 
academia. The obvious implication is that we do not judge an 
art text or a plastic text by applying linear, binary 
oppositional thinking to determine its meaning or value as a 
"good" text. Instead, it opens up a criticism, if you like, 
of inspired mime and creative imitation. 
I have used deconstruction because it is a useful way of 
reading to analyse the philosophical methodologies within the 
discursive formation of Knowledge. This formation has 
included erasure in the control of representation that, as a 
tool of dominance in discourse, has privileged certain 
reality constructions in the intertextual field of discourse 
over others, these then participating in (re)producing and 
sustaining the dominance of certain worldviews over others. 
Deconstruction then can inhabit the text—say the text of the 
university—for the purpose of questioning the assumptions 
and limits of its structures, to critique its prejudices 
based on false opposites, and to examine what it excludes as 
inferior. This process re-establishes connectivity with the 
field where the text's structure has excluded it: in the 
attempt to construct an identity that is totally separate or 
totally unified; to establish authority based on this 
identity; to impose its version of objective or correct 
"reality" upon others because of this authoritative identity; 
and thus in the end to control representation according to 
its own philosophical interpretations of Truth, the Real and 
Knowledge. Reading erasure through deconstruction then is 
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the critique of structural dominance in textual construction-
-in philosophy and literary criticism, in both "literary" and 
"social" texts—through language, representation, and 
discourse which shape the way we see and recreate "reality" 
in the intertextual field of discourse. 
Parasitical Readings 
My practice of reading erasure is to read deconstructively 
through philosophical texts in a discourse, using parasitical 
readings. By this I mean that one inhabits the textual 
structures, following the construction of the text, and since 
each text is different this means that the inhabitation will 
always be different. However, there are common 
deconstructive strategies of reversal, displacement and 
locating the gap between what a text says and what it uses in 
its margins, and this involves investigating the opposites 
that the text sets up, discovering which is privileged, which 
is marginalised, which excluded to create the structure's 
very identity, and then to read those opposites for sameness, 
looking for the excluded resemblance and hence deconstructing 
the grounds for assumptions based on radical difference. 
This method involves close reading using textual evidence 
of a text's assumptions, not however for the purpose of 
interpreting exactly what it means, but to try to worm a way 
into its very structure and definitions, through the margins 
it sets up. It is a process of roughing up its boundaries a 
bit by radically questioning its oppositions, disturbing its 
attempt at unity or homogeneity, and finding its fear of 
contradictions, so that it becomes possible to rework the 
assumptions produced through the text's structure. It is not 
exactly a critique of the text as wrong, nor a judgement of 
it as bad, nor an attempt at defining its meaning. It is an 
examination of how the text attempts to create meaning, what 
is dominated or excluded as a result of this meaning, and 
whether that meaning is privileged in the intertextual field. 
It is an effort not so much to find meaning as to be engaged 
in a constant critique of the production of meaning and 
ideology. 
114 
In challenging the (hu)man/woman dichotomy as it appears 
through the representation of two supposedly opposite 
discourses, I read deconstructively through both structures 
asking basic questions about their identities to see if they 
are in fact opposites, as well as looking for similarities. 
For example, is the so-called human discourse really human 
(inclusive of all humans) and is it a true discourse 
according to the dictionary (does it "hold forth as in 
lectures" and converse "in a back and forth motion" as in 
dialogue); and is this women's discourse really written only 
by, for, and about women? Secondly, in investigating the 
structures of erasure I ask what are the theoretical 
assumptions and practices of the human discourse, (which we 
know from gender bias to be a (hu)man discourse)., and by what 
methodologies and politics did it become this; and are these 
theories and practices in any way shared by the women's 
discourse? Johnson says the following about reading the way 
an identity—including the identity of a discourse—creates 
its structure by privileging difference and marginalising 
resemblance: 
Reading, here, proceeds by identifying and dismantling 
differences by means of other differences that cannot 
be fully identified or dismantled. The starting point 
is often a binary difference that is subsequently 
shown to be an illusion created by the workings of 
differences much harder to pin down. The differences 
"between" entities (prose and poetry, man and woman, 
literature and theory, guilt and innocence) are shown 
to be based on a repression of differences "within" 
entities, ways in which an entity differs from itself, 
(emphasis mine; Johnson, World 2) 
In this case the difference which is said to be "outside" of 
the entity is really a rejection of the same quality on the 
inside and therefore a rejection of its resemblance to the 
field. If an entity sees its resemblance to what is supposed 
to be its opposite, then its notion of identity collapses, 
marking the place where the structural boundary leaks and the 
entity actually resembles the outside other. But as Johnson 
points out: 
To say, for instance, that the difference between man 
and woman is an illusion created by the repression of 
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differences within each may to some extent be true, 
but it does not account for the historical exclusion 
of women from the canon. Jacques Derrida may sometimes 
see himself as philosophically positioned as a woman, 
but he is not politically positioned as a woman. Being 
positioned as a woman is not something that is 
entirely voluntary. (2) 
Here we are reminded that erasure is not only due to 
philosophical structures that create differences and 
oppositions in language, but also results from the force of 
traditions that reinforce belief systems about superiority 
and inferiority throughout the intertextual field of 
discourse. In this sense, the historical exclusion of women 
from the canon comes down to the politics of prejudice and 
power as dominance. 
The Politics of Field Theory: Power Over or Power With 
The concept of the field can provide a theoretical bridge 
across the canyons of erasure. For me this is the most 
interesting aspect of poststructuralist thought since it 
offers a strategy to deconstruct the definition of power as 
dominance that is inherent in the politics of erasure. If we 
look at the dictionary definition of power, it is the 
"ability to do" or "power as control, power over"; and it 
defines the group ability to do in terms of a "body of 
authority or government having dominion, rule of, control 
over and influence thereof", as in power politics and might 
is right, where an authoritative body represents others. 
This definition of power as control over others, privileges 
the ableness to do of some, while repressing the ableness to 
do of others. However, this either/or definition of power 
does not include the "ability to do" among a participating 
group of equals, thereby omitting the middle way which is a 
concept of shared power, or power with all in the field. 
Because erasure is a tool of dominance in discourse 
indicating power as control of representation, it reflects a 
concept of power based on a mechanistic worldview, where 
power over must assxime separateness as necessary to its 
success. But the quantum worldview has changed those 
metaphysical assximptions from a mechanistic "objective" 
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reality to a systemic, interconnected field where "reality" 
is an uncertain, malleable perspective created constantly 
through our style of observation. In this worldview of 
connectedness, dominance and power over cannot be successful 
in the long term since everything affects everyone in the 
field; something ecology is now teaching us with a vengeance, 
and in this ecosystem the chain is only as strong as its 
weakest link. (I will discuss the dominant definition of 
power and its relationship to Knowledge in the deconstruction 
of the (hu)man discourse in Part Two, and in Part Four I will 
highlight a different concept of power based on relationship 
as theorised by women artists.) 
In considering the politics of poststructuralism as 
informed by a field theory perspective on power, I would 
argue that poststructuralist thought is not apolitical, 
though it acknowledges the principle of undecidability, for 
as Johnson says: 
It is often said, in literary-theoretical circles, 
that to focus on undecidability is to be apolitical. 
Everything I have read about the abortion controversy 
in its present form in the United States leads me to 
suspect that, on the contrary, the undecidable is the 
political. There is politics precisely because there 
is undecidability. (World p 15). 
Undecidability simply means that the determination of meaning 
is never subject to certain closure, and it never was. Thus, 
meaning, like politics, will always be an ongoing process of 
negotiation in the intertextual field of discourse. Rather 
than assume undecidability is a lack of stable meanings, 
oppositions and hence fixed positions, field theory simply 
offers a different understanding of position as interrelated 
ideologies and always changing. Therefore, rather than no 
position, I would argue that poststructuralist thought 
suggests flexible positions involved in a practice that 
continuously critiques ideological formation, emphasing 
dialogue across boundaries to monitor the effects of 
structures, be they critical methods, ideologies, political 
platforms or organisational models. 
I would argue that poststructuralist thought challenges 
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positions of authority or a politics based on claiming power 
due to essential superiority. It challenges positions that 
present themselves as totally separate from others in the 
field, or positions that present as unified, homogenised, and 
unconscious of all the multiple ideologies that make them up. 
It challenges positions that privilege their difference in 
order to negate resemblance for the purposes of claiming 
justified superiority and oppression of "others" who are 
nevertheless equal. In short, for me poststructuralist 
theories, like feminist theories, challenge oppressive 
structures that produce dominance in the intertextual field 
and the oppositional way of thinking that erasure as 
dominance reflects. I feel that the politics of feminism and 
poststructuralism have not been fully received as structual 
transformations because they are both engaged in critiques of 
various power structures, which is precisely why erasure and 
marginalisation tactics are used to prevent dialogue and 
structural change. Just as feminism has been reduced to 
women's issues, women's equality and regarded as another 
adjunct to political positions rather than a transformation 
of its power structures, similarly deconstruction has been 
reduced to another form of literary criticism misrepresented 
as nihilistic quietism and appropriated as an adjunct to 
literary criticism rather than a transformation of its 
structures. Thus to achieve an intertextual discourse where 
the group reality is shaped by colloboration rather than 
control, there must be a privileging of dialogue rather than 
institutional erasure, with a purpose of study and a practice 
of criticism that is not tied to power as dominance. 
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PART TWO. The Politics of Erasure: Might is Right, or 
Deconstructing the fHu)man Discourse 
Introduction 
In connection with the characters. . .first and most important, 
that they be good. . .but goodness exists in each class of 
people: there is in fact such a thing as a good woman and 
such a thing as a good slave, although no doubt one of these 
classes is inferior and the other, as a class, is 
worthless.. .for it is possible for a person to be manly in 
terms of character, but it is not appropriate for a woman to 
exhibit either this guality or the intellectual cleverness 
that is associated with men. 
Aristotle, Poetics 
Moreover, even dialogue would seem to be outside their 
(women's) realm, for without authority. speaking is 
inappropriate... 
Aristotle, Politics 
The right of suffrage is then truly universal when it is 
extended to all the adult males of the State, without regard 
to distinctions of property; it can not go beyond this limit 
and be extended to women, without violating the main 
principle on which the very being of the State rests for 
support, which is the subordination of wives to their 
husbands, of children to their fathers, and of slaves (in 
every community which has them) to their masters... but 
women, children and slaves are not the State, are not the 
protectors of society... and men—freemen—... are in fact 
the lords and rulers of the political community to which they 
belong. . . for a little reflection will convince us that 
Nature and right reason point to men as the proper 
depositories of political power. 
Samuel Seabury, American Slavery Distinguished from the 
Slavery of English Theorists and Justified by the Law of 
Nature 
The process of an interaction between individual and 
environment, where dominant opinion is defended and new 
opinion is established, was termed 'spiral of silence' 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974b). People,.,live in perpetual fear of 
isolating themselves.,. If they find that their views 
predominate or increase, then they express themselves freely 
in public; if they find that their views are losing 
supporters, then they become fearful, conceal their 
convictions in public, and fall silent. Because the one group 
express themselves with self-confidence whereas the others 
remain silent, the former appear to be strong in public^ the 
latter weaker than their numbers suggest. 
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Mass Media and Social Change in 
Developed Societies 
The epigraphs above give textual evidence of 
Aristotelian definitions relating to the inferior position of 
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women and slaves which are carried through in Seabury's 
discussion of suffrage in 1861. Such definitions have set up 
the voicelessness, the lack of authority, and the inability 
to dialogue on an equal basis with women or slaves. These 
assxmptions point to an identity of the (hu)man discourse 
with a social environment where males become the dominant 
defenders of opinion (or tradition) while women, according to 
Noelle-Neumann, by their sheer absence, would find it 
difficult to express different or contradictory opinions and 
fall prey to the spiral of silence. In Part Two I will show 
why the identity of the (hu)man discourse is a masculinist 
entity that in defining femininity has appropriated the body 
of Woman but erased the texts of her mind and voice, creating 
an absence which has contributed to the ongoing spiral of 
silence of women, the containment and colonisation of human 
imagination, and the dominant representation of women as 
"domestic" in the context of the public/private opposition. 
In beginning to deconstruct what has been represented as 
the human discourse, the most obvious questions involve its 
name, i.e. is it human and inclusive of all humans who write, 
and is it a true discourse, does it dialogue freely? By the 
end of Part One, these questions were answered by the 
evidence of erasure, such that the human discourse can be 
seen to be a (hu)man discourse in that it excludes women and 
represses free dialogue with their texts. I traced this 
evidence to document primarily the "how" and some of the 
"why" erasure is achieved by focusing on gender biased 
critical practices in discourse and the representation of 
women in the dramatic discourse as inferior opposites in the 
(hu)man/woman dichotomy. In Part Two I want to explore the 
"why" of erasure more fully by analysing the identity of the 
(hu)man discourse through a deconstructive and feminist 
reading of foundational texts and philosophical structures 
that produce this belief system within the discursive 
formation of great drama and Knowledge. Therefore I will 
investigate the definitions, rules, and philosophical 
structures of the (hu)man discourse that have manifested 
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dominance through erasure as nonreception (sustained negative 
reception coupled with anthological exclusion) ; as a politics 
of might is right where prejudices and the power to support 
them have excluded women beyond the standards of 
institutional structures; and as the representation of women 
in the dramatic discourse as emotional and illogical, whose 
plays and themes are reduced and trivialised as "women's" 
plays and "women's" issues, pertaining primarily to the 
domestic sphere. 
In Section (A), "The Gods of Great Drama: Imitation or 
Creation?" I will show that gender biased critical 
assumptions can be traced to dramatic standards derived from 
Classical definitions of art, nature and the Aristotelian 
rules that have become institutionalised as "objective" 
through the force of tradition. Here under the claim of 
poetic "imitation" of nature we find subjective and seemingly 
arbitrary rules that support an ideology where art is ruled 
by methodology in order correctly to interpret the 
"universals" for the didactic purpose of art. The dramatic 
rules alone, however, do not account for the representation 
of the plays and subjects of women as "women's" plays and 
issues. 
In Section (B), "Knowledge, Gender and the Aristotelian 
Worldview", I explore the underlying metaphysical assumptions 
that produce the essentialist and separatist definitions of 
Woman which are based on the oppositions that 'naturally' 
locate reason in males, with females defined as 'naturally' 
emotional and incapable of reason. The shift from art as 
"imitation" to art as interpretation of "reality" 
necessitated a privileging of "male" reason in the correct 
representation of universal knowledge, and hence, the 
dominance of masculinist experiences of the public realm. 
This location of reason contributed to the inability to 
dialogue with the "unreason" of women. However, a politics 
of erasure that does not dialogue with women's texts, erasing 
them even when against all odds they do manage to succeed, 
exposes a control of representation based on power as 
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dominance or might is right. This exclusion goes beyond 
critical standards and derives from a belief system of women 
as inferior, a bias that is evident as masculine dominance 
across various economic, racial and political spectrums. I 
employ a deconstructionist and feminist analysis of the 
metaphysics and the philosophical structures underlying this 
belief system which have not only contributed to the 
formation of a masculinist tradition where women are 
represented as inferior opposites, but also reflect dominance 
in institutional control of representation and the 
construction of ideology through a politics of 
interpretation. I will show that the identity of the (hu)man 
discourse depends upon an oppositional metaphysics where 
Aristotelian logic and his law of non-contradiction produces 
dominance through the elimination of contradiction 
(opposites) and uncertainty in the dramatic discourse, in the 
construction of universal knowledge, and in philosophy and 
the construction of meaning. These structures insure that 
the (hu)man discourse is not only dependent upon socially 
constructed opposites such as male/reason/public and 
female/emotional/private, but also the exclusion of them from 
defined spaces to avoid contradiction, thus privileging 
difference in the construction and preservation of identity 
rather than resemblance. 
In Section (C), "A Pub(l)ic/Private(s) Split, or Plays 
by Women: Subjects for Nonproduction", I will go on to argue 
that the public/private split which privileges the masculine 
public polarity and locates the female playwright 
(artist/theorist) in the domestic sphere, gives her an 
identity of (op)position that contributes to her erasure in 
the (hu)man discourse, where by its own logic, both her 
gender and her textual subjects function as sites for 
contradiction and thus become subjects for nonproduction as 
the evidence of erasure confirms. I will also discuss the 
"spiral of silence" as it relates to some of the effects of 
these metaphysics in the lived social world, where absence 
and a lack of dialogue in the intertextual field of discourse 
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suits in a lack of collective awareness of difference, 
ntradiction and resemblance; of dominance as it relates to 
rect and indirect power and the colonisation of the human 
lagination; of definitions of femininity in the (hu)man 
Lscourse which are questionable and where femininity can 
ronically be read as a "discourse" that appropriates the 
ody of Woman and her reproductive work but does not dialogue 
ith her mind or voice; and of the continuing dominance of 
he representation of the female artist/theorist as domestic, 
ler work as "women's" plays, and her subjects and feminism as 
'women's" issues. 
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Section (A) . The Gods of Great Drama: Imitation or Creation? 
In deconstructing the identity of the (hu)man discourse 
where erasure has been a tool in the production of a dominant 
tradition, it is important to understand how the rules, 
methodology and philosophical structures have constructed 
this identity of a masculinist tradition and that it has no 
objective nature. The dramatic rules and literary criticism 
have an essentialist basis in that definitions of male and 
female are based on the notion of inherent essences derived 
from classical concepts of nature, whereby Aristotelian 
concepts of art and universality have functioned to exclude 
women from this discourse. What I am arguing in this section 
is that the tradition of great drama is not based on 
objective standards handed down on a tablet from the gods of 
drama, who claimed they were merely "imitating" Nature in art 
and thus representing the 'Real'. Instead these standards 
are based on subjective interpretations of Nature 
constructing "reality" through representation and the force 
of literary tradition, constituted by an ideology where art 
was ruled by methodology in order correctly to "create" the 
universals of wisdom for the didactic purpose of art as 
learning. The shift from inspired "imitation" to "creation" 
as the correct interpretation of universals laid the 
conceptual foundation which necessitated the wisdom, genius, 
and above all. Reason, of the good poet. (This led to 
problems for those perceived as having no reason and in the 
next section on Knowledge and Gender I will further 
deconstruct the combination of these classical concepts, 
their metaphysics and philosophical structures, using 
feminist critiques by Marjorie Grene, Meaghan Morris and 
Michele Le Doeuff, followed by a crititjue of the implications 
of the dramatic rules for women by Sue-Ellen Case.) 
Before discussing some of the foundational texts, I 
would like to cjuote some passages from Essays on the Critical 
Appreciation of Modern English Literature and Drama to 
illustrate the continuous historical reliance upon certain 
fundamental assumptions produced by the Greek founding 
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philosophers. In F. Jackson's essay called "The Drama in the 
Twentieth Century", he describes the "basis for the 
discussion of the drama of the twentieth century in English-
speaking communities" (6): 
It is useful to recall Victor Hugo's famous dictum 
that spectators are of three kinds: first the 
women, secondly the thinkers, and last of all the 
crowd properly so called. The crowd demands action 
on the stage; women seek for passion, and the 
thinkers look for the display of character. The 
crowd so hungers for action and movement that it 
has no time for the study of character or of 
passion. Women are so preoccupied with passion 
that they place no value upon action or character, 
whilst the thinkers desire so vehemently the 
development of living character that, whilst 
willingly accepting passion as an incident in its 
development, they become impatient of action, 
(emphasis mine; 5-6) 
With this perspective on women, the masses, and the educated 
elite, Jackson makes the following assumptions about good 
theatre and the theatregoer: 
It follows that the crowd demands sensation when 
it goes to the theatre, women emotions, and the 
thinker meditations and ideas. All are seeking 
pleasure, and all are right. The theatre must, if 
it is to be successful, satisfy all three 
elements, all three desires for action, passion, 
and thought ... We should bear in mind that every 
theatregoer has within himself the three elements-
-male. feminine, and mob. It follows that a great 
play must satisfy all three appetites; its action 
must seize upon our attention, its passion must 
feed our emotions, and its philosophy of life and 
the meditations of its characters must stimulate 
our thoughts, (emphasis mine; 6) 
Jackson's conclusions about what elements are necessary for 
a "great play" are based on a perceptual split between body, 
emotions and mind as primarily located in the mob, women or 
men respectively; a notion derived from the dichotomies of 
classical philosophy pertaining to male/female, 
reason/emotion, and ruler/slave which appear in the dramatic 
rules. 
In Marvin Herrick's The Fusion of Horatian and 
Aristotelian Literary Criticism, he argues that two important 
concepts which have been the basis of literary criticism are 
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the Aristotelian theory that art imitates nature, and the 
Horatian emphasis on the didactic function of poetry, with 
the wisdom of the poet to access universal knowledge as the 
source of good writing. With respect to the construction of 
dramatic tradition, Herrick argues that a few key concepts 
were established by Aristotle's Poetics. These are classical 
concepts of nature and art, poetic imitation, the function of 
poetry, and the dramatic rules themselves. Dryden expresses 
the Englishman's acceptance of this ancient view of nature 
and art: 
Thus I grant you that the knowledge of Nature was 
the original rule; and that all poets ought to 
study her, as well as Aristotle and Horace, her 
interpreters. But then this also undeniably 
follows, that those things which delight all ages 
must have been an imitation of Nature; which is 
all I contend, (emphasis mine; qtd. in Herrick 27) 
Notice that Dryden tries to rely on knowledge as an imitation 
of Nature, yet practically in the same breath concedes that 
Aristotle and Horace are her "interpreters". Herrick points 
out the importance of 'realistic' representation in imitation 
and he guotes Aristotle: 
'And it is also natural for all to delight in 
works of imitation. The truth of this second point 
is shown by experience: though the objects 
themselves may be painful to see, we delight to 
view the most realistic representations of them in 
art, the forms for example of the lowest animals 
and of dead bodies.' (emphasis mine; gtd. in 
Herrick 29) 
What is "realistic" then is bound up with nature as "real", 
but Herrick goes on to show that Nature is perceived in 
various ways, such that he concludes the role of the poet is 
not simply as an imitator of nature but also as a creator or 
interpreter of idealised fiction, with a role of power: 
Aristotle himself provides material for the 
sixteenth century conception of artistic imitation 
as a creative process, an idealized fiction. In 
the Physics. which by 1555 most of the Horatian 
commentators seem to know, Aristotle says that art 
imitates nature. Perhaps Aristotle is not always 
clear in his use of the term nature, but one 
important meaning is the generative force in the 
universe, or, as it may be interpreted, the 
creative process. Thus it may be said that the 
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artist creates somewhat in the same way as that in 
which nature creates. The ultimate stage in such a 
theory appears in Scaliger, who calls the poet, in 
his creations, almost a second deity, (emphasis 
mine; 33) 
Some definitions of Nature regard it as residing in all 
humans and thus poetic imitation theoretically should be 
available to all humans. Cicero regards Nature as "the 
common mother of us all" (7) , and Horace follows this up: 
"nature, says Horace—and here he probably is thinking of 
nature as the parens communis—forms our emotions within us 
and enables us to express them in words" (8). This notion of 
nature and human nature as what is common or "natural" to us 
all, has led to the notion of universality and the imitation 
of it through the expression of the poet, who could be 
anyone. However, Herrick points out that in Ars Poetica, 
"Horace sometimes uses nature in the narrower sense of 
natural faculty, or genius" and, when answering the question 
of whether nature or art is the more important force in 
poetry, "Horace answers the question by asserting that both 
nature and art are necessary" (8). Though Aristotle says 
that art imitates nature, to Horace and Cicero the imitation 
alone is not art and, thus, the role of the poet is to use 
his "genius" to "create" through imitation by also expressing 
universal, natural human emotions. This led to the dominant 
concept of art not as pure inspiration from "nature" 
(available to anyone), but with art as creative "imitation" 
using his genius to interpret and express "universal natural 
human emotions". Here art as the imitation of nature assumed 
an interpretive methodology for a purpose, which was 
learning. 
While Herrick states that Horace apparently stresses 
pleasure in poetry, he "also insists on the didactic function 
of poetry; that is, he insists that wisdom, or knowledge, is 
the very source of all good writing" (40) . Cicero was 
influential on sixteenth century Horatian critics, and wrote 
that the orator should "teach, delight and move" (41): 
In my opinion, indeed, no man can be an orator 
possessed of every praiseworthy accomplishment. 
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unless he has attained the knowledge of everything 
important, and of all liberal arts, for his 
language must be ornate and copious from 
knowledge. since, unless there be beneath the 
surface matter understood and felt by the speaker, 
oratory becomes an empty and almost puerile flow 
of words, (emphasis mine; qtd. in Herrick 32) 
Though the dual role of poetry, to teach and to delight, was 
established before the revival of the Poetics, scholars 
searched for the didactic function in Aristotle and found 
support in the Rhetoric: 
'And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all 
things connected with them must also be pleasant; 
for instance, a work of imitation, such as 
painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well 
imitated, even if the object of imitation is not 
pleasant; for it is not this that causes pleasure 
or the reverse, but the inference that the 
imitation and the object imitated are identical, 
so that the result is that we learn something', 
(gtd. in Herrick 30) 
Scholars find further support in the Poetics: 
The explanation is to be found in a further fact: 
to be learning something is the greatest of 
pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to 
the rest of mankind, however small their capacity 
for it; the reason of the delight in seeing the 
picture is that one is at the same time learning— 
gathering the meaning of things, e.g., that the 
man there is so-and-so; for if one has not seen 
the thing before, one's pleasure will not be in 
the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due 
to the execution or coloring or some similar 
cause', (emphasis mine; qtd. in Herrick 29) 
Thus Horatian commentators accept Horace's dictum that nature 
and art are necessary for learning in poetry, and find 
satisfactory support from Aristotle. Herrick argues that the 
Horatian attitude towards nature and art appears with the 
beginnings of literary criticism, and remains a familiar 
attitude thereafter. He quotes Salisbury from the twelfth 
century: 
Art originates in nature, he believes, and natural 
gifts are necessary to the artist, but natural 
talent must always be supplemented and guided by 
art, (emphasis mine; 25) 
In this case, "guided by art" refers to a methodology 
established through standards and definitions, that allow for 
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the correct expression of wisdom. Thus some literary critics 
may emphasise natural gifts and inspiration, while the neo-
classical critics emphasize learning and art. However, 
Herrick guotes John Dennis from 1701 who claims art for the 
control of passion: 
The first is nature, which is the foundation and 
basis of all. For nature is the same thing with 
genius, and genius and passion are all one ... The 
second thing is art, by which I mean those rules, 
and that method, which capacitates us to manage 
every thing with the utmost dexterity that may 
contribute to the raising of passion. (26) 
Thus art, supposedly an inspired imitation of nature, is 
revealed to be a system of rules and methodology with a 
specific purpose, to manage passion (that unruly thing) and 
distribute the wisdom of genius. Interestingly, the textual 
evidence links "as one" nature, passion, and genius without 
specific regard to sex, where only the rules and methodology 
of art control passion. Yet we have already seen examples in 
the reviews that locate reason within males providing them 
with an advantaged access to wisdom and genius, while emotion 
and thus unruly passion is located within females which sets 
off moral alarm bells. In the next part of this chapter I 
will do a deconstructive reading of the Aristotelian dramatic 
rules calling attention to these "essential" definitions as 
applied to gender, but also employing a critique of the 
objectivity of the rules whereby they are supposed to be a 
methodology for the distribution of universal wisdom in the 
name of inspired imitation, though I will argue that they are 
actually subjective and at times seemingly arbitrary rules 
for interpretive creation. 
The Dramatic Rules 
After considering some of the underlying assumptions of 
the Classical world view, the dramatic rules of Aristotle and 
Horace may seem less arbitrary, and more an extension or 
result of these fundamental assumptions about nature, art, 
and the didactic function of poetic imitation. Herrick 
indicates that the most important dramatic rule is literary 
propriety, or what is called the doctrine of decorum, which 
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he says colors all the other rules. He then divides the rest 
of the rules into seven categories: 
1. Plot is the soul of poetry. 
2. The dramatic unities must be observed. 
3. Characters should be conventionalized. 
4. All plays should be divided into five acts. 
5. The chorus should be treated as one of the actors. 
6. The deux ex machina should be used but sparingly. 
7. Spectacle is the least artistic element in the 
theater. 
(Poetics and the Ars Poetica, 68-69) 
The doctrine of decorxim in Horace's Ars Poetica "emphasizes 
the necessity of fitting the various parts of a poem 
together, the sound to the sense, the style to the thought, 
the character to his age and race" (48). Aristotle defined 
propriety of style in Rhetoric: 
'Propriety of style will be obtained by the 
expression of emotion and character, and by 
proportion to the subject matter. Style is 
proportionate to the subject matter when neither 
weighty matters are treated offhand nor trifling 
matters with dignity, and no embellishment is 
attached to an ordinary word' ... Aristotle says 
that there is an appropriate style for each class 
and character: 'I mean class in reference to age— 
child, man, or old man; to sex—man or woman; to 
country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian'. (emphasis 
mine; qtd. in Herrick 48-49) 
As can be seen, there is quite a strict requirement for 
appropriate style according to subject matter, sex, age, and 
class, so that the definitions of the latter established by 
tradition will dictate how they must be represented in good 
drama. If these definitions are not followed, by women and 
other writers who try to carve out and represent new and 
different definitions, then decorum is violated and women 
playwrights are accused, as we have seen, of "dangerous 
logic" or "slovenliness". Herrick points out that, to 
Aristotle, plot is the most important element and, while 
sixteenth century commentators accepted this dictum, decorum 
was uppermost in the minds of the commentators "who seize 
upon any evidence in Aristotle that can substantiate this 
all-important decorum demanded by Horace and Cicero" (49): 
At the time when he is constructing his Plots, and 
engaged on the Diction in which they are worked 
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out, the poet should remember to put the actual 
scenes as far as possible before his eyes. In this 
way, seeing everything with the vividness of an 
eye-witness as it were, he will devise what is 
appropriate, and be least likely to overlook 
congruities. fPoetics, qtd. in Herrick 49) 
Aristotle's statement in Poetics was that "plot is the soul 
of tragedy", and the scholars extended this to read "plot is 
the soul of poetry", a maxim that became accepted (70). His 
emphasis on action and plot and, particularly, action in 
tragedy is clear: 
Character gives us qualities, but it is in our 
actions—what we do—that we are happy or the 
reverse. In a play accordingly they do not act in 
order to portray the Characters; they include the 
Characters for the sake of the action. So that it 
is the action in it, i.e. its Fable or Plot, that 
is the end an purpose of the tragedy; and the end 
is everywhere the chief thing. Besides this, a 
tragedy is impossible without action, but there 
may be one without Character, (qtd. in Herrick 69) 
Remembering that "art imitates nature" it is interesting that 
a fixed plot centered around action is such a key element for 
what is supposedly an imitation of a rather unstable 
"nature", and therefore Herrick argues that the Aristotelian 
plot "has a definite connotation of artistic creation or 
fiction" (69) : 
For example, Aristotle speaks of a 'well-
constructed plot', and the finest plot, in his 
judgment, is the complex action which includes 
artfully arranged discoveries and reversals of 
fortune, (69) 
Herrick addresses this contradiction between imitation and 
artistic fiction: 
Then we must always keep in mind Aristotle's 
statement that the 'poet must be more the poet of 
his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch 
as he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element 
in his work, and it is actions that he imitates'. 
We must also keep in mind that the good poet, 
according to Aristotle, even when he selects a 
subject from actual history, relates what might 
have happened rather than what has happened, 
(emphasis mine; 70) 
It would seem that the necessity to imitate nature conflicts 
greatly with the creative or fictionalised element of 
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Aristotle's plot construction and the poetic embellishment of 
"what might have happened". Nevertheless, women playwrights 
have been mercilessly criticised for lack of plot and action, 
when they may in fact have been imitating the "nature" of 
restricted domestic, ordinary, or working class lives. 
The dramatic unities of Time, Place, and Action evolve 
out of the requirement that a work of art must have a unity 
of plot, deriving from Aristotle and Horace: 
Horace's praise of Homer for success in 
construction, with a coherent beginning, middle 
and end, naturally offers another opportunity for 
recommending unity of action. (76) 
Thus the structure of the plot with a beginning, middle and 
end is supposed to unify the action, but Herrick argues that 
this dictxim eventually becomes the demand for a single 
action. Herrick shows that while Aristotle mentioned in 
Poetics that action should proceed as "one continuous whole", 
it is the Horatian commentators who help to establish a 
"strict unity of action, demanding a single action" (76) . 
Their interpretation may come from Aristotle's Poetics: 
'Plots are either simple or complex, since the 
actions they represent are naturally of this 
twofold description. The action, proceeding in the 
way defined, as one continuous whole, I call 
simple when the change in the hero's fortunes 
takes place without Peripety or Discovery; and 
complex, when it involves one or the other or 
both', (qtd. in Herrick 76) 
Herrick argues that the phrase "one continuous whole" may be 
associated with "simple" plots, but not necessarily so; yet 
the Horatian scholars have a tendency to "demand a single 
action" (77): 
All conscientious followers of Plato and Aristotle 
)cnow that a work of art must form one continuous 
whole, and if there is any doubt about the 
wholeness of the complex plot, then the simple 
plot is surely the best kind of plot. Does not 
Horace say that a poem should be simplex et unxim? 
At all events, such, I gather, is the reasoning of 
the Horatian commentators, who not only help 
establish unity of action but help to establish 
the narrow interpretation of a single action 
admitting no sub-plots, (emphasis mine; 77) 
Thus the emphasis on single action becomes firmly entrenched 
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as central to artistic unity, while according to another 
sixteenth century scholar, Madius: "the plot is the substance 
of the poem, the episodes are digressions" (71). Despite 
this dictum, many criticisms of plays by women consisted of 
attacks on the simplicity of the plot or, indeed, the 
inability of the female author to construct a more complex 
plot in a longer piece. They have even been criticised for 
satisfactorily resolving all conflicts within the plot. And 
of course, those women who did experiment with structure, 
using many sub-plots to shift the emphasis from one character 
or story to the relationship between several characters, were 
accused of not following the dramatic unities of time, place, 
and action. 
At this stage, I would like to discuss briefly plot 
structure in relationship to the rule about the appropriate 
length of the play being five acts; a rule that is clearly 
most arbitrary but depends on longer is better and according 
to which women have suffered severe criticism in relation to 
the length of their plays and their inability to sustain a 
longer plot. It was Horace who said "let no play be more or 
less than five acts" (90), and this axiom was faithfully 
observed for many years until the three act play became 
fashionable in the 19th century. Although there is no 
evidence that Aristotle ever dictated five acts, he defined 
the tragedy as consisting of the Prologue, Episodes, Exode, 
and two choral portions. The Horatian commentators followed 
Horace's axiom about the five acts of comedy and applied its 
structure to tragedy as well: 
In the first act the argument is unfolded; in the 
second the action starts from the beginning 
towards the end; the third brings perturbations 
and impediments; the fourth brings a remedy to 
offset the evil; the fifth brings all to a happy 
conclusion, (Landinus qtd. in Herrick 90) 
But apparently while Horace specified acts, Aristotle spoke 
of the size of plots in general; and he favoured the larger 
play: 
The limit, however, set by the actual nature of 
the thing is this: the longer the storv. 
consistently with its being comprehensible as a 
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whole, the finer it is bv reason of its magnitude. 
As a rough general formula, 'a length which allows 
of the hero passing by a series of probable or 
necessary stages from misfortune to happiness, or 
from happiness to misfortune', may suffice as a 
limit for the magnitude of the story, (emphasis 
mine; Herrick 91) 
Here we see the definitions relating to the "nature of the 
thing" and while the length of the play was to accommodate 
the unfolding of the various elements in the plot, it also 
had a didactic and aesthetic purpose which the commentators 
derived from Aristotle's Poetics: 
Just in the same way, then, as a beautiful whole 
made up of parts, or a beautiful living creature, 
must be of some size, a size to be taken in by the 
eye, so a story of Plot must be of some length, 
but of a length to be taken in by the memory, 
(emphasis mine; qtd. in Herrick 92) 
This version of Poetics emphasises size in relation to memory 
capabilities, but another version of Aristotle stresses the 
aesthetic aspect: 
Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and 
every whole made up of parts, must not only 
present a certain order in its arrangement of 
parts, but also be of a certain definite 
magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order. 
(emphasis mine; qtd. in Herrick 92) 
As I have shown, in critical receptions of women's texts this 
dictum that length implies greatness has been the fundamental 
assumption by which many critics have dismissed the women's 
plays written as one-act pieces. Even when women did write 
three act plays these were seen as faulty in construction 
since females did not have sufficient reason and therefore 
could not possibly sustain the plot structure for that length 
of time. However, if the necessity for size to be retained 
in memory were so crucial, then a short play ought to be even 
more instrumental in educating spectators; if beauty is a 
matter of size and order, then the one-act play with all its 
economy of size is a mastery of order. Surely in the case of 
dramatic rules about length, we could say that beauty is very 
much in the eye of the beholder. 
Rigidity of plot structure and linearity of narrative 
are also functions of, as well as parties to, the concept of 
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conventionalised characters with their requirement to be 
"real", and "consistent", so that they help facilitate the 
"probable" or "necessary" outcome of plot. Herrick discusses 
Aristotle's propriety of characters: 
There are four qualities, he says, to aim at: the 
characters should be (1) good, (2) appropriate, 
(3) like the original, and (4) self-consistent. It 
is the second quality that specially bears upon 
the doctrine of decorum: 'The second point is to 
make them appropriate. The Character before us may 
be, say, manly; but it is not appropriate in a 
female Character to be manly. or clever'. 
(emphasis mine; 49) 
Here is evidence that the social definitions of gender for 
women are directly incorporated into the dramatic rules in 
terms of their representation being "appropriate" to fulfill 
the rule of decorum. Another scholar, Luisinus, quotes 
Aristotle's statement that "fine language, even in poetry, 
from a slave or a youth is very unbecoming" (55)—hence 
decorum functioning to maintain style as well as class and 
sex distinctions. In addition to the characters being good 
and appropriate, it is necessary that they are "like 
reality". However, the representation of the reality of 
hximan nature in Classical thought is regarded as an imitation 
of what is self-evidently, inherently natural essences, and 
not a result of their own subjective interpretations: 
'The third is to make them like the reality, which 
is not the same as their being good and 
appropriate, in our sense of the term. The fourth 
is to make them consistent and the same 
throughout; even if inconsistency be part of the 
man before one for imitation as presenting that 
form of character, he should still be consistently 
inconsistent', (qtd. in Herrick 53) 
The quality of consistency in characters in deference to 
making them "like reality" has resulted in a homogenising or 
stereotyped characterisation that is still so prevalent in 
drama today. Herrick states that August Strindberg was one 
who made a vigorous protest against conventionalised stage 
characters: 
Strindberg goes on to protest against the fixed 
types that have swanaed over the stage for 
generations past. Even the great Moliere has 
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presented these 'homogeneous' characters; ... 
Strindberg himself tries, he says, to make his 
characters 'conglomerates, made up of past and 
present stages of civilization, scraps of 
humanity, torn-off pieces of Sunday clothing 
turned into rags—all patched together as is the 
human soul itself. (90) 
More recently, feminists in theatre have heavily criticised 
the portrayal of women as stereotypes; in Understudies. 
Wandor mentions that in 1978 the Feminist Theatre Study Group 
picketed West End shows, handing out leaflets to "draw 
attention to the situation of actresses and the content of 
the plays" (47): 
Did the characters in this play imply that: 
Blondes are dumb? Wives nag? Feminists are 
frustrated? Whores have hearts of gold? Mothers-
in-law interfere? Lesbians are aggressive? 
Intellectual women are frigid? Women who enjoy sex 
are nymphomaniacs? Older women are sexless? We 
are a group of theatre workers who are tired of 
portraying these cardboard cutouts. We want 
theatre managers, directors and writers to stop 
producing plays which insult women. (47-48) 
Besides insulting women by reducing them to one-dimensional 
consistencies, conventional characters have also served to 
limit the work for women actors as Australian Chris Westwood 
points out in an interview from Playing the State; 
In 1981 Jude Kuring and I were sitting around in 
the Nimrod Theatre. I was a project officer and 
she, an actor, was whingeing about lack of work 
for women. In every play there's six roles for men 
and one for women and that one is the heart-of-
gold whore or the mother; those stereotypes. We 
decided to invite some other actors to see if we 
could do something about it. We wrote out a 
questionnaire with questions such as: 'Do you ever 
feel like punching yoxir director in the face?' 
'Are you fed up with earning less in an average 
year than a boy?' (qtd. in Watson 219) 
Inevitably the stereotyped characters are seen as less 
important, the acting is less difficult, and therefore the 
parts are paid less. The necessity for characters to be 
"like reality" and yet "consistent" is an obviously 
contradictory demand when supposedly imitating the nature of 
'real' people who are often proven to be more changeable than 
consistent. Yet this dictum serves to carry out Aristotle's 
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orders for the plot's action to be unified, and more 
importantly, controlled. In this sense the characters' 
consistency helps to develop the consistency of the action to 
bring about a "probable" reality which is in fact an 
orchestrated one according to the tradition: 
The right thing, however, is in the Characters 
just as in the incidents of the play to endeavor 
always after the necessary or the probable; so 
that whenever such-and-such a personage says or 
does such-and-such a thing, it shall be the 
probable or necessary outcome of his character; 
and whenever this incident follows on that, it 
shall be either the necessary or the probable 
conseguence of it. (Poetics, gtd. in Herrick 53) 
In this statement, the characters do help to develop the 
incidents and are not indispensable to action. Despite 
Aristotle's insistence that action is so much the most 
important element that it is even possible to have Tragedy 
without characters, his rigid split between action and 
character breaks down when he says that the "right thing" is 
"in" the characters who by their "saying" and "doing" help to 
create the probable reality. Yet there were nximerous 
criticisms of women playwrights as boring and unimaginative 
because their plays consisted almost entirely of 
characterisation with very little action. These aspects of 
characterisation—who they are and what they do—are 
important for the development of Aristotle's rules about the 
appropriate dramatic style for tragedy and comedy. 
There are particular requirements in terms of propriety 
for tragic or comic characters, such that the stylistic 
separation between tragedy and comedy can also be discussed 
as part of the rule about conventionalised characters with 
respect to class distinctions. This tragedy/comedy split has 
adversely affected the reception of many plays by women who 
combined these styles in an attempt to represent a more 
wholistic cycle of life in their plays, a point I will 
discuss further in Part Four. Yet again they were criticised 
for not following the dramatic unities, lack of unified plot, 
and irrational or unrealistic subject matters. According to 
the founding fathers, the tragedy/comedy split in drama has 
137 
a didactic function for the lower classes, who become 
accustomed to misfortune by watching the upper classes 
suffer, while they gain pleasure from laughing at the 
misfortune of the lower classes. Yet this split between 
tragedy and comedy can be accused again of creative artifice 
rather than art imitating nature, since life cycles usually 
do not split tragedy and comedy so neatly between the 
classes. Further, on the question of the usefulness of 
tragedy (arousing grief) as opposed to comedy (arousing 
laughter), tragedy is presented as the catharsis of fear, 
pity, or immorality and is therefore didactic, but eventually 
the debate centers upon the skill of the poet and the rules 
of Art to control the passions aroused by tragedy. 
Herrick points out that it was the influences of Horace 
and Cicero who insisted on its didactic function that led 
Robortellus to propose that tragedy offers a utilitarian 
function for those who are not heroes and kings: 
But when he comes to tragedy he argues that the 
spectator, by exposure to tragic drama, becomes 
accustomed to grief, fear, and pity, and 
conseguently is less shaken by misfortune than is 
one who has not experienced the tragic emotions. 
Therefore, says Robortellus, the audience obtains 
a utility from tragedy; namely, this sustaining 
comfort whenever misfortune, the common lot of 
mortals, strikes. (42) 
Herrick argues that tragic characters can also be eiobellished 
for this didactic purpose, and he refers to Willichius 
writing on the Poetics: 
Aristotle says that tragic poets should follow the 
example of the good portrait-painters, who 
preserve the likeness but maike the subject 
handsomer than he is. Thus Willichius introduces 
the conception of imitation as an idealization of 
reality, (emphasis mine; 30) 
The concept of idealisation of reality is echoed in 
Aristotle's distinction between comedy and tragedy from the 
Poetics! "that comedy makes its personages worse and tragedy 
better than average men" (qtd. in Herrick 53) . In the 
context of Aristotle's assumptions about class and sex 
therefore, tragic drama about heroes and kings is to elevate 
the audience by exposing them to people who are "better than 
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average men", while comedy makes the lower classes feel 
better by laughing at those who are made "worse" than average 
men. Thus the imitation of 'reality' becomes the 
fictionalisation of reality with respect to character which 
helps to serve the didactic function of these dramatic 
styles. 
Most commentators accepted Aristotle's dictum regarding 
the pleasure of grief and fear produced by tragedy. 
Nevertheless, one might well ask, says Herrick, paraphrasing 
Denores: "why should tragedy (which moves grief) rather than 
comedy (which moves laughter) please people?" (43) . The 
answer Denores gives to this centers around the difficulty of 
the poet, and emphasises his skill: 
The answer lies, he believes, in the greater 
artificiality of tragedy, in the greater 
difficulties overcome by the tragic poet. This 
answer owes much to Aristotle, who argues, in the 
Poetics, that the best dramatic poet^ i.e., the 
most artistic poet, is the one who relies upon the 
imitative, or creative, element in his work rather 
than upon verses or scenery, (emphasis mine; 43) 
This interpretation anticipates the "theory of the difficulty 
overcome" (43) , but surely deriving pleasure from tragedy for 
this reason relates more to the poet's own delight in his 
"artistic" skills to construct the more "dramatic" artificial 
tragedy—since the audience presumably are mostly less 
learned and would not even be able to appreciate this 
difficulty overcome. However, the pleasure referred to by 
Aristotle brings up the aspect of the audience's experience 
and here the debate centers around the Aristotelian notion of 
catharsis, in an attempt to reconcile the fundamental 
opposition between pleasure and learning. 
There are some useful points to this debate as they 
affect the criticisms of women playwrights, who are so often 
accused of extreme emotionality, sentimentality or wild, 
passionate ravings of rage and violence. Although the 
predominant Aristotelian definition of catharsis is to purge 
emotions, it eventually becomes associated with 
"physiological" excitement so that its usefulness as a 
dramatic style is overridden by the moral necessity to 
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nontrol emotions through reason so as to effect the most 
valuable learning. There are several interpretations of what 
Aristotle meant by catharsis in his definition of tragedy 
which is "incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to 
accomplish its catharsis of such emotions" (42). The 
pleasure of catharsis is variously seen by scholars as the 
purging of spectators' fear and pity, as a way of getting 
used to these emotions in misfortunes, and (the more modern 
and less favoured by interpretation) as a physiological 
experience of emotional excitement. While most sixteenth 
commentators try to interpret catharsis as a moral purging of 
emotions of either fear and pity, Madius was even more moral: 
How can pity and fear remove pity and fear? No, the 
tragic catharsis removes from the mind other, and evil, 
perturbations, such as wrath, avarice, luxury; and the 
removal of these evil passions allows the mind to become 
adorned with virtues. (43) 
Herrick argues that one scholar, Robortellus, finds evidence 
in Aristotle's definitions that tragic catharsis is not 
didactic, but physiological with respect to excitement and 
emotions: 
Aristotle speaks of the excitement brought on by 
religious songs as comparable to a medicinal 
purge; he speaks of the harmless delight afforded 
by these purgative melodies. Thus Aristotle 
clearly indicates here a physiological, not a 
moral or didactic, interpretation; the catharsis 
effected by music is orgiastic rather than 
instructive, (emphasis mine; Herrick 42) 
Herrick states that what Aristotle meant by catharsis has 
been debated for over four hundred years, in a project to 
reconcile its function as aesthetic and didactic. And this 
may be a significant indication of the difficulty in the 
struggle to control—through the methodologies of proper Art-
-the emotional or "orgiastic" experience of tragic catharsis 
in favour of the more accepted "reason" of learning, or the 
pleasure of comedy. 
Yet in an interview with Jenny Rankin discussing women poets, 
Hewett argues that some writing may need to be more involved 
with letting go of control: 
What they write has its own immensely emotional 
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drive, I do think that women tend to strip, or 
maybe they're at the stage of their development 
where it's necessary to strip the pretences away, 
to be very violent and passionate and wild about 
their sense of themselves, because they've never 
been allowed to be so, except perhaps Emily 
Bronte, who did it very nicely. But women need 
this, and therefore their poems tend to sometimes 
appear to fall apart by the very intensity of the 
emotional drive which they have to put into it to 
get through to what they want to say. (Hecate's 
Daughters, 1978, p 118-119) 
I would suggest that the control of passion through the 
structural reins of traditional rules for 'art' functions to 
control more than abstract emotions, acting in particular to 
restrict the representations of explosive passion by those 
who are victims of socially repressed anger, violence and 
sexuality. 
The next rule I want to mention briefly is the 
cautionary use of gods or the "supernatural" on stage, and 
the related condemnation of spectacle. So many contemporary 
women playwrights have been criticised for resorting to the 
unnatural or spectacle (unimportant expressionism) , when they 
use exaggerated scenery, mythological creatures, gods and 
goddesses, and large representations relating to "femininity" 
such as walking vaginas, bras, huge children, and stoves. 
The dictum against these stylistic devices supposedly relates 
to the proper imitation of nature but, as I shall show, 
nature becomes linked with artistic control in the proper 
representation of reality and what is probable through 
history, thus further using an essentialist interpretation of 
nature to reinforce traditional social definitions. Herrick 
says that all the Classical authorities condemn the frequent 
use of of the deus ex machina which is the use of divine 
interference when matters involved are beyond human control, 
because this is seen "as contrary to art, nature, and 
probability" (96). But Aristotle's argument against divine 
intervention through the deus ex machina relates more to 
keeping artificiality out of the play. Yet Aristotle does 
say that the most artistic dramatist is the most creative, 
but when it comes to what he perceives as being outside of 
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nature, the play is considered more natural when the poet is 
in control of the resolution of the plot, rather than divine 
interference: 
Aristotle's argument is simply this: the artistic 
resolution of a plot should come from the plot 
itself, from the natural progression of probable 
events, and not from agents outside the plot, 
whether gods or not . . . Castelvetro presents a 
sensible explanation ... he believes that 
Aristotle is objecting not only to the use of gods 
on the stage, but to the use of any miraculous 
agents that are contrary to nature. (Herrick 96-
97) 
However, beyond the element of poetic control, critics like 
Thomas Hobbes argued against the inclusion of preternatural 
elements in drama and epic poetry, emphasising the imitation 
of nature's possibilities, though this now becomes the 
"resemblance of truth" which is "the bound of the 
historical": 
There are some that are not pleased with fiction unless 
it be bold, not only to exceed the work, but also the 
possibility of nature: they would have impenetrable 
armors, enchanted castles, invulnerable bodies, iron 
men, flying horses, and a thousand other such things, 
which are easily feigned by them that dare. Against such 
I defend you ... by dissenting only from those that 
think the beauty of a poem consisteth in the exorbitancy 
of the fiction. For as truth is the bound of historical, 
so the resemblance of truth is the utmost limit of 
poetical liberty. In old time amongst the heathen such 
strange fictions and metamorphoses were not so remote 
from the articles of their faith as they are now from 
ours, and therefore were not so unpleasant. Beyond the 
actual works of nature a poet may now go; but beyond the 
conceived possibility of nature^ never, (emphasis mine; 
qtd. in Herrick 98-99) 
As Herrick has argued, Aristotelian imitation of nature is 
creative fictionalising, though "nature" now also becomes 
represented as imitating history. The slide from not 
exceeding the "possibilities of nature" to the poetic limits 
represented by the "resemblance of truth" as the "bound of 
the historical" is the continuing evolution of a way of 
thinking that ignores the fact of its own subjective 
interpretation of nature and reality. In seeking to 
represent universal reality it remains blind to its own false 
assumption that history itself is objectively 'real' and 
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therefore truth and, consecpiently, the best and proper realm 
for the poet. Further, the assumption that women are 
naturally without reason in Classical thought and the 
representation of them as such in the drama and poetry, 
continues and manifests itself in the 17th century as a truth 
that considers itself bound up in history rather than 
fiction. For women writers who might be trying to represent 
subject matters which are outside of "nature" or "historical 
truth" as defined by Classical tradition, there are words to 
use but simply no acceptable space within the context of a 
male-defined reality to insert such representations. 
Similarly, the seeming historical 'fact' that there are few 
women playwrights ignores the socioeconomic obstacles for 
woman writers, the lack of documentation on the many women 
playwrights who did produce plays, and the problematic effect 
upon women of the dominance of men in theatre, as Hewett 
points out: 
If you think about women playwrights in English 
Literature generally, there's not very many of us. 
I don't know what this says. Does it say that the 
whole mechanics of which plays are constructed are 
difficult for women? Does it say that they find it 
difficult to work within theatre structures? I 
think probably the second is true, that it's 
difficult to work because of the existing theatre 
structures and also maybe that intense co-
operative effort is made difficult for women 
because of their past experiences and timidity. 
(Hecate 119) 
Thus the difficulty for women may not only be in writing 
against a dominant tradition of stylistic rules, but also in 
the problem of working and producing in existing theatre 
structures dominated in numbers by men. 
Similar to the dictum against the unnatural or the 
supernatural, a rule which devalues enchantment literature, 
science fiction and other forms of what might be called 
"extreme" fiction that are outside the "conceived 
possibility" of nature and history, the rule that spectacle 
is the least artistic element in theatre follows as a logical 
assumption if nature is not considered as spectacle, but it 
is more likely to be the case that spectacle is seen as 
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"easy" and not really due to any artistic skill. As Hobbes 
said, fiction that "exceed[s] the work — is easily feigned 
by them who dares" (98) , which implies that it is more 
difficult and more literary to imitate nature and the truth 
of history, but that one must be merely daring to move out of 
the prescribed standards. In the same way spectacle is seen 
as in rather bad taste and not really stimulating the 
audience through the prescribed methods of poetic imitation. 
Horace protests against the "appearance on stage of horrible 
and incredible spectacles" and emphasises "the offense to 
good taste, to decorum" (99), but Aristotle's Poetics refers 
to the skill of the poet: 
The tragic fear and pity may be aroused by the 
Spectacle; but they may also be aroused by the 
very structure and incidents of the play—which is 
the better way and shows the better poet ... 
Those, however, who make use of the Spectacle to 
put before us that which is merely monstrous and 
not productive of fear, are wholly out of touch 
with Tragedy; not every kind of pleasure should be 
reguired of a tragedy, but only its own proper 
pleasure, (emphasis mine; qtd. in Herrick 99) 
The objection by the Classical authorities to the "artifice" 
of the supernatural or spectacle may be more evidence of 
their struggle to balance contradictory definitions of poetic 
skill: on the one hand, imitating nature for authority within 
the rules of the doctrine of decorum, and on the other 
simultaneously being creative and artistic—nature as opposed 
to artifice. In the space of dramatic rules this 
contradiction implies that being the most creative is not 
necessarily being the most artistic, although Aristotle 
states this as so. One must be creative within the rules of 
skill, and therefore the lofty task of imitating nature 
really consists of definitive, arbitrary rules for craft 
work. Considering assximptions that the pleasure of tragedy 
lies in the theory of the poet's difficulty overcome; the 
emphasis on the poet to be in control of the plot resolution; 
and the importance of the skill of the poet to arouse fear 
and pity through structure and incidents; it is more likely 
that "imitating nature" really functions to give Authority to 
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the artifice of fictionalising 'reality' and 'Truth'. The 
struggle to elevate artistic creation using the imitation of 
nature and the representation of historical truth 
consequently serves to grant the poet power and the status of 
a "second deity", rather than that of a mere fictionaliser. 
The purpose of the dramatic rules, then, would be to achieve 
a set of requirements with which to measure literary skill as 
artists; fulfilling the didactic function of art by 
containing unruly passion, mere fantasy or spectacle within 
a structure that dictates the greatest poets would be 
imparting wisdom to the less intelligent masses, and guite 
possibly also achieving god-like immortality, in the process 
of establishing a dominant tradition. 
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Section (B). Knowledge. Gender and the Aristotelian 
Worldview 
The famous Aristotelian dicta are in one sense an 
arbitrary set of standards, yet they are derived from 
fundamental perspectives within a particular worldview. It 
is important to deconstruct the metaphysical assumptions 
underlying these traditional standards because, as Sue-Ellen 
Case points out, "the seemingly dramatic standards which 
select playwrights in the canon are actually the same 
patriarchal biases which organize the economy and social 
organization of the culture at large" (gtd. in Dolan 319). 
Thus metaphysics is in the lived social world as Nancy 
Passmore writes in The Politics of Women's Spirituality: 
Every facet of Western metaphysical thought 
assumes a separation: material/spiritual, 
male/female, nomena/phenomena, infinite/finite, ad 
infinitum! All 'approved' knowledge is based on 
implicit metaphysics as well as empirical reality 
... Literacy, and the whole Aristotelian, 
patriarchal worldview, tends to categorize, to 
label, to name, and to impose a linear quality 
upon our perceptions of reality. Even the act of 
reading/writing compartmentalizes logic, meaning, 
and the resultant worldview or reality-picture 
into segments that appear to occur sequentially, 
further reinforcing linear thinking. (166-167) 
I will show how the Aristotelian metaphysics of this 
historical tradition of standards contributed to the gender 
biased value judgements made in critical practices, as well 
as resulting in a masculine positivity of critical terms. 
This makes it nearly impossible to find value in women's 
texts that do not fit within these definitions and creates 
enormous difficulties for women writers. Further, the 
broader context of these standards which depend upon the 
belief system of women as inferior opposites, requires an 
addressing of the underlying philosophical structures that 
produce such dominance in the social construction of 
Knowledge, meaning, and power. These structures, including 
Aristotelian logic, the law of non-contradiction and a 
metaphysics of binary opposites, have not only contributed to 
the formation of a masculinist tradition in the (hu)man 
discourse in which women are represented as inferior 
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opposites, they also expose power as dominance in the control 
of representation and the construction of ideology. This can 
be shown through a deconstructionist and feminist critigue of 
dominance as it manifests in the metaphysical split between 
male/reason/public and female/emotional/private; of the 
dominance in philosophy and Knowledge which excludes 
contradiction and represses the indeterminable in the 
construction of meaning; of the dominance of meaning in a 
politics of interpretation where "correctness" is based on 
the authority of 'real' experience; of the dominance of 
metaphysics and rigorous objectivity as a platform of power 
for institutional control of representation in the production 
of naturalised ideologies; and in the construction of 
identity where the dominant emphasis has shifted from 
resemblance to difference. Thus in this section I will 
explore the relationship between the metaphysics of 
Knowledge, gender and the Aristotelian worldview in order to 
deconstruct dominance as it manifests in the philosophical 
structures that have produced the identity of the (hu)man 
discourse. 
Obviously if art is inspiration arising from a "nature" 
that is common to us all, then anyone can be inspired and 
produce art. However, as I have shown in Section (A), "The 
Gods of Great Drama: Imitation or Creation?", the didactic 
function of art, poetry and drama which requires the poet's 
learning and wisdom in order to be good writing, necessarily 
excludes those in society who are excluded from learning 
because they are thought not to possess reason; and these are 
slaves and women. As Case points out in Feminist Theatre, 
"this idea is articulated in Aristotle's Politics: 'the slave 
has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is 
without authority'" (18). The faculty of reason, which is 
interpreted as an essential quality located in the male 
rather than a construct available to all, thus becomes an 
important pivotal point for distinguishing who is capable of 
the possibility of philosophy, since it is the use of reason 
that shifts knowledge beyond individual experience to a 
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knowledge of the universal. Herrick discusses this 
distinction in learning, noting that "as Aristotle says in 
his Metaphysics, all men desire to know", but points out 
that, according to Robortellus, "all men do not learn in the 
same way" (32): 
Ignorant men learn by particulars. Wise men, 
philosophers, learn by universals as well. Thus 
the common man who views a work of imitation, a 
picture or a carving, recognizes only the 
particulars, the particulars which he has already 
experienced. The philosophical observer, however, 
joins the universal with the particular and 
exercises his reason, (emphasis mine; 32) 
The poet is not just an imitator, but a creator; not just 
inspired by nature, but an interpreter of it; and what 
facilitates the greater art is the poet's own reason and 
wisdom which allows him (sic) to philosophise "universal" 
knowledge, as distinguished from mere recognition of the 
particulars based on real experiences. 
However, Grene argues in A Portrait of Aristotle that 
there is a major contradiction running through the 
construction of what objects constitute Knowledge, stated by 
Aristotle as those which must be real and universal. Yet as 
stated above particulars are "real" and therefore not objects 
of universal wisdom. Grene points out that Plato believed 
physical reality was not stable; that only general 
conceptions, or universals, could be the true objects of 
knowledge: 
The flowing world of sense, Plato believed, lacks 
the stability of the purely knowable; it flits by, 
drecimlike, taking shape with every man's illusion. 
Only general conceptions, not this man but 
humanity, not this pleasure but good itself, are 
knowable. Such generals, of course, for Plato were 
Forms.,,. (24) 
Aristotle agreed with his teacher that objects of knowledge 
must be permanent and stable to be real, and therefore only 
universals are objects of knowledge. However, Aristotle 
contradicted himself arguing that only individuals are fully 
real ("this man, this horse", 24), Since individuals are 
constantly changing particulars, how can they be 'real' 
objects of knowledge that must be unchanging and universal? 
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Grene puts it this way: 
But particulars, except in the heavens, change 
size and shape and quality as well as place, are 
born and die. Only universals are objects of 
knowledge. Yet Aristotle did deny the reality of 
the Platonic Forms; only individuals, he insists 
again and again in the Metaphysics. are fully 
real. Beings in the primary, the genuine sense are 
individual things such as this man, this horse, 
this ox ... So once more, Aristotle, most 
meticulous of dialecticians, seems to be 
asserting, within the compass of a given work: 
knowledge is of the real and universal; but 
whatever is real is not universal; therefore if 
knowledge is of the real it is not of the 
universal, if of the universal, not of the real. 
Yet knowledge by definition must be both. (24) 
As Grene points out, Aristotle himself argued laboriously in 
the Book Gamma "that the Law of Non-Contradiction is 
fundamental to all meaningful discourse. No meaningful 
proposition can assert of the same subject in the same 
respect an attribute and its opposite" (emphasis mine; 24-
25) . As Grene says "when we put his statements about 
universality and knowledge and reality alongside one another, 
he himself seems to be doing just that" (25) . What is at 
stake here, illustrated by contradiction, is not only the 
limitations of defining objects of universal knowledge, but 
the indeterminacy of what is real. 
According to Grene, Aristotle's basis for the 
determination of knowledge depends upon a theory of 
representation that reflects a stable reality, with fixed 
positions and stateable essences. Grene discusses the basis 
of demonstrable knowledge in A Portrait of Aristotle, where 
she points out that Aristotelian definitions are problematic: 
Aristotle argues that demonstrative knowledge must 
be bounded in three directions. It must begin from 
fixed premises and move through a finite number of 
middle terms to precise and definite conclusions. 
A science is not infinitely expandable in any of 
these three directions, because what it exhibits 
is itself a finite structure, the essence of a 
natural group of individuals. Thus, once more, 
science depends for its possibility on the fact 
that things have essences, what's stateable in 
definitions. (95) 
Representation can be considered as a structural mode with a 
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binary sign system whereby the orientation of definitions is 
produced within a logic of inferior/superior, center and 
margin, and the elimination of contradiction to preserve a 
homogenous identity. The sign as a binary structure produces 
a tendency to create definitions by privileging one aspect of 
a so-called opposition over another, according to the 
subjective beliefs of the representer. However, those 
aspects which seem exactly oppositional (black/white) within 
a structure depend upon an observer positioned at the centre 
where the gaze along a linear line then defines the black 
area and the white area. As soon as the position of the 
observer shifts from that relative centre to the margins (the 
grey area) or across defining boundaries into another 
structure, that particular linear perspective is lost and the 
notion of centre and opposites collapses into differences or 
distinctions in a field. In this sense, the concept of a 
relative centre represents a similar conceptual shift to the 
discoveries of Copernicus, as Smith observes in Subject 
Woman: 
The significance of Copernican innovations was 
less that the sun rather than the earth was 
declared to be the centre of the solar system than 
that the position of the observer was no longer 
fixed and could no longer be disattended in 
interpreting observations, (qtd. in Oakley 325) 
This displacement of the fixed position—i.e. relativity— 
creates the lack of stability from which an interpreter makes 
observations, and has major consequences for the Aristotelian 
basis of scientific discourse and the determination of 
Knowledge. The lack of a fixed premise from which to begin 
and end, as well as the problematic notion of fixed essences 
in an environment which, both as quantum physics and the 
social sciences show, is an interrelated, constantly changing 
'web' of uncertain relations, thus presents an impossibility 
of assuming a definite, stable position in science or any 
other discourse. Thus the philosophical dichotomies 
mentioned earlier that rely upon the notion of essences, 
stability, and rigid boundaries dissolve into an intertextual 
field of relative perspectives, so that the "nature" of 
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oppositions depends upon the observer's position. 
In the production of universal knowledge by defining the 
'real', a metaphysics of opposites has been the basis for 
philosophical discourse in the construction of meaning and 
Truth in which the logic of the law of non-contradiction 
eliminates contradiction and opposites to determine meaning 
or establish and maintain a homogeneous identity. In this 
sense, the opposites are part of the location of differences 
for the purposes of determining order. In The Pirate's 
Fianc6e, Morris discusses Le Doeuff's Women and Philosophy 
which argues that the metaphysics of opposites has been a 
means of signifying difference as part of creating 
philosophical discourse: 
for Le Doeuff, the image of other (as dark 
continent, disorder, depth of the unintelligible, 
internal enemy and so on) is only one of a series 
of Others produced by philosophy in its process of 
self-definition. The child, the people, the savage 
and the pre-Socratics also come in for their fair 
share of alienation. Nevertheless, the figure of 
the feminine is extremely important. Not only does 
it appear to be a feature of the oldest 
metaphysics (as in Hegel's listing of Pythagorian 
oppositions; limit/infinity, unity/multiplicity, 
masculine/feminine, light/darkness, good/evil), 
but it also serves as a means of signifying a 
difference which creates philosophical discourse. 
(91) 
Without a stable 'reality' though, the location of opposites 
collapses into mere significations of difference, and the 
certainty of meaning in such a project becomes impossible. 
However, according to Le Doeuff, certainty within 
philosophical discourse is achieved through historical 
exclusion and the repression of the indeterminable, in order 
to make itself definite: 
It is too simplistic, she argues, merely to list 
the various historical exclusions of philosophy 
(rhetoric, seductive discourse, occultism). The 
fact that philosophy is a discipline, claiming to 
obey a finite stock of procedural rules and 
operations, indicates that something is repressed 
within it. The point is rather that what 
philosophical discourse labours to exclude must 
be—and must remain—something indeterminable: 'It 
is not, and cannot be [determined], since either 
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it is precisely the indefinite, or else philosophy 
amounts to the formal postulate that a practice of 
exclusion, a discipline of discourse, is necessary 
in order for the permitted modes of thought not to 
remain themselves indefinite. This then would 
constitute a general form of exclusion, one 
capable of being given a certain mmber of 
different contents. without itself being 
consubstantial with any one particular content'. 
(Le Doeuff qtd. in Morris 91) 
The practice of exclusion of the indeterminable in whatever 
form (woman, slave, or savage) , is, as Le Doeuff points out, 
necessary in order for those "permitted modes of thought not 
to remain themselves indefinite" (91). Knowledge as a 
project of philosophical order, is not the provable substance 
of Reality and Truth, but functions as the interpretation of 
permitted modes of thought that repress uncertainty through 
the exclusion of contradiction—and this means locating 
differences within a structure of oppositions that must be 
maintained. One of these is the reason/emotion opposition 
located in the (hu)man/woman dichotomy. 
As mentioned earlier, the production of philosophical 
knowledge is based upon the faculty of reason. The concept 
of rationality, as a located opposite within the dichotomy 
between reason/unreason, has been responsible for excluding 
women from philosophy and the literary traditions of 'great' 
writing. Its location as a masculine faculty, exercised 
according to rules and structures of philosophy, has also 
driven feminists away from 'theory' as it is perceived as 
essentially a patriarchal discourse. Le Doeuff directs two 
critiques of rationality, which, as Morris says, "work 
precisely by accepting the equation femininity = unreason, 
and by giving it a positive political value" (90). Morris 
claims that one critique is aimed against the statement by 
Guy Lardreau in L'Ange. "that slaves and women are indeed 
without reason, that 'when a slave, as slave, or a woman, as 
woman, reasons about slaves or women, this reasoning can only 
be an unreason'" (90), for this implies that "any autonomous 
discourse of the rebel must make itself heard in the 
irruption of unreason" (90). Lardreau says his 
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"announcement" is made in the name of "Greek frankness" (90) 
but Morris and Le Doeuff reply thus: 
knowledge about women has always been masculine 
property, 'in which case L'Ange is not announcing 
anything'; and that it is time to return, not to 
Greek frankness, but to an elementary historical 
materialism capable of recalling that slave 
societies proclaim the unreason of the slave, and 
patriarchal societies fondly repeat that woman, 
dear creature, lacks reason. (90) 
The second critique of rationality by Le Doeuff undermines: 
'a certain feminism of difference which seems 
unaware of its debt to Auguste Comte'—the 
position that rationality is indeed a masculine 
property, that therefore philosophical discourse 
is traversed by masculine values, and that women 
must seek their own specificity and their own 
discourse. (90) 
The acceptance by feminism that rationality is essentially 
male is thus the force behind the move to escape philosophy 
in order to discover or create a female discourse. Morris 
paraphrases Le Doeuff's reversal of the argument as she 
critiques this acceptance of an essential 'male' rationality: 
from the fact that philosophical discourse has 
often been structured by a misogynist imaginary, 
it does not necessarily follow that 'rationality' 
is a masculine privilege. She then develops a two-
sided counter position: (i) it is all to easy to 
overestimate the influence of philosophical 
representations of femininity, and thus to accept 
philosophy's myths about its own powers and 
importance; (ii) when the mystifications which are 
produced by philosophy come under attack—for 
example, the positivist image of women as morally 
superior and theoretically deficient—then it is 
the practice, and not the refusal, of philosophy 
which can provide the necessary (if insufficient) 
critical means for ousting and unmasking the 
alienating schemas which philosophy produces, 
(second emphasis mine; 90) 
Though feminism might want to produce a different kind of 
philosophy that does not reproduce knowledge based on 
oppositions, its occasional refusal to participate in 
philosophy and theoretical discourse because this is seen as 
patriarchal, merely perpetuates the location of reason and 
theory within the realm of the masculine. The position that 
breaks down this dichotomy of reason/unreason and 
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reason/emotion is the excluded middle denied by Aristotelian 
either/or logic—precisely the exercise of reason by women, 
and the exercise of emotion by men that displaces the 
location of these qualities and renders them meaningless as 
opposites. Ronald de Sousa discusses this boundary breakdown 
in his introduction to The Rationality of Emotion, where he 
argues that not only are these gualities not opposite, nor 
restricted to either the male or female location, but that 
they are interrelated and operational simultaneously within 
the exercising of either faculty: 
Despite a common prejudice, reason and emotion are 
not natural antagonists. On the contrary: I shall 
argue that when the calculi of reason have become 
sufficiently sophisticated, they would be 
powerless in their own terms, except for the 
contribution of emotion. For emotions are among 
the mechanisms that control the crucial factor of 
salience among what would otherwise be an 
unmanageable plethora of objects of attention, 
interpretations, and strategies of inference and 
conduct. What remains of the old opposition 
between reason and emotion is only this: emotions 
are not reducible to beliefs or to wants, (xv-xvi) 
Michael Ryan, in Marxism and Deconstruction also argues 
against the reason/unreason opposition, saying that "for 
feminism, a similar reversal and displacement of a purely 
theoretical position is conceivable" (121). He discusses 
men's detachment from female violence and "hysteria" 
especially when it is directed against male rationality and 
domination because: 
Men know (that is, can theorize, envision, 
overlook, and oversee) what feminine "hysteria" is 
about. They believe it is an untheorized practice, 
an unconscious rage that has not been elevated to 
theoretical consciousness and thereby controlled, 
(not my emphasis; 121) 
Male theorising in the psychiatric discourse about feminine 
"hysteria" referred to it as a mental and physical disease as 
evidenced in A Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, edited 
by Daniel Hack Tuke: 
A consideration of the main facts called 
hysterical will indicate the general definition of 
hysteria in its physical basis as a disorder or 
defective development of the functionally higher 
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layers of the cerebral cortex, with manifestations 
of both mental and bodily phenomena in varying 
proportion, and occurring mostly in the female 
sex. (vol. 1, 1976, p 619) 
The medical profession did not take women's complaints about 
their position in society seriously nor question whether the 
"hysteria" was produced by cultural structures of oppression, 
nor did they consider men's symptoms of emotional and mental 
distress from shell shock as similar to hysteria. Instead 
the traditional dichotomies were maintained and hysteria was 
seen as evidence of an essential quality of feminine 
unreason, an assumption that was also exhibited in the 
popular press: 
A fashionable German physician named Wiederhold is 
doing three months imprisonment for having 
belaboured a nervous lady patient with a stick as 
she lay in bed. The doctor defended his course of 
treatment on the ground that stick was the only 
effective cure for hysteria, a theory which 
deserves the consideration of all who have had any 
experience of lovely woman when the spirit moves 
her to shut her eyes and shriek. (Bulletin, 
Sydney, 9 July 1892, p 15) 
Ryan argues that deconstruction would focus in on this 
exclusion of "hysteria" from the male position of 
rationality: 
Might not the self-monumentalizing paralysis of 
rational rigor (mortis) itself be an effect of 
what it excludes as feminine 'hysteria'? In other 
words, the hierarchy of male reason and female 
unreason could be reversed. Feminine 'hysteria', 
rather than male coercive self-control, then 
becomes the sign of moral and philosophical 
goodness. (121) 
By defining rational control as an effect of hysteria which 
has been excluded as unacceptable and unreasonable emotions, 
the oppositions are displaced and "the poles of expressive 
violence and implosive control would be seen to pass into 
each other" (121): 
Male theoretical detachment in the face of 
feminine "hysteria" is, like all theory that 
succeeds always in balancing all the equations, 
simply a less evident form of hysteria and 
violence. And "female" hysteria might be a 
"rational," therapeutic, and potentially 
revolutionary form of violence. (121) 
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Despite all the traditional definitions of male rationality 
and female emotionality, and the great poet's need for reason 
to control passion and express universality, according to 
Herrick, Aristotle also writes that "'poetry demands a man 
with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of 
madness in him'" (9). In light of the extensive textual 
evidence to suppress unruly passion, uncontrolled emotions, 
and certainly the madness of unnatural spectacle, this 
statement is perhaps the final irony. 
In the construction of Knowledge, when representation is 
controlled by the construction of meaning through the 
elimination of contradiction—it is a project necessarily 
involved in repression, and domination in the construction of 
ideology. Gayatri Spivak suggests the domination of meaning 
underlies the politics of interpretation in her collection of 
essays. In Other Worlds; 
When Kristeva writes 'this abject awakens in the 
one who speaks archaic conflicts with his own 
improper objects, his ab-jects, at the edge of 
meaning, at the limits of the interpretable [and] 
it arouses the paranoid rage to dominate those 
objects, to transform them', she is writing not 
only of Celine's anti-Semitism, but also of the 
revolutionary impulse (p. 91) . What is at stake 
here is a politics of interpretation. (128) 
Similar to Le Doeuff's argximent that what is repressed in 
philosophy is the indeterminable, a politics of 
interpretation represses contradiction to eliminate the fear 
of uncertainty and the lack of a fixed position hovering at 
the margins of meaninglessness. The domination of meaning is 
a project to locate in static form—the word, the correct 
interpretation, the Truth—what is really an ongoing, 
relative and subjective interaction that occurs through 
dialogue. In this sense, naming becomes power that is 
sustained through erasure and the control of representation. 
This domination of meaning in the (hu)man discourse 
privileges a practice of criticism centered around a politics 
of interpretation that more often works to preserve the 
identity of the discourse because the power to be "correct" 
is based on the authority of 'real' experience. Hence the 
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criticisms of women playwrights who were attacked for their 
inadequate knowledge and "experience" of the real world. In 
Jardine's play from Grafts. Feminist Questions d'aores 
gynesis. published in Susan Sheridan's recent collection. 
Feminist Cultural Criticism, she quotes Jane Gallop's 
argument that such a politics is inherently conservative: 
But then 'belief in simple referentiality is not 
only unpoetic but also ultimately politically 
conservative, because it cannot recognize that the 
reality to which it appeals is a traditional 
ideological construction, whether one terms it 
phallomorphic, or metaphysical, or bourgeois, or 
something else. The politics of experience is 
inevitably a conservative politics for it cannot 
help but conserve traditional ideological 
constructs which are not recognized as such but 
are taken for the "real"'. (175) 
Therefore those critics (and writers) with experiences 
privileged by the identity of the discourse more often 
contribute to maintaining the status quo, while those writers 
and critics who lack experience are considered without 
authority. Thus the masculinist identity that privileges 
male experience in the public realm is preserved by writers 
and critics, (generally male, or females who corroborate 
traditional gender roles), who can best interpret the 
universal wisdom in the representation of these experiences. 
In this sense, critical practices of interpretation 
function to control representation such that by the 
historical force of tradition, the ideologies of the 
discourse become naturalised and self-evident. However, 
according to Spivak, this politics of interpretation is based 
on a notion of ideology that denies the process of 
"historical sedimentation", and regards the subject as 
"freely willing" and "consciously choosing" against a "world 
seen as background": 
It is difficult to speak of a politics of 
interpretation without a working notion of 
ideology as larger than the concepts of individual 
consciousness and will. At its broadest 
implications this notion of ideology would undo 
the oppositions between determinism and free will 
and between conscious choice and unconscious 
reflex. Ideology in action is what a group takes 
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to be natural and self-evident, that of which the 
group, as a group, must deny any historical 
sedimentation. It is both the condition and the 
effect of the constitution of the subject (of 
ideology) as freely willing and consciously 
choosing in a world that is seen as background. In 
turn, the sub j ect (s) of ideology are the 
conditions and effects of the self-identity of the 
group as a group. It is impossible, of course, to 
mark off a group as an entity without sharing 
complicity with its ideological definition. A 
persistent critique of ideology is thus forever 
incomplete. (emphasis mine; In Other Worlds 118) 
To go beyond a politics of interpretation requires a broader 
notion of ideology "that would of course situate the merely 
conceptual framework within a more extended and heterogeneous 
field" (118). In the heterogeneous field, the subject and 
the world are part of an intertextual field such that the 
element of dialogue within groups, and among groups, rather 
than erasure, becomes important to prevent the historical 
sedimentation of "natural" or "self-evident" reality 
constructs. Thus the formation of knowledge is forever 
involved in a continual process of ideological reform and 
critigue; with subjects operating to understand their own 
complicity as flexible, interrelated positions rather than by 
polarisation into opposition, and the struggle for dominance. 
As Ryan puts it in Marxism and Deconstruction, the 
metaphysics behind a politics of interpretion may be rooted 
in something other than an innocent desire for knowledge or 
meaning: 
But that rigorous identity and absolute truth—in 
metaphysical rationalism with its firm categorical 
divisions and strict objectivism—may merely be an 
excuse for power. (211) 
While representation as a theoretical structure has been 
passed off as a reflection of objective reality, 
intertextually in discourse it participates in creating 
reality constructs through ideology. What seems "natural" 
or "real" is thus an ideological construct reached either as 
communication agreements between interacting subjects in the 
process of dialogue, or by force through the power of a 
particular group to dominate the use of representation. 
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Institutionalised knowledge produced by the domination of 
meaning, with authority vested in those who control 
representation, is not self-reflexive when it erases texts 
and refuses dialogue, nor is it disinterested in its own 
power when it refuses to acknowledge its own complicity in 
the production of ideology and structural power 
differentials. Analysing erasure as a tool of dominance in 
the (hu)man discourse then, requires understanding the way 
representation in language is itself a dominating structure, 
as well as deconstructing how it has been controlled, and by 
whom, to create specific kinds of privileged reality 
constructs which, in a will to power are then imposed upon 
others using the force of erasure and exclusion; without 
dialogue, without agreement. The structure of power as 
dominance is hierarchical and falsely based on an assumed 
superiority that favours one aspect of an opposition and 
results in dominance over those perceived as inferior others. 
The dominant entity will always defend its own identity by 
exaggerating the differences it locates in perceived 
inferiors, while simultaneously suppressing within itself its 
resemblance to the 'others', in a lack of self-reflexivity. 
What may be in question, then, when addressing erasure in the 
(hu)man discourse, is a non-reflexive criticism based on a 
politics of interpretation that determines meaning and value 
using a fixed subject-object (critic-text) position, as 
compared to what Spivak refers to as: 
a position that today would call itself the 
politics of textuality, seeing that the network of 
politics-history-society-sexuality, and the like, 
defines itself in ideology by acknowledging a 
textual or weblike structure. (In Other Worlds 
121) 
Rather than being a project to determine the correct 
interpretation of an objective reality, a politics of 
textuality regards meanings as constantly negotiated in a 
weblike structure through representation, and thus can be 
interested in self-reflexivity and its own complicity in the 
production of reality constructs, a practice and politics of 
criticism which I will discuss further in Parts Three and 
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Four. 
Having looked at how gender definitions of masculinity 
have permeated the (hu)man discourse through the dramatic 
rules for good writing and the philosophical structures of 
Knowledge, I will next discuss a feminist analysis of how 
this discourse identity affects and limits the woman 
playwright and the woman writer in terms of her ability to 
express difference, with respect to style or gender, and how 
the critical language of masculine positivity has supported 
gender biased criticism. Case argues that the dramatic 
rules, by their criteria, have stereotyped and excluded women 
as characters, spectators, and dramatists. They are supposed 
to help the poet create the appropriate style for presenting 
subject matter, and the right characterisation combined with 
the properly constructed plot will help the poet in his 
"imitation" of a probable reality. But these standards have 
privileged action through plot; supported distinctions of 
class and gender; imposed the unification of time and space 
through the dramatic unities; privileged the homogeneity of 
character in conventionalisation; linearised narrative as the 
breaking up of daily cycles into compartmentalised segments 
with fixed conclusions; and through decorxim and proper style 
have controlled representation by privileging reason over the 
disorder of unruly passions, spectacle, the unnatural or the 
supernatural. Case points out in Feminism and Theatre that 
Aristotle's requirement for characters to be good is a moral 
imperative which excludes women: 
'In connection with the characters ... first and 
most important, that they be good but goodness 
exists in each class of people: there is in fact 
such a thing as a good woman and such a thing as a 
good slave, although no doubt one of these classes 
is inferior and the other, as a class, is 
worthless', (qtd, in Case 16) 
The absence of the male in this discussion "illustrates that 
the male citizen is the standard of good, but that this 
quality may even be found in others" (16) , The tragic 
character must be good, and therefore, women and slaves 
cannot be the subject of tragedy, which is the most didactic 
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form of drama for the lower classes. The requirement for 
appropriate action according to character again restricts 
women from the higher realms of drama, since tragic heroes 
must be noble, good, and exhibit bravery and intellectual 
abilities: 
'for it is possible for a person to be manly in 
terms of character, but it is not appropriate for 
a woman to exhibit either this guality or the 
intellectual cleverness that is associated with 
men'. (Aristotle qtd. in Case 17) 
Case argues that there are several translations of the 
Poetics where the term manly is used interchangeably with 
terms like brave or clever so that the male gender, bravery 
and cleverness become synonomous. Gender-specific 
Aristotelian assximptions prefigure the theory of the inferior 
other and therefore: 
rest upon the intersection of social reality and 
aesthetic prescriptions. In both realms, women are 
the outsiders. They function only to provide the 
limits of the male subject, which help to complete 
his outline, or they illustrate differences from 
him, which highlight his qualities. (Case 17) 
It is important to add that the "social reality" referred to 
is in fact the masculinist interpretation or version of what 
women and slaves are, not an objective reality. Case also 
points out that women's lack of character not only restricts 
them within the dramatic text, but affects their entire 
experience of drama and art as spectators: 
Aristotle links the act of representation to the 
pleasure of learning, both for the artist and for 
those who view his art ... The pleasxire of mimesis 
is didactic, and learning is linked to the 
enjoyment-reception of its product. Since 
cleverness is gender-specific to the male, the 
enjoyment of art may be restricted to his 
province. (18) 
In Aristotle's system, thought is to facilitate correct 
choices, and pity, fear and recognition in the drama helps 
teach audiences about correct choices (18). Without 
cleverness, women lack the ability to make such choices and, 
in The Politics. Aristotle states that since women have no 
authority of choice and no cleverness, they are silenced: 
Morever, even dialogue would seem to be outside 
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their realm - for, without authority, speaking is 
inappropriate. as the same passage in The Politics 
goes on to argue: 'the courage of a man is shown 
in commanding, but of a woman in obeying ... as 
the poet says "Silence is a woman's glory", but 
this is not equally the glory of a man'. (18) 
Therefore, Case argues that in Aristotle's system, the drama 
has no function for women either as spectators or writers. 
Traditional dramatic standards, combined with a 
predominant masculinist identity that privileges the public 
sphere, have functioned as the authoritative basis for 
judgement in the field of literary criticism with severe 
consequences for the representations of women. Women writers 
have been restricted by the limits of stereotyped 
characterisation, and their representable experiences, which 
Joanna Russ refers to as acceptable myths and heroines in her 
article "What Can a Heroine Do? or Why Women Can't Write" 
from Woman as Writer. She makes the point that women who do 
not write within the limits of male myths, but instead 
develop alternative styles, structures and myths, are prone 
to become "outsiders" and their writing is "always in 
critical jeopardy" (161). She suggests two alternatives: 
There seem to me to be two alternatives open to 
the woman author who no longer cares about How 
She Fell in Love or How She Went Mad. These are 
(1) lyricism, and (2) life. By 'lyricism' I do not 
mean purple passages or baroque raptures; I mean a 
particular principle of structure. (158) 
While not every woman wants to write in the lyric mode, nor 
should she have to, Russ does make some interesting points 
about how that structure works against the prescribed 
elements of traditional narrative and drama: 
If the narrative mode (what Aristotle called 
'epic') concerns itself with events connected by 
the chronological order in which they occur, and 
the dramatic mode with volxintary hximan actions 
which are connected both by chronology and 
causation, then the principle of construction I 
wish to call lyric consists of the organization of 
discrete elements (images, events, scenes, 
passages, words, what-have-you) around an unspoken 
thematic or emotional center. The lyric mode 
exists without chronology or causation; its 
principle of connection is associative, (emphasis 
by Russ; 158) 
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In this sense, Russ says that "the invisible center is what 
the novel or poem is about" because (158): 
it is also xinsayable in available dramatic or 
narrative terms. That is, there is no action 
possible to the central character and no series of 
events which will embody in clear, unequivocal, 
immediately graspable terms what the artist means. 
(158) 
Of course, "what the artist means" or "what the novel is 
about" are always problematic since they are never fully 
available from the text and are subjective interpretations. 
Yet, the decentered, associative style Russ discusses is even 
more outside of the prescribed dramatic structure and, 
therefore, seems unaccessible in the traditional critical 
terms. As an example of this mode, Russ refers to Virginia 
Woolf who she says is criticised for the fact that "nothing 
happens" in her novels, with the "usual vocabulary of 
denigration: these novels lack important events, they are 
hermetically sealed; they are too full of sensibility; they 
are trivial; they lack action; they are feminine" (159) . The 
other alternative beside that of the lyric mode is "life", or 
what Russ describes as moving out of male myths and writing 
from "structure of one's own experience" (159), but this too 
has problems: 
How to write a novel about a person to whom 
nothing happens? A person to whom nothing but a 
love story is supposed to happen? A person 
inhabiting a world in which the only reality is 
frustration or endurance—or these plus an 
unbearably mystifying confusion? (159) 
In writing about experiences which do not flow 
chronologically or resolve climactically, Russ suggests that 
women's texts are subject to being received as "formless" or 
"inexperienced": 
obviously life is not like that; life is not messy 
and indecisive; we know what life (and novels) are 
from Aristotle—who wrote about plays—and male 
novelists who employ male myths created bv a 
culture that imagines itself from the male point 
of view, (emphasis mine; 159) 
It is important to remember that the male point of view is 
also a social construct, and that this version of reality or 
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myth is not an essentially male perspective, but rather a 
conditioned masculinist position. Nevertheless, despite the 
difficulty of author based criticism which located writing as 
emerging from any one author's experience, critics have 
privileged the masculine version of representation: 
It is a commonplace criticism that only the male 
myths are valid or interesting; a book as fine 
(and well-structured) as Jane Eyre fails even to 
be seen by many critics because it grows out of 
experiences—events, fantasies, wishes, fears, 
daydreams, images of self—entirely foreign to 
their own. As critics are usually unwilling to 
believe their lack of understanding to be their 
own fault, it becomes the fault of the book. Of 
the author. Of all women writers, (last emphasis 
mine; 159) 
Critics who rely on what is traditionally accepted, or their 
own ideological belief systems, will always have difficulty 
in relating to a text that is different, or which represents 
what is outside of their immediately understandable realm of 
experience. And in this sense, perhaps the lack of space for 
what is different makes its existence more difficult, as Russ 
intimates: "make something unspeakable, and you make it 
unthinkable" (160). 
Since "insiders" know "perfectly well that art ought to 
match their ideas of it" while "outsiders" end up with 
critical problems, Russ argues that some writers have 
attempted to place their different myths within genres where 
the "reality" represented is also outside of the traditional 
patriarchal realm. These areas are detective stories, 
supernatural fiction, and science fiction, which we know from 
the Classical authorities do not require as much skill as the 
artistry of writing within literary propriety. However, Russ 
argues that these genres are influenced by Medieval patterns 
of fiction which dramatise a more collective social 
organisation: 
I think the resemblance lies in that medieval 
literature so often dramatizes not people's social 
roles but the life of the soul ... Science 
fiction, political fiction, parable, allegory, 
exemplxim—all carry a heavier intellectual freight 
(and self-consciously so) than we are used to. All 
are didactic. All imply that human problems are 
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collective, as well as individual, and take these 
problems to be spiritual, social, perceptive, or 
cognitive—not the fictionally sex-linked problems 
of success, competition, castration, education, 
love, or even personal identity with which we are 
all so familiar, (emphasis mine; 162) 
Certainly Russ makes some sweeping generalisations and, in a 
sense, all representations of hximan problems are fictional 
whether they are collective or individual. But her argximent 
that the (hu)man discourse does not critically validate myths 
which deal with experiences outside of those that have been 
"fictionally sex-linked" is a reasonable one: 
Our current fictional myths leave vast areas of 
hximan experience unexplored: work for one, genuine 
religous experience for another, and above all the 
lives of the traditionally voiceless, the vast 
majority of whom are women. (163) 
She concludes her argximent by saying that "women cannot 
write—using the old myths" because the old myths are fatal. 
She writes of the interrelationship of myth and gender role 
as constructed through the intertextual network of text and 
social practice: 
Our traditions, our books, our morals, our 
manners, our films, our speech, our economic 
organization, everything we have inherited, tells 
us that to be a Man one must bend Nature to one's 
will—or other men. This means ecological 
catastrophe in the first instance and war in the 
second. To be a Woman, one must be first and 
foremost a mother and after that a server of Men; 
this means overpopulation and the perpetuation of 
the first two disasters. The roles are deadly. The 
myths that serve them are fatal. (163) 
Although these myths are "fatal", the difficulty is in 
creating new myths that can interact within the intertextual 
field of discourse, without being subjected to erasure. In 
Gender and Transition. Alice Eichholz discusses Mark Gerzon's 
interesting suggestions for alternatives to the old roles for 
heroes which he divides as belonging to the pxiblic and 
private sphere: 
The two public archetypes he presents are the 
Frontiersman, the one who alone conquers the earth 
and tames the forests, and the Soldier, the 
protector who abuses his body in order to defend 
... Gerzon describes the balance between these two 
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public heroes of Frontiersman and Soldier as 
peace-loving champions of freedom ready to kill to 
prove it. (292) 
Gerzon comes up with some alternatives to the 'normal' hero: 
For the Frontiersman, the less defended hero who 
is capable of interdependence is the Healer, with 
a commitment to healing the wounds in the earth 
made by the Frontiersman. The choice instead of 
the Soldier is the Mediator, able to hear contrary 
points of view and understand the 'enemy' because 
he understands himself from within rather than 
projecting it onto others. Rather than work coming 
first for the Breadwinner, the choice is 
Companion, who has the opportunity to share in 
work, love, and family. In the workplace and 
education, rather than the Expert, the choice is 
that of Colleague, one who values all 
contributions and skills, realizing everyone's 
expertise in their own experience. Finally, rather 
than the Lord representing that distanced role of 
responding to hurt and pain, whether spiritual, 
psychic, or physical, the Nurturer understands the 
closeness and hximanity necessary in healing, 
including his own. (293) 
Eichholz points out that many of these new choices for heroes 
incorporate qualities which have been the traditional domain 
for the feminine gender, as Manhood is an increasingly 
aggressively challenged concept. In this respect men and the 
masculine gender construct also become the subjects of 
feminism, rather than mere onlookers upon a feminism that 
only 'liberates' women from the domestic sphere and leaves 
male-dominant power structures unchallenged. T^d in the face 
of increasing domestic and public violence, there is a crisis 
of confidence about heroes, and about leaders in whom people 
have invested their safety and security, leading to an 
unspoken and almost unconscious disappointment: 
'These heroes don't do what I thought they would. They 
don't protect me or my children. They can't. There must 
be an alternative'. (294) 
Quite rightly though, in an economy based on the- old heroes, 
Eichholz she says that "how these choices become real options 
is the challenge" (293) . 
Although the (hu)man discourse employs gender biased 
criticism derived from the Aristotelian tradition, masculine 
positivity in critical language also supports and contributes 
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to this gender bias which makes it nearly impossible to have 
positive words to describe women's writing. In The American 
Woman Playwright. Olauson lists some of the socially 
conditioned assximptions about gender as they are incorporated 
into the dramatic discourse from Ellen Moers' article "The 
Angry Young Women": 
1. Women are uncomfortable with facts or big 
ideas. Their intellectual preoccupations are 
small. 
2. Women's experience is limited to home and 
hearth. 
3. Women are naturally sensitive to smaller 
emotional states but usually have less perceptive 
powers than men. 
4. Women's natures are passive, not active, and 
ordinarily they observe rather than do. Therefore, 
they are more adept at noting detailed social 
nuances than men; thus they are more conservative, 
nostalgic, and at times, brilliantly satiric of 
small social scenes. 
6. Women are deficient in logic and order 
therefore lack the ability to create good plots, 
(qtd. in Olauson 3) 
Such gender assumptions about women in criticism stem from 
the Aristotelian dramatic standard of plot construction as 
conflict, climax and resolution which as I have shown, is a 
style that has been represented as "logical" and seen as a 
necessary prerequisite to a good play. Therefore the good 
Playwright must also appear as logical; since the feminine 
gender is constructed as emotional, then the text of the 
woman playwright and by association her subjects, becomes an 
obvious site for critical disregard on the basis of gender. 
Gender-biased criticism, however, works beyond the standards 
of drama by consistently locating the ability to achieve such 
constructions within the assumed logical qualities of the 
male playwright, thereby simultaneously constructing a 
critical language which represents positive qualities in a 
text using masculine gender attributes. Thus words like 
'drive' and 'hard-hitting' are associated with males and 
therefore good playwrighting; a play about alcoholic families 
written by a man may be classified as 'gut-wrenching' while 
a similar subject represented by a woman is referred to as 
'domestic' or 'trivial'. In Second Words. Margaret Atwood 
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discusses this masculine positivity in critical language, and 
the lack of positive critical terms for the differences 
represented through women's writing. After a survey of 
"sexual bias in reviewing" as a group project in 1971-72, 
they put together some classifications of gender-biased 
attitudes. The first one is called the "Quiller-Couch 
Syndrome" and refers to a turn-of-the-century essay by the 
man of that name who defined masculine and feminine styles in 
writing: 
The 'masculine' style is, of course, bold, 
forceful, clear, vigorous, etc.; the 'feminine' 
style is vague, weak, tremulous, pastel, etc. In 
the list of pairs you can include 'objective' and 
'subjective', 'universal' or 'accurate depiction 
of society' versus 'confessional', 'personal', or 
even 'narcissistic' and 'neurotic'. It's .roughly 
seventy years since Quiller-Couch's essay, but the 
'masculine' group of adjectives is still much more 
likely to be applied to the work of male writers; 
female writers are much more likely to get hit 
with some version of 'the feminine style' or 
'feminine sensibility', whether their work merits 
it or not. (197) 
The second pattern they noticed is that "good equals male" 
and "bad equals female". Atwood refers to it as the Lady 
Painter Syndrome: 
'When she's good', he said, 'we call her a 
painter; when she's bad, we call her a lady 
painter'. 'She writes like a man' is part of the 
same pattern; it's usually used by a male reviewer 
who is impressed by a female writer. It's meant as 
a compliment. See also 'she thinks like a man'. 
(197) 
Maleness is exemplified by the 'good' male writer, but 
femaleness is seen by reviewers as a handicap which should be 
transcended. Further, adjectives for good male writing like 
"strong" or "gutsy" or "hard" are often used to describe 
pieces written by men which are then thought of "as merely 
realistic" (197). However, a similar piece by a woman is 
likely to be labelled as "cruel" or "tough" (197): 
The assximption is that women are by nature soft, 
weak and not very good, and that if a woman writer 
happens to be good, she should be deprived of her 
identity as a female and provided with higher 
(male) status. Thus the woman writer has, in the 
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minds of such reviewers, two choices. She can be 
bad but female, a carrier of the 'feminine 
sensibility' virus; or she can be 'good' in male-
adjective terms, but sexless. (198) 
The important point is that there are no words in the 
critical vocabulary for expressing the concept of "good" 
female, good woman writer (198): 
Work by a male writer is often spoken of by 
critics admiring it as having 'balls'; ever hear 
anyone speak admiringly of work by a woman as 
having 'tits?' Possible Antidotes: Development of 
a 'good/female' vocabulary ('Wow, has that ever 
got Womb ... ' ) ; or preferably, the development of 
a vocabulary that can treat structures made of 
words as though they are exactly that, not 
biological entities possessed of sexual organs. 
(198) 
Other critical methods for reducing the work of women writers 
is the concentration on domestic themes in the piece while 
ignoring other topics that might be represented; then 
patronising the writer for an excessive interest in 
domesticity (198). In this instance, if a man writes about 
doing the dishes it is considered realism but if a woman does 
"it's an unfortunate feminine genetic limitation" (199). 
Another syndrome noted is the "sexual compliment put down" 
where the reviewer comments on the "cute picture" of the 
"female author on the cover" while simultaneously dismissing 
her as a writer: 
She: 'How do you like my (design for an 
airplane/mathematical formula/medical miracle)?' 
He: 'You sure have a nice ass.' (199) 
Finally, reviewers caught up in this syndrome often manifest 
the same logic when writing about women writers, stereotyping 
the author according to common media images, such as the 
"happy housewife" where writing is a hobby, or "Ophelia" 
which concentrates on how the writer is "a crazy freak" near 
to the brink of turning into a "suicidal Sylvia" (201). 
Atwood says that one interviewer actually asked her to "say 
something interesting .. . say you write all your poems on 
drugs" (201). Another image is the "Miss Martyr or Movie 
Mag" which portrays the writer "as someone who suffers more 
than others. Why does the writer suffer more? Because she's 
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successful, and you all know Success Must Be Paid For" (2 01) . 
Despite the one-dimensionality of traditional criticism 
represented by this male positivity in critical language, 
some women writers are anxious about being associated with 
feminism; one reason Atwood mentions is a reservation that 
feminist literary criticism would also become one-
dimensional : 
However, a feminist criticism need not necessarily 
be one-dimensional. And—small comfort—no matter 
how narrow, purblind, and stupid such a criticism 
in its lowest manifestations may be, it cannot 
possibly be more narrow, purblind and stupid than 
some of the non-feminist critical attitudes and 
styles that have preceded it. (192) 
Let us hope that feminist literary criticism will be up to 
the challenge of not repeating these "stupidities" of 
history. 
Gender-biased positivity in critical language points to 
the necessity of further analysis with respect to the binary 
sign and signification itself; here the dominance of reason 
functions through representation to separate and privilege 
identity by difference over the "imaginary" identity by 
resemblance. This dichotomy has operated through continuing 
negative criticism that denigrates plays by women that 
utilise the imaginary, the poetic or illogical associations. 
Derrida's deconstruction of the binary sign combined with 
Foucault's analysis of the sign in The Order of Things where 
he argues that the "murmur of resemblance" resides in the 
associative powers of the imagination even when constructing 
identity by difference, provides a basis for altering this 
privileging of difference over resemblance. The binary sign 
of Saussure is defined as the link between concept and image, 
and represents a dichotomy between mental concept and 
physical image or word; but the opposition breaks down since 
the signified itself already consists of an endless chain of 
signifiers and thus is not a 'pure' mental concept. In The 
Order of Things Foucault considers the "archeology" of the 
binary sign in the seventeenth century as a conceptual shift 
in thought within the sign system from resemblance to 
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difference, and the consequences for knowledge and the 
dichotomy between imagination and reason: 
we shall find the signs that have become tools of 
analysis, marks of identity and difference, 
principles whereby things can be reduced to order, 
keys for a taxonomy; and, on the other, the 
empirical and murmuring resemblance of things, 
that unreacting similitude that lies beneath 
thought and furnishes the infinite raw material 
for divisions and distributions. On the one hand, 
the general theory of signs, divisions, and 
classifications; on the other, the problem of 
immediate resemblances, of the spontaneous 
movement of the imagination, of nature's 
repetitions. And between the two, the new forms of 
knowledge that occupy the area opened up by this 
new split. (58) 
He argues that in the Renaissance there was a more complex 
notion of the sign: 
at that time, the theory of the sign implied three 
elements: that which was marked, that which did 
the marking, and that which made it possible to 
see in the first the mark of the second; and this 
last element was, of course, resemblance: the sign 
provided a mark exactly in so far as it was 
'almost the same thing' as that which it 
designated. It is this unitary and triple system 
that disappears at the same time as 'thought by 
resemblance', and is replaced by a strictly binary 
organization. (64) 
The sign was in the mark and thus was a "form of the world"; 
it was "bound to what it marks by the solid and secret bonds 
of resemblance or affinity" (58). Furthermore, "resemblance 
was linked to a system of signs; and it was the 
interpretation of those signs that opened up the field of 
concrete knowledge" (71). According to Foucault, "it was not 
Icnowledge that gave them their signifying function, but the 
very language of things" (59) , and "it is in this sense that 
it was the divination of an essential implication" (59) . In 
the seventeenth century the organisation of the sign becomes 
binary, constructed as a pure duality "in its simple state as 
an idea, or an image, or a perception, associated with or 
substituted for another" (64). But in this duality, the 
signifying element itself is not the sign and "in fact, the 
signifying element has no content, no function, and no 
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determination other than what it represents" (64): 
the binary theory of the sign, the theory upon 
which the whole general science of the sign has 
been founded since the seventeenth century, is 
linked according to a fundamental relation with a 
general theory of representation. (67) 
The sign can be more or less probable, more or less distant 
from what it signifies, and either natural or arbitrary 
because: 
the relation of the sign to its content is not 
guaranteed by the order of things in themselves. 
The relation of the sign to the signified now 
resides in a space in which there is no longer any 
intermediary ficfure to connect them: what connects 
them is a bond established, inside knowledge, 
between the idea of one thing and the idea of 
another. (63) 
Foucault is arguing that between the idea signified and the 
idea signifying, the idea of the role of representation is 
displaced and knowledge comes to "reside entirely within the 
signifying element" (emphasis mine; 64) . Similarly the 
fabrication of meaning within representation is displaced and 
is seen to reside in the word: 
As in the sixteenth century, 'semiology' and 
'hermeneutics' are superimposed—but in a 
different form. In the Classical age they no 
longer meet and join in the third element of 
resemblance; their connection lies in that power 
proper to representation of representing itself. 
There will therefore be no theory of signs 
separate and differing from an analysis of 
meaning. (66) 
Therefore, from the 17th century on, "it is within knowledge 
itself that the sign is to perform its signifying function; 
it is from knowledge that it will borrow its certainty or its 
probability" (59): 
It is no longer the task of knowledge to dig out 
the ancient Word from the unknown places where it 
may be hidden; its job now is to fabricate a 
language, and to fabricate it well—so that, as an 
instrximent of analysis and combination, it will 
really be the language of calculation ... it was 
the sign system that linked all knowledge to a 
language, and sought to replace all languages with 
a system of artificial symbols and operations of a 
logical nature. (62-63) 
Foucault argues that the archeological conditions which made 
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possible the Classical system of thought, the binary system 
of signs, the introduction into knowledge of probability, 
analysis and combination, and the justified arbitrariness of 
the system, was "the dissociation of the sign and resemblance 
in the early seventeenth century" (63): 
So signs are now set free from that teeming world 
throughout which the Renaissance had distributed them. 
They are lodged henceforth within the confines of 
representation, in the interstices of ideas, in that 
narrow space in which they interact with themselves in 
a perpetual state of decomposition and recomposition. As 
for similitude, it is now a spent force, outside the 
realm of knowledge. It is merely empiricism in its most 
unrefined form; like Hobbes, one can no longer 'regard 
it as being a part of philosophy', unless it has first 
been erased in its inexact form of resemblance and 
transformed by knowledge into a relationship of equality 
or order, (emphasis mine; 67) 
Despite the attempt to exclude resemblance in the production 
of knowledge, Foucault argues that "similitude is still an 
indispensable border of knowledge. For no equality or 
relation of order can be established between two things 
unless their resemblance has at least occasioned their 
comparison" (67). Imagination operates therefore as the 
"murmur of resemblance" even in the construction of identity 
by difference, as it was the imagination that used 
resemblance to link two things together: 
Without imagination, there would be no resemblance 
between things. The double requisite is patent. 
There must be, in the things represented, the 
insistent mxirmur of resemblance; there must be, in 
the representation, the perpetual possibility of 
imaginative recall. (69) 
So resemblance was situated on the side of imagination, while 
the age of reason demanded identity by logic, and the 
categorisation of differences: 
From the seventeenth century, resemblance was 
pushed out to the boundaries of knowledge, towards 
the hximblest and basest of its frontiers. There, 
it links up with imagination, with doubtful 
repetitions, with misty analogies. And instead of 
opening up the way to a science of interpretation, 
it implies a genesis that leads from those 
unrefined forms of the Same to the great tables of 
knowledge developed according to the forms of 
identity, of difference, and of order, (emphasis 
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mine; 71) 
Here Foucault points out that the understanding of how 
knowledge is constructed through interpretation could have 
opened up a "science" that acknowledged its own 
interpretation and thus studied it as an object involved in 
the constant process of constructing ideology through 
representation. Instead the interpretive act of resemblance 
is banished to the outskirts of superstition and Knowledge is 
defined by identity established through difference and order. 
Thus the Aristotelian construction of knowledge as an 
interpretation of what was thought to be Divine essences, 
along with the Age of Reason project to construct order 
within the space of representation, have both assumed a 
fundamental metaphysics of binary opposites and the 
privileging of rationality: the first ignoring its own fact 
of interpretation through an "imitation of nature" and the 
other assuming representation as the constitution of meaning. 
These rationalistic projects have led to a historical 
distrust of imagination or that which is perceived as 
"unreason"—while those whose signs are constructed by 
"illogical" associations and resemblance are denigrated and 
marginalised as mad, superstitious or unskilled literary 
artisans. 
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Section (C) . A Pubf1)ic/Privatefs^ Split, or Plavs by Women: 
Subjects for Nonproduction 
In this section I wish to address the "spiral of 
silence", where metaphysics in the lived world has excluded 
difference and rendered the plays of women as subjects for 
nonproduction; where erasure has resulted in the absence of 
her texts from the public realm and the private realm of 
imagination. I will discuss some of the effects of this 
absence that continue to perpetuate the reductionist and 
separatist notion of "women's" issues including: the lack of 
collective awareness in discourses of women writers and their 
representations; the subsequent dominance in the intertextual 
field of discourse as a form of direct and indirect power, 
including the containment and colonisation of the 
imagination; and the existence within the (hu)man discourse 
of what can ironically be called the discourse of femininity-
-also a discourse without dialogue, where definitions of the 
feminine gender have been arrived at through the 
appropriation of the sexual aspects of the female body, 
(which women are seen to collude with through reproductive 
work) , rather than by agreement with the female mind and 
voice through textual interaction in the (hu)man discourse. 
Metaphysical oppositions have affected women playwrights 
not only in the classroom but in the intertextual field of 
discourse where text and social practice interact to 
(re)produce each other in the lived social world, manifesting 
as the physical opposition of the public and private spheres. 
As I have shown in Part One (A) and (B) , the masculinist 
identity of the (hu)man discourse privileges the public realm 
while Woman as an inferior opposite is consigned to the 
private sphere. Thus the female artist/theorist and her 
plays, by the very logic of this discourse, will predictably 
function as sites of contradiction and, as such, will be 
eliminated to preserve the identity of the (hu)man discourse, 
rendering her and the representations in her texts as 
subjects for nonproduction in the public realm. It is also 
predictable according to this metaphysics and logic that she 
will be represented as pertaining to the private, domestic 
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and emotional realm designated by her i n f e r i o r gender 
def in i t ion regard less of her a c t i v i t i e s , thus explaining the 
representat ion of her work as "women's" p lays and "women's" 
i ssues . 
The project of tracing the effects of the historical 
erasure of women playwrights (and by implication, the 
hegemonic construction of the identity of the (hu)man 
discourse) are impossible to docximent fully as they are 
widely dispersed in an interrelated, intertextual community. 
To make matters more difficult, the effects of absence can 
not only be understood by what has been visible, but also by 
what is still unseen and unheard, and how such absences have 
resulted in exploitation for some people in the field of 
competing interests for social power. At issue here is not 
only the available literary responses in suppressed texts 
that may reflect contradictions or differences, but the 
possible alternatives that might occur in a society should 
such texts be allowed free circulation, for instance, public 
dialogue, different social structures and practices, or even 
more texts. In the intertextual field of discourse, the 
absence of texts which represent contradictory ideas to the 
dominant social norms contributes to the continuing spiral of 
silence and the continuing domination of particular 
worldviews. The silence and the dominance are in a sense 
self-perpetuating because of institutionalised literary and 
educational standards that reproduce the texts of some while 
excluding others, as I have shown in the evidence of 
anthological erasxire of plays by women. The dominance of 
these traditional standards not only helps to construct, but 
also to maintain, social values like gender or class which 
are, in turn, reinforced by other interrelated institutions 
that people interact with in society. Since it is these 
dominant standards themselves which are reflected in the 
critical practices that have ignored women's playscripts, 
understanding them metaphorically as the 'bricks' of beliefs, 
values and ideologies then makes them available as important 
keys to deconstructing the power paradigm of institutional 
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structures which have deployed them to exclude certain texts, 
beliefs, and alternative social practices. The dominant 
standards not only ignore and erase different texts that do 
appear, but silence those that may have appeared, rubbing out 
the imaginative possibilities by the demand that they be 
correct within social standards of acceptability. 
The dominant masculinist identity of the literary canon 
is maintained as the status quo within the educational 
institution by the force of tradition—the acceptable 
literary texts that are treated as the historical standards 
of objective definitions for good literature. Although the 
standards seem to exclude from the curriculum any writing 
that is not good enough, either in content or form, 'not good 
enough' is inherently a value judgement made by some people 
on the style of someone else's creativity and as such can 
operate to exclude contradiction or difference as it is 
perceived in relation to the tradition. Therefore, texts by 
women, working class people, blacks, or migrants which 
represent styles or perspectives which are merely different, 
instead are treated as inferior or ignored because they are 
not the same as traditional writing by men. Even though the 
tradition of literary men seems flexible as it records the 
evolution of different writing styles and ideas within 
itself, some of these texts which appear to be radical on one 
level may still be reinforcing traditional gender or race 
relations for example. Tradition as practiced cannot really 
be that flexible as the standards themselves impose 
limitations on radical creativity or difference for any 
writer; there are men whose writings challenged the most 
contradictory aspects of power relations and they have also 
had their work suppressed. But if it were possible for 
institutional standards to represent an objective criteria 
for all writing, there would be some ability to include what 
seems to be new or different writing as it presents itself 
from anywhere. without resistance from the institutions which 
purport to deal in the business of circulating texts, and 
without hostile reactions from critics to some perceived 
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threat in the writing of a play. Since the writing of women 
has been excluded from educational curricula for so long, 
despite proof of success both in the critical and public 
domain, it is obvious that the resistance to accepting these 
and other texts as 'good' writing constitutes rigidity in the 
identity of the (hu)man discourse itself through the 
institutionalisation of the definitions themselves. This is 
precisely because the traditional standards are not objective 
but are very much based on subjective perspectives that 
depend upon the belief system of the inferiority of women, 
and associated socioeconomic values that operate through 
institutions whose power for continuation depends upon 
rendering invisible anything different to themselves. 
This invisibility of different perspectives and values 
precipitates a lack of dialogue in the whole textual field, 
in the public and private realm, between that which verifies 
the structural assumptions, and that which contradicts them. 
Though we can note that there is an absence of texts and a 
lack of discourse about women, minorities or socially 
disadvantaged groups in the Canon, this 'absence' is also 
manifested in the public realm through libraries, schools, 
bookstores, and public media discourses. This absence 
invades the private realm as it is about people who write for 
themselves and others, making representations which involve 
collective and personal pain, powerlessness and political 
isolation, and it is about people who are not allowed to read 
these words. Here absence leads to the colonisation and 
containment of the human imagination where metaphysical 
dominance in the intertextual field of discourse crosses over 
into the physical public and private domains. The 
institutional erasure of difference thus ensures that the 
public domain is overflowing with homogeneous representations 
which render "objective" the dominance of patriarchal and 
economic ideologies; render "normal" the social practices 
that rigorously separate the public and domestic realms; and 
render "natural" the gender and class roles that 
predominantly appropriate the mental realm of work in the 
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public sphere of business, politics and art for middle/upper 
class white heterosexual males, while women, the working 
class, and so-called minorities are considered biologically 
appropriate for domestic and manual labor; homosexuals, still 
considered unnatural, are best hidden. Even though 
individual people do not react uniformly to the signs and 
texts of a discourse, nor do they always fully accept or 
participate in a dominant ideological practice; nevertheless, 
without visible signs of other people's resistance to 
identify with in the public realm of texts and discourse, 
they do not have the opportunity to link their own personal 
problems and resistance to an external collective perception 
of an ideological ineguality. It is perhaps here that we 
think of the "spiral of silence", of people isolated and 
fearful to express opinions which seem to be solitary and 
different. 
This silence means that it is difficult to generalise 
about the effects of erasure upon individuals in the social 
field, as it is egually difficult to locate the sites of 
resistance only in the recuperated texts of those who have 
been erased or marginalised. What can be more confidently 
docximented and analysed are the traces of structures and 
absences as larger effects; for example, that certain 
continued critical practices at the institutional levels have 
resulted in certain obvious difficulties for contemporary 
women writers and their audiences. These include problems 
with achieving production, publication, and continued 
distribution. Olauson argues that the relationship between 
critical practices within institutions and textual 
availability in the public realm cannot be ignored. This 
relationship has been avoided in the past by a dominant 
ideology that separates the public and private sphere as if 
they do not influence each other. This ideology assximes that 
critics are unbiased, objective and adhere to some absolute 
standard of good writing; and argues a free enterprise 
platform whereby if a text is 'good' then public demand will 
ensure its availability. All these assximptions ignore the 
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power of critical practices as taught to and practiced by 
critics and academics within institutions to construct the 
existence of a text, or determine whether it is even worthy 
to be read. Olauson writes: 
Megan Terry points out that perhaps because of 
critical disregard her reading public has had a 
difficult time finding her plays in bookstores and 
libraries. In her opinion there is an attitude of 
indifference toward women authors, even toward 
those whose works have been published. (8) 
I have argued that the foundations of such problems for 
contemporary women playwrights were laid in deeply-rooted, 
historical notions of 'great drama' standards which are 
actually derived from metaphysical and philosophical 
structures that contribute to gender biased criticism and 
representation. Anthological or textual erasure continues to 
have several important traceable effects with respect to 
contemporary women playwrights and production: 1) a lack of 
women's texts not only in institutional curricula and 
historical literary discourse but in the public sphere; 2) an 
absence of women with authoritative positions in theatre 
careers that regulate the plays available for the public; 3) 
a lack of collective awareness among women regarding previous 
texts by women playwrights resulting in a lack of textual 
participation in discourse formation; 4) the development of 
a 'new' genre—feminist theatre—associated with feminism as 
a social movement and feminist literary criticism; 5) the 
tokenisation of a few women's texts in anthologies of the 
mainstream canon with most dismissed as 'women's plays' to be 
dealt with by feminist literary criticism and an alternative 
feminist canon, itself treated as a subspecies of hximan 
discourse. I will discuss some of these effects of absence 
in this section and go on to address the others in Parts 
Three and Four. 
Plavs bv Women in the fHu)man Discourse: Sites of 
Contradiction and Subjects for Nonproduction 
While a poststructuralist feminist critique of the 
masculinist identity of the (hu)man discourse, deconstructing 
its metaphysics, philosophical structures, and oppositional 
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logic, leads to the conclusion that women as subjects will be 
excluded from this discourse because of their gender identity 
as inferior opposites^ another aspect to these metaphysics is 
the treatment of the subjects of women's texts within the 
(hu)man discourse. By association with women's gender, we 
have seen reviews that constantly emphasise the domestic 
aspects of women's texts. However, there is a serious lack 
of discussion and therefore dialogue with many of the other 
"public" themes or social "subjects" represented in the plays 
of women, as critics often ignore mentioning them in the 
reviews. At this point in the thesis it can be suggested 
that the erasure of women playwrights signifies an exclusion 
of contradiction therefore in two ways, firstly because of 
their (op)positional gender and secondly because their 
textual subjects—representing problems and differences— 
demand an end to dominance. Women authors in the (hu)man 
discourse are a contradiction to their gender role which we 
see in author based criticism, and even without reading the 
erased plays we can speculate that these texts represent 
differences and contradictions to traditional social 
structures and dominant notions of gender. Reading the plays 
gives further evidence of such representations to support 
this "logical" speculation, and of course the evidence from 
the reviews also tells us that certain subjects are ignored 
and excluded from serious dialogue by the critics of women 
playwrights. Thus erasure has resulted in the nonproduction 
of women playwrights and their subjects in the (hu)man 
dramatic discourse which not only excludes contradiction, but 
refuses to dialogue with difference that demands an end to 
dominance. 
The examination of the metaphysics of literary standards 
in the intertextual field of discoxirse, as they participate 
in the spiral of silence and the colonisation of the 
imagination, is also the investigation of metaphysics in the 
lived social world through the practices of daily life that 
form the subjects of plays by women which then become erased. 
Because there may be few texts to represent the social 
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problems or differences of the "voiceless", and these texts 
are also not a "reflection" but a fictionalised construction, 
the social practices of daily life themselves can be read as 
textual constructs. For example, the definitions of 
femininity and the work of the feminine gender role, can be 
considered for their participation in constructing the 
ideologies represented by the dominant social paradigm—who 
reproduces, educates, regulates the marketplace, legislates, 
who negotiates what gets counted in the system of National 
Accounts. Ryan refers to this as "the metaphysics of 
everyday life" in Marxism and Deconstruction (117): 
Metaphysical assximptions become ideologically 
effective when they are institutionalized or woven 
into the habitus of a society. For example, 
metaphysical categorical distinctions between 
private and public, interior and exterior, would 
be used to justify the division of labor between 
women in the household and men in the public 
domain. (118) 
The philosophical metaphysical definitions prescribed within 
assximptions of literary standards are not, as Ryan says, 
"simply a guestion of knowledge confined to the philosophy 
classroom. Metaphysics is in the world, as ideology, in 
those unconscious presuppositions and categorical foundations 
of social practice" (118), Further, Ryan explains that 
metaphysical thinking provides the modes of categorisation 
which "define and legitimate the form of division" and that 
ideology "always legitimates a division of labor," a practice 
which "necessarily" produces tension and contradiction in the 
field "because it relies on an unequally distributed 
differential of power and force" (118). For example, in 
semiotics the primary signification of the signs male and 
female is the physical sex difference, but the secondary 
signification of these signs incorporates the social 
construction of gender which defines female as representing 
femininity and male as representing masculinity, with further 
significations being that feminine is naturally inferior, and 
lacking all the masculine qualities defined as positive. The 
differential of power arising from the division of labor is 
revealed in the contradictions of gender representation. For 
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example, nurturing and caretaking are secondary gender 
significations attributed to women as an extrapolation of 
female reproduction, and thus are not regarded as positive 
masculine gender qualities. Logically therefore, they are 
inferior gualities which must be represented as positive for 
the feminine gender through the glorification of motherhood, 
though in actuality they remain devalued as either low-paid 
or unpaid labor in both the public realm of business and the 
private domestic realm. It is the either/or metaphysical 
perception of such identity constructions, which relies 
either on assximptions of total difference or on equally 
erroneous assximptions of androgyny as total sameness, that 
represent such a simplistic separation of the heterogeneous 
dynamics of any organism, either in the individual or the 
community. 
Ryan argues that such divisive forms are necessary for 
ideology and its function of "legitimating dominance and 
guaranteeing hegemony because metaphysical thinking 
homogenizes contradiction, dissonance, and heterogeneity" 
(118) . The attempt to produce the state of a false 
homogeneous reality requires the "forceful exclusion of 
certain messages from the public domain" (118) , and these 
often have to do with differences and lived social problems 
with dominant social structures and gender definitions 
relating to pain, privation, hunger and even death (here I 
think of Alma deGroen's The Joss Adams Show where a devalued 
young mother throws her child down a garbage shaft), It is 
precisely those contradictions—expressed through social and 
textual expressions of deviance and rage—that reflect the 
tension and pain produced by unequal power practices within 
an ideology such as patriarchy; and, as such, would need to 
be marginalised or suppressed. The historical erasure of the 
majority of published texts by women playwrights, that 
critique the problematic social definitions as textual 
constructs, is thus a form of ideological dominance in the 
intertextual field of discourse where critics and the 
dramatic discourse have not taken the social issues 
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represented by women playwrights seriously, 
A striking feature of many plays by women over a 
substantial period of time is the representation of 
marginalised subjects that function as sites of contradiction 
because they depict unfavourable consequences of traditional 
gender identities and associated economic and political 
ideologies in a patriarchal, or male dominant system. Thus 
a play textually depicting domestic violence—child abuse and 
wife-battering—contradicts the 'normal' social identity of 
the home as a haven; a horrifying rape scene jars the myth of 
female pleasure in being dominated; women in factories 
keeping and feeding babies in toilets disrupts the assximption 
of civilised, satisfied workers. Female characters as 
mothers/housewives who go mad, die, or destroy their children 
offer a different definition of the angel in the house or the 
happy secure housewife. Repeated representations of the so-
called 'normal' gender roles until they seem natural and 
inevitable—where romance and its epilogue, motherhood, is 
central to a woman's identity while a man's identity is built 
on his position in the world—continuously reinforce the 
notion that experiencing contradictions or a different 
reality is an individual's innate problem rather than an 
interrelated consequence of social structures. This is where 
erasure operates to prevent collective awareness of 
contradictions as a widespread and socially constructed 
problem; through the nonproduction of subjects that 
contradict the dominant identity structures, thus rendering 
them seemingly marginal problems, limited to a few. 
In addition, the fact that women writers are 
representing these contradictions reveals a different 
perspective of women other than as 'unegual', ignorant, or 
totally dominated. Their analysis of gender and other social 
structures through textual representations of strategies for 
coping or resisting a masculinist context, reveals not only 
an awareness of male-dominated constructions of power in both 
the domestic and public spheres, but also theorises how those 
domains overlap, and interrelate with economics and race. 
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such that the plays move beyond the restricted classification 
of women's issues. Barbara Christian writes in "The Race for 
Theory" that, despite her reluctance to "pronounce" a "black 
feminist theory": 
This is not to say we are not theorizing. 
Certainly our literature is an indication of the 
ways in which our theorizing, of necessity, is 
based on our multiplicity of experiences. 
(Feminist Studies 76) 
Such textual strategies may range from representations of 
historical images of activist women, 'history' and 'myth' 
from a different perspective, to reconstructing rituals that 
celebrate women and life-affirming cycles, to depicting women 
who try and fail to make it in a 'man's world', to women who 
cope with social roles through collaboration with other 
women, to women who resist through deviation in madness, 
crime, and illness, or women who survive in a dystopian 
future. 
In my readings there are no representations of a Utopian 
vision where women and men co-exist with equal power in the 
same social structures that have existed historically. Some 
feminist critics, wanting positive role model images of 
women, have asked where these representations are? Writing 
about feminist plays, Moore considers this lack in "Woman 
Alone, Women Together" from Women in American Theatre: 
Most of these plays derive at least some of their 
dramatic impact from the fact that they look at 
pre-women's movement times from a post-women's 
movement point of view: this is the way it was, it 
has not been clearly seen before. There is not yet 
a body of playwrighting work that deals with the 
new communal future or that concerns women 
characters with feminist values and aspirations, 
if you will, the Mount Everests that women have 
begun in the last ten years to climb. What are the 
dramas in a woman's life when her life is a life 
she has freely chosen? (189) 
It seems to me that whole point of a structural critique of 
representation is to consider the way we as subjects do not 
freely choose. Such a lack therefore may not only signify 
the traditional realist's problems with what a heroine can 
do, nor simply point to the colonisation of the female and 
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male imagination, but rather may signal the impossibility of 
the representation of equality within hierarchical social 
structures that produce unequal gender, economic and 
political power differentials. The problematic relationships 
of women within patriarchal models of dominance, then, are 
not represented in plays by women as 'natural' nor as blindly 
accepted, but as an intense struggle for survival in a 
continuing process of negotiation. To position women 
playwrights and their representations of women as unequal, 
second-class citizens or "deficient carbon copies of men" 
reflects a position that Oakley refers to in Subject Woman, 
where the "inequalities are paralleled by unequal 
interpretations" (333). 
Power as Dominance and the Colonisation of the Imagination 
In this section I wish to discuss the dominant model of 
power in the (hu)man discourse in terms of direct and 
indirect social power, where the ability to control 
representation through literary standards and through erasure 
as a tool of dominance is an important instrximent in the 
maintenance of particular worldviews, through the containment 
and colonisation of hximan imagination and therefore the 
(re)production of dominant belief systems. In the identity 
of the (hu)man discourse, the historical model for a 'power 
over' paradigm is a hierarchical structure where power is 
defined as either "control over others" or the individual's 
"ability to do", but this definition excludes the possibility 
of the group's "ability to do" without exerting control over 
others, i.e. shared power as in co-operatives. I would argue 
that alternative structures of power, i.e. nonhierarchical, 
are not widely discussed in the public domain because they 
contradict the dominant definition of power, and in Part Four 
I will suggest that many women playwrights theorise 
alternative structures of power based on association rather 
than dominance. 
The hierarchical model of power operates through several 
interrelated aspects: 1) as an ideology based on the 
assximption of male superiority; 2) as a hierarchy of 
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authority figures within the institutions of heterosexuality, 
marriage and the family; 3) as the construction of male and 
female identities subjected to power as dominance, repression 
of self-determination or autonomy, and coercion into gender 
oppositions where difference is based on exaggerated 
polarities that repress resemblance; and 4) as an ideology 
that permeates sexual, moral, economic, and political 
definitions which maintain male dominance through 
authoritative institutional support systems. In Bryan 
Turner's The Body and Society he points out that, as the 
institutional support for patriarchy is diminished under the 
onslaught of "a powerful ideological critigue" which argues 
for women's legal rights concerning property and economic 
distribution, we are left with what he calls patrism: 
dominance based only on prejudice and discrimination (156). 
He argues that institutional power patterns are also fought 
out at a personal face-to-face level in a micro-politics of 
the body, disease, deviance, and violence. Despite some 
legislative or institutional changes regarding women's 
rights, patrism suggests that the construction of power as 
dominance over others is still manifested at the personal 
level through familial hierarchies and social gender patterns 
which continue to pass on the seeds of perceptual inequality 
in a doctrine of seeing some men as greater than others, 
women as somehow lesser than men, and adults as better than 
children. Feminist theory has been engaged in extensive 
critiques which seek to understand the effects of power 
patterns on people as applied through social constructions of 
gender, race and class. These critiques are not restricted 
to women's liberation but question the 'naturalness' of 
gender, the structural definitions of 'masculinity' or 
^government', and the 'power over' social hierarchies of the 
state that oppress and victimise both women and men. Social 
structures that disempower and prevent the self-autonomy of 
people provide the fertile ground for various levels of 
fascism, and are handed down over generations through 
colonisation of the imagination, control of creativity. 
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restriction of life-choice options, and the regulation of 
time, space and property. However, the notion that power is 
only external and able to be totally centralised is being 
questioned, as are the assximptions that the oppressor is a 
victor, that women are passive victims, or that all men 
benefit from patriarchy, which I will discuss further in Part 
Four, "Patterns of Power: the (De)colonisation of the 
Imagination". 
R.A. Sydie discusses Weber's work on patriarchy and 
power in her book Natural Women. Cultured Men, with Weber's 
definition of power as the "probability that one actor within 
a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which 
this probability rests" (56); he also refers to domination as 
a special form of power in two general types: 
the indirect type refers to the power that a 
monopoly over economic resources can convey, and 
the direct type ... control over others. This 
latter form of domination is one that expresses an 
'authoritarian power of command' that will be 
obeyed, (qtd. in Sydie 56) 
Sydie points out that the force of tradition sanctifies the 
"authoritarian" power of the patriarch such that when direct 
power is exercised in relationships between people in 
families, he is "dependent upon the subordinates' willingness 
to obey in the absence of any means of enforcement" (57) . 
Indirect power, however, exercised in hierarchical structures 
that monopolise economic resoxirces, legislation, and 
enforcement agencies, acts to institutionalise dependency 
through centralised state control over the social collective. 
using resource deprivation as well as enforcement by the 
threat of violence. It is obvious that both forms of 
domination interrelate with each other, in the public and 
domestic realms, to produce social structures where power is 
exerted as control over others, resulting in dependency and 
victimhood in the domination-oppression hierarchy. In this 
sense indirect public power affects the domestic interactions 
of direct power through the erosion of freedom and stress 
from restrictive conditions of lack such as poverty, illness 
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or exhaustion. The domestic sphere mirrors the structure of 
indirect power, disguised within the family hierarchy where 
authoritarian child-raising practices and coercive 
conditional love prepare the child to accept forms of 
indirect social domination as an adult. In Part Four, 
Section (A) , I will discuss theories of Reich and others, who 
have long argued for less oppressive family practices, such 
that children will resist social dominance. Thus both forms 
of domination interact to set up conditions for personal 
disempowerment while institutionalising dependency on the 
collective level, using representation as the science of 
ideology to 'naturalise' and 'normalise' the unequal power 
constructs. 
Heath recalls a course where a graduate student remarked 
that he could not conceive of anyone other than as 'a full 
hximan subject—what else could one be?' to which the female 
teacher answered simply, 'well you can be a victim'" (Men 
25). As Rowbotham writes in Once a Feminist in 1969: 
Partly the matter is very concrete, it is about 
25p an hour and the suicide rate, about nursery 
schools and legal discrimination. All these need 
to be studied. But there is another important 
aspect to 'the women problem'—how it feels in the 
head. If the external social situation subdues us, 
it is our consciousness that contains us. (12) 
Rather than categorise people as either a full hximan subject 
or a victim, it is less reductionist to say that people are 
in a sense always full human subjects, but may be operating 
through generations of ideology or 'reality' constructs 
whereby they accept victimising roles as 'their lot'; roles 
which restrict self-empowerment to the point of near 
hopelessness for organised collective resistance. To the 
extent that people are not aware of how they lose (or give 
up) their power to act like full, empowered hximan subjects— 
self-determining but also with the awareness of their 
collective relationship—such is the degree to which they 
have been victimised by external social forces. For example, 
since men have been socially conditioned not to focus on 
feelings, while women are taught to satisfy everyone else's 
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needs first, these binary identities reinforced by 
institutionalised normalcy meike it difficult for either one 
to realise that they are operating under restrictive 
definitions (normalcy operating here as the 'thick boot' that 
disguises the fact that someone is stepping on your foot) . 
As Sawchxik argues, dominant representations of ideological 
constructs which produce a physical state of 'normalcy' such 
as gender role inequities or working class poverty masks a 
different kind of colonisation as well: 
It is the imaginary which informs what is to be 
our experience of both past and future. Hence, the 
colonization that capitalism achieves is also an 
imperialism of the imagination—not just 
domination over such physical spaces as the third 
world. (64) 
The colonisation of the imagination which sets up the lack of 
people's ability to even imagine self-empowerment and 
collective strength, is referred to by Rowbotham as 
"containment". She writes: 
The oppressed in their state before politics lack 
both the idea and practice to act upon the 
external world. Both coherent protest and 
organised resistance are inconceivable. They do 
not presxime to alter things, they are timid. Life 
is cyclical, weary, events happen, disaster 
impinges, there is no rational order in the 
universe, to the authorities properly belong the 
business and responsibilities of government. They 
play dximb and the superior people assxime they have 
nothing to say, nothing to complain of. Those in 
power conclude their 'inferiors' must be a 
different order of people. This justifies their 
sxibjugation. The impresion is confirmed by their 
inability to take the advantage offered to them, 
by the shrugging off of responsibilities, by the 
failure to take initiatives. They refuse to help 
themselves, they are their own worst enemy. But 
meanwhile they survive. They are skilled in 
collaboration and sxibterfuge. They do not compete, 
they resort to sly, indirect methods. Like Brer 
Rabbit they lie low. Women have been lying low for 
so long that most of us cannot imagine how to get 
up. We have apparently acquiesced always in the 
imperial game and are so perfectly colonised that 
we are unable to consult ourselves. Because the 
assximption does not occxir to us, it does not occur 
to anyone else either. We are afraid to mention 
oxirselves in case it might disturb or divert some 
important matter he has in hand. We are the 
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assistants, the receivers, the collaborators, 
dximb, lacking in presximption, not acting 
consciously upon the external world, much given to 
masochism. We become sly—never trust a woman—we 
seek revenge, slighted we are terrible; we are 
trained for sxibterfuge, we are natural creatures 
of the underground. Within us there are great 
gullies of bitterness, but they do not appear on 
the surface. Our wrapped-up consciousness creeps 
along the sewers, occasionally emerging through a 
manhole. After death, hag-like spirits roam the 
earth, the symbols of frustrated unfulfilled 
desires. But in life our spirits are contained, 
(emphasis mine; Once 2-13) 
Consensus reality is not a simple observation of the 'way it 
really is out there' but is basically imposed through the 
dominance of certain ideologies among competing versions of 
social constructs. Therefore, the institutional powers to 
exclude, repress and erase some versions as unreal, bad, 
impossible or incorrect before they are fully circulated in 
the textual/social field for collective discussion and 
response is an extremely powerful political advantage that 
reduces the imagined possibilities from the textual field. 
Thus women's writings which critique or offer different 
imaginings of 'reality' have contributed less to the 
formation of consensus reality constructs because of their 
long term lack of exposure in the textual field; a 
colonisation of containment, but also confusion, emptiness 
and a sense of 'unreality'. 
In Christiane Rochefort's article "Are Women Writers 
Still Monsters?" she describes how she sxirvived as a female 
creator, with a feeling of unreality that accompanied growing 
up female in a society with gendered sexes: 
I know with certainty that my salvation as a 
creator (I mean as a person) is due to the fact 
that I was dximb enough, blind and deaf enough, not 
to understand that I was a female. Although it was 
obvious, and I received all the necessary 
information about it (don't do this, don't say 
that, don't, don't, a little girl does not), I 
remained deaf, blind, and reluctant: not me, not 
for me. 'Me' was something else. Somewhere else. 
Since reality was a lie, I had a reality of my 
own: a secret life in dreams. There, a double of 
mine with no defined sex (I didn't know that I 
meant: with no defined role) would do such great 
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things as riding horses, sailing boats, rescuing 
animals from hunters and people from fire, plague, 
Indians from white people, inventing stories, 
drawing, dancing, making music, sculpting stones 
... In the world of appearances. I didn't feel 
real, (emphasis added; New French Feminisms 184) 
Rochfefort says she survived because her parents couldn't 
afford a therapist who would bring her back to 'reality', but 
writes that hers must be a common experience which defeats 
many girls: 
I learned later on, in consciousness-raising 
groups, that it is a pretty common experience— 
female children are driven mad, schizophrenic— 
because there is a total antagonism between what 
they are and what society wants them to be. Among 
them, a remarkable proportion is defeated in this 
combat. I almost was, between twelve and twenty: 
then I was rescued by a small light of political 
consciousness: I learned that I was an oppressed 
person.... (184-185) 
Since both sexes are gendered into roles, the repression and 
conflict must exist for men as well, though it may express 
itself differently. While boys are given wider scope in 
terms of how they can imagine themselves publicly in the 
world, they nevertheless suffer from a colonisation that 
reduces their expression within the confines of social 
'normalcy'. 
The Construction of Femininity; A Discourse without Dialogue 
The definition of femininity within the (hu)man 
discourse—where women's texts are excluded—can be 
ironically called a discourse of femininity. The 
construction of femininity includes the active participation 
of women to create themselves within the (hu)man discoxirse, 
but in a specific and limited way—through appropriation of 
their biology and their work—but not by agreement through 
dialogue in the intertextual field, nor in the institutional 
decision-making that organises social practices. In this 
section I would like to discuss how the absence of women's 
texts, their representations of difference, sameness and 
contradictions, have led to definitions of femininity (and 
masculinity) that need to be questioned because they have 
been formed in discourse without dialogue and agreement, yet 
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simultaneously they have been constructed through the 
intertextual field of discourse with the participation of 
women and their work in society. The erasure of women's 
texts and dialogue from the (hu)man discourse suggests that 
there is dominance in the representation of femininity, where 
women have been subjected to an ideology within the (hu)man 
discourse that men write, men govern, and men define what is 
good drama. 
A direct and perhaps obvious result of plays by women as 
subjects for nonproduction is the historical lack of 
awareness regarding previous or even contemporary women 
playwrights among the general population of women. While 
women have been writing plays at least since the 10th century 
(in the Anglo-Saxon sphere), critical disregard and 
curricular absence in educational institutions has prevented 
any ongoing discussion of their work which can take its place 
as part of the historical drama discourse. The result is a 
history of drama as written by men, with critical practices 
of interpretation developed by men. Yet this patriarchal 
discourse does not fully succeed in excluding the existence 
of women and their texts since, in actual fact, the discourse 
becomes defined by its need not to include them. Such a 
discourse which seems merely to be transferring meanings 
freely is actually operating to constitute meanings within 
its structure through its own self-legitimising measures; and 
these are embedded in a political relationship between texts 
and social practices. Within this relationship where women 
do participate in certain social practices but are largely 
excluded from textual production and institutional decision-
making, the discoxirse of femininity has been constructed 
simultaneously with the (hu)man discoxirse, such that 
femininity becomes defined as the legitimate exclusion from 
social practices that organise power. According to Bell and 
Newby in their article, "Husbands and Wives" from Dependence 
and Exploitation in Work and Marriage: 
A degree of ideological hegemony over women must 
clearly be maintained if they are to continue to 
accept their subordinate position as natural and 
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desirable, and the superior power of men as 
legitimate. (159) 
In order for women as readers to accept the invisibility of 
women writers as natural, an ideological hegemony must exist 
regarding not only the superiority of males as writers, but 
about the 'naturalness' of a lack of women's writing. Bell 
and Newby discuss the process of legitimising husband 
dominance, but it also applies to literary practices if we 
replace the word "wives" with "women readers' and "husbands" 
with "male writers": 
It is apparent that, in this case, wives [women 
readers] must be provided with a consistent and 
coherent set of ideas which interpret the 
dominance of their husbands [male writers] in a 
manner that reinforces their legitimacy. 
Evaluative and factual statements must be made to 
elide—not only do men hold power but they ought 
to do so. Male interpretations must be taken to be 
correct interpretations, particularly in the area 
of defining rights and obligations. (emphasis 
mine; 159) 
Though Aristotelian standards of great drama are responsible 
for the literary qualities that are privileged in the 
dramatic literary canon, it is the institutions—managed by 
men in top positions—which have conferred legitimate 
greatness upon male writers, through textual reproduction and 
canonical formation. While masculine interpretations of 
literary standards are one part of this discourse, what also 
must be taken as legitimate are male definitions that women 
ought not to write. Bell and Newby argue that achieving thi^ 
kind of legitimacy within an ideological hegemony is done by 
"a degree of totality in the hierarchical situation" (159), 
and that sex-role socialisation: 
both within the family and later in agents of 
secondary socialisation, such as schools—is a 
vital element in the achievement of ideological 
hegemony over women ... That male and female 
children are in many important respects treated 
differently from birth by all their significant 
others, in a manner that is consistent with the 
existing ideological hegemony, is a, if not the, 
vital social mechanism for the creation and 
maintenance of this ideological control, (emphasis 
mine; 160) 
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Writing, when socially constructed as legitimate professional 
work for men, does not appear to be something that anyone can 
do successfully, in some sort of space which is free but, 
instead, is largely perceived as an area of work already 
appropriated by masculinity. Therefore, by implication, the 
social construction of femininity becomes vital to the 
ideological hegemony as part of and not separate from the 
discourse that legitimises a literary canon where texts 
naturally ought to be written by men. 
Thus for Dorothy E. Smith, in Becoming Feminine: The 
Politics of Popular Culture, femininity is a textually 
mediated discourse "not limited to the text, though it is 
organised by and in relation to the text" (40). To explore 
femininity as discourse "means a shift away from viewing it 
as a normative order, reproduced through socialization, to 
which women are somehow subordinated. Rather, femininity is 
addressed as a complex of actual relations vested in texts" 
(emphasis mine; 41), Smith defines texts as: 
the more or less permanent and above all 
replicable forms of meaning, of writing, painting, 
television, film, etc. The production, 
distribution, and uses of texts are a pervasive 
and highly significant dimension of contemporary 
social organization (38) 
And she refers to Foucault's concept of discourse in The 
Archaelogy of Knowledge as: 
an assemblage of 'statements' arising in an 
ongoing 'conversation', mediated by texts, among 
speakers and hearers separated from one another in 
time and space. The notion of discourse displaces 
the analysis from the text as originating in 
writer or thinker, to the discoxirse itself as an 
ongoing intertextual process, (39) 
However, she argues that "texts must not be isolated from the 
practices in which they are embedded and which they organize" 
(38). Discourse is not limited to the literary or visual 
text in some separate physical space, but includes the 
intersection of texts with the social practices they organise 
and are embedded in; these social practices then participate 
in transforming and reproducing further texts such that the 
social practices themselves can also be read as texts: 
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Texts enter into and order courses of action and 
relations among individuals. The texts themselves 
have a material presence and are produced in an 
economic and social process which are part of a 
political economy. (40) 
In discussing femininity as a discourse. Smith wants to see 
it as a social organisation of relations which is mediated by 
texts, but she also does not want to lose women as active 
subjects, nor ignore the possibilities for resistance within 
discourse. She says: 
In the context of Foucault's archeology, the 
concept of discourse has some of the same force as 
structuralism in reducing the subject to a mere 
bearer of systematic processes external to her . . . 
We must not begin by conceiving women as 
manipulated by mass media or subject passively to 
male power, but recognize when we speak of 
'femininity' that we are talking about how women's 
skills and work enter actively into textually-
mediated relations which they do not organize or 
produce. (emphasis mine; 39) 
Though women's historical work and skills have participated 
in forming a discourse of femininity within the structure of 
male-dominance represented as patriarchal discourse, their 
texts and responses to real life situations in oppressive 
social structures have not been allowed entry to the 
formal/institutional areas of discourse formation. Thus 
women have been appropriated for a discourse of femininity 
within the ideology of patriarchy, and to varying degrees 
participate in and must live the consequences, but they have 
not been allowed to produce the social organisations nor 
institutions which reproduce the discourse. There is then an 
element of collusion by women but it is by way of 
participation in daily life, while simultaneously women are 
denied the participation in decision-making power structures 
which would allow them to insert their responses to problems 
and consequent desires for change. Smith, then, does not 
want to view 'femininity' as: 
an effect of patriarchal oppression. Apart from 
avoiding the treatment of women as passive 
victims, it is important, I believe, to recognize 
women's active and creative part in its social 
organization. (39) 
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These "actual relations vested in texts" have to do with what 
people actually do; since femininity, as it has been 
constructed, is part of a complex of actual practices, it 
cannot adequately be comprehended by reducing it to the 
"level of meaning, normative pattern or signification" (38): 
The concept of culture has been important recently 
in restoring our sense of the active engagement of 
people in the making of their social worlds, and 
has been a valuable corrective to the banalities 
of the causal models ... which transform what 
people do into the effects of processes at work 
behind their backs. It has the disadvantage, 
however, of transposing what people actually do 
into phenomena of meaning or signification. 
Analysis then focuses on the system of 
significations or symbols. The actual process as 
an ongoing, evolving, unfolding social 
organization of the actual practices of. actual 
individuals escapes. (38) 
In a "Tale of Inscription/Fashion Statements" Kim Sawchxik 
cautions that assessing what people do to interpret cultural 
meaning is extremely problematic because, firstly, it assumes 
that all people receive and respond to images and texts 
within discourse in a unified way: 
It is assximed that images are literally absorbed 
by the viewer, that each image is immediately 
readable and meaningful in and of itself, 
regardless of the context, the circximstances of 
its production, circulation and reception. The 
viewer, except of course for the educated critic 
who has learned to see beyond this level of 
deception, is assximed to be immediately 
susceptible to these images. (Canadian Journal, 
vol XI, 1987, p 55) 
Secondly, she argues that there is no inherent meaning that 
can be interpreted from the intersection of one or two 
variables such as sex and class, which are then extrapolated 
from cultural practices: 
The 'meaning' of cultxiral phenomena is neither 
expressive of one or two primary social relations, 
nor is it 'symbolic'. One cannot assxime that a 
crucifix worn by Madonna is an expression of her 
essentially Christian nature, or that the wearing 
of high heels reflects a woman's identification 
with a patriarchal-sexual economy. (57) 
Sawchxik discusses fashion, and femininity, as "constituted 
through the effects of language, through the circulation and 
197 
vagaries of discourses which affect the very nature of its 
images and its objects" (55). All the uncertainty of 
language and interpretation thus applies to the construction 
of femininity, refuting the notion of some 'natural' fashion 
for women which reflects their inherently natural femininity. 
Referring to the intertextual constitution of subjectivity 
and objects, she argues that it challenges interpretation of 
the object as a "simple sign, symbol or icon" (56): 
Neither fashion nor woman can be seen as objects 
determined simply by two variables, such as sex 
and class, for they are constructed in this fabric 
of intertextual relations. At any specific 
historical juncture, fashion is located in a 
discourse on health (corsets, suntanning, 
fitness), beauty (ideal shapes of breasts, 
buttocks or lips), morality and sexuality (dress 
as sign of one's moral fibre), the nation and the 
economy (the guestion of the veil in Algeria), and 
location (climate, geography, seasonal 
variations) , to name only a few possibilities. 
These discourses involve the body, produce the 
body as a textured object with multi-dimensional 
layers, touched by the rich weave of history and 
culture. (55) 
Textually mediated discourse "displaces the central place 
given to the textual by Foucault, bringing into view the 
social relations in which texts are embedded and which they 
organize" (Smith 40) . The concept of discourse used in this 
way "transposes the kinds of observations collected by the 
concept of 'culture' into actual practices which are open to 
direct investigations" (emphasis mine; 40-41). 
The reduced accessibility of women's texts that have 
investigated social practices and represent contradictions 
arising from problematic social structures, obviously 
suggests that both male and female readers have been more 
exposed to the meanings of established gender codes in texts 
and social practices from the traditional (hu)man discourse, 
which has been passed off generically as the "hximan". 
However, because the intertextuality of discourse intersects 
with people's everyday lives, the ideological hegemony which 
Bell and Newby argue is necessary cannot be maintained 
indefinitely because, for example, the often violent 
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contradictions in women's real lives impinge upon the 
patriarchal discourse that represents itself as protection, 
safety, or romance. The crisis for patriarchy as an 
ideology, or as Turner names it, patrism, is precisely 
related to the crisis of representation which, as Foucault 
noted in The Order of Things, cannot represent life: 
The obscure but stubborn spirit of a people who 
talk, the violence and the endless effort of life, 
the hidden energy of needs, were all to escape 
from the mode of being of representation. (209) 
The power of withholding women's texts to inhibit women's 
collective awareness and action is great, for the dominant 
social construction of gender identity lays the basis for 
women's low feelings of self-worth within themselves. 
Without an external common site of resistance, they continue 
to perceive their inferior social status as purely their own 
problem, if they recognise it at all. As personal 
contradictions intensify and become more widely recognised as 
related to larger social structures, these contradictions 
often lay the groundwork for the emergency that presents 
itself as a crisis of faith in the authority of social 
institutions which do not deal effectively or compassionately 
with the reality of people's lives. The awareness of the 
'emergency' though is considerably slowed by the lack of 
inclusion of women's texts in the educational curricula, and 
thus has important political as well as literary 
implications. Without the visible participation by women in 
the decision-making process of the construction of social 
practices, we are left with a patriarchal tradition that only 
appropriates women for a passive, voiceless discourse of 
femininity—resulting in masculinist institutions which are 
nearly empty of women's texts, bereft of adequate personal 
representation and concerted political action by women, 
resulting in a public social arena where men are also 
excluded from engaging with women and their texts on a larger 
scale. In the intersection of contradictions between the 
representations of a patriarchal ideology, and the actual 
social practices of the definitions of femininity, lies the 
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crisis of oppressive conditions that prefigures the existence 
of feminism as a social movement and in language. Thus the 
absence of women's texts has contributed in part to the 
emergence of feminism that is directly concerned with the 
contradictions and oppression in women's lives. With 
feminism came the interaction of feminists with the 
patriarchal discourse, developing into feminist literary 
criticism, as well as the formation of a 'new' genre of drama 
known as feminist theatre which I will discuss in Part Three. 
Summary; "Women's Issues" and the Metaphysics of 
Marginalisation 
In Alma De Groen's Rivers of China which portrays a 
futuristic society that has reversed gender power and 
eliminated all writing by men, a female doctor tells an 
oppressed male orderly, "you can give anybody a history that 
never happened and they'll believe it" (54) . But the actual 
existence of social analysis in published texts by women 
writers along with the evidence of their literary and popular 
success, could not be erased completely from the memory of 
generations. The leakage of their traces, and the continuing 
painful contradictions in women's lives, combined with 
misogynist attitudes that excluded women and left their texts 
absent from institutions and the public arena, set the stage 
for feminism as an organised social movement which emerged to 
question these erasures, contradictions and absences. Such 
a long term repression of women's direct participation and 
textual inclusion in the formation of literary discourse, 
despite historical textual evidence of their work, was part 
of the social landscape out of which feminism slowly grew as 
a collective awareness of discrimination based on sex; an 
awareness that has been combined with a questioning of social 
and political structures which institutionalise inequality 
and dependency as part of the construction of oppression. 
However, the representation of feminism as a 'women's issues' 
movement has spilled over and resulted in the marginalisation 
of women's plays from the early Suffragettes to the writers 
of modern feminist theatre through the strategy of critical 
representation as 'plays for women', 'women's theatre', or 
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simply 'feminist theatre'. Yet distribution and discussion 
of women's work (and the work of all people regardless of 
sex, race, or class) is crucial to a more directly 
representative drama discourse for, as critic and playwright 
Michelene Wandor points out: 
Often the above phrases are used by misogynists to 
ghettoise work by women; sometimes they are used 
by women in a purely defensive manner, and (via 
the good intentions of a pro-woman perspective) 
forestall serious discussion and criticism. Such 
discussion is essential if women are to become a 
full and challenging part of theatre work. (Drama 
Spring 1984, emphasis mine; 5) 
Such a classification by critics has operated to reduce the 
scope of the play's audience while simultaneously not 
requiring them to devote any serious discussion to the social 
and political implications in the representations of women's 
texts. Critics have not considered how differences in style 
and performance space operate to critique the definitions of 
traditionally accepted forms of dramatic writing and, indeed, 
theatre itself. It is obvious that what has been missing for 
women dramatists for so long is the aspect of inclusion and 
discussion for, while creating a text is a means of action, 
it is xinderstandable that the writer(s) would want others to 
read them. However, the representations in women's texts 
which criticise or question social structures have been 
depoliticised through being (as I have shown) left out of the 
discourse in certain specific ways, by critical practices 
which ignore those themes, and by the resolute classification 
of the plays as dealing with "women's" issues. 
I have examined the metaphysics of this critical term 
not only for the historical evidence of its marginalising 
effects, but also to trace the traditional definitions which 
(re)produced certain belief systems that allowed men in 
critical positions to perceive women as inferior opposites, 
and their representations as somehow being essentially 
domestic, relevant only to women and, therefore, 
intellectually and socially inconsequential. It is the 
Aristotelian tradition that has laid the basis for the 
voicelessness of unauthorised members of society such as 
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women and slaves, contributing to dominant gender roles and 
the ironic discourse of femininity whereby definitions of 
women's identity have been based on an appropriation of their 
biology and reproductive work, rather than their voices and 
minds; creating a spiral of silence instead of dialogue and 
agreement. In addition, the perception of complete 
separation between public and private domain has resulted in 
a lack of discussion and dialogue between different spheres 
of the community, which further characterises the 
construction of the women's movement as pertaining only to 
women and domestic issues. I believe that when we 
deconstruct the concept of 'women's issues' we are looking at 
a very complex weave, but that some threads can be found 
hanging loose from the tapestry, and certainly the 
Aristotelian worldview has something to do with many of 
those. And in this worldview, representation, dominated by 
its own structural definitions and metaphysics, in the hands 
of masculine-defined institutions, has created what can be 
called the (hu)man discourse which masquerades as universal 
knowledge of hximan experience. And this has been achieved by 
the tradition of privileging the participation of certain 
classes of men and by promoting certain subjects, while 
excluding women's participation in the discourse in a very 
specific way—through the exclusion of their texts and their 
personal presence from powerful institutions that reproduce 
texts and organise social practices. The texts of women 
which represent subjects that contradict the dominant social 
definitions under a patriarchal reality construct, also act 
to deconstruct the dominant homogeneous gender definitions, 
and as such must be excluded from representation in the 
discoxirse in order for a patriarchal reality construct to 
maintain its oppositional roles where men are superior, men 
are public, men write, and men govern. It is therefore the 
control of representation using erasure as a tool of 
dominance in discourse which has constructed the identity of 
the masculinist (hu)man discourse that excludes the full 
participation of women in order to maintain its dominant 
202 
identity. This has resulted in the historically impossible 
position of the female artist, where in the (hu)man discourse 
she is in (op)position to the traditional definitions of her 
gender, while her subjects function as sites of contradiction 
and through erasure become subjects for nonproduction, being 
represented as "women's" issues as if to be read by women and 
dealt with critically by the "women's" or "feminist" 
discourse. 
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PART THREE. The Response to Erasure; Not for Women Only, or 
Deconstructing the Women's Discourse 
Introduction 
We are a feelingless people. If we could really feel, 
the pain would be so great that we would stop all the 
suffering. If we could feel that one person every six seconds 
dies of starvation (and as this is happening, this writing, 
this reading, someone is dying of starvation) we would stop 
it. If we could really feel it in the bowels, the groin, in 
the throat, in the breast, we would go into the streets and 
stop the war, stop slavery, stop the prisons, stop the 
killings, stop destruction. Ah, I might learn what love is. 
When we feel, we will feel the emergency: when we feel 
the emergency, we will act: when we act, we will change the 
world. 
Julian Beck, The Life of the Theatre 
All social structures which institutionalise ineguality and 
dependency are fought out at the level of a micro-politics of 
deviance and disease. 
Bryan Turner, The Body and Society 
'I use certain language that is a symptom of the violence of 
the culture,' Finley insists. 'If I talk about a woman being 
raped, I have to use the language of the perpetrators' ... 
Evans and Novak took exception to the fact that at one point 
Finley spreads chocolate across her naked body in what she 
describes as 'a symbol of women being treated like dirt ... 
My work is not about entertainment ... People usually leave 
my shows crying'. After leaving one of them, her grandmother 
sent her a note. It was a mixed review that could sum up the 
dilemma that anv unbridled artist poses for the NEA [National 
Endowment for Art, USA]. 'She said that I was talented ... 
but also a toiletmouth.' 
Richard Lacayo, Time 
As Julian Beck says, when we feel the emergency we act, 
but when women act in ways that are not acceptable to 
tradition, they are repressed and called "toiletmouths", not 
"nice" girls. I contend that women playwrights have been 
acting against social dominance, but have been erased as 
inferior opposites by the (hu)man discourse, in which they 
and their plays have been made subjects for nonproduction by 
a discourse that not only excludes contraditions, but resists 
critigue and does not dialogue with a difference that demands 
an end to dominance. What is the response to this? In Part 
Three I want to argue that women have been responding to 
social dominance for quite some time, for example, through 
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their playwriting, and through feminism as an organised 
sociopolitical movement, but this response, like the plays of 
women, has also been subject to the tactics of erasure as 
nonreception, and marginalisation, that have reduced this 
work from a critique about social issues to "women's" issues, 
of interest only to women. 
In Part Three I explore the other discourse involved in 
"the impossible position of the female artist" who expresses 
feeling caught between the definitions of two seemingly 
opposite discourses. I will argue that in reading through 
the "women's" discourse, one can find textual evidence that 
feminism, and feminist literary criticism, is not a discourse 
about or for women only, though it has been represented as 
such, and that it is not a totally opposite discourse, though 
it operates as an oppositional critigue. After 
deconstructing the identity and philosophical structures of 
the (hu)man discourse, I will now address the identity of the 
other half of the (hu)man/woman dichotomy. In Part One I 
have identified erasure as nonreception (sustained negative 
reception coupled with anthological exclusion), through 
gender biased criticism and a politics of dominance where 
prejudice operates with and beyond the institutional 
standards. In Part Two I have deconstructed the identity of 
the (hu)man discourse as based on essentialist definitions 
and philosophical structures that have (re)produced this 
dominance in discourse within the discursive formation of 
Knowledge, using a politics of interpretation based on the 
authority of 'real' experience as a dominant practice within 
literary criticism. With this evidence from Part One and Two 
in mind, I will selectively read through the "women's" 
discoxirse, locating sameness, difference, and traces of 
erasxire where this discourse mimics the traditional 
assximptions and critical practices of the (hu)man discourse. 
In Section (A), "Be(coming) Equal; Social Issues Become 
'Women's Issues'", I will argue that the historical 
construction of women as inferior opposites and their writing 
as "women's issues", was a reductionism that affected early 
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and contemporary feminism through the homogeneous 
representation of feminism as concerned only with equality, 
i.e. becoming equal in an unchanged social system. This 
meant that the structural critiques of gender and related 
socioeconomic power structures have been resisted and erased 
under the simplistic banner of "equality". 
In Section (B), "Feminist Literary Criticism and Men: 
Closed Doors and Separate Corridors", I will challenge the 
notions of feminist theory as "theoretically thin" and 
"separatist", arguing that men have not acknowledged the 
theoretical diversity of the feminist discourse, nor have 
they acknowledged their own subjecthood within feminism as a 
critique of gender that applies to men. I shall argue that 
because of the biased standards that have excluded women from 
the mainstream discourse, women have had to mobilise 
separately to create an environment to read and express 
difference, yet their critique of gender and power is not 
only for women, but for men as well. Men who do engage with 
feminism experience authorial anxiety from not being "female" 
and therefore able to interpret women's writing "correctly", 
thus revealing that they are conditioned to a politics of 
interpretation, with the authority of being "correct" related 
to 'real' experience. 
In Section (C), "Tradition and the Position Mission", I 
question the myth of theoretical homogeneity and analyse the 
various positions and oppositions within feminist literary 
criticism, not only to offer a poststructxiralist perspective 
within feminism, but also within the practice of criticism 
itself. This discussion will also provide the context for 
questioning how these positions have affected the development 
of the genre of feminist drama. 
In Section (D) , "Defin(d)ing Feminist Drcima and the 
Anti-Canon", I explore the project of defining feminist drama 
and the problems with establishing a female tradition, a 
practice that is often resisted by female playwrights. In 
the project to establish a feminist drama where certain 
prescriptive and role model demands operate to create yet 
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another canon, the concern is that this structure mimics the 
tradition of the (hu)man discourse and excludes women writers 
from the feminist anti-canon. 
In Section (E), "The Impossible Position of the Female 
Artist: No(Where) Right (?) to (W)rite", I will discuss the 
impossible position of the modern female artist, discussing 
the public representation of feminism and how this negative 
environment has affected the creativity of the female 
playwright and her critical reception. In the second section 
I will explore comments from women playwrights themselves 
that express their alienation, isolation, and fears about 
critical reception, both from the mainstream and the feminist 
critical discourses. 
The negative representation and reductionism of the 
feminist discourse by the mainstream media has affected the 
woman playwright with respect to the mainstream critical 
reception of her work by labelling her work as "feminist" and 
therefore only being about women's issues. But it has also 
negatively affected the perception of the female artist with 
respect to her wanting to position her work within the 
feminist discourse. As Lavery admits in her article "But 
will men like it? Or living as a feminist writer without 
committing murder" from Susan Todd's collection Women and 
Theatre. she felt her work was somehow diminished if it was 
reduced to the label of 'feminist': 
The Great Ear and Two Typing Fingers discovered 
her mouth. But the Mouth was avoiding the word 
'Feminism'. I was full of ... 'No, I wouldn't call 
my work feminist as such ... it's about people, 
all people ... no, we don't advertise ourselves as 
feminist, because we don't want to preach, just to 
the converted . . . while of course I sympathize 
with a lot of what people in the women's movement 
are saying ... half the world is men ... yes, of 
course I like men ... haha goodness me yes....' In 
the smallest meanest part of my mind, I felt that 
calling myself a feminist diminished me ... I was 
Me^ the Great but As Yet Undiscovered, 
Unrecognized Writer. While I was grateful of 
course to Fervent Feminists, I was, well, you 
know, much more than that. (27) 
Perhaps this is one of the saddest effects of erasure. 
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A. BefComing) Egual: Social Issues as "Women's Issues" 
Women have responded to dominance in discourse through 
the writing of plays, and they have also responded to 
dominance in the intertextual field of discourse through 
feminism. From the first wave, feminism as a diverse 
political movement has challenged the socioeconomic and 
political structures that produce inequalities; yet like the 
plays of women, it has suffered erasxire tactics of 
nonreception through the reductionistic representation of its 
being concerned with "women's issues" rather than social 
issues. This representation has negatively affected women's 
equal participation in the intertextual field of discourse 
and continues to do so, through the marginalisation of 
women's art, feminism, and feminist literary criticism. 
I will argue that its early reception as the "woman's 
cause" to obtain the vote created the perception of suffrage 
as a reform pertaining only to women's status of equality, 
where the argximents centered around women becoming equal to 
men because they were 'essentially' inferior opposites. This 
debate effaced early feminism as a movement concerned with 
gaining equal access to legislative power in order to change 
already existing socioeconomic structures that affect 
everyone in an interrelated fashion. The reduction of 
feminism to a homogeneous demand by women to become equal to 
men is a representation which has reduced and marginalised 
(as "women's issues") women's response to social dominance, 
either in art or in feminism. I will briefly consider the 
construction of this representation of feminism as "women's 
issues" rather than hximan social issues through the 
following: 1) feminism's first-wave demand for social changes 
through access to political legislation via the vote for 
women was subsximed by the fight to prove their equality 
within an unchanging system; 2) this challenge by women to 
legislate their own social constructs and the ensuing 
political and social resistance from male-dominated 
institutions exposed the traditional assximption of male 
intellectual superiority—a gender construct dating back at 
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least to Aristotle's definitions—reflected by the assximption 
of men's natxiral right to decide politically the social 
reality for women; 3) a lack of support from men in various 
other social movements (which resulted in mostly women 
working for the feminist cause) provided the visible 
representation that feminism's social critiques were only 
"women's issues"; and 4) this classification has not only 
marginalised the theoretical diversity of the feminist 
movement, but also repressed its critique of gender as an 
ideologies and socioeconomic structures. 
While certain suffragette plays of the time were 
propaganda pieces about the vote they also dealt with various 
social issues. They depicted images of tired women in 
factories and poverty-stricken servants and, as I have shown 
in Part One, many other plays by women dealt thematically 
with several types of social injustices including racial, 
sexual, and economic discrimination. Early feminists and 
playwrights working for suffrage have been represented as 
fighting for the vote, when in fact they were very aware of 
problems with limited access to education, the professions, 
contraception, legal property rights, and the economic 
exploitation of the working class. The vote was seen as a 
giving a possibility of involvement in legislation over these 
very issues, rather than being simply an ineffectual token of 
men's power. Clare Coss quotes Emma Goldman in her poem 
"Emma": 
Because what you have here is character and 
situation and the potential for women who are 
moving together to move away from just carving out 
for themselves a bigger piece of the capitalist 
pie. (Not for Women Only 69) 
In Australia, the National Women's Consultative Council has 
circulated a kit called the Political Awareness Seminar for 
Women, and the following quotations come from these various 
docximents and posters from the suffragette movement that 
represent their interest in reforming social structures (no 
page nximbers were on these posters in the kit) . In 
"Australian Women Explain; Why We Want the Vote", women in 
Victoria demand the vote saying: 
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Remember that Democracy means Government by the 
People, and not Government by Half the People.... 
1. We are Taxed—Taxation without Representation 
is Tyranny. 2. We have to obey the laws—Therefore 
we should have a voice in making them. (Rose Scott 
Papers, Mitchell Library) 
The Women's Christian Temperance Union from New South Wales 
made a very clever argximent based on the Biblical references 
of male and female togetherness in marriage and, although 
they claimed an essentially feminine virtue, they still 
acknowledged the conditions of poverty which contributed to 
driving women to prostitution; 
God made us a dual hximanity. Those whom God has 
joined together man has persisted in putting 
asunder in politics, and the result has been a 
disaster. Witness the social condition of our 
women, sweated almost to starvation and the awful 
sacrifice of health and virtue resulting from such 
conditions. (Rose Scott Papers, Mitchell Library) 
It was quite clear that Suffragettes felt they had to 
legislate in their own interests, writing that "women could 
not legislate for men; men cannot do so fairly for women", 
and they also argued that men were not acting on behalf of 
women, "because some social wrongs which women suffer will 
not be altered till women use their voting power" (Christian 
Temperance Union, Rose Scott papers) . Masculinist resistance 
took many forms but was really only based on one argximent— 
women's essential inequality—and that left the Suffragettes 
no longer arguing about social conditions but for their own 
equality first, so that they could then represent what they 
began to call their own interests, or women's wrongs. A 
central argximent against women voting was based on women's 
lack of intellectual strength; charging that women would vote 
like their husbands anyway, to which some Suffragettes 
replied; 
In cases where husband and wife vote together, it 
will be an additional soxirce of sympathy and bond 
of union. In cases where they vote differently, 
they will agree to differ, as they now do in 
religous matters. A man will not respect his wife 
less because she has an opinion of her own and is 
free to express it. (Rose Scott Papers, Mitchell 
Library) 
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From a docximent called "They Say—Well! what do they say?", 
Mary Lee from South Australia lists several main points of 
resistance from men, "women are unfit to use the 
Parliamentary vote; our members of Parliament are the chosen 
servants of the people; women's need and interests are fairly 
represented in our Parliament; and our form of democracy is 
democratic" (Mitchell Library). Lee argues the usual 
Suffragette platform about taxation and democracy but she 
also replied that if women were fit to rear the men, they 
were fit to judge their capacity to make laws, and that; 
While members of Parliament are chosen by men 
only, they will represent the interests of men 
first; women's interests may be safely neglected. 
They can neither put these men in nor turn them 
out—they have no vote. (Mitchell Library) 
The public/domestic separation argximent from men was strong 
and here Lee combined the argximent for equality with the 
demand to legislate social conditions; 
They say; that 'women have no business with public 
affairs'. Have they no business with equal 
justice to men and women in our law courts? No 
business with an equal standard of morality for 
men and women? No business with the laws which 
govern our schools—which protect our homes—which 
restrict the greed of the sweater—which control 
the treatment of our women and children in the 
workshops and factories? These are 'public 
affairs', (emphasis mine; Mitchell Library) 
The widening of the argximent from eguality with men into 
their concerns for organising for just social practices, 
demonstrates an early form of the personal is political, as 
well as the suffragettes' resistance to social issues being 
classified as domestic rather than public. 
Although it is evident that women activists in Australia 
and overseas such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman or Emma Goldman were concerned with social structures, 
and openly criticised the educational, economic, and 
government practices which created dependency and inequality 
in their society, their writing has been represented as being 
part of the women's movement for the vote and thus, concerned 
only with the 'woman question'. The fact that such a debate 
was carried on among men alone in Parliament and other male-
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dominated institutions, and was referred to as a 'question' 
indicates that there was a conscious choice involved for men 
as to how thev would resolve the social definitions for 
women. implying that the matter was not a natural 
inevitabi 1 itv. The very resistance of many men to women's 
access to the vote within the political debate, exposed their 
assximptions of intellectual superiority represented by the 
exclusive right to decide on whether or not they should 
consider women as intellectual equals and 'grant' them access 
to decision-making in legislation. This resistance and the 
tactic of forcing women to argue their equality is 
significant in that it reveals a contradiction within the 
ideology of biological separatism underlying gender roles in 
the patriarchal society. Despite the claim that separate 
gender roles were based on natural biology, the very fact of 
political undecidability and debate revealed that gender was 
not derived from some 'natural' notion of women as different 
and equal, but quite obviously was based on perceptual value 
judgements of women as different and inferior—an attitude 
which also didn't acknowledge these values as subjective 
constructions. 
Women's textual critiques of social oppression—which 
should have exposed the ideology of gender construction for 
both sexes—instead were not seriously considered as 
representing anything more than women's problems, generally 
perceived as an inability to adapt to their naturally correct 
role. The historical definition of a masculinist public 
realm based on the male experience and perception of life as 
universally correct, includes regarding women as 'natural' 
physical and mental inferiors who require the 'protection' of 
the domestic sphere. In this structure, any discontent 
expressed by women is regarded as their own adjustment 
problem and not a fault with the social structures that are 
based on 'natural' definitions. Thus, any organised 
political movement by women around such issues would be seen 
as outside their capabilities and a transgression of their 
natural social role in the first instance. 
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The agenda of the suffragette movement not only had to 
point out that all people as eguals deserved the same rights 
to the vote and therefore access to legislative decision-
making for the construction of social systems, but also to 
confront an emotional, biased perception of male superiority 
which required them to argue that women were equal in the 
first place. The next "logical" reduction in locating the 
argximent around women being egual to men meant that the issue 
was not about an end to oppressive social institutions 
through more representative legislation, but was about the 
ideology of sex equality within the existing male-defined 
power paradigm. The political responses from governments, 
therefore, have largely been to make legislative moves that 
grant women more equality with men in an unchanged system 
where men retain the power of their nximbers and influential 
positions, while gender ideology remains intact. 
Another factor that contributed to the perception of 
early feminism as a 'women's movement' involved the lack of 
visible political participation by men in the work of gender 
reform within institutional structures. Despite the 
platforms of sex equality in other social reform movements 
such as the socialists, anarchists, and utilitarians, 
feminism remained an issue about women's equality because it 
was not seriously incorporated as a critique involving all 
related socioeconomic constructs that institionalise the 
belief system of women as inferior others. Generally 
speaking men did not play an active part in feminism as a 
social movement and leadership has been in the hands of 
women. Olive Banks notes in her book Becoming a Feminist: 
The Social Origins of 'First-Wave' Feminism that "the most 
striking thing about feminism is the extent to which it has 
been a movement of women and not just for women" (106) . Her 
work analyses men and women in the early feminist movement in 
England and she reports that, despite the general lack of 
male participation in the feminist movement; 
there have been from the first a number of men 
whose support for feminism went deeper than 
sympathy and who, by their actions, made a real 
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contribution to the progress of 'first-wave' 
feminism. (106) 
While some first-wave feminists worked with these men in 
other reform causes, most women largely devoted themselves to 
feminism: 
the most distinguishing feature of the male 
feminist, however, is the extent to which their 
feminism was just one amongst a nximber of causes 
and not, as in the case of many of the women, the 
one cause to which they devoted their lives. (109) 
This alignment with other reforms may be one reason for some 
men's reluctance to identify strongly with woman's suffrage, 
since the link with feminism might affect their credibility 
in other issues. Richard Pankhurst (a relative of the 
Pankhurst sisters) discusses this problem in the introduction 
to the reprint of William Thompson's Appeal of One Half of 
the Hximan Race. Women. Against the Pretensions of the Other 
Half. Men. To Retain Them in Political, and Thence in Civil 
and Domestic Slavery ^  which was written with Anna Wheeler and 
published in 1825 as a rebuttal of James Mill's "Article on 
Government" written in 1820: 
The subjection of women, though regarded as 
entirely natural, and acceptable, by society at 
large, had already been challenged by Mary 
Wollstonecraft from a woman's point of view, by 
Godwin, Saint-Simon and Owen from an Anarchist or 
Socialist standpoint, and by Bentham from that of 
the Utilitarians. Many of the latter, however, 
displayed a marked reluctance openly to identify 
themselves with the women's cause—either because 
they were afraid of incurring personal opprobrixim 
or ridiculed or because they believed that to do 
so would destroy their chance of achieving other 
reforms, (ix) 
According to Pankhurst, both Thompson and Wheeler were 
disappointed at the lack of commitment to women's suffrage by 
people involved in the anarchist, socialist, and utilitarian 
movements; 
Thompson and Anna Wheeler were gravely concerned at such 
'backsliding' on the part of otherwise enlightened 
persons whose principles, they felt, ought to have made 
them unswerving champions of women. As Bentham's 
personal friends, deeply influenced by Utilitarian 
thought, they wiere much grieved when Pierre Dxunont of 
Geneva, one of Bentham's chief followers, and often 
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regarded as the philosopher's official spokesman, 
announced his opposition to women's suffrage. This 
betrayal, as they saw it, appeared even more serious 
when Dximont was joined by no less a figure than 
Bentham's principal British disciple, James Mill, (ix) 
Mill had made the argximent that political representation 
could be denied in cases where an individual's interests were 
included in the interests of those who did have 
representation: 
In it he expounded the Utilitarian case for 
democracy in general, but declared it 'pretty 
clear that all individuals whose interests were 
'indisputably included in those of others' could 
be denied political representation 'without 
inconvenience'. He stated that this category 
included not only children, whose interest was 
'involved' in that of their parents, but also 
women, on the ground that the interest of almost 
all of them was 'involved in that of their fathers 
or in that of their husbands'. These glib words 
produced heated controversy among the more 
progressive Utilitarians, and naturally shocked 
every supporter of women's emancipation, (x) 
Banks' studies show that a higher percentage of women 
feminists had aligned themselves with socialism which, 
besides having a general platform of sexual equality, 
provided an alternative analysis of economic conditions and 
distribution. She points out that despite the fact that 
socialism provided a few important male feminists such as 
Keir Hardie and George Lansbury, large numbers of men simply 
did not identify with the women's struggle to the extent that 
both men and women identified with the goals of socialism, 
and that it was mostly women who did the work (106): 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that male 
socialists, in spite of the movement's ideological 
commitment to sex equality, felt less sympathetic 
to the goals of feminism than men whose political 
commitment was to Liberalism. (108) 
But she also suggests that although most English male 
feminists were liberals, increasing opposition to women's 
suffrage from the Liberal Party leaders drove women feminists 
increasingly towards socialism, while the Liberal men 
deserted the cause: 
The smaller proportion of socialists in the male 
sample as a whole, therefore, is due to the way in 
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which men began to move out of the women's 
movement at about the time when Liberalism was 
ceasing to be its dominant political affiliation, 
(108) 
Further, the concept of the family wage and family unit in 
socialism prevented serious considerations of power 
relationships within the working-class family, making 
possible the reconciliation of patriarchy and socialism, but 
denying the more radical critique of gender offered by 
feminism: 
Consequently although many socialists were 
prepared to concede sex equality as a general 
principle, the actual demands made by feminists 
frequently appeared at best as trivial or 
irrelevant. (112) 
Though the initial fruitful alliance of socialist and 
feminist women added more dimension to feminism, "men were 
less willing to try to reconcile feminism and socialism" 
(112): 
women's attempts to reconcile socialism and 
feminism were by no means always successful and, 
in the last resort distracted many women from 
feminism altogether, but this was in the long run. 
(112) 
Despite the commitment of some men in the first wave of 
feminism, the work of theorising gender construction and 
discrimination based on sex has increasingly been left to 
women, becoming isolated as a movement pertaining only to 
women. The xinderlying attitude of masculinist superiority 
revealed in the strategic resistance to women's suffrage by 
men with institutional and political power thus affected 
feminism's first-wave in a very specific way: the fight for 
social change through access to political legislation was 
shifted to another groxind, that of proving women were equal 
in the first instance and therefore could and should act in 
their own interests to decide social realities. The 
construction of gender ideologies as they affected men was 
thus effaced—though it had the potential to critigue 
oppressive social structures which affected both women, men 
and children—and the political struggle was diverted into an 
ideology of equality with the masculinist model as the 
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established norm. These factors and no doubt many more 
emotional and psychological determinants, contributed to the 
representation that feminism was only about women's problems, 
and that its goal was merely to achieve eguality in a male-
defined system of power structures. It is hard to avoid the 
spectre of Aristotelian traditional definitions of man as the 
possessor of superior intellect, bravery and the 
authoritative voice, as it forms a large cornerstone of the 
foundations that support ongoing gender assximptions of the 
(hu)man/woman dichotomy, which in turn make possible the 
extreme separation of women from public and governing 
decision-making processes. 
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Section (B). Feminist Literary Criticism and Men: Closed 
Doors and Separate Corridors 
The discourse of feminist literary criticism has 
operated in a theoretically and politically diverse fashion 
to analyse the production of social dominance in discourse, 
as part of the project of responding to the absence and 
erasures of women's texts from the Canon. However, it has 
also suffered the same reductionist representation as being 
only about and for women, with a "positive" project of 
recuperating lost texts. This discourse has been accused of 
being "theoretically thin" and "separatist", yet an 
historical exploration of this separatist phenomenon reveals 
it to be a strategy emerging from traditional standards and 
critical practices of exclusion by the mainstream 
publications of the (hu)man discourse. Further, the familiar 
classification of social issues when inscribed by women as 
being "women's issues" is a reductionist representation that 
not only denies the diversity of the feminist critique of 
social dominance, but also contributes to the lack of men's 
participation in a dialogue with women as to how feminism 
applies to men. These reductionist and exclusionist 
practices in discourse are erasure tactics of nonreception, 
acting to repress dialogue and thus reinforcing the 
opposition between the masculinist mainstream discourse and 
the feminist discourse, rather than acknowledging an 
interrelationship, particularly with respect to critical 
theory. In the name of "women's issues" men do not fully 
receive the feminist structxiral critiques of gender and 
power, and thus do not have to respond to them nor 
colloborate on changes. This limiting representation 
continues to have a negative effect upon the woman playwright 
such that her work is regarded as being best handled by the 
"women's" discourse, thus further inhibiting the reading of 
women's texts by both sexes. 
I would like to do a reading of the dialogue represented 
in Jardine's Men in Feminism, to challenge this separatism as 
being only the choice of 'man-hating' women rather than as a 
necessary strategy to enter institutionalised discourse. 
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This reading also challenges the lack of participation by men 
who do not see themselves as subjects within feminism—a 
critique of gender and interrelated socioeconomic power 
structures that pertains not only to the gender construction 
of women and femininity, but to men and masculinity. The 
dialogue on "men in feminism" gives textual evidence that 
when men try to interact with feminism, they speak of 
experiencing the anxiety of being able to interpret 
correctly, the difficulty of having an authoritative or 
secure position within feminism, or not wanting to impose 
themselves upon "women's" space. Although the feminist 
discourse critigues the (hu)man discourse such that they are 
at times oppositional, this dialogue reveals that they are 
not fully opposite except in the representation and 
perception of them as having an essential and gendered 
identity, i.e. masculinist or woman-centered. These comments 
by men indicate that they are used to a politics of 
interpretation with authority, correctness and position based 
on experience of the 'real' and, since they are not women, 
they feel no such stability of position within the "women's" 
discourse of feminism. This is clearly a case of the shoe 
being on the other foot, and also points to a need to 
reorient criticism away from this sort of a politics of 
experience based on essentialist and gendered identities. 
I would like to address some of the male responses to 
the feminist discourse as theoretically thin or separatist 
through Spivak who writes about the interpretive politics at 
a symposixim on "The Politics of Interpretation" where she 
notes that Terry Eagleton: 
Having praised feminist criticism (carrying his 
own name on the list by proxy; see n.20) for its 
revolutionary-Marxist potential . .. proceeds to 
trash it in three paragraphs; his main contention, 
feminism is theoretically thin, or separatist. 
Girls, shape up! fOther Worlds 132) 
She then says that "if I were writing specifically on 
Eagleton on feminism, I should question this unexamined 
vanguardism of theory" (132) which questions not only the 
definition of thick theory, but how is that certain men say 
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that feminist criticism is "theoretically thin"? At the 
symposixim, Spivak notes more stabs at feminists by Davies and 
Said. In particular she notes that Davie "reproaches 
feminists for not differentiating among women of different 
countries" (131): 
Where is it acknowledged, for instance, in the 
vocabulary of feminism that 'woman', as conceived 
by an American writing about Italians, cannot help 
but be significantly different from 'woman' as 
conceived by an Italian looking at Americans? 
(gtd. in Spivak 131) 
His comment reveals an ignorance of the monumental amount of 
writing in the feminist discourse about the problems and 
limitations of racial and cultural relativity when theorising 
about women, as Spivak notes: 
This is of course a ridiculous mistake. The 
heterogeneity of international feminisms and 
women's situations across race and class lines is 
one of the chief concerns of feminist practice and 
theory today. To document this claim would be to 
compile a volume of bibliographical data. (131) 
Next she highlights Davie's telling of a story about Said's 
mother who had her passport taken away by the British officer 
once she was married: 
by doing so he made one more vacancy in the guota 
of permitted immigrants to Palestine from among 
the dispossessed of war-devasted Europe. The 
feminist response to this—'Aha, it was the wife's 
passport that was destroyed, not the husband's'— 
wholly fails to recognize the outrage that Mrs. 
Said felt, which her son now feels on her behalf. 
For if the law had been such that the husband took 
his bride's name, so that it was the man's 
passport that was destroyed, the outrage would 
have been just the same, (last emphasis mine; qtd. 
in Spivak 131) 
While Davie is trying to do a simple sex reversal to argue 
that both sexes can suffer under a particular law, Spivak 
argues that he is missing the point precisely because it is 
only under patriarchal law that a woman changes her name: 
If I may descend into unseemly levity for a 
moment, I will quote my long-deceased father: 'If 
Grandmother had a beard, she would be 
Grandfather.' For the point is precisely that in a 
patriarchal society there are no such laws, (my 
emphasis; 131) 
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She then writes that Said called for a criticism that would 
account for "quotidian politics and the struggle for power" 
(qtd. in Spivak 131) . It seems obvious that Said does not 
have a thorough knowledge of the feminist discourse and 
Spivak points out examples of feminist criticism which have 
undertaken this project: 
At its best, feminist hermeneutics attempts 
precisely this. Part of the attempt has been to 
articulate the relationship between phallocracy 
and capital, as well as that between phallocracy 
and the organized Left. I refer Said to two 
representative titles: Zillah R. Eisenstein's 
Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist 
Feminism and the collection Beyond the Fragments; 
Feminism and the Making of Socialism. (131-132) 
Arguing against the simple homogenisation of feminist 
literary criticism, Spivak asks Eagleton about the location 
of such a monolithic discourse: 
First. where does this undifferentiated, 
undocximented. monolithic feminist criticism hang 
out? The gesture of constituting such an object in 
order that it may be appropriated and then 
devalued has something like a relationship with 
the constitution of a monolithic Marx, Marxism, 
and Marxist critics that we have encountered in 
most of these essays, (emphasis mine; 132) 
Though Spivak's text is asking Eagleton to prove where the 
homogeneous thinness of the entity known as feminist 
criticism is located, since she argues that, from a wider 
perspective (probably developed by studying feminist literary 
criticism seriously), it seems quite heterogeneous, another 
problem related to access and location emerges. 
In the front of The Pirate's Fiancee. Morris produces a 
long bibliography of women theoreticians and their nximerous 
books addressing a multiplicity of ideological critiques; she 
notes that many literary theory anthologies continue to come 
out with predominantly men in them, while the women Morris 
lists are published in feminist critical collections. While 
that is a physical aspect of where they hang out; the other 
aspect is why do they hang out there and not elsewhere? It 
seems reasonable to argue that the erasure of women from the 
(hu)man discourse has contributed to their exclusion from the 
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discourse of literary theory and their subsequent need to 
locate within feminist publications. This physical aspect 
may contribute and explain in part the other searing question 
at stake which is how such an "undifferentiated, 
undocximented, monolithic" object gets constituted, and then 
devalued. 
Although there is an interrelationship and similarity 
between the work of the mainstream and feminist discourses, 
particularly with respect to modern literary theory, this is 
effaced by the continuing representation of them as opposite, 
rather than as, at times, oppositional, and worthy of 
dialogue and acknowledgement. The multiple positions within 
feminism and feminist literary criticism have developed in 
the context of a critigue of traditional forms of criticism 
and the mainstream literary canon that excludes women. Thus, 
this context has provided the interrelated field against 
which feminism and the practice of feminist literary 
criticism participates, not only as a critigue, but in the 
questioning of itself to avoid mimicking traditional critical 
practices and power politics by the (hu)man discourse 
(although in the next section I will also argue that some 
assumptions and practices of traditional criticism have been 
reproduced by the feminist discourse). The transnational 
discussion in feminism between the materialist criticism of 
textual production, and the essentialist criticism that 
defines a female tradition and an aesthetics of sexual 
difference in language, is part of an ongoing debate between 
"nature" and "culture". Poststructuralist feminism is a 
perspective that links and decontructs these oppositions as 
derivative of the opposition between the literary and the 
sociological, this in turn resting on the fundamental 
opposition between 'fiction' and the 'real'. Yet this 
opposition has been questioned by feminists through the 
interrelationship with literary experience and social 
identity, foreshadowing the postmodern concept of the 
intertextuality of texts and social practice. Although the 
poststructuralist feminist perspective emerges in relation to 
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the work of Derrida, I would argue that feminists and the 
discoxirse of Woman have long pointed to the link between 
images and language as they affect the imagination and the 
construction of Woman and Man in the social field, and thus 
they have questioned the power structures and vested 
interests of those who control the representation of these 
images and language in the production of sexual, political 
and economic social practices. Accordingly, although the 
feminist critique of structure and power has perhaps been 
done differently from prominent French theorists, 
nevertheless I think that the poststructuralist feminist 
perspective is also a synthesis of work already done within 
its own discourse and in relationship to the (hu)man 
discourse. 
Thus the feminist discourse has not done this work 
alone—separately—but in direct relation with what can be 
referred to as a 'patriarchal' discourse. As the title of 
Morris' book The Pirate's Fiancee implies, the discourse of 
modern literary theory also owes its debt to feminism and 
feminist literary criticism, not so much in a case for 
origins but as an acknowledgement of interrelationship, 
though women's absence from these texts signals that they are 
not worthy to be included. The feminist discourse has used 
its diversity, not only to argue definitions of feminism and 
feminist literary criticism, but to accept its multiple 
positions, and to examine its own complicity in the 
production of power structures, in order to avoid simple 
power reversals. So it is this heterogeneous aspect of 
feminist studies that has also functioned as its own 
deconstruction of monolithic power, similar to what SpivcJc 
says about "the deconstructive view"; 
It is also the deconstructive view that keeps me 
resisting an essentialist freezing of the concepts 
of gender, race, and class. I look rather at the 
repeated agenda of the situational production of 
those concepts and our complicity in such a 
production. This aspect of deconstruction will not 
allow the establishment of a hegemonic 'global 
theory' of feminism, (emphasis mine; 84) 
Yet in "Reading Like a Man" Robert Scholes refers to 
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similarities between feminism and deconstruction in a rather 
cynical fashion; 
One of the things that makes the conjunction of 
feminism and deconstruction interesting is that 
both positions have difficulty in determining 
their relationship to order and power, (emphasis 
mine; Men in Feminism 210) 
Here he assumes that feminism and deconstruction are frozen 
"positions" rather than discourses which question structures 
and positions that produce particular kinds of "order" and 
power. It would follow that such discourses would not want 
to mimic a "relationship to order and power". Therefore part 
of the difficulties experienced in "determining" such 
relations is not due to any theoretical deficiency, but 
rather to a self-reflexivity of their own positional 
complicity in the production of social "order and power". 
In his article "Male Feminism" from Men and Feminism. 
Stephen Heath addresses Eagleton's position, noting that a 
wide range of work by feminists might serve to expose the 
criticism of "theoretically thin" as an uninformed and 
limited judgment; 
Given theory and reservations, Eagleton's 
'theoretically thin' is probably right; he thinks 
it is. I think the contrary, that if we step 
outside the bounds of theory and reservations, 
stop waiting to see 'what a "feminist literary 
theory" as such might mean' ... we shall find a 
range of work by feminists (Irigaray and Spivak 
and Bovenschen and Coward and ... though the point 
is not to produce an imitation of Eagleton's list 
of 'major Marxist aestheticians') which can only 
make the judgment of 'theoretically thin' appear 
as a gesture of reaction and resistance, (emphasis 
mine; 12) 
Heath also wonders about the validity of this standard notion 
of judgement; 
Is it helpful, appropriate, feminist for men to 
stand in judgment of feminism and its theoretical 
work and its political debates, brandishing an 
assximed standard of autonomy in the one hand and 
its foregone dismissal in the other? (12) 
Alice Jardine discusses feminists' irritation with men's 
treatment of feminism in "Men in Feminism: Odor di Uomo or 
Compagnons de Route?", responding to Heath and other male 
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critics as she dialogues in letters with Rosi Braidotti; 
But perhaps we are also irritated by the 
prescription and reduction of complexity that has 
so far governed so much of men's interventions 
into feminism ... Alice: Rosi, how long before it 
becomes no longer a question but an answer. a 
prescription about how women should go about what 
they're doing, saying, and writing ... There is 
then a kind of streamlining of feminism—a 
suppression of the diversity and disagreement 
within the movement itself ... Rosi: Yes, in our 
work we've all tried to come to terms with the 
complexity of these issues ... don't you think we 
could ask our male allies to respect this 
complexity and try to cope with it themselves? 
(Men in Feminism 57-58) 
Perhaps the notions of "theoretically thin" or 
"undifferentiated homogeneity" or "separatist" stem from 
perceptions (or lack of) by male critics and publishers who, 
on one hand, have excluded women from male-dominated journals 
and, on the other, constituted their own lack of 
participation in the feminist discourse. Heath also mentions 
that; 
Barthes one day in conversation; 'you study what 
you desire or what you fear'. In any formal sense 
I haven't studied feminism or feminist issues (is 
formal study anyway the point?) but I have read 
and thought about and written in relation to it 
and them, written on matters that are matters with 
which feminism is concerned—sexual difference, 
the contemporary construction of sexuality, the 
imaging and representation of men and women, 
(emphasis mine; 6) 
I would argue that perhaps formal study is precisely the 
point if there are to be continued sweeping generalisations 
made about feminist literary criticism with respect to its 
thinness or homogeneity; its separatism certainly didn't 
evolve in an innocent void. Jardine articulates feminist 
irritation a bit further; 
we could get more micropolitical: are we not 
irritated simply by their professional when not 
professorial tone so often sandwiched between 
sharp critiques of one woman writer after another? 
By their tendency to descend into pathos and 
apology as soon as they're threatened? ... By 
their general discursive strategies which indicate 
that they've heard our demands but haven't 
adeouatelv read our work? (last emphasis mine; 58) 
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Male critics such as those mentioned above could not have 
read widely in the feminist discourse and thus deny the 
diversity within feminist work that analyses social 
structures relating to power and its effects from so many 
perspectives to list only a few: gender roles and equality 
between the public/private sphere; literary/social 
representations and the construction of Woman; psychoanalytic 
explorations of desire, sexuality and language; capitalism 
and economic distribution; labour and socialism; 
intersections of race/gender/class in discrimination; women 
and Third World oppression; ecology and the effects of 
imperialism; critiques of definitions of sexuality in radical 
and lesbian feminism; critiques of interrelationship between 
language, metaphysics, and philosophical constructions of 
knowledge and literary criticism offered by poststructuralist 
feminism. 
Jardine writes about roughly three groups of male 
academic critics today: 
1) First, the Silent Majority: those who neither 
read nor take into account the enormous body of 
work produced by feminist intellectuals over the 
past twenty years ... 2) Then there are those who 
plug in and out of feminism without changing 
anything in the overall itinerary of their theory 
or practice. Three discursive strategies are 
particularly evident here: a) what I call 
'authoritative' writing on women from guys who 
already have authority; b) men who express 
sympathy towards feminism and then turn around and 
pan women's books ... c) those who operate one of 
the oldest male seductive strategies around: 
Divide and Conquer. To women they say: I like your 
work, but not hers; or: feminist theorists are 
smarter than women's studies advocates; or: only 
feminists outside of the academy are really 
radical. 3) But then there is a third group—there 
are those men who are really trying, really 
reading and changing. (55-56) 
The separation of a feminist discourse is thus marked off by 
the name feminist, by its critical reception (reactions and 
resistance), and by the mostly exclusive work of feminists 
coupled with the lack of men participating in the discourse; 
where the very social conditions which brought about the 
'women's' publishers and journals are a result of exclusion 
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from the (hu)man discourse. The representation of feminism, 
like feminist literary criticism, as 'separate' or 
'homogeneous' is related to the limited critical perceptions 
precipitated by the very lack of participation by men to 
dialogue with women about the ideologies being examined, 
namely power and its interrelationship with gender, race and 
class. 
Though Heath has not been one of the male critics who 
make such generalisations, and has participated in writing 
about matters of concern to feminism, he nonetheless writes 
that: 
the point after all is that this is a matter for 
women, that it is their voices and actions that 
must determine the change and redefinition . . . 
Women are the subjects of feminism, its 
initiators, its makers, its force; the move and 
the join from being a woman to being a feminist is 
the grasp of that subjecthood ... my desire to be 
a subject there too in feminism—to be a feminist-
-is then only also the last feint in the long 
history of their colonization ... I have to 
realize nevertheless . .. that I am not where they 
are and that I cannot pretend to be ... which is 
the impossibility of my, men's, relation. (1) 
Though Heath says that this does not mean "I can do nothing 
in my life, that no actions are open to me, that I cannot 
respond to change for feminism" (1), he still concludes that 
he cannot be a subject in feminism, as he is not in that 
position. While I sympathise with Heath's reluctance to move 
in on the aspect of feminism he sees as their own territory 
so to speak, I think the matter of men's "impossible 
relation" to feminism could perhaps be clarified by a broader 
understanding of what is meant by 'feminism' and 'feminist' 
and 'subject' thereof; in other words, who is involved. It 
is important to recognise that a feminist or a Marxist is not 
a totalised identity and that people can and do maintain 
multiple ideological aspects with which they identify. 
Further, even though some women (definitely not all) insist 
that men cannot be feminists and they can only work to fight 
sexism, this is a biologically essentialist position which 
continues to locate gender oppression only within women— 
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therefore only women can become feminists—but patriarchy is 
a structure of power and a system where both men and women 
participate and both suffer from the oppression of limiting 
definitions. 
Feminism in its theories is so much more than liberating 
a woman from poor self-esteem or restricted gender roles; it 
does a great deal of theorising about social power structures 
and oppression with respect to race and class. While Heath 
goes on to say that "women are not feminists by virtue of the 
fact alone of being women: feminism is a social-political 
reality, a struggle, a commitment, women become feminists" 
(1), he does not seem to recognise that men can also become 
feminists as soon as they acknowledge that they too are the 
subjects of feminism in the sociopolitical reality construct 
of domination and oppression. Further, they can write about 
their own complicity in maintaining this construct as well as 
their losses from it (perhaps they don't perceive this bit) , 
rather than always having it pointed out by feminists. 
Jardine comments: 
Why then would men want to be in feminism if it's 
about struggle? What do men want to be in—in 
pain? ... Rosi; 'it's easier for any man to forget 
the historical fact that is the oppression of 
women: it's one of their favorite blind spots'. 
(58) 
I have quoted Heath elsewhere stating that it is difficult 
for men to recognise their own constructions of masculinity 
as contributing to the oppression of women; but this is 
precisely the point where they can then acknowledge 
themselves as subjects for an analysis of how they are 
oppressed under the same reality constructs. This may mean 
examining what they themselves have lost in the name of 
Masculinity, Philosophy, Science, Fascism, Capitalism and 
other 'isms' that promote the interests of some while 
excluding others. It is important for men to examine what 
they have contributed by their action or inaction to the 
domination and exploitation in regimes that privilege things 
like reason, logic, brute strength, competition, some 
people's hard work, development at all costs and 
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institutional hierarchies, while at the same time devaluing 
all that has been excluded as weak, all that has suffered as 
vulnerable and small, all that has not counted in national 
budgets—like the unpaid work and the real hximan and 
environmental costs of reproducing hximanity from the 
business-as-usual practices of making hard economic 
decisions. 
Jardine reflects on the participation of men that is not 
representative of struggle nor of a feeling of the position 
of pain, but is more of a certain language or technique of 
analysis: 
What are the mechanisms. linguistic and otherwise, 
whereby these men are able to evacuate questions 
of their sexuality, their subjectivity, their 
relationship to language from their sympathetic 
texts on 'feminism', on 'woman', on 'feminine 
identity?' Most difficult of all is that these few 
men, our allies, have learned their lessons well. 
The actual 'content' of their writing is rarely 
incorrect per se. it is almost as if they have 
learned a new vocabulary perfectly, but have not 
paid enough attention to syntax or intonation. 
When they write of us—always of us—their bodies 
would seem to know nothing of the new language 
they've learned, (emphasis mine; 56) 
Now Heath responds to this by "unpacking" his honest "primary 
reaction", a: 
defensiveness [that] ran as a strand through any 
nximber of other moments of response—annoyed, 
resigned, argximentative, submissive ... Alice's 
statements appeared to me as a familiar, though 
kindly, representation of the sort of suspicion 
which female feminists often have of male 
feminists; ... precisely the fear of being 
excluded—and a desire to vindicate myself in 
relation to the other's demands ... Even though 
Alice speaks of me and other men as allies, we're 
clearly not able to do quite the right thing. (36) 
Heath's authorial anxiety over being "not doing quite the 
right thing", allows him to feel the pain and fear of being 
excluded which women writers have felt for a long time due to 
both hostile critical reviews and institutional exclusion. 
The possibility of "correctness" is constituted by the 
notions of position and authority according to the prescribed 
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rules and standards of a dominant identity in discourse, like 
'patriarchal' or 'woman-centred', such that the metaphorical 
shoe is relative to what kind of shoe it is, whose foot wears 
it and where the foot is in relation to other shoes. In 
Heath's second article in the collection, "Men in Feminism: 
Men and Feminist Theory", he tries to locate his irritation 
over Jardine's comments and comes around to looking at the 
intersection of correctness and position; 
I do think that men want very much to know where 
they are vis-a-vis feminism, that feminism can 
guickly be produced by them as a matter of their 
place (and so of its)....To be in or out, that is 
the question we readily get ourselves into: 
gaining, obtaining, maintaining, sustaining, 
fixing a place, a position, ours....Part of the 
difficulty is to do with 'correctness', the 
problem men, we, can have, again, of protecting— 
of self-protecting—position. I want to be 
somewhere securely. (42-44) 
In thinking through this need for a secure position, with the 
need to be correct as a defense against the criticism of 
others. Heath quotes Derrida on feminism; 
Can one not say, in Nietzsche's language, that 
there is a 'reactive' feminism, and that a certain 
historical necessity often puts this form of 
feminism in power in today's organized struggles? 
Perhaps one should not so much combat it head on— 
other interests would be at stake in such a move— 
as prevent its occupying the entire terrain, (qtd. 
in Heath 43) 
As Heath notes, all this talk of position, "combat" and 
"occupying terrain" takes on the significations of threat and 
danger, assximing the adoption of a territorial wargame going 
on, with feminism perceived as wanting to move in and take. 
over the "entire terrain" as a new monolithic power structure 
which will replace the current male-dominant hierarchy. In 
an intertextual network where origins are lost in a chain of 
historical events and significations, how can one begin to 
locate the original impulse defined in the notion of 'active' 
as an isolated initiative, as opposed to the word "reactive" 
with its slightly hysterical connotations—although the 
reactive term at least more honestly acknowledges itself as 
linked to related forces? Heath writes that Derrida; 
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writes reactivelv, against what he calls 
'"reactive" feminism' which he grants may have a 
certain historical necessity but which must not, 
obviously, be allowed to occupy the whole terrain, 
back with a vengeance to locus and place—where is 
mine going to be? ... '"Reactive" feminism' sounds 
like women's movement and struggle, in reaction— 
precisely—against oppression, against the sexual 
terms of existing social reality. Identifying it 
as such, as '"reactive" feminism', is the male 
vision; and from that identification it is then 
seen as 'occupying the entire terrain', or about 
to ... dangerously, a threat, (emphasis mine; 43) 
Although Derrida challenges the idea of place. Heath argues 
that his naming of feminism as "reactive" and referring to 
the "terrain" suggests the struggle for position through 
opposition rather than through responsibility and 
interrelatedness. It classifies feminism as another separate 
ideology in the struggle for controlling positions in space, 
rather than as critiques emerging from an already constituted 
discourse that produced women's oppression and silence. 
The persistent lack of acknowledgement by men of their 
own subjecthood within feminist theory, and the denial of 
their complicity in the production of male dominance, results 
in the separatism of feminist theory as 'women's' studies, 
where male critics feel so unsure of a secure position and 
correctness. Heath quotes Paul Smith who in thinking through 
feminist theory says he feels "that it's impossible to say 
anything properly correct" (44); 
But then her point is that correctness is not the 
point; being properly correct is purely 
theoretical, pure theory; the reality is 
different, is unceasing, contradictory, difficult, 
heterogeneous, impossible, everyday. My problem 
as a man is not being properly correct—as Jardine 
suggests, men can be extremely good at that, 
staking out their right place—but acknowledging 
that my relation to feminism is not going to be 
some simple recognition ... that it must change me 
beyond any position to fall back on, beyond any 
foregone security, (emphasis mine; 45) 
The "foregone security" not only arises from knowledge of 
position, but from the position of knowledge, of coming from 
a place of authority. The judgement of the author is not 
only defined by the critic's position in relation to the 
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dominant standards of a dominant discourse (included or 
excluded) , but is also very much a prescriptive critical 
practice that preserves the dominant identity of the 
discourse through appealing to the concept of authentic 
authority based on a politics of experience. Robert Scholes 
remarks in "Reading Like a Man" that women need to rely on 
their experience as a validation of their interpretations of 
women's writing as authoritative: 
Feminists claim a purpose and an authority that is 
based on their membership in a class extending 
beyond the bounds of academic institutions and 
their discourses. A male critic, for instance, may 
work within the feminist paradigm but never be a 
full-fledged member of the class of feminists. On 
the same problems, the same texts, he will never 
work with the authority of a woman, (emphasis 
mine; Men in Feminism 207) 
This statement reversed, indicates that within the (hu)man 
discourse, dominated by male writers supposedly representing 
universal experiences, women will also never work with the 
authority of a man, and, hence, as we have seen, the 
exclusion of erasure. However, it is not accurate to say 
that all feminists claim authority based on some homogeneous 
experience of being a woman, and not all feminists are 
engaged in a politics of experience. What Scholes is 
suggesting is the continuing opposition between the writings 
of men and women with authentically-sexed critics to 
interpret what is 'contained' in each text according to what 
sex it 'reflects'. Scholes writes as if the experiences of 
each sex were natural, isolated, and could be reflected 
purely objectively; as if those texts were not the results of 
generations of texts in an intertextual discourse. Heath 
realises that perhaps he makes an incorrect assximption, "I 
might well be mistaking Alice's comments" (37) , and that 
Jardine is not defending some "definitional integrity" (37) 
in feminist discourse that male critics have transgressed. He 
doesn't seem to know what the "tone or syntax" is except that 
men could address the issue of their bodies. I think she is 
referring to something missing in men's participation in 
feminism, some expression of feeling and commitment that 
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comes across from "syntax or intonation" but which is more 
tangible because it is a recognition of pain and struggle 
reflected in the body, in action and in work. Jardine gives 
some concrete advice on what might be missing from men who 
want to be "in" feminism—their work—and I will quote her at 
length: 
If you will forgive me my directness, we do not 
want you to mimic us, to become the same as us; we 
don't want your pathos or your guilt; and we don't 
even want your admiration (even if its nice to get 
it once in a while) . What we want, I would even 
say what we need, is your work. We need you to get 
down to serious work. And like all serious work, 
that involves struggle and pain. As guide to that 
work, I would like to remind you of a sentence by 
H§l&ne Cixous—a sentence which, to my knowledge, 
has not been taken seriously by our allies at all: 
'men still have everything to say about their own 
sexuality'. You still have everything to say about 
your own sexuality; that's a challenge, if it 
helps you to think of it that way . . . And, in 
closing, since none of the three men's papers 
today addressed that question, and indeed, posited 
it as unanswerable, I would like to offer a short 
and pragmatic agenda for beginning this vast work 
which has yet to begin. (60) 
In his second article Heath now actually likes "intonation" 
when he compares it to hearing because "hearing can serve as 
terms for the kind of recognition feminism involves; women's 
voices, women's experience, women's facts; not just an object 
'feminist theory', nor just that representation" (45). This 
borders on empathy with women's pain, but perhaps still 
doesn't sufficiently recognise men's own experiences, their 
own sexuality, their own oppression and inequality involved 
in the production of women's pain. Both Jardine and Heath 
note Smith's suggestion that, "the intellectual task of 
understanding feminist theory is not a problem since feminist 
theory is situated within the array of post-structuralist 
discourses with which many of us are now perhaps over-
familiar" (qtd. in Heath 41), and therefore the problem lies 
elsewhere. As long as the purpose and politics of criticism 
remain traditional, I do not think these writers are over-
familiar with the politics of poststructuralism. And I might 
suggest the problem is a lack of motivation by men to attend 
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to men's bodies, men's sexuality and men's power as they 
participate in constructing systems that confer benefits upon 
privileged members, while disempowering others. This study, 
of course, means work and change and transformation of 
traditional structures, as well as relinquishing power 
through the sharing of it. Heath explores this problem: 
The understanding of feminist theory, quite simply 
of feminism, is a huge problem for men, for us, 
because it involves grasping the fact that it is 
not another discourse (let alone in a 
poststructuralist array), not another voice to be 
added, an approach to be remembered and catered 
for, but that it radically affects and shifts 
everything and that that radical shift is not 
negotiable—the old understanding—in such panic 
terms as 'occupying the entire terrain', is not 
translatable into a problem of 
'inclusion'/'exclusion'. It is easy for me to say 
that—an image of self-righteouslness is quick to 
form, I know—but the point is to live it, 
including in theory, in writing, teaching and so 
on. (44) 
Heath concludes that "the hardest thing is that feminism is 
ordinary, everyday, and a 'change of world'" (45) and ends 
his second essay with; 
But where does that leave us? What should we do? 
There is no ready answer (that would be an 
easing), we just have to learn. All I can say here 
and now in the MLA, in this context, is that we 
should probably start by trying to grasp who we 
are as men, asking that from feminism rather than 
wondering what 'they' want from an assximed male us 
... and could 'men in feminism' today be anything 
but another strategy of that, of our imposition? 
(45) 
In this context the situation is still passive. Heath and men 
must simply learn by asking feminism "who we are as men" 
(must someone else tell them?) , and while this is a beginning 
of considering themselves as subjects within feminism, Heath 
still concludes rather glximly that their participation is 
bound to be another imposition. In reply to Heath's 
question, "what should we do?" Jardine suggests: 
I think that you—our male allies—should issue a 
m o r a t o r i u m on t a l k i n g a b o u t 
f e m i n i s m / w o m e n / f e m i n i n i t y / f e m a l e 
sexuality/feminine identity/etc. It is much easier 
to speak about women than to speak as a body-coded 
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male—to imagine a new man. (Men 60) 
She then gives a more pragmatic list of suggestions involving 
teaching, theory, and practice, and I believe it is 
worthwhile quoting most of her list as it indicates the depth 
of the lack of participation by most men when considering 
themselves and their subjecthood in feminist studies—a lack 
of participation that has contributed largely to the 
marginalisation of feminist work as only 'women's studies': 
1) Echoing Heath, you can stop being sophisticated 
in theory and politically naive in practice—for 
example, you can help stop the killing of women's 
books in reviews ... Or stop your colleagues—when 
not yourself—from leaving them out, or simply 
dismissing them. 
2) You could read women's writing—write on it and 
teach it. 
3) You could sponsor women students (as long as 
we're going to remain in the institution). 
4) You could recognize your debts to feminism in 
writing. 
5) While doing so, you could watch out for the 
'shoulds' and 'should-nots' and especially stop 
being so reductive. Please don't make a mythology-
-in the Barthesian sense—out of feminism. 
6) You could critigue your male colleagues on the 
issue of feminism—although I warn you that this 
is likely to make you very unpopular. 
7) And the most important, you yourselves could 
stop being reactive to feminism and start being 
active feminists—your cultural positionality as 
men allows you to! 
And what about in the realm of theory? Here the 
list is endless. You have at least twenty years of 
feminist theory to take seriously (emphasis mine) 
.. . you could take on—as men after feminism—some 
of the symbolic fields most addressed by feminist 
theory; .,, from cinematic theory, the symbolic 
hegemony of vision as organizing metaphor of 
patriarchal history; or men's relationship to 
technology, weapons, and war. Or Sports—what is 
going on in the male psyche with these bats and 
balls and nets? In the deeper realms of 
psychoanalytic inquiry, ,, , you have not even 
begun to think about your mothers. Nor have you 
rewritten your relationship to your fathers ,., 
how would a male critic after feminism rewrite 
Harold Bloom's Anxiety of Influence? 
What else? Well, there's men's relationship after 
feminism, to death, scopophilia, fetishism ,.. the 
penis and balls, erection, ejaculation (not to 
mention the phallus), madness, paranoia, 
homosexuality, blood, tactile pleasure, pleasure 
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in general, desire (but, please, not with an 
anonymously universal capital D) voyeurism, etc. 
Now this would be talking your body, not talking 
about it. It is not essentialism; it is not 
metaphysics, and it is not/would not be 
representation. As Luce Irigaray put it, 'the 
bodily in man is what metaphysics has never 
touched....' On a more literary note, do theories 
of narrative structure in the male realm always 
have to be modeled upon traditional male desire: 
beginning, middle, end? What about problems of 
enunciation, voice, and silence? Can vou think 
through the heterogeneity of the subject without 
putting the burden of the demised universal 
subject onto the female? (emphasis mine). And most 
important, when you're reading men's books, 
whether new or old, are you up to taking Nietzsche 
seriously?: 
What has the Man not been able to talk about? 
What is the Man hiding? 
In what respect is the Man mistaken? 
You see, you have all of your work before you, not 
behind you. We as feminists, need your work ... We 
need you as travelling compagnons into the twenty-
first century. (Men in Feminism 60-61) 
I think it's important to add that, although Jardine says 
that men speaking their bodies would not be representation, 
it is perhaps more a way of saying that even though all 
language is in fact representation, men don't have to 
continue to emphasise or be limited by the binary metaphysics 
of opposition when they deconstruct their own position; and 
they don't have to be afraid of reproducing themselves 
endlessly as dominant males within 'representation' or 
'essentialism'. They can address their own 'representation 
as essential males' in the social construction of masculinity 
and explore how that translates into social practices having 
to do with politics, economics and education; as well as how 
those practices relate with such situations as domestic 
violence, murder, rape, incest and sexual abuse. And they 
can do all this without speaking of themselves as essential 
males and fixed masculinity—in other words they can speak 
their bodies and their actions as constructs, which leaves 
the possibility open for change. As Jardine says; 
I do not agree with Smith or Heath that to work 
through your male sexuality would only reproduce 
what's come before, reproduce the phallocentric 
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imaginary. Not if you've really read and lived 
feminist work, which I think some of you have. 
(Men 60) 
But it is that very masculinity which seems impossible to 
question and, interestingly, Heath says: 
Perhaps it is almost that 'feminine' and 
'femininity' should be scrapped, their use 
abandoned; they come too loaded with the image, 
the construction, the monolithic male definition 
of the 'qualities' of women-woman. But not 
'masculine' and 'masculinity', which can be used 
each time to name the elements of a system that 
assures male domination. (15) 
It is not possible to scrap an essential feminine as "loaded 
with monolithic male definitions" while continuing to ignore 
the monolithic male definitions for masculinity, as if these 
were somehow reflective of the natural state for.men, against 
some neutral unchanging background. If the positions based 
on some inherent essence are ever to be put to rest, then a 
structure of power which has been appropriated by a male-
dominant sex-role system must also not continue to be named 
as "masculine" so that the monolithic constructions of 
masculinity within such a system can be uncovered and 
transformed. Perhaps with the participation of male and 
female subjects from so-called oppositional positions, such 
as the 'mainstream' academy and 'women's studies' we might 
see what Derrida writes about in "Women in the Beehive" 
that after using the feminine force to deconstruct 
phallogocentrism, the real challenge of the second stage is 
"to give up the opposition between men and women", and this 
is not only in language but in the belief system of male and 
female as opposite hximans, not just opposite sex (emphasis 
mine; Men in Feminism 194). If that should happen, perhaps 
Spivak's conclusion to her article, "The Politics of 
Interpretation" on the symposixim of the same name, would not 
be necessary to write; 
In a report on our symposixim in the Chicago Grey 
City Journal. Ken Wissoker said about my inclusion 
in the panel: 'She was there. I assxime. because 
she translated Derrida's Of Grammatology'. Reading 
those words, Elizabeth Abel's long and gracious 
letter of invitation to me came to mind. It was my 
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point of view as a Third World feminist that she 
had hoped would enhance the proceedings. Apart 
from a pious remark that the maids upstairs in the 
guest quarters were women of color and a show of 
sentiment, involving Thomas Macaulay, when Said 
and I held the stage for a moment, the Third World 
seemed exorbitant to our concerns. As I reflected 
upon the cxmulative politics of our gathering, 
that seems to strike the harshest note, (emphasis 
mine; Other Worlds 133) . 
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C. Tradition and The Position Mission 
Certainly the critical (non)reception of women 
playwrights by historical mainstream critics has made it 
necessary for feminist literary criticism to expose the 
limitations of traditional literary criticism's values and 
approaches to women's writing. Yet it is also necessary to 
think about the ways in which positions are constructed 
within the discourse of feminist literary criticism, not only 
to avoid mimicking the essentialism of gender biased 
practices of erasure as evidenced in the (hu)man discourse, 
but also to question the practice of literary criticism in 
response to the difficulties of women playwrights who express 
feeling as if they are caught between the critical 
expectations of mainstream criticism and the hopes and 
critical expectations of feminist criticism (discussed in 
Section E). 
In the process of such a critique, and the search for 
alternative strategies for reading and analysis, there has 
been a range of approaches produced in feminist literary 
criticism that have inevitably affected the defining of 
feminist drama, including a questioning of the theoretical 
basis of the practice of literary criticism itself. Within 
this debate there is an ongoing struggle between the impulse 
to redefine and recuperate a more positive, less oppressive 
definition of woman, along with the project to deconstruct 
biological essentialism and related conditions of material 
oppression. The basic opposition set up by this struggle 
within the discourse of feminist literary criticism is 
between the essentialism of a 'feminine' tradition and 
aesthetics, and the materialist analysis of gender as a 
social construct. I see the poststructuralist critique as 
offering a deconstruction of this opposition which in fact 
depends on the opposition between the literary and the 
sociological, as differentiated by the 'real' world and the 
'fictional' text. This opposition gives way in the 
intertextual field of discourse where all interpretations are 
textual constructs, and in this sense, whether they pertain 
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to the 'literary' or the 'social', they can be regarded as 
both real and fictional constructs. I will argue that a 
practice of feminist criticism which works within a broader 
concept of heterogeneous ideology and thus with a politics 
not organised simply around being female, can deconstruct 
oppression as interrelated with gender, class and race; it 
can consider its own complicity in the construction of power; 
and it can refuse to mimic structures of the (hu)man 
discourse (like a gender biased tradition and canon). Such 
a practice emerging from this debate can be a nongendered, 
nonessentialist approach that represents a more malleable 
'position' that is not simply reducible to a simple binary 
opposition, and which can be a consolidation of many 
interrelated aspects of feminist theory that address the 
structures of gender and power. It is the limitations of 
this notion of 'positions' based on (op)positions, as 
discussed within feminist literary criticism, that I want to 
explore as providing the context for my next section on 
defin(d)ing feminist drama; representing a choice between 
recreating another politics of interpretation and experience, 
as compared to developing a politics of textuality and what 
John Frow refers to as a "new understanding of the ends of 
textual study" (Inaugural Lecture 7) , to be discussed in Part 
Four (C) . 
An interesting part of the discourse of feminism is the 
somewhat contradictory struggle between the project that 
appeals to a positive notion of femaleness to redefine women 
and femininity in ways that are different from patriarchal 
definitions, with the project to deconstruct the biological 
essentialism of 'natural' definitions for Woman, the 
feminine, and subsequent gender roles. The latter project 
rejects the 'natural' explanations for gender, and instead 
confronts the way representations of femininity and 
masculinity have operated as ideological definitions in a 
social context that crystallise into cultural, economic and 
political inequalities. In an essentialist vein, the 
descriptive and prescriptive approach seeks to uncover and 
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reproduce a definitive feminine aesthetics and a literary 
tradition in women's writing that has presximably been 
marginalised or 'unread' in the framework of patriarchal 
forms of discourse, criticism, and the notion of a 'man-made' 
language. This is at odds with the materialist approach 
which rejects the notion of 'feminine' or 'aesthetics' in 
favour of the text as a social construct related with power— 
and thus examines the intertextual elements of gender 
representation, historical materialism, and ideology as part 
of the textual significations that help to reproduce power 
differentials in gender and economic oppression. 
Essential Matter 
The first project attempts positively to redefine women 
in a notion of women's presence, their femaleness, and their 
writing as affirmative. Kay Turner quotes Mary Daly in 
"Contemporary Feminist Rituals"; 
The women's revolution is not merely about 
equality within a patriarchal society (a 
contradiction in terms). It is about power and 
redefining power. Within patriarchy, power is 
generally understood as power over people, the 
environment, things. In the rising consciousness 
of women, power is experienced as power of 
presence to ourselves and to each other, as we 
affirm our own being against and beyond the 
alienated identity bestowed upon us within the 
patriarchy. (Politics of Women's Spirituality 225) 
Where such an affirmative project has problems is when it 
tries to base this power of positive redefinition by 
appealing to a natural or even superior 'essence' as it 
searches for the feminine nature, body, writing, or tradition 
untainted by men or patriarchal preconceptions. For example, 
Moi points out in Sexual/Textual Politics, that while H616ne 
Cixous seems to be appropriating anti-essentialist and anti-
biologistic stances of Derridean theory and arguing against 
terms like 6criture feminine or 'feminine writing' which 
incorporate the binary logic of masculine and feminine, she 
nevertheless describes a feminine libidinal writing in La 
Jeune_N§e; 
Femininity in writing can be discerned in a 
privileging of the voice: 'writing and voice ... 
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are woven together' (JN, 170). The speaking woman 
is entirely her voice; 'she physically 
materializes what she's thinking; she signifies it 
with her body' ('Medusa', 251/44, JN, 170). Woman, 
in other words, is wholly and physically present 
in her voice—and writing is no more than the 
extension of this self-identical prolongation of 
the speech act. The voice in each woman, moreover, 
is not only her own, but springs from the deepest 
layers of her psyche: her own speech becomes the 
echo of the primeval song she once heard, the 
voice the incarnation of the 'first voice of love 
which all women preserve alive ... in each woman 
sings the first nameless love' (qtd. in Moi 114) 
According to Moi, "every time a Derridean idea is evoked, it 
is opposed and undercut by a vision of woman's writing 
steeped in the very metaphysics of presence she claims she is 
out to unmask" (110) . It seems that linking patterns of 
behaviour and writing structures to the masculine or feminine 
is anti-biologistic as long as the terms are recognised as 
representing gender: that which is socially constructed as 
masculine or feminine. But the slide from the constructed, 
gendered term to the essentialism of assximed 'natural' and 
biologically derived qualities is all too easy. 
Discussing gendered language, Moi quotes Cher is Kramarae 
who defines sexism in language "as the way in which the 
'English lexicon is a structure organized to glorify maleness 
and ignore, trivialize or derogate femaleness'" (156). In 
Man Made Language Dale Spender also makes a similar 
assertion: 
The English language has been literally man made 
and ... it is still primarily under male control 
... This monopoly over language is one of the 
means by which males have ensxired their own 
primacy, and consequently have ensured the 
invisibility or 'other' nature of females. and 
this primacy is perpetuated while women continue 
to use, unchanged, the language which we have 
inherited. (emphasis mine; qtd. in Moi 156) 
Locating sexism in language by seeing language as a male 
structure again charges the structure itself with having some 
inherent sexual essence, rather than analysing sexual bias as 
difference expressed in the social context of interpretation: 
This is not 'merely' a theoretical point: even if 
we grant the viability of the project of locating 
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sexism in language (and after all, as we shall 
see, even Kristeva concedes that language is also 
in some way structured) , we immediately run into 
problems. For if we hold with Volosinov and 
Kristeva that all meaning is contextual, it 
follows that isolated words or general syntactical 
structures have no meaning until we provide a 
context for them. How then can they be defined as 
either sexist or non-sexist per se? (157) 
This position also negates the participation of women in 
language within the social context, and lays the blame on an 
original conspiracy by men: 
If it is the case, as Thome and Henley argue, 
that similar speech by men and by women tends to 
be interpreted quite differently, then there is 
sxirely nothing inherent in any given word or 
phrase that can always and forever be constructed 
as sexist. The crudely conspiratorial theory of 
language as 'man-made', or as a male plot against 
women, posits an origin (men's plotting) to 
language, a kind of non-linguistic transcendental 
signifier for which it is impossible to find any 
kind of theoretical support. (157) 
Thus the notion of sexual difference in language remains 
embroiled within the framework of an oppositional dichotomy. 
The detailing of sexual difference in this fashion tends to 
efface the intertextual construction of such differences 
through the control of representation, whereby the 
interpretations of false gender unities are promoted, while 
the appearances of 'difference' in the texts of both men and 
women are marginalised. Moi argues that because these 
differences are produced by both sexes, no valid conclusions 
can be made to locate them by sex: 
As far as the study of sex differences in language 
goes, any analysis of isolated fragments 
(sentences) in literatxire, as for instance in the 
much-quoted case of Virginia Woolf's theory of the 
'woman's sentence', will warrant no specific 
conclusions whatever, since the very same 
structxires can be found in male writers (Proust, 
for example, or other modernists), (Moi 155) 
If there were such a thing as a man-made language that was 
unified and subject to closure, then it would be impossible 
for the discourse to produce feminist significations. The 
notion therefore that male dominance has been produced by 
male language, and that a release from oppression lies in 
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discovering or creating a female language, remains trapped 
within locating sexual essence in the boundaries of things 
rather than as produced in the particular context of a 
struggle for power, and also ignores the positive 
participation of women in that struggle with language: 
The question of sexism is a question of the power 
relationship between the sexes, and this power 
struggle will of course be part of the context of 
all utterances under patriarchy. It does not 
follow, however, that in each and every individual 
case the feminine interlocutor will emerge as the 
underdog. (157) 
The appeal to a feminine essence for a positive definition 
for women's writing is mimicking the same essentialist and 
sexist assximptions about the 'natural' superiority of the 
male body and mind, Moi points out that: 
Definitions can certainly be constructive. But— 
and this is the point overlooked by such 
argximents—they can also be constraining. As we 
have seen, many French feminists reject labels and 
names, and 'isms' in particular—even 'feminism' 
and 'sexism'—because they see such labelling 
activity as betraying a phallogocentric drive to 
stabilize, organise and rationalize our conceptual 
universe. They argue that it is masculine 
rationality that has always privileged reason, 
order, unity and lucidity, and that it has done so 
by silencing and excluding the irrationality, 
chaos and fragmentation that has come to represent 
femininity, (emphasis mine; 159-160) 
The key point here is that these qualities have only been 
represented and produced with the gendered labels of 
masculine and feminine. As Moi argues; 
My own view is that such conceptual terms are at 
once politically crucial and ultimately 
metaphysical; it is necessary at once to 
deconstruct the opposition between traditionally 
'masculine' and traditionally 'feminine' values 
and to confront the full political force and 
reality of such categories. We must aim for a 
society in which we have ceased to categorize 
logic, conceptualization and rationality as 
'masculine', not for one from which these virtues 
have been expelled altogether as 'unfeminine'. 
(emphasis mine; 160) 
Such definitions have never been completely totalised or 
unified, nor ever derivative of any 'real' essence that had 
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not been interpreted and construed by the dominant vested 
interests of Knowledge, ideology and power. 
Similarly, critics who reinforce traditional gender 
values by classifying work in terms of 'female' plays do a 
disservice to the community, not only by encouraging the 
separatism which keeps men and women from trying to 
understand each other's work, but also by prejudging the 
audience's ability to receive work that might be 
confrontational. An interesting case in point is a review by 
Helen Musa of In The Secret Room, a play about domestic 
violence written by Australian playwright Kate McNamara: 
It has to be said that In The Secret Room is not 
for everyone. In particular, men would be well-
advised to think twice before venturing into this 
evening of theatre for women—an evening which 
illximinates the dreams of Everywoman, while 
inevitably hitting out at the inexplicable 
violence of Everyman. (Canberra Times^ 8 August 
1988, p 14) 
Another female reviewer on ABC radio, Victoria Edgar, 
encouraged men to see the play because "it shows the strength 
and sensitivity of women" and such representations are 
important to raising discussion about the issue of domestic 
violence (8 August 1988). Fortunately there were several 
Letters to the Editor by men that refuted Musa's assximptions 
about male interest and ability to confront unpleasant 
issues: 
My thanks to your theatre critic, Helen Musa, for 
her solicitous concern about the threat to my 
tender male sensitivities posed by TAU's 
production. In The Secret Room. Unfortunately I 
saw the play before reading the review and deluded 
myself that it was an informative and valuable 
piece of theatre. But I've now realised the error 
of my ways. Without the benefit of Ms Musa's words 
spread like bedraggled chook feathers to shelter 
us timorous men from the feminist storm, I stood 
open to be confronted by the play. To protect me 
from myself in the futxire, I suggest there is a 
higher calling for Ms Musa. What we need is a new 
Dr. Bowdler, especially for the besieged middle-
class sons of the Blainey dreaming. Someone who 
can sanitise everything that presximes to challenge 
us to think about ourselves, leaving us safe and 
comfortable in our theatre seats. Someone who will 
protect us from the opinions of women or anyone 
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else who seeks to confront us with disturbing 
truths about the world. Someone who will ensure 
that playwrights who wish to speak out on behalf 
of those whose circumstances force silence on them 
also remain silent. Mind you, building a new 
theatre of the insipid will not be easy. There is 
much to be done, many discomfiting works from the 
past to be musalated. Perhaps Ms Musa could start 
with Euripides and work forwards. That may mean 
she no longer has time to cobble together any more 
shallow reviews for your paper, but there's always 
a price to pay for progress. (Peter Wise, Canberra 
Times, 12 August 1988, p 8) 
Traditional assumptions about femininity and masculinity have 
long served as a justification for a history of separatism 
between the "opposite" male and female organised around the 
public and private realms, with subsequent domination and 
exclusion of women from positions of definitive power in 
institutional, legal, political, economic and cultural 
realms. And although feminism and feminist literary 
criticism had to mobilise separately because of this 
exclusion, nevertheless mimicking the separatism of gender 
biased essentialism that privileges difference rather than 
resemblance cannot be a longterm useful strategy in feminist 
literary criticism for transforming traditional conceptions 
of gender and power, nor for encouraging dialogue between 
male and female. 
The materialist position in feminist literary criticism 
is found wanting by some feminists, and Maggie Humm argues 
that it lacks a viable means of judging aesthetic and 
literary value, since for English feminist critics the text 
alone cannot provide the signifying opposition (Women's 
Writing 99) . The tension between what Humm calls 
'materialist' versus 'literary' criticism, is that the 
materialist approach seems to "ignore" aesthetics and 
literary value. However, the power invested in institutions 
to construct the dominant notion of good aesthetics and hence 
literary value is precisely what is under critique in the 
materialist project (the construction of authority and belief 
systems through control of representation by institutions). 
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Hximm maintains there is a refusal of an aesthetic value 
evident in English work which uses cultural writers to 
understand how literary traditions and educational 
institutions oppress women. Marxist-feminism concentrates on 
the ideological construction of women's exploitation in the 
work and family ethic and in media representation, while 
linking historical materialism with definitions of women in 
literature (99-100). But Hximm's problem with English 
materialist criticism is centered around aesthetics and the 
necessity for literary value; 
Although feminist work, in England, on the genre 
of romantic fiction has enlarged the boundaries of 
what we can call 'literature' there are weaknesses 
in the approach as an explanation of literary 
patterning. By describing ethnographically the 
role of literary culture within women's 
experience, this criticism has often refused any 
framework of 'good' or 'bad' representation 
aesthetically. Meaning then can only be the result 
of a changing interaction between particular 
verbal forms and socially constructed readers. 
While the notion of meaning, in this sense, as an 
ideological force is often very well demonstrated, 
it ignores the whole issue of literary value. 
(100) 
A materialist or feminist/Marxist project does not explain 
"literary patterning" in terms of judging an aesthetic 
good/bad value, but demonstrates the interrelationship of 
ideology, economics and cultural practices in the 
construction of multiple significations for a text, 
specifically relating to its production or nonproduction in 
the social field. The critical practice of determining what 
a text means, and whether it is aesthetically good or bad 
value (for money) is exactly what underlies a politics of 
interpretation that operates in the literary canon. The 
project to "explain literary patterning" for judging literary 
value thus derives from a historically essentialist position 
which defines knowledge as certain observable 'natural' 
tendencies; for example that women writers use a great deal 
of oven imagery, small details or parlours, while male 
writers are rather better at representing larger universal 
issues such as war or politics. As I have shown, the 
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subjective nature of the critics and their own ideological 
belief systems dramatically alter the act of judging 
'literary' value such that they do not only objectively 
observe a text according to a prescribed standard, but they 
actually impose their own values in the process of 
interpretation and thus reproduce a tradition. In an 
interview by Dinah Leavitt, playwright Megan Terry responds 
angrily to the question of whether we should look for a 
feminist or feminine aesthetic: 
I'm always fighting against critics because so 
many are biased whether they are feminist critics 
or male critics. They always want you to conform 
to whatever party line they're putting out . . . 
They want to use the artist to push whatever line 
they want. It's the duty of the artist to 
criticize everybody including herself and her 
attitudes. The feminist movement needs some 
criticism from artists so that we don't get so 
hidebound and serious. I refuse to be used. (Women 
in American Theatre 289) 
An important point of materialist criticism though, is that 
the masculinist tradition which has marginalised women 
writers by controlling representation according to a certain 
set of standards will not be undermined by a practice of 
defining a feminine tradition for the purpose of 
egalitarianism in canonical texts. 
Thus the derivation of a feminine aesthetics that works 
on defining what is specifically female about a women's 
tradition, language or culture, is not only a mirror reversal 
of the male essentialism, looking to nature for a 'real' 
authoritative referent and position, but it is a policy that 
considers the text as an object to be judged quite apart from 
the political and economic environment which has facilitated 
its production or nonproduction. On the other hand, the 
materialist project of uncovering cultural ideologies 
involved with textual production refuses to agree that it is 
only a literary experience that forms the basis from which an 
aesthetic good/bad value judgement can be made, or that this 
judgement is ever objective or apolitical. However, this 
position need not ignore the style, form or representations 
of the text as being part of an aesthetic 'literary' 
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experience that can also perform cultural work in a counter-
discursive fashion by displacing dominant structures in the 
intertextual field of discourse. 
These oppositions can be seen as the fundamental 
struggle for a basis of critical authority between positions 
of judgement based on essentialism (nature) or materialism, 
(social construct). However, the female tradition depends 
upon a notion of the real reflected in the literary, while 
the materialist depends upon the social referent as real. 
Their opposition is deconstructed by the intertextual field 
of discourse where all texts are 'real' and fictional and 
social constructs, such that the validity of experience 
reflected in the literary text and the social referent is 
being questioned as a dichotomy between a 'fictional' text 
versus the 'real' world. Thus the basis of positions and 
oppositions as relating to some notion of objective "reality" 
is underlying the construction of Knowledge through 
interpretation and judgement in the practice of literary 
criticism. In the practice of literary criticism as a 
politics of interpretation, the struggle for an authoritative 
position which appeals to 'essence', 'nature', or 'reality' 
for the correct meanings to constitute knowledge, is 
criticised by deconstruction, or what has come to be known as 
poststructuralist feminism. Thus I believe that the 
important challenge for feminist literary criticism—in 
acknowledging the struggle within its own discourse between 
the essentialist, materialist and poststructuralist aspects— 
is to confront the construction of these positions within the 
institutionalised oppositions of the 'literary' versus the 
'sociological'. This needs to be done in order to question 
the basis of power in the representation of knowledge as 
essentialist, particularly in the establishment of 'values' 
where critical judgement and authority is organised around a 
politics of 'real' experience and a politics of 
interpretation, with their underlying dependence upon stable 
meanings and a struggle for power between correct positions. 
As Mary Poovey states in her article "Feminism and 
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Deconstruction": 
We will need to turn from campaigns that reproduce 
the essentialism of sex difference to projects 
that call into question the very essentialism upon 
which oxir history has been based. In this sense, 
conceptualizing the issue in terms of real women 
is part of the solution, but it is also part of 
the problem. (Feminist Studies 63) 
What this suggests for a practice of feminist literary 
criticism that is striving to avoid the politics of 
hierarchical institutions that have constructed the literary 
canon, is that essentialism must be avoided as a platform for 
the exercise of power through judgement strategies based on 
'real' experience, and oppression has to be addressed as a 
set of interrelated competing interests for power that are 
produced within an intertextual field. As Moi says in 
Sexual/Textual Politics this is not to constitute women as 
'against' power; 
But women's relationship to power is not 
exclusively one of victimization. Feminism is not 
simply about rejecting power, but about 
transforming the existing power structures—and, 
in the process, transforming the very concept of 
power itself. (Sexual/Textual 148) 
Such a project would question the construction of a literary 
'feminist' canon as well as the simple insertion of women's 
texts into the mainstream canonical structure. As Moi points 
out: 
If, as I have previously argued, all efforts 
towards a definition of 'woman' are destined to be 
essentialist, it looks as if feminist theory might 
thrive better if it abandoned the minefield of 
femininity and femaleness for a while and 
approached the questions of oppression and 
emancipation from a different direction. (148) 
Thus the project of defining what is "female" within the work 
of women in order to judge them by a set of standards will 
merely replicate the essentialist positions of authority in 
the tradition of literary criticism as practiced within the 
(hu)man discourse. What may be more relevant is a 
nongendered approach to investigate the critique of 
oppression offered by representations in women's or men's 
texts with respect to their feminist dynamics, and then to 
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read how these critiques of form, style, or subject work 
counter-discursively within the context of reception and 
production in the intertextual field of discourse (discussed 
in Part 4). 
As Wandor indicates in her introduction to Look Back in 
Gender. the study of the defects of traditional literary 
criticism is not limited to women: 
... the received tradition of the theatre presents 
us with an imaginative world created and 
controlled by men. In the texts that have come 
down to us, this is a world of great imaginative 
power and it is this power in its complex 
manifestations which informs our approach to the 
theatre of our own time ... Feminist movements 
since the nineteenth century have challenged the 
traditionally subordinate roles of women in both 
society and the theatre, and in the most recent 
wave of feminist since 1969-70 and the development 
of the theatrical 'fringe' in the context of 
British subsidised theatre, many more challenges 
have been made to traditional male dominance in 
the theatre ... In this context, the function of 
gender means not just looking at female characters 
but at male characters too. This can only work if 
it demonstrates the critical ways in which 
maleness as well as femaleness work in the 
operation of the theatrical dynamic, (xiv) 
Following along the lines of this point, Wandor has suggested 
that maleness as well as femaleness needs to be discussed for 
its textual and political connotations in drama, and Munich 
makes a similar point in "Notorious Signs, Feminist Criticism 
and Literary Tradition"; 
For this reason alone it would be mistaken for 
feminists to polarize criticism according to the 
genitals of the author, or to attend only to 
women's writing. This reification of gender will 
retard the changes in reading that is [sic] one of 
feminist criticism's goals. (Making 251) 
She also points out that the demands of the same critical 
tradition which excluded women's texts from canonical 
acceptance have also affected and limited the readings of 
texts that become part of the canon; 
Critical discoxirse has tended to be more 
misogynist than the texts it examines. Tagged with 
a patriarchal interpretation, canonical texts pass 
into the culture validated by what the Institution 
of Reading has understood ... Ideally a feminist 
251 
critigue would question not only the inadequate 
representation of other voices in the western 
literary canon but the inadequate explication of 
received tradition. The blindness of patriarchal 
criticism to female-authored works does not mean 
that its acuity to subjects it has called its own 
is thereby sharpened. On the contrary, the 
defensive strategies that males use to avoid what 
has become a main subject for feminist critics— 
the 'invisible' sexual politics of literature— 
have lamed their interpretation of the canon as 
well. To privilege certain forms as great, certain 
themes as important and certain genres as major 
has required traditional criticism to disregard or 
elide those very aspects in the 'great' texts that 
are incongruent with patriarchal gender 
definitions. (251-252) 
As Cynthia Ward writes in her article on oral texts, "What 
They Told Buchi Emecheta", it is the limited interpretations 
of the standard tools of literary criticism which need to be 
deconstructed: 
Realist literary conventions such as unity, 
credibility, character development, and motivation 
have been—appropriately—called into question by 
readers who have found such prescriptive criteria 
constitutive of a normalizing, bourgeois white 
male subjectivity. It is no longer possible to 
consider such criticism value-neutral, and its 
relevance even to works that were consciously 
written according to such conventions is 
questionable. (emphasis mine; PMLA. January 1990, 
P 86) 
This mode of analysis questions prescriptive criteria as they 
have privileged masculinist values, but the forms themselves 
are not gendered, such that the appearance of differing 
styles or representations can signify a critique but they 
need not signify either a male, female or feminist genre. 
The 'Real' World 
In examining the multiplicity of ideologies underlying 
'knowledge' and the role of positions within criticism 
itself, the intersection of feminism and language is an 
exploration of the ways that language, although shared by 
all, is not gender-neutral, nor free of ideological value, 
nor is it shared equally as in the case where male dominance 
has appropriated language in specific ways that exclude the 
full participation of others—as in legal, medical. 
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scientific, or literary discourses. The role of language in 
representation and the intertextual construction of social 
values is described by Nelly Furman in her article, "The 
Politics of Language; Beyond the Gender Principle": 
Literary criticism is one of the places where 
feminism confronts patriarchal values. Feminist 
criticism unveils the prejudices at work in our 
appreciation of cultural artefacts, and shows us 
how the linguistic medixim promotes and transmits 
the values woven through the fabric of our 
society. (Making 59) 
In the work of examining the ways in which critical practices 
have worked in reviews to apply a set of values to women's 
writing, one of the necessary projects for feminist literary 
criticism, according to Hximm in Feminist Criticism^ has been 
to: 
reverse the situation where male critics talk 
about the syntactical defences and distortions of 
women writers, and identify instead the way male 
readings are themselves full of specific defences 
and distortions before we can provide correctives 
... to demolish the whole argximent of male 
criticism in which the perspective of a non-
aligned male critic is assximed to be sexually 
neutral while a feminist is seen as a case of 
special pleading. (12). 
Hximm argues the need to "establish a feminist position in 
literary criticism very quickly because criticism is central 
to the hegemonic power of education, [so] why not just get on 
and write a feminist criticism?" (Feminist 12). However, a 
feminist theory which guestions the hegemonic power of any 
institution would want to be very careful not to set itself 
up as another adjunct to theory as already practiced and, 
although Hximm recognises this, she still says "it is male 
criticism, not feminism, which has the ideological blinkers" 
(Feminist 12) . To displace the male critic as an invalid 
judge and replace it with a feminist judge does not question 
the underlying tradition of criticism itself. As Furman 
points out: 
Yet an unfortunate consequence of the critics' 
efforts towards a separate, but equally valid, 
literary tradition is that they leave unquestioned 
some of the prejudices which create the authority 
of tradition in the first place. Among those 
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notions unchallenged are: universal hximan 
experience, and reflection of experience in 
literary representation. (63) 
I have already argued that the (hu)man discourse and its 
gender biased standards do not represent hximan, nor 
universal, experience. To collect women's writing and argue 
that there is an historical tradition which has been excluded 
is one thing. However, to establish a female tradition which 
privileges women's experiences—that only women can write and 
interpret—would merely replicate the masculinist gender 
prejudices underlying a politics of experience in the (hu)man 
discourse. Further, the work of feminist criticism which 
assximes the text to be an unproblematic reflection of 
experience ignores the fact that representation is a 
construct rather than a simple reflection. It thus remains 
within a practice of interpretation and the determination of 
'meaning' based on a politics of 'real' experience reflected 
in literature: 
For Gilbert and Gubar, as for Showalter, there is 
no doubt that literature reflects life and that 
experience of life is translated into literature 
(63) ... While the egalitarian argximent in 
feminist criticism calls for equal representation 
in literature of women's and men's experience of 
life, poststructxiralist feminism denounces 
representation itself as already a patriarchal 
paradigm. (59) . .. What is taken for granted in 
the study of images and their relation to 
experience is that the 'picturing' of experience 
is gender-neutral or free of ideological values, 
(emphasis mine; 67) 
Although she points out that a female egalitarian tradition 
does not question the prejudices which construct tradition, 
she nevertheless accuses poststructxiralist feminism as 
"denoxincing" representation as patriarchal. It would be more 
accurate to argue that representation has been controlled by 
a patriarchal discoxirse to constitute and reproduce its own 
power: but there is no essence in representation that 
poststructuralism would categorise as "patriarchal" in the 
first instance. 
More important than the gender of representation is that 
representational art is caught up in the age-old ideology of 
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art imitates nature, where in the name of Art, poetic 
imitation forgets that it is fictionalising 'nature'. As 
Monteith points out: 
One of the immense positive gains accruing from 
feminist criticism has been the realisation that 
the female in literature is a literary construct. 
That may seem a very obvious statement. Didn't we 
always know that everything in literature is 
constructed? At one level, yes. But the act of 
construction didn't seem to matter very much as 
long as it was considered in terms of 
craftsmanship. (emphasis mine; 1) 
A stake in the notion of experience reflected in art is the 
concept of the text and the world as separate; one 
essentially 'real' and one 'fictional'—instead of both as 
interrelated aspects within ideological construction and 
interpretation. In Woman as Writer Lorna Sage refers to this 
reflection myth as one that has reinforced traditional gender 
ideologies, but also points out the possibilities of writing 
to challenge them; 
This notion of the 'world' on the page is an 
enduring critical myth that feminist thinking has 
again and again (and rightly) called into 
question. It is also, however, the reflex of a 
practical hope—that writing can test out and 
change the parameters of freedom. (15) 
However, "testing out the parameters of freedom" can end up 
being a struggle between realism and 'imaginative' writing, 
often interpreted as 'alternative' and judged harshly against 
more important 'serious' writing about the 'real' world. The 
dichotomy between 'serious' and 'alternative' is often 
centered around the notion of real versus artificial, and 
Sawchxik argues that the postmodern challenge to what is 
'natural' in the referent as the so-called real background, 
deconstructs the very notion of a real world through the 
process of mixed signs: 
Some aspects of feminist thought, which criticize 
fashion on the basis of its 'misrepresentation' of 
women, and advocate a return to the 'natural' 
body, and 'natxiral' beauty have also had to be 
abandoned ... The present era, the age of the 
postmodern, marks a collapsing of the space of 
these borders. Reality, the referent, is called 
into question at that junction where artificial 
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signs are intertextual ly mixed with 'real 
elements'. (emphasis mine; Tale 60) 
The difference between the real and the artificial is 
embedded within the question of definition for feminist 
literary criticism which Hximm poses as the problem between 
the literary and the sociological; 
Is it to docximent women's social oppression and, 
therefore, methodologically, slip towards the social 
sciences (in literary terms realism) ; or should it train 
women linguistically for a transformation of language? 
(emphasis mine; Feminist Criticism 45) 
Because Hximm is subscribing to the separation of the "real" 
world and the "fictional" page, she maintains the opposition 
between the "literary" and the "sociological" and thus judges 
the materialist approaches in feminism as "slipping" towards 
realism and the social sciences and, presximably, away from 
language and literature. As I have argued earlier, this 
dichotomy between literary and sociological falls away when 
there is no privileging of the real over the literary because 
they are both seen as constructs within the field of 
representation. In this sense, the world is not on the page, 
but instead the world is also like a page, and social 
practices can be thus be read as constructed texts which 
intersect with the literary. 
Within the concept of intertextuality, Moi suggests that 
textual analysis can be more productive when looking at the 
whole text in the social field and not just a fragment of 
writing; 
The only way of producing interesting results from 
such texts is to take the whole of the utterance 
(the whole text) as one's object, which means 
studying its ideological, political and 
psychoanalytic articulations, its relations with 
society, with the psyche and—not least—with 
other texts. Indeed, Kristeva has coined the 
concept of intertextua1ity to indicate how one or 
more systems of signs are transposed into others. 
(156) 
It is this multiplicity of significations, as Volosinov 
writes, which indicates that "differently oriented accents 
intersect in every ideological sign", and thus within the 
intertextual field of the same language the sign functions 
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like "an arena of struggle" (qtd. in Moi 157): 
This point is crucial to a non-essentialist 
feminist analysis of language. It posits that we 
all use the same language but that we have 
different interests—and interests must here be 
taken to mean political and power-related 
interests which intersect the sign. The meaning of 
the sign is thrown open—the sign becomes 
'polysemic' rather than 'univocal'—and though it 
is true to say that the dominant power group at 
any given time will dominate the intertextual 
production of meaning, this is not to suggest that 
the opposition has been reduced to total silence. 
The power struggle intersects in the sign. (158) 
However, intertextuality does not only refer to 'literature' 
as Furman describes it, but also refers to the world as a web 
of written and other signs. Monteith refers to this aspect 
of intertextuality as the encoding of social values: 
Intertextuality is a concept which seems 
particularly important and relevant to women at 
the moment, both as writers and as critics...I 
believe that social values encoded in the text at 
the time of writing are also part of its 
intertextuality and those specifically applying to 
gender differences are particularly relevant to 
the feminist critic, (emphasis mine; 5) 
While the concept of intertextuality incorporates the 
possibility of uncovering cultural values, it is not a 
'method' of analysis that is reduced to the written text, as 
if the 'meaning' of social values were "encoded" in a fixed 
way within the literary text but rather how they as 
representations interact with the field of discourse through 
reception, interpretation, and production, which of course 
changes as cultural perceptions of social codes change. Thus 
intertextual analysis points to the ongoing critique of 
meaning in the field of discourse. 
For example, June Howard discusses the equality debate 
based on different and equal, or similar and equal, arguing 
that a third theoretical position exists which she says is 
advocated by Kristeva and prefigxired by Virginia Woolf (187) : 
the very dichotomy man/woman as an opposition 
between two rival entities may be understood as 
belonging to metaphysics. What can 'identity', 
even 'sexual identity', mean in a new theoretical 
and scientific space where the very notion of 
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identity is challenged? (Kristeva qtd. in Howard 
187) 
As identity includes some biological "essence" but is largely 
a social construction, there is no reason to demand equality 
based on the natural sameness or natural difference of men 
and women. The poststructuralist challenge is rather that 
there is no concept of absolute identity as 'natural 
opposites', reflecting some innate thing that is a self-
evident basis for power organised around sex, race or class— 
it merely argues that identity is a process of subjective and 
intertextual constructions. Some feel that the 
deconstructionist project which argues against any natural 
essence that could prescribe a unified identity for woman, 
seems to eliminate a political position that is organised 
around being female. However, as Poovey suggests in 
"Feminism and Deconstruction" it means organising around more 
than being female; 
We need to recognize that 'woman' is currently 
both a position within a dominant, binary symbolic 
order and that that position is arbitrarily (and 
falsely) unified . .. The multiple positions real 
women occupy—the positions dictated by race, for 
example, or by class or sexual preference—should 
alert us to the inadequacy of binary logic and 
unitary selves without making us forget that that 
this logic has dictated (and still does) some 
aspects of women's social treatment ... For, if 
the position 'woman' is falsely unified and if 
one's identity is not given (solely or 
necessarily) by anatomy, then woman—or even 
women—cannot remain a legitimate rallying point 
for political actions ... Real historical women 
have been (and are) oppressed, and the ways and 
means of that oppression need to be analyzed and 
fought. But at the same time, we need to be ready 
to abandon the binary thinking that has stabilized 
women as a group that could be collectively 
(although not uniformly) oppressed. (Feminist 
Studies 62) 
The expansion beyond binary thinking and falsely unified 
positions does not eliminate the project to analyse and 
dismantle structural oppression as it affects females, but 
rather suggests the necessity of a broader understanding of 
ideology and positions. In this sense instead of a 
reductionist, unified political position only based on being 
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female, there is a more complex analysis of the multiple and 
interrelated ideologies of economics, race, or cultural 
politics that are involved in the reproduction of social 
constructions of power. 
(Op)positions 
Poststructuralist theories have argued that essentialist 
criticism practiced as interpretation within a politics of 
experience has resulted in the construction of knowledge and, 
therefore, 'positions' of power, according to the values of 
those with access to 'knowledge' and the authority of 
critical decision-making. The resistance to the challenges 
to essentialism offered by intertextuality and the 
deconstruction of the 'real' are often due to simplified 
understandings of these concepts, but might also relate to 
the difficulty of relinguishing the power to dominate and 
control the textual field from the organisational platform of 
falsely unified, essentially 'real' and 'oppositional' 
positions. 
In Men and Feminism. Smith wrote that only a woman could 
speak with authority about women's texts, thus revealing a 
basis of criticism as a politics of experience, but he also 
implies the need for a secure, correct position, as Heath 
says: 
Part of the difficulty is to do with 
'correctness', the problem men, we, can have, 
again, of protecting—of self-protecting— 
position. I want to be somewhere securely. 
Thinking through feminist theory, Paul says he 
feels 'that it's impossible to say anything 
properly correct', (qtd. in Heath 44) 
However, the secure position fortressed with 'clear' meanings 
justifies the exertion of power over others perceived as 
'wrong', which is often a case of judgement based more on 
what is unknown about the 'other'. Heath refers to men 
needing to have a "position" as a "stand" within feminism: 
I do not want to say that 'where am I?' is a male 
question but I do think that men want very much to 
know where they are vis-a-vis feminism, that 
feminism can quickly be produced by them as a 
matter of their place (and so of its) , and as a 
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theoretical matter, especially in a context like 
this, this MLA session, where we can too easily 
make feminism an approach, which then gives us an 
approach, a handy object, some thing we can place 
ourselves in relation to, 'feminist theory' as 
topic (exactly, our topos)—where can I stand? 
(Men 42-43) 
Perhaps Heath is arguing that men would rather deal 
theoretically—more securely—with feminism as a mapped out 
sort of abstract approach instead of taking it into 
themselves to consider their own constructions of masculinity 
and power, but this is still a self-indulgent excuse and a 
separatist approach that will no doubt keep feminism as the 
unknown other. The fear of acknowledging the common ground 
instead of righteously fighting from opposite corners is more 
likely a reflection of the inability to relinquish power 
gained by dominant positions within a traditional politics of 
interpretation. 
In A World of Difference, Johnson discusses some of the 
misconceptions about deconstruction which she relates to a 
resistance to uncertainty, and a dependence upon the 
traditional polarised oppositions in the practice of 
interpretive criticism. She writes that radicals see in 
deconstruction "a conservative plot to talk literary critics 
out of participating in social change while conservatives see 
in it a nihilistic desire to cancel out human meaning 
altogether" (6) . Johnson argues that there is strong 
resistance to the idea that "language cannot itself be 
entirely reduced to interpretability", and this resistance is 
"always absolutized into nihilism or guietism" (6). This is 
because without the familiar oppositions within which to 
anchor firm interpretations of meaning and consequently 
secure positions, it is seen as the death of all meaning, all 
discourse, and all positions. Johnson then shows that 
several arguments against deconstruction reveal themselves to 
be immersed in the simple logic of binary opposition. For 
example, several criticisms argue as follows: 
In the absence of any appeal to a coercive reality to 
which the plurality of subjectivities can be referred, 
all perspectives become equally valid. 
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Certainty and piety of all kinds are systematically 
undermined in favor of a universal relativism of values 
and judgment. Just as the revisionists are led to 
reduce the act of criticism to a given critic's 
subjective preference, so do professors relegate 
judgment of all sorts to the students' subjective 
preferences. 
In revisionist criticism the first consequence of 
calling discourse itself into question is the 
proposition that all criticism amounts to misreading, 
and thus one reading is as legitimate as another. 
But if all interpretation is misinterpretation, and if 
all criticism (like all history) of texts can engage 
only with a critic's own misconstruction, why bother to 
carry on the activities of interpretation and criticism? 
(qtd. in Johnson 12) 
Johnson points out that the logic of such statements can be 
examined for their own reductionism: 
1. If all readings are misreadings, then all reading 
are equally valid. 
2. If there is no such thing as an objective reading, 
then all readings are based on subjective preferences. 
3. If there is no absolute truth, then everything is 
relative. (12) 
Such statements represent the common misunderstanding and 
fear that if everything is relative, then one cannot say 
anything, or if there is no objective absolute reality, then 
there is no meaning and everything lapses into nihilism. 
As Morris argues, these fixed opposites were never there 
as 'real' in the first place, and meaning has always been a 
process of constructing reality through the field of 
interpretations. Morris interprets Baudrillard's essays in 
Simulations as bemoaning a lost reality, arguing that it is 
actually the lost oppositions and noble dichotomies at the 
heart of the problem since they have been part of defining 
the difference between reality and the imaginary (Pirate's 
196): 
This is one difference between a system of 
'meaning', in Baudrillard's terms, and a system of 
simulation; the former depends on solid 
oppositions, which in the latter are 'short-
circuited by the confusing of poles, in a total 
circularity of signalling'. The cxirious clarity 
here is not that this logic then requires us to 
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declare the death of meaning, but that it first 
requires us to consent that meaning was really 
'that'—and only that ... At stake here is not 
only another addition to the appalling powers of 
goo, but a positive notion of 'existence' as the 
way things used to be—according to a system of 
noble dichotomies. And when that system becomes 
unstable (like the 'unstable equation of lines, 
dots, frames and pulses' in the video image), then 
things are as good as (but worse than) dead. 
Reality can only exist, be positively itself, be 
'real', if it is different from and opposed to the 
imaginary. So it is with sex and work, history and 
nature, desire and power; if a 'savage opposition' 
between them is dissolved then they are, in an 
absolute sense, no longer with us.... (196-197) 
In fact, the liberation from 'Absolute Truth' and the 'one 
correct position' determined between "savage oppositions" 
leaves the field open to constant assessments of the 
production of meaning and social structures for their 
effects, seeing these not as the inevitable results of a 
'natural' system of power but as constructed and therefore 
offering the possibility of social changes in the 
distribution of power. 
Perhaps it is this very possibility of change from a 
fixed order and power structure—resulting from the absence 
of an absolute reality platform from which to rule—that has 
the essentialists nostalgic for their secure (op)positions. 
In their article "The Nostalgia for Law and Order and the 
Policing of Knowledge", Donald Morton and Mas'ud Zavarzadeh 
discuss a review (referred to as "Yuppies") of Catherine 
Belsey's Critical Practice, saying that; 
'Yuppies" understanding of its tutor text and of 
deconstruction is philosphically highly 
problematic, since it naively declares that Belsey 
'clearly presents' (p. 12) deconstructive thought. 
It is rudimentary that deconstruction contests the 
very possibility not only of 'sximmary', but also 
of 'clarity', and 'representation', arguing that 
by maintaining the illusion of 'clear 
representation'. Western logocentrism has set up 
hierarchies which enable it to regard language as 
a transparent medixim for communication between 
sovereign subjects who are assximed to have access 
to some transdiscursive knowledge—presence. (26) 
The deconstructive critique xindermines the foundational 
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categories of the practice of interpretation such as the 
subject/object split, the unified conscious subject, the 
concept of reality as organised around empirical knowledge, 
the dominance of meaning and indeed the authority of 
knowledge itself as the organiser of positions of power. The 
effect of destabilised knowledge upon such positions may in 
fact represent the greatest area of resistance; 
'Yuppies'' representation of the world as a lawful, 
rule-governed, and authoritative check on our conception 
of 'reality' is reinforced by the theory of knowledge to 
which it adheres: empiricism as the mode of knowing the 
world. In the name of empiricism, 'Yuppies' rejects the 
postmodern view that data is always already an 
interpretation situated in ideology, for fear that such 
a view destabilizes 'knowledge' and threatens not only 
its authority but Authority itself. (33) 
Morton and Zavarzadeh point out that the rise of empiricism 
as a theory of knowledge grew out of the period of "rising 
mercantilism when prospering merchants were seeking an equal 
footing with king and church, or at least freedom from 
exploitation" (Bruner qtd. in "Nostalgia" 33) . Thus they 
argue that the politics of empiricism relate to the ideology 
of a particular class: 
Empiricism, in other words, is the scientific and 
philosophical ideology of a rising class—a class 
that is attempting to dislodge the 'authority' of 
Divine Rights and Divine Revelation by postulating 
Nature itself as the source of knowledge and that 
furthermore theorizes that access to Nature is 
direct, free, and open to all. Having by our own 
time succeeded in obtaining power, however, the 
bourgeoisie is attempting to maintain that power 
by transferring 'authority' from Divine Right to 
Nature so that Natxire in itself becomes the source 
of xincontestable knowledge, indeed replacing 
Divine Revelation. Freedom for one class then 
becomes suppression of others, and it is this 
suppressive, authoritarian aspect of empiricism 
that is institutionalized in various forms of 
modern positivism. 'Yuppies' puts forth this view 
of knowledge as the only 'scientific' form of 
knowing and in doing so offers a theory of science 
which is, as we have argued before, suitable for 
the petty-bourgeoisie today and highly useful to 
the conservative agenda. (33) 
The politics of interpretation determines meaning by 
following the same agenda as empirical knowledge, such that 
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the authority of critical judgement is based on the 
privileged experience of some which results in the 
suppression of the texts of others. Thus when the 
'knowledge' of some people is used to impose authority upon 
others, it becomes a crude power tactic that displaces the 
valuable experiences and cultural systems of others 
considered devoid of correct 'knowledge' by the well-
positioned authorities who dominate and homogenise the 
textual field. 
It could well be that the moving away from a politics of 
interpretation may signal a shift beyond the concern to 
produce 'fixed' or 'correct' positions of reference, since 
any position to some extent is always plural and relative in 
time and space. As Spivak intimates, the fixed stand negates 
this plurality; 
A better formulation of this is to be found in 
Pierre Macherey; 'we always eventually find, at 
the edge of the text, the language of ideology, 
momentarily hidden, but eloquent by its very 
absence'. Let us consider moments on the edges or 
borders ... Such a gesture will yield a hint of 
their politics as well, a politics of the freely 
choosing subject who, devising his (sic) own 
plurality, breaks this theory as he takes a stand, 
fin Other Worlds 122) 
Yet if the notion of a unified 'stand' from which 
'objectively to observe' a text through an oppositional 
politics of interpretation is no longer accurate, then the 
traditional technique of using an ideological position as a 
judgement platform for literary criticism may need revision 
as Wayne Booth suggests: 
The sense of ideology as free choice is the goal; 
'the question we now face, then, as believers in 
feminist (or any other) ideology, is this; am I 
free, in interpreting and criticizing a work of 
art, to employ that ideology as one element in my 
appraisal of the artistic value of that work?' 
(qtd. in Spivak, In Other Worlds 122) 
The deployment of ideological positions "objectively" to 
judge the "artistic value" of the work as essentially good or 
bad becomes a very problematic situation, and has everything 
to do with production or nonproduction in the field. 
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Obviously there is nothing intrinsically 'wrong' with 
assximing a stand as a position of reference, as long as the 
critic takes on board her/his subjectivity, cultural 
relativity, historicity and ideological plurality as a 
participant with the text and not as separate from it. It is 
not that one cannot make judgements, nor take positions and 
organise as part of the process of informed dialogue, as long 
as these judgements do not deny the imagination or experience 
of others. Yet the problem of secure or correct positions 
often ends up as a separatist struggle for dominance rather 
than as a co-operative critique of the ideological 
construction of power differentials in the intertextual field 
of discourse. 
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Section (D). Definfd)ing Feminist Drama and the Anti-Canon 
As oppressive social conditions and absences set the 
stage for the emergence of feminism and feminist literary 
criticism, the scarcity of women in the mainstream drama 
discourse produced the response from feminist writers of 
creating another genre known as feminist theatre, in addition 
to the ongoing work of recuperating the lost texts of women 
playwrights. In this section I will discuss the historical 
emergings of what has come to be known as feminist drama, as 
well as some of the limitations of defining a genre that some 
women playwrights themselves resist. In reading 
deconstructively through the project to define a feminist 
drama, I will compare various strategies with practices of 
the (hu)man discourse and feminist literary criticism; in 
particular, the establishment of a tradition of female 
writing, using Case's discussion of a "new poetics" to work 
through the opposition between the essentialist and 
materialist project in defining a feminist drama. I will 
conclude by discussing the implications of defin(d)ing 
feminist drama as a prescriptive project that can lead to an 
alternative feminist canon which then mimics erasure by 
excluding women who seemingly do not conform (according to 
the prescriptive standards and subjective interpretations of 
the feminist critics). 
I will argue throughout that it is more useful to 
develop a nongendered and a nonprescriptive analysis of plays 
by women as texts operating in the intertextual field of 
discourse, so that their work is not imposed upon by critical 
judgements based on the same traditional assximptions and 
erasure practices of the (hu)man discourse, only with a 
mirror reversal that privileges the female gender. There is 
often a different st^le of theatre/performance in the plays 
of women that is less hampered by dramatic traditions in the 
form, and by dominant gender definitions in the represented 
subjects, but I would not attribute this style as belonging 
to the essence or nature of being female. It does relate to 
the cultural construction of gender, but gender construction 
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is not limited to women and I do not believe that one must be 
female to write "difference" in style or form. The subjects 
of women may arise out of personal experience of course, 
(though the play is still a textual construct and not a 
simple reflection of 'reality') which differs from those of 
males (remembering that some men are raped, and economically 
or racially oppressed). Still, to limit the representation 
of gender oppression and other feminist issues to women 
writers only is engaged in a politics of interpretation based 
on the authority of 'real' experience which would deny the 
imagination of males to write on the gender oppression of 
women (and men), just as the (hu)man discourse denied women 
the authority to write about the public realm. 
Herstory and Early Roots 
Liz Natalie notes in her book Feminist Theatre: A Study 
in Persuasion that early feminist groups concluded that a 
feminist drama didn't exist, so they proceeded to write it. 
Helene Keyssar discusses the "roots and contexts" of feminist 
playwrights in America in her book Feminist Theatre where she 
states that feminist drama emerged in America in the late 
1950S-1960S, "parented by the women's movement and the 'new 
theatre'" (1), and that whether or not women playwrights 
identified themselves "publicly or politically as 
'feminists'" at this time, playwrights existed whose "'art is 
related to their condition as women'" (Honor Moore qtd. in 
Keyssar 1) . However, these observations of lack by feminist 
writers in the 60s reflect the historical erasure of earlier 
women playwrights' representations and critical arguments. 
As I have shown in Part One, there have been many women 
playwrights prior to and after the period of the 
suffragettes, who also discussed their condition as women, 
but the feminist theatre emerging from the 60s was more 
visibly related to the social context of the women's 
movement, and thus took on the name of feminist theatre. It 
is my observation that what is now called feminist theatre 
(i.e. that produced from the late 1950s to the present) is 
the reappearance of similar key subjects in earlier plays by 
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women which also engaged in critiques of the dominant 
representations of gender and other social constructions. 
While it may be tempting to say that the contemporary work by 
women is more radical in its critique of representation, 
there are striking examples of avant-garde writing style, 
innovative theatrical techniques, and shocking imagery of 
violation to women even as early as the first known woman 
playwright, Hrosvita the nun. Thus, a problem with the name 
of "feminist" theatre is a denial of its own historicity, in 
that the term 'feminist' is time defined from the late 1950s 
onwards as an emergent social movement—as if what came 
before was not like feminism. 
In Olauson's historical examination of American women 
playwrights and criticism, she argues that while the 
suffragette plays were more overtly political in their focus 
on the right to legislate and vote for government, the main 
emphasis in women's texts from the 30s to the 50s was on a 
woman's individual conflict with conventional gender roles. 
She says that, in the 60s, the focus became a 'feminist' 
questioning of political systems and a dissatisfaction with 
the effect of social institutions upon the individual, 
associated with feminism as a social movement (140-69). Yet 
representations throughout that earlier period including 
plays such as Machinal, Can You Hear Their Voices. The Old 
Maid, The Torrents. Aria de Capo or Trifles very directly 
confronted social, political and business institutions as 
they impinged on women, men and children, as family and 
workers. In addition, prior to the radical style of the 60s, 
women playwrights were experimenting with dramatic form in 
the expressionistic plays of the 20s and 30s, as well as in 
the 'new drama' of the 40s and 50s in critiques that 
questioned 'realistic' representations of reality. Rachel 
Frances says in her introduction to A Century of Plays by 
American Women that; 
Women were major contributors to the dramatic 
activity of the 1930s. Their plays are neglected 
today for the same reason that so much of the 
drama of that period is; they bear the label of 
'politically subversive'. (20) 
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These early plays perhaps were regarded as subversive but, 
whatever the reason, they were criticised as trivial and 
domestic or just simply ignored. As Wandor states, it is 
worth remembering the degree of challenge represented in a 
play "when one tries to work out why some plays become 
commercially successful while others don't—and in part this 
is likely to stem from the nature of the feminist message 
contained in the play" (6). It is perhaps the way that the 
feminist message was represented which changed from the first 
wave of feminism to the second wave of the 60s, as a 
strategic writing response to gain acceptance for plays in 
what, for women, was a hostile critical environment. Lynda 
Hart's introduction to Making A Spectacle points out that 
since drama is "more public and social" than other literary 
arts, "the woman playwright's voice reaches a community of 
spectators in a public place that historically has been 
regarded as a highly subversive, politicized environment" 
(2) . She discusses the meaning of spectacle in theatre and 
"the power inherent in this collective confrontation [which] 
challenges the very structures of 'reality' that have kept 
women behind the scenes" (2). Hart argues that, since the 
theatre is most removed from the domestic sphere, the woman 
playwright takes a greater risk than the novelist, but it 
also offers "her greater potential for effecting social 
change" (2) . It is likely that this risk and/or greater 
potential is because of the public nature of theatre, and its 
more immediate confrontation with audiences and critics, 
where the media reviews given to plays are very often a vital 
necessity for their successful performance runs, and eventual 
publication. There may have been greater difficulties for 
women playwrights in sustaining their work on stage if it 
contradicted dominant social power structures. The closer 
their work was to political challenge, the more vulnerable it 
was to critical marginalisation; hence strategies of writing 
and production became crucial to achieve the widest audience 
and the most positive representation. 
This then may account for Clausen's perception that all 
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women writing plays from the 30s to the 50s did not seem 
overtly political, but represented issues which she argues 
challenged the difficulties of their personal gender roles. 
What may have changed was not the politics—but the writing 
strategies from a more overt style of direct political 
confrontation to the more indirect personal representations. 
And since modern feminism has argued that the personal is the 
political, it can be said that most of the plays by women 
from the Suffragettes through to the 50s were also engaged 
with feminist concerns regarding gender and social 
structures, though in differing historical contexts from the 
modern plays which are now seen as the birth of feminist 
theatre. Generally speaking then, the emergence of 'feminist 
theatre' as somehow a 'new' genre reflects the lack of 
awareness about previous writing by women playwrights, their 
topics, and their spectacles, and is an effect of historical 
erasure which produces the syndrome of women playwrights 
having endlessly to reinvent the wheel. Other consequences 
include a lack of access to argximents posited over time which 
form the continuity in a discourse and, as Virginia Woolf 
argues in A Room of One's Own, provide the basis for 
'masterpieces' which are not the exclusive property of an 
individual genius, but reflect the intertextuality of a 
collective reading and thinking process over time. 
Finding 
Erasure has made it difficult to find and read plays by 
women due to the problems of production, publication and 
distribution, but the difficulty of locating their names has 
been reduced by feminist researchers who have practised for 
some time a strategy of textual recuperation of women 
authors, though the problem of finding the texts in print 
still remains. Although a few scholarly books about plays by 
women have appeared in the last few years, the surface has 
yet to be scratched. Women playwrights remain in relative 
obscurity, with the same production problems they have 
suffered in the past. Keyssar's Feminist Theatre has an 
extensive bibliography, providing a good start on recent work 
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from the 50s onwards. The publication of Women in American 
Theatre by Helen Krich Chinoy and Linda Walsh Jenkins was a 
landmark, their appended Sourcebook listing many women 
playwrights from the 1900s onwards, as well as theatre 
groups, awards, and sources of publication including 
periodicals and reviews. Leavitt has provided an extensive 
discussion of women's collective drama work in Feminist 
Theatre Groups. Rachel France, editor of A Century of Plays 
by Women, offers a wide range of many older plays, as well as 
a supplementary reading list of playwrights from 1900 to 
1950. Rosamund Gilder's book Enter the Actress docximented 
Hrosvita of Gandersheim, a 10th century nun, as the first 
woman playwright in the 3 0s and, though her plays were 
translated in 1920 by Christopher St. John who wrote How the 
Vote was Won, Hrosvita still remained an unanthologised 
unknown. Her work has since received some attention from 
feminist scholars such as Karen Malpede in Women in Theatre 
and Sue-Ellen Case in Feminism and Theatre. 
Wandor's work in Understudies: Sexual Politics and 
Theatre offers a useful historical perspective on feminist 
theatre from its emergence as such in Britain in 1969. She 
feels that there were general phases to the work by women in 
theatre, both as groups and individual playwrights, such that 
one group may have moved from a more overtly political 
agitprop style to more personal dramatic work, while other 
groups did the reverse. In Understudies Wandor offers a 
description of these phases in feminist theatre based on 
dominant styles and themes, and it is interesting that she 
identifies phases in modern feminist theatre similar to 
earlier play-writing strategies put forward by Olauson, That 
is, a movement from overtly political issues to a focus on 
more individual characters, along with a questioning of 
representation in dramatic forms, I will quote the brief 
sximmary of Understudies from her article "The Fifth Colximn: 
Feminism and Theatre;" 
1. 1970-1973: Collectivist, libertarian, issue-
based agitprop. Mainly street theatre, taking its 
content from the early vigour of feminist analysis 
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of passivity, femininity, women's oppression in 
the family. Vivid and larger-than-life visual 
imagery, short on words. Followed by indoor 
agitprop, which mixed naturalistic 'telling it 
like it is' scenes with music, songs, cartoon 
symbols for capitalism. Theatre used as a 
consciousness-raiser, often followed by 
discussion. Very much of its time in rejecting 
writers and directors as part of the oppressive 
hierarchy of convential theatre. 
2. 1974-1979: Professional companies beginning to 
form—the best known of which are the Women's 
Theatre Group (1974), Monstrous Regiment (1975-6) 
and Gay Sweatshop (1976). Feminism slowly 
beginning to have an impace on women working in 
the professional theatre; the impact ranging from 
women who saw the new developments as a chance for 
more work, to those for whom it was a chance to 
think about feminism in general, and the need for 
women to produce challenging work. The groups 
helping to generate women writers, since they were 
no longer content only to devise and write 
collectively. In keeping with socialist theatre in 
general, a tendency to move away from issue-based 
agitprop, to wanting radical 'plays', with more 
concern for the subtleties of individual 
character. Social realism the dominant form. 
3. From 1979 two chief developments, both 
indicative of the direct and indirect impact of 
feminism on younger women working in theatre for 
the first time; new young writers and directors, 
who mostly see themselves as in some way 'post-
feminist'—i.e., they have a less militant 
attitude to feminism, but have the confidence to 
choose to work in theatre, which they might not 
have done a decade before. Secondly, a theatrical 
initiative from women performers which is quite 
different from the early agitprop work. These 
were/are groups who directly challenge the 
conventional stage representation of the female 
performer. For them stage presence has become 
robust, physical, witty, working through visual 
imagery as much as through words (the latter 
usually less important). (Drama 5) 
As Wandor sxirveys the spectrxim in alternative theatre, she 
finds "an interesting development" that moved from the vivid 
imagery of early street theatre to a theatre of argument 
which explored "what it would mean to reclaim the experience 
of women and gays ... reversing the conventional priorities 
of male heterosexual experience and also altering its class 
perspective" fUnderstudies 49). What she calls the third 
phase shows a return to some of the "early spontaneity" but 
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in a different context: 
instead of using dressing-up and visual imagery to 
challenge the audience's assximptions about real-
life oppresion, the new spontaneity revolved 
around an examination of the way the theatrical 
forms themselves work to represent sexuality ... 
The new work takes over and subverts entertainment 
forms which already exist, (emphasis mine; 49) 
As I have shown, most of the negative criticisms relate to 
the problematic "structures" of women playwrights, usually 
basing this on an essential lack of logic. I agree that this 
experimentation with form in art is more likely a precursor 
to a poststructuralist critique of structural differences 
which can develop into a nongendered and nonprescriptive 
analysis of drama that I will discuss later in this chapter 
and in Part Four (B) . However, Wandor goes on to say that 
this new work "opens up the possibility of an original female 
performance style" (49). I would have to argue that this is 
still an appeal for some essentially female-only mode, a mere 
reversal of masculine essentialism. The next stage to 
pinning down a 'female' performance style is defining the 
characteristics of such a 'feminine' or 'feminist' work to 
apply in the construction of a tradition and a canon. The 
gender essentialism that defines a female tradition or style 
within feminist literary criticism thus affects feminist 
drama because it applies similar limitations in defining what 
is feminist as located only in the play, and as relating to 
the experience of being female, rather than about 
representations of gender and oppression and how they work 
beyond the play within the intertextual field of discourse. 
Definfd)ing 
In Feminist Theatre Groups. Leavitt points out that 
there are basically two types of feminist theatre, the 
conservative and the radical. The conservative feminists 
seek reform within the traditional social structures and are 
interested in obtaining more work opportunities for women in 
theatre. However, British director Pam Brighton points out 
in her article "Directions", that the problem with 
"visibility" and "advances for women" within traditional. 
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mainstream theatre is one of compromise and even seduction by 
the institutionalised theatre; which operates as a product in 
a marketplace, with a hierarchical system of funding by 
vested interests, in a gender-biased realm of critical 
reception: 
The established theatre seems to me to pander more 
than ever to the social malaise, a circus 
specializing in trivializing hximan experience and 
potential. Each production becoming even more 
clearly a watershed in the career of its director 
climbing on the ladder to the top. I'm not sure 
women's theatre is the answer. Pack of Women, 
which I did shortly after coming back to England, 
taught me that when women have committed 
themselves to becoming objects of commerce and 
adulation they can behave just as badly as men in 
the same situation, perhaps worse, cloudy as the 
issues can become under the mystique of 
sisterhood. So perhaps it's my class that keeps me 
from pining for the whorehouse. When I read 
articles by women clamouring for representation 
inside the National and the RSC, I grimace. I have 
no intention of resuscitating those bastions of 
privilege. The future of the theatre lies, like 
the future of the country, in creating entirely 
fresh ways of examining ourselves and our 
potential for living together, of reviving and 
reconstituting whatever is left of our abilities 
to combine rather than to compete, (emphasis mine; 
Women and Theatre 60-61) 
Brighton guestions the establishment of a woman's tradition 
as an egalitarian approach that creates two separate 
traditions. Leavitt suggests that the radical aspect of the 
movement seeks a "fundamental change in the social system" 
rather than to "strive for individual or group success 
according to most established criteria" (94). She observes 
that like feminist groups, women's theatre groups also 
"support women and foster sisterhood" (94); 
The women's movement is concerned with exposing 
female myths, shattering female stereotypes and 
providing role models for women. Likewise feminist 
theatre seeks to discover what a woman is and 
could be, values the woman's experience, creates 
accurate characterizations and establishes a 
woman's tradition through a rediscovery and 
reappraisal of women's history. (94) 
Here we see the impetus to displace the construction of 
femininity as defined by the (hu)man discourse through 
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different gender representations. However, "role models" can 
lead to the prescriptive project that women must have 
characters who do certain things or they are not dealing 
correctly with feminist issues concerning gender. This 
definitional style is evident in Janet Brown's Feminist 
Drama: Definition and Critical Analysis where a play is 
considered feminist when "a woman's struggle for autonomy is 
the central rhetorical motive" (1). 
Leavitt writes that feminist theatre is interested in 
"presenting truthful images of women and the woman's 
experience through a growing body of drama that specifically 
focuses on women" (99). However, plays by women are still 
only representations of women, and the text is not a simple 
reflection of life but a construction where "truthful" is a 
relative term. It is perhaps more relevant to say that the 
work focuses more on women, questioning the way women have 
been represented and the social context within which they are 
embedded, while also reconstructing different images of 
women. Shotlander writes in an interview that all her work 
must be relevant to women; 
One nonfeminist woman said, after hearing about my 
projects, "But they're all about women. You're 
capable of writing something universal." I told 
her I'd just seen a very "xiniversal" film on TV 
all about men, soldiers in World War II killing 
each other. (Belles Lettres 5) 
Plays by women have focused a great deal on female 
experiences and perspectives with certain popular topics such 
as mother-daughter relationships, women's history plays, 
"rape, women in prison, women and madness, aging women, 
male/female relationships, social problems of daycare, 
unemployment, problems of welfare and urban renewal, and 
lesbianism" (Leavitt 96). In addition, the domestic or the 
trivial receive special attention: 
Commonplace activities and images, prevalent in 
visual art by women, are frequently represented in 
feminist drama, sometimes in an effort to point 
out the value of acts ordinarily perceived as 
trivial, sometimes to point out the terrible waste 
involved in them. (96) 
While Leavitt says that most feminist theatre deals with the 
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oppression of a woman or a group of women, and usually show 
protagonists discovering a different awareness, they "do not 
show how the newly aware characters will function in a still 
sexist world" (95). Perhaps the questioning may be a 
significant part of the answer: 
When people see a struggle without an answer, they 
get upset because they want a positive answer. I 
think a positive answer exists in a clearly posed 
question. A solution which is too simple for a 
complex situation is not believable and gives the 
audience a false sense of knowing what to do. 
(Deborah Fortson qtd. in Leavitt 95) 
Though some of the difficulty for women playwrights may be 
that the "solutions are too complex" (95) , it may also signal 
the unrepresentability of equality within a sexist and 
hierarchical power structure. 
Like Keyssar, Wandor and Case, Leavitt considers that 
feminist theatre exhibits a "desire to merge its ethics with 
its aesthetics" (94) in the attempt to locate and define a 
feminist style. Yet although every kind of style is utilised 
in plays by women or feminist theatre, she concludes that; 
It is too soon to identify an original form in 
feminist drama precisely because women are still 
experimenting with and searching for forms that 
appeal to them. (99) 
However, one dominant characteristic in structure is the 
short form or one-act play but rather than regarding the 
prevalence of this as indicating a lack of dramatxirgical 
skill, Leavitt argues that the one-act form was strategically 
suitable for the work being done. In an interview with Megan 
Terry, she argues that many pieces were written for 
gatherings where a long play would be unsuitable; 
A lot of them were written to be done at rallies 
where you have to do something quick and incisive 
to stir up the audience. There was not time to sit 
and contemplate things for three hoxirs. The one-
act form is marvelous. I love short stories, and 
the one-act is like a short story and like films. 
(Women in American Theatre 291) 
Leavitt offers several playwright's comments with Terry 
saying that she wants "to say it, get it over with and go on 
to the next thing"; Lamb indicated that "shorter plays are 
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easier to get produced and that her intense, compact, direct 
style is suited to her material"; while Wandor believes that 
"the expressionistic element, when present, is often more 
effective in the one act form" (qtd. in Leavitt 97-99). 
As much of the work is described as "plotless, circular, 
layered, poetic, choral, lyric, primal, ritual-like, multi-
climactic, surreal, mosaic, collage-like, and non-realistic" 
(98) , Leavitt concludes that overall, feminist drama has 
rejected traditional 'male' forms built on a hierarchical 
dramatic structure and points to the debate on whether or not 
a feminist aesthetic exists. Despite using alternative 
forms, many feminist playwrights reject the "formulation of 
an aesthetic because of implicit restrictions that would be 
disastrous to an emerging art form" (104) . One example would 
be Liz Natalie's Feminist Theatre; A Study in Persuasion 
where the feminist play must contain a rhetoric of persuasion 
towards feminist beliefs. While some feminist playwrights 
may use nonrepresentational techniques to disrupt audience 
complacency and even dependency upon the traditional gender 
assximptions embedded within so-called realism, they 
nevertheless may still wish to resist the categorisation or 
demand for a particular style, as playwright Sandra 
Shotlander points out; 
I try to reach audiences with identifiable 
emotion, but I sometimes wish that Australian 
audiences and even feminist audiences would be 
more open to works that require thought. I don't 
think we should make any rules about 
representation or nonrealistic style. However, the 
style the playwright chooses is part of the 
statement. (Belles Lettres 5) 
The other side of the coin relates to the development of a 
different culture; 
Martha Boesing believes that if women are going to 
develop a counterculture that is literally not any 
part of oxir culture (because the whole culture is 
male) 'then you have got to have people who say, 
"that is feminist and that's not"'. (104-105) 
The fallacy here is the belief that the whole culture is 
male, and therefore there must be a new culture created that 
is female. Not only is this a position that biologically 
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homogenises males and females, but it also denies the 
participation of women in the creating of the current 
culture. The impetus behind the xirge to define what "is 
feminist and what is not" does not have to be a prescriptive 
aesthetic relating to women only. It can be stated in a 
nongendered way as the project of experiencing plays (by 
women or men) as a representation of cultural textual 
constructs, which in a variety of ways can work to reinforce 
or guestion traditional assximptions and belief systems 
concerning gender and related socioeconomic social 
structures. 
In Case's Feminism and Theatre there is a tension 
between the essentialist and materialist positions, only as 
applied to the discussion of feminist theatre and the 
struggle for new definitions. Case offers an analysis of 
form and suggests that different forms can deconstruct the 
tradition of Aristotelian drama: 
New feminist theory would abandon the traditional 
patriarchal values embedded in prior notions of 
form, practice and audience response in order to 
construct new critical models and methodologies 
for the drama that would accommodate the presence 
of women in the art, support their liberation from 
the cultural fictions of the female gender and 
deconstruct the valorisation of the male gender 
... This 'new poetics' would deconstruct the 
traditional systems of representation and 
perception of women and posit women in the 
position of the subject. (115) 
Here it seems that Case considers the traditional form and 
practice of drama is essentially, by nature, patriarchal, 
rather than as forms that have been appropriated by 
masculinist definitions and critical interpretations. 
Therefore the aesthetics are located within the realm of the 
form and content rather than as the result of competing 
interpretations in the intertextual field of discourse. 
There is also a prescriptive element, then, that feminist 
drama must reject this "patriarchal" form to create a 
politically aware aesthetics with women as the privileged 
subject rather than the inferior object. Some women 
playwrights may fear that a proclaimed 'feminist' work will 
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be marginalised, however, they may also face the possibility 
of their work being received as traditional or less 
'feminist'; 
The concept of a feminine morphology retains the 
traditional inscription of gender onto cultural 
forms, merely inverting the value system. Critics 
such as Wittig argue that, by valorising the 
feminine, feminists will keep women in the ghetto 
of gender. Some theatre practitioners have also 
responded negatively to the notion of a feminine 
form. They feel it means that, if they work in 
traditional forms, they are not feminists (or 
feminine), and that their work is discounted 
because of their preference for those forms, 
rather than seen as marking an advance for women 
in the field by making their professional work 
visible.... (Case 130) 
Case then argues that certain techniques must be rejected 
because the methods themselves create a misrepresentation of 
female sexuality: 
From a feminist perspective, the Method techniques 
for building these characters lead the female 
actor into inaccurate analyses of female 
sexuality. Other acting techniques, such as the 
playing of an objective and establishing a through 
line, are also culturally inscribed models from 
the patriarchal culture ... Logically, the 
rejection of these acting techniques implies a 
rejection of the kind of plays they serve. (123) 
In a similar move as the argximent about man made language. 
Case suggests that some feminist playwrights frequently write 
disjointed plays because they do not feel their life 
experiences can be represented within the 'man-made' 
structures of drama with its linear Aristotelian demands for 
plot. Yet there is no evidence that writing styles can be 
assigned essential genders since, for example, there men who 
write 'lyric' sentences or 'circular' narratives and male 
playwrights who have written 'unresolved' plots, and thus 
have not created good drama according to Aristotelian 
dictates. Such disjointed plots written by both male and 
female playwrights may be a more 'realist' representation of 
how the mind works as it interprets events in time, 
contradicting and working against the mainstream dramatic 
construction of neat, chronological narratives. 
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Because Case argues that the sexual politics are in the 
"nature" of traditional forms rather than in the surrounding 
critical practices that (re)produce traditional forms, she 
therefore suggests that the logical extension of a "new 
poetics" is women's language and female dramatic form: 
The discoveries about the political nature of 
traditional forms raises the question, 'is there a 
women's form—a feminine morphology?' If women are 
to be the subjects rather than the objects of 
cultural production, doesn't this cultural 
revolution necessitate a new form and perhaps even 
a new discourse for women? (128-129) 
This understanding of the "political nature" of tradition is 
not in the form, a debate that remains located in the 
struggle to prescribe what essence to what form to be 
correct. Instead the politics of tradition are in who 
appropriates and controls the form, such that textual 
production is not a function of essential "natural" content 
and form, but of the control of representation through 
critical power to interpret, prescribe value and influence 
textual existence. It may be that the creative work of women 
in drama has manifested different forms of playwrighting or 
acting and this can certainly be a focus of study; however, 
if there are new forms they do not automatically become 
feminine or feminist because they are created by women, nor 
should this interpretation constitute a political demand for 
women playwrights. I will discuss the implications of such 
a demand for specific plays more fully at the end of this 
chapter, as the pressure for feminists to locate a feminine 
style or define the feminist dramatic form is a constraint 
that is often rejected by women playwrights themselves. 
Case acknowledges that these questions of form and 
content involve a major debate between the essentialists and 
the materialists; 
Feminist critics who prescribe a feminine form 
have been termed 'essentialists' by their 
opponents. This means that they ignore the 
economic and historical conditions that have 
determined the process of cultural gender 
inscription. They are termed essentialists to 
contrast them with materialists, who emphasise the 
economic and historical advantages of gender 
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inscription for the elite class of men in the 
patriarchy. (130) 
It seems to me that this description of essentialists as 
those who "ignore economic and historical conditions" leaves 
out the primary definition of essentialism whereby what is 
stateable, definable, i.e. the meaning of something, is 
assximed to be inherent according to 'natural' essences within 
things, rather than as a produced within discourse by 
critical interpretations about things. Therefore, although 
Case seems to accept that the concept of feminine forms 
actually reinscribes rather than criticises the notion of 
gendered forms, she nevertheless doesn't want to give up the 
position that a feminine libidinal expression would 
reconstitute itself in a feminine language and a feminine 
dramatic form; 
Many feminist critics closer to the materialist 
position would argue that the notion of a feminine 
form merely reifies the traditional gender 
constructions of masculine and feminine—that any 
liberation for women in art would come from their 
freedom to create in any kind of formal context. 
Others closer to the position of the new poetics, 
would argue that a reorganisation of theories of 
libidinal development and dramatxirgical devices 
would create a new position for the female 
desiring subject that would change the way the 
field of signs is constructed. (128) 
The point which continues to be missed is that form is not 
masculine, forms are restrictive in certain ways. It is 
actually only the appropriation of Aristotelian dramatic 
forms and rules by "male reason" which constituted a gender 
biased tradition that is behind the ideology of a patriarchal 
discoxirse. The repositioning of woman as "desiring subject" 
is really a reversal of values within the interpretive sphere 
of the writer/reader and in itself does nothing to alter the 
way "the field of signs is constructed". Writers can disrupt 
the binary structure of the sign, but the field of signs will 
always be constructed through interpretations, since this 
limitation cannot change within representation as a mediated 
mode of commxinication. 
While Case discusses the two approaches of essentialism 
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and materialism as oppositions within criticism of feminist 
theatre, she in the end argues that perhaps both positions 
can be used for different purposes depending on the 
situation; 
It seems, however, that certain gains can be 
realised from both sides of the issue. Perhaps 
these positions could be combined in some way, or, 
within a historical context, perceived as 
alternative theoretical strategies for specific 
political purposes. They need not operate as 
competing theories for a controlling position that 
subsximes practice and organises positions, much 
like the theoretical strategies operating in the 
'Name of the Father'. Rather, they would appear as 
tactics to be employed when they were useful in 
either dismantling the patriarchal structure or 
aiding in the cultural revolution. (130-131) 
It is quite apparent that within the context of a feminist 
critique, women would want to reject the limited 
interpretations of Aristotle's poetics which rather 
arbitrarily defined certain forms as good drama and 
privileged male reason to accomplish these in the 
construction of a dominant patriarchal drama discourse. 
However, while it seems necessary to critique and deconstruct 
the restrictions of a patriarchal structure, it is not 
obvious how such a structure would be dismantled by creating 
a "new poetics" that privileges woman as a subject and 
defines a feminine form of drama. A "new poetics" merely 
claims that there is another and different form by which to 
judge women. This does not seem to be a useful strategy but 
rather a name-calling duel to see whose poetics is better or 
that both should have equal space—neither of which goes 
anywhere toward questioning why forms have to be gendered in 
the first place. 
Case constructs an either/or situation where it is 
useful to employ an essentialist position when dismantling a 
patriarchal structure—by arguing that there is a feminine 
structure based on a female libido that can transform the 
nature of patriarchal discourse. Or when useful, one can 
employ a materialist position to work on the cultural 
revolution—by arguing that gender is a historical and 
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economic construct. It is contradictory to, on the one hand, 
argue for a position which says that there is an essential 
form which is feminine and one which is masculine but, at the 
same time (or when politically useful for the cultural 
revolution) argue that all gender definitions are socially 
constructed by ideologies of the family, church and state. 
However, a poststructuralist deconstruction of this 
opposition would embrace this contradiction and argue that 
neither end of the spectrxim is totalised or separate. The 
materialist understanding of gender as a social construction 
based on relativity to culture, economics and race has to 
refuse categorising any textual form or social practice as 
being the result of a 'natural' essential, or absolute 
quality that is located in only one sex—but it does not have 
to deny the existence of nature or essence. And certainly 
the essentialist can acknowledge social constructions that 
may influence and produce new or different forms, but without 
using nature to claim these forms as an aesthetics 
genetically inherent to sex or race for the pxirpose of using 
it as a platform of 'real' experience in the judgment of 
other texts. 
Despite Case's attempt to reconcile these two positions 
in the name of plxiralism, the reason for their separate 
purposes in her argximent—one for discourse and one for 
culture—remains undisclosed. I would suggest that it 
relates to the institutionalised dichotomy between the 
literary and the sociological as I mentioned in the previous 
section. It is this opposition which needs to be continually 
deconstructed as it sustains the opposition between the 
'real' and the 'fictional', (instead of both as real textual 
constructs) where the 'real' is privileged as the important 
referent for a politics of interpretation and the authority 
of experience. The obvious question for a politics of 
interpretation based on essentialist and gendered criticism 
still remains; what is a 'real' or 'natural' for men or women 
at this point in a history of representation? 
One attempt to go beyond the notion of gendered writing. 
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definitions and criticism for feminist theatre is described 
by Wandor in an interview about her book. Carry On 
Understudies: 
'I felt it was absolutely essential this time to 
have a framework by which plays could be analysed. 
People have got lazier about how to approach 
women's work, and this could be destructive to the 
work. I think analysing creates'. Labels like 
'feminist theatre' or 'women's theatre' can, she 
believes, never be more than 'useful signposts'; 
the book proposes instead an analytical approach 
where plays can be rigorously examined according 
to their different political 'dynamics', (qtd. in 
Hinds 30) 
According to Wandor, such signposts "are not really helpful 
in trying to develop an analytic approach which will help us 
understand what is new and important about the work women are 
doing in theatre" (Drama 5). Her framework tries "to analyse 
and understand what kind of feminist dynamic might be present 
in a play by a woman, I am exploring the overall dynamic, the 
sum of the whole to which the parts (however different they 
are) contribute" (Drama 6). In this framework of analysis 
she does not try to define feminism as a particular genre of 
drama, but seeks to assess the different political dynamics 
of feminist theory as represented in plays, such as aspects 
of radical, liberal, materialist, and socialist feminism 
which offer different strategies for addressing oppression 
with respect to economics, race and class. In this sense the 
assessment of a feminist dynamic moves the analysis of the 
body of work beyond a prescriptive aesthetics only in the 
text, to the terms of its contextual political dynamics as 
relative to the dominant discourse, rather than as separate 
from it. A framework of analysis which goes beyond the 
signposts of "feminist" or "women" is necessary strategically 
to avoid the critical practice of "limited issue" 
marginalisation, which continuously depoliticises women's 
texts by refusing to accept them as a valid part of the hximan 
discourse. Case, too, examines different feminist dynamics 
in Feminist Theatre as I mentioned in Part One (B) . She 
looks at the effects of gender in drama from a historical 
perspective, criticising Aristotle's Poetics in the formation 
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of a tradition of drama, tracing plot and character 
requirements throughout Elizabethan and Restoration drama as 
the basis for an argximent on the absence of women in drama, 
and the lack of strong character parts for women. And in 
Part Four (B) , following the work of Keyssar, Malpede, 
Gilman, and Schechner, I will offer a nongendered, 
nonprescriptive analysis of how the differences in plays by 
women work counter-discursively in a "strategy of 
contradiction" to deconstruct the homogeneity of dominant 
forms and representations in the dramatic discourse. 
The Politics of the Anti-Canon 
In response to these fundamental assximptions and a 
dominant representation of 'normal' reality, feminist 
literary criticism has had to critique such literary 
representations while also examining the methodologies of the 
institutions of power that reproduce them. However, a vital 
part of the project to define feminist literary criticism is-
-like feminism—the struggle not to reproduce the same 
practices and systems of power. A significant problem with 
a fixed definition or standard of feminist drama is that it 
lends itself to privileging structxiralist or prescriptive 
criticism of women's texts, which facilitates their 
incorporation into an alternative feminist canon that may not 
in fact be an anti-canon but the mimicry of traditional 
critical politics using alternative texts and different 
values. 
In a reading of Jill Dolan's "Bending Gender to Fit the 
Canon: The Politics of Production", an example of the type of 
play which might be left out of such a feminist canon is 
Norman's Pulitzer Prize winner 'night Mother, which Dolan 
feels is not a feminist play. She admits that her review was 
coloured "by a mistrust of the institutional approval 
Norman's play received" (Making a Spectacle 335). Looking at 
the previous Pulitzer Prize winners shows that institutional 
approval in the form of a distinguished award does not result 
in mainstream canonisation over time, nor does it 
automatically imply that the text conformed to canonical 
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standards, though the critics may have read it as such by 
ignoring certain themes or their political implications. 
Dolan's remarks with respect to 'night Mother depend on a 
certain definition of feminist plays as she says her "review 
went on to question whether the play is at all feminist" 
(335) : 
The premise alone defies feminist categorizing; If 
feminist plays are defined as those that show 
women in the painful, difficult process of 
becoming full hximan beings, how can a play in 
which suicide is assximed from the first moments be 
a thorough consideration of women? (336) 
The idea behind positive role model criticism is that a 
feminist play must show 'positive' images of women as they 
struggle towards and succeed in becoming 'full hximan beings'. 
This however, assximes that the women were not full hximan 
beings in the first place, simply because they were in the 
process of coping within the structural confines of social 
gender roles such as housewife, mother, teacher, prostitute 
or nun. Since for Dolan, Jessie at the outset has already 
decided she is stepping out of the whole structure, the play 
cannot be feminist; but what if for Jessie, she becomes a 
more conscious human being and grasps her form of autonomy by 
making that choice: to step out of a structure she no longer 
wishes to be in? In William Demastes' Beyond Naturalism; A 
New Realism in American Theatre, several critics write that 
the physical loss of life was overemphasised and that against 
the background of a world Jessie despises, it can be seen as 
an act of will, "if there's advocacy [in the play], it's not 
in favor of suicide, but in favor of autonomy" (Stone qtd. in 
Demastes 152) . Perhaps it may be just as important for women 
who routinely consider suicide to relate their problems to a 
playtext that explores what that is, the decision and the 
act; and while exposing the intersections between personal 
obstacles and discriminatory social structures, the text may 
not automatically survive its 'heroine' in a prescribed 
fashion. Surely there must be room for texts where women are 
represented making many different choices, and what may be 
more important for feminist studies is the way the text works 
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to expose the relationship between the character and their 
environment, as well as their strategies for survival; a 
drastic measure like suicide can equally be pointing to an 
enormous failure on the part of the social system, and not 
merely representing a character's 'fault'. Certainly a 
project of feminist literary criticism has been to respond to 
the limiting gender representations of women in texts, 
arguing that these images affect women's perceptions of 
themselves in social practice, but the crucial argximent has 
been against the homogeneity of these images. Thus, while 
feminist readers may wish to see 'positive', or less 
restrictive images of women for inspiration, it is also 
possible to learn from what might seem to be a 'negative' 
image, and so it may not be valid to judge representations as 
'not feminist' because they critique the system from a 
different perspective. 
Dolan also argues that the play is typical of liberal 
feminist drama saying: 
Like most traditional American dramas, 'night 
Mother's focus on individual suffering and the 
play's unwillingness to discuss Jessie's dilemma 
in terms of a wider social context make it weak as 
a political statement and inadequate from a 
materialist feminist perspective. (336) 
There are many references to the wider social context which 
Jessie feels a failure in, a context she dislikes and chooses 
to leave, stating that this has nothing to do with her 
epilepsy which has been medically under control for a year. 
Dolan says the play focuses on "individual suffering" and 
since she privileged the daughter's dilemma, "with which I 
felt it was impossible to empathize" (336) , what she is 
really admitting is that she as a reviewer cannot feel 
empathy for those who contemplate and commit suicide in large 
numbers everyday and therefore for her the play is simply 
about an individual's suffering. The next question would be 
though, how can individual suffering possibly not be related 
to the wider social context, assximing the person does not 
live in a vacximn? 
Many critics both male and female refer to these 
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individuals in Norman's plays as "ordinary" in a derogatory 
tone, as if they were sub-hximan and not worthy to be leading 
parts in a stage play. For example, in Beyond Naturalism 
Demastes says: 
Norman's focus is on women, and her plays present 
worlds filled with commonplace events and common 
people, those not in privileged positions in 
society. Their portrayals in turn reveal worlds 
and lives that are essentially meaningless. These 
simple lives, though, extend beyond those people 
living them, (emphasis mine; 146) 
Here these lives are called meaningless though it is admitted 
that their suffering is somehow extended beyond their own 
lives. Using the standard of dramatic unities, critics have 
taken Norman's characters to task for their speech, but it is 
from a biased perspective; 
Given the realistic design of her works, some 
critics have perceived an inconsistency between 
the type of characters she presents and the level 
of thought they often rise to in their speeches. 
(Demastes 146) 
Kauffman attacks 'night Mother on just this basis, 
criticising Thelma who has just been informed of her 
daughter's impending suicide; 
Instead of the hysteria we might expect from this dodo, 
instead of the screaming or fainting or struggle or even 
a transparent ruse to get the gun, she casts herself as 
a partner in a 'clever' cat-and-mouse duet, as if she 
were accustomed to such crises and were competent to 
handle them, (qtd. in Demastes 146) 
From Kauffman's male dominant perspective on gender which 
regards women as mentally defective, and assximes that poor, 
small-town women are even more so, this mother is seen as a 
"dodo" who cannot possibly be the character engaged in such 
a desperate battle for her daughter's life. Yet perhaps for 
people who know small-town women or indeed are small-town 
women, they might not be so sxirprised at the levels of speech 
they rise to and, indeed, this just may be another point of 
Norman's plays. In an interview Norman explains her 
characters by quoting the Gospel of Matthew; 
'Inasmuch as you have done it to the least of 
these, my brethren, you have done it unto me.' She 
explains herself; 'That's what I'm doing, I'm 
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saying, "Let's take the least of these, our 
brethren. Let's look at them"', (qtd. in Demastes 
152) 
Norman's tactic may not be so much a righteous holier-than-
thou attitude but more a strategy to expose the 
interrelatedness between all people in a society, suggesting 
there is a shared responsibility for creating the social 
structures which facilitate that society's emotional and 
material wealth, and its poverty. 
Finally, a reading outside of some notion of definitive 
feminism within the play can reveal the work done by the play 
when considering it as part of the intertextual field of 
discourse. Dolan says that she "saw the play as co-opted 
into a scheme of male dramatic and ideological values, and 
noted that women are getting the Pulitzer Prize for plays 
that" (335): 
depict women killing themselves or living totally 
immobilized in their backwoods, suburban homes ... 
It's ironic; or is it? When so-called feminist 
plays like 'night Mother and Crimes of the Heart 
are cheerfully honored by the ... coveted prize, 
there's a not-so-subtle message underlying the 
Pulitzer awards. It's a form of anti-feminist 
backlash. (335) 
However, if the reader can divorce from the social 
connotation of suicide as failure within this play, and then 
read for the cultural production of Jessie's anger by taking 
her mother's power seriously, a quite different reading 
emerges. Jessie's stated desire is to succeed at the first 
conscious choice of her lifetime and through her anger, her 
fatigue, and her dislike of the global situation, the choice 
is suicide—which includes extracting herself from her mother 
in order to succeed. Jessie spends an arduous evening 
telling her mother about herself and her choice, while Mama 
battles to maintain the status quo, with Jessie's life 
tightly entwined around her own; 
I don't know what I did, but I did it, I know. 
This is all my fault, Jessie, but I don't know 
what to do about it now! ... Everything you do has 
to do with me, Jessie. You can't do anything, wash 
your face or cut yoxir finger, without doing it to 
me. That's right! You might as well kill me as 
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you, Jessie, it's the same thing. This has to do 
with me, Jessie. (72) 
Though Jessie tries to say the suicide is her choice and has 
everything to do with her own life. Mama tries in a variety 
of ways to blackmail Jessie continuously with guilt for 
leaving her alone, insisting their lives are almost as one. 
Jessie finally screams: 
Then what if it does! What if it has everything to 
do with you! What if you are all I have and you're 
not enough? What if I could take all the rest of 
it if only I didn't have you here? What if the 
only way I can get away from you for good is to 
kill myself? What if it is? I can still do it! 
(72) 
In the end, Jessie makes a last attempt to retain ownership 
and control of her suicide as her choice; 
I'm not giving up! This is the other thing I'm 
trying ... This is how I have my say. This is how 
I say what I thought about it all and I say no. To 
Dawson and Loretta and the Red Chinese and 
epilepsy and Ricky and Cecil and you. And me. And 
hope. I say no! ... I am what became of your 
child. I found an old baby picture of me. And it 
was somebody else, not me. It was somebody pink 
and fat who never heard of sick or lonely, 
somebody who cried and got fed, and reached up and 
got held and kicked but didn't hurt anybody, and 
slept whenever she wanted to, just by closing her 
eyes ... That's who I started out and this is who 
is left. That's what this is about. It's somebody 
I lost, all right, it's my own self. Who I never 
was. Or who I tried to be and never got there. 
Somebody I waited for who never came. And never 
will. So, see, it doesn't much matter what else 
happens in the world or in this house, even, I'm 
what was worth waiting for and I didn't make it, 
(75-76) 
The play is not about success in the 'usual' terms as society 
defines it, but departs from the dominant expectations of an 
audience hoping for the character's survival. The text can 
be seen as exposing a contradiction, working against the 
traditional definition of motherhood as always nurturing and 
an assximed right, with daughterhood as an obligation to 
fulfill the mother's life—however painful the circumstances. 
The play becomes a very radical representation that questions 
what is so nxirturing about women reproducing the oppression 
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of traditional gender roles, aware of their own pain in life 
but irresponsibly ignoring how the same institutional 
structures will inevitably limit and hurt their own children. 
Through the play's critique of Mama's unquestioning 
acceptance of her lot in life, "I don't like things to think 
about. I like things to go on" (52) , and the reproduction in 
Jessie of what she experienced as living up to a role, "he 
always knew I was trying, so it didn't work" (59) , the 
implication is that an alternative is needed to the 
institution of motherhood purely for personal fulfillment or 
as a 'natural' pasttime for women, like marriage. The text 
makes a savage indictment of how little people communicate 
within the confines of institutionalised roles substituted 
for lives, and how little they know of each other's feelings. 
Though Jessie asks most of the questions about their lifetime 
together. Mama eventually comes to realise she knows next to 
nothing about her daughter, and her questioning seems to 
shock Jessie: 
Mama; And I want to know why you've lived here 
this long feeling the way you do. 
Jessie; You have no earthly idea how I feel. 
Mama: Well, how could I? You're real far back 
there, Jessie. 
Jessie; Back where? 
Mama; What's it like over there, where you are? Do 
people always say the right thing or get whatever they 
want, or what? 
Jessie; What are you talking about? 
Mama; Why do you read the newspaper? Why don't you 
wear that sweater I made for you? Do you remember 
how I used to look, or am I just any old woman 
now? When you have a fit, do you see stars or 
what? How did you fall off the horse, really? Why 
did Cecil leave you? Where did you put my old 
glasses? (55-56) 
The text suggests that a crisis is necessary to get people 
talking, but despite the intensity of their interaction on 
this last night, Jessie considers it as related to the 
crisis, rather than as a real change; 
Mama: I'll pay more attention to you. Tell the 
truth when you ask me. Let you have your say. 
Jessie; No, Mama! We wouldn't have more talks 
like tonight, because it's this next part that's 
made this last part so good. Mama. (75) 
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Perhaps what is feminist about the play is not that women 
should commit suicide, but the suggestion that conscious 
thinking and action by women might be necessary to reproduce 
not equal, but superior, relationships and opportunities for 
their children, which may mean a radical critique of gender 
roles that institutionalise dependency and unequal power 
structures. 
Thus, we can see that prescriptive criticism which 
expects a text to perform according to a certain standard in 
order to be feminist is mimicking the fundamental principles 
of a canon which has expected a text to be direct or hard-
hitting in order to be a classic. Further, if we acknowledge 
that the emergence of feminist literary criticism was 
necessitated partly by the dominating practices of 
institutions which constructed a literary canon around the 
exclusion of women and their texts from the discourse, then 
surely a goal of feminism and literary criticism would be to 
study the fundamental principles and structures of those 
dominant institutions, so as not to replicate or mimic them, 
in a simple reversal with different people in the position of 
power to judge, select and exclude. If we understand that 
using representation and an appeal to a male-defined reality, 
institutions operating under the guise of objective literary 
standards for 'proper' content and form have really been 
involved in judging the style of people's creativity based on 
selection by exclusion according to very subjective 
standards, then sxirely the next move would be to question the 
basis of that process of judgement itself; according to whose 
reality, whose standards, who does the selection, and for 
whom? The next deconstruction after that is to ask what 
necessitates a process where power figxires make judgements 
based on selection bv exclusion? Remembering that there is 
no fixed objective content nailed down 'inside' words, since 
meaning (conscious, unconscious, repressed, and non-meaning) 
is constantly produced and reproduced by either agreement, 
force or coincidence between subjective participants, the 
whole basis of 'objective standards' for judging 'content' or 
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'meaning' dissolves; all that is left is appearance or 
style, and the appreciation of style is really a matter of 
the reader's selection according to their own interests. 
The act of setting up a canon or an alter-canon is in 
itself a restrictive move which denies the appearance of 
difference that will escape the definitions of "good" writing 
established by the particular tradition. The notion of a 
canon also involves an authoritative committee using 
judgments for exclusion supposedly based on objective 
standards, though I have shown that such judgments often 
depart from standards. The canon appeals to the right way to 
read, the right way to create, the right way to transfer 
correct meanings, indeed the right way to read meanings. 
While every reader when making a decision to read one thing 
instead of another is in a sense making a selection by 
exclusion, it is the subjective choice of the reader that is 
important to acknowledge and value, and this may be effaced 
with a canon. Until such time as learning is less 
authoritative and students are self-empowered to determine 
their interests from an early age, they will require guidance 
and advice with respect to reading lists, but in avoiding the 
politics of the canon, there may be more and more of a move 
away from author centered courses. 
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Section (E). The Impossible Position of the Female Artist; 
NofWhere) Rightf?) to fW)rite 
In this section I want to relate erasure as dominance in 
the intertextual field of discourse to the personal problems 
of writing as a woman playwright; how this dominance feels 
like the "impossible position of the female artist", a phrase 
coined by American playwright, Myrna Lamb. Although they are 
difficult to generalise, to some extent the effects of 
'environmental' negative critical practices on creativity can 
be located within the autobiographical discourse of 
playwrights in interviews, introductions and articles. These 
writings theorise such problems as isolation and lack of 
support, fear of negative critical reception, or texts being 
caught between standards of mainstream criticism and certain 
aspects of feminist literary criticism, such as prescriptive 
or role model criticism. In addition, contemporary women 
playwrights have been caught up in the association with 
modern feminism, suffering from its negative media attention 
such that women playwrights often resist being associated 
with feminism as a sociopolitical movement, or with the 
project of defining feminist theatre. While there are a 
variety of reasons for this resistance, there appears to be 
a denial of the heterogeneous ideological forces at work both 
in themselves as subjects, and in their work, so that, while 
the writing may involve issues from the feminist discourse, 
the writer can mentally split off and deny any involvement 
with feminism. There is also resistance to limiting 
definitions and recreating the authority of a genre, but a 
great deal of denial can also be attributed to fear of the 
negative critical environment. I will deal with the negative 
environment first, and then discuss the influence of this 
environment on the private writer. 
In the introduction to Women's Writing; A Challenge to 
Theory. Moira Monteith points out that since criticism itself 
is a construct subject to various social pressures, "it 
follows that research interests also will reveal the effects 
of those forces" (3). However, she argues that the research 
area which relates the critical environment and creativity as 
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it concerns women writers has been neglected: 
We need to recognise the legitimate connections 
between the environment in which a work is created 
and the finished product and the specific factors 
that affect women; to explore the relationship 
between creativity and criticism noting 
particularly the constraints imposed by any 
literary canon; and to understand the sense of 
alienation that some writers experience when they 
try to use the medixim of language that 
superficially appears free for all, (emphasis 
mine; 3) 
Perhaps one of the most important achievements for feminist 
theorists has been proving the many ways that language is not 
"free for all". However, much of what is associated with 
feminism, including feminist literary criticism, has suffered 
from homogenising misrepresentations and negative media 
stereotyping that has reduced the scope and depth of feminist 
argximents and kept women (and men) from associating with it. 
Elizabeth Wilson points out in her book Adorned in Dreams 
that: 
from the earliest days of contemporary feminism 
the mass media promoted a caricature of feminists-
-the bra-burning 'women's libbers' who hated men 
but dressed just like them; a caricature virtually 
xinchanged from nineteenth-century Punch. It seems 
that bra-burning was an invention of the media. 
There were, however, many demonstrations, both in 
England and in America, against sexism in the 
media, against the way in which stereotyped ideals 
of beauty were forced on women, and against the 
way in which women were seen only as sexual 
objects, not as people. This was an important 
theme in the early years of the contemporary 
women's movement but the mass media consistently 
confused anti-sexism with being anti-sex, 
(emphasis mine; 230) 
While such media slang may not seem important enough to be 
taken seriously by the population, it nevertheless is a 
negative and homogenising term for a complex series of 
argximents, as Wilson mentions. This reductionist 
representation of feminism is also divisive in that it 
alienates women from different classes which were already 
working for issues that could be identified as coming from 
theories in feminism, as Sheila Rowbotham points out Wandor's 
recent collection. Once a Feminist: 
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Unfortunately, most working class and trade union 
women know about women's liberation mainly from 
media ... Many of them have been campaigning for 
equal pay and nurseries for years and feel 
understandably suspicious of pxiblicity suddenly 
given to young, middle-class women. (26) 
Further, she quotes Sandra Peer relating a discussion about 
equal pay at a school in Newcastle in 1970 when women's 
liberation was raised, and the "doubts" about it were clearly 
related to media stereotyping: 
All the women had doubts about it, and some were 
very hostile. By the end most were won over, 
though I doubt if any of them will ever join 
women's liberation organisations for reasons of 
time as much as anything . . . Their chief 
objections were the glorification of outside work 
as a means of liberation, the anti-men image and 
the bra-burning image—most of which derive from 
TV interviews rather than from actual positions 
taken within women's liberation. (qtd. in 
Rowbotham 26) 
The media images fashioned a perception of feminists as 
'radical man-haters' because of its very simplicity as a 
slogan, and paved the way for the 'I'm not a feminist but' 
argximent so many women have used to complain about a 
masculinist system, while simultaneously refuting their 
possible affiliation with an organised movement represented 
as 'bra-burners'. In a recent newspaper article by Susan 
Hocking called "A Big Win for Little People" she tells the 
story of a pregnant woman who won a case to be allowed to 
work until full term: 
Mrs, Marshall was quoted as saying that although 
she was not a 'bra-bxirning feminist', the action 
of her former boss had prompted her to do 
something about the discrimination if for no other 
reason than that should the child she was 
expecting be a girl, then that child should not be 
subjected to such treatment later in her life, 
(Courier-Mail. 10 June 1990, p 21) 
Hocking had the good grace to recognise this stereotyping for 
how it supports a dominant system and notes; 
But it is a little disturbing to realise that Mrs, 
Marshall, like, I suspect, so many people, seems 
to believe that it is only so-called 'bra-bxirning 
feminists' who normally take action to defend 
women's rights. That is as incorrect as the 
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assximption that it is only hardened, experienced, 
powerful 'somebodies' who can fight governments 
and win. In our regular attempts to categorise 
people who buck the system, we too often bandy 
around terms such as radicals and stirrers and 
whingers. And bra-burning feminists. (21) 
This kind of simplistic representation which reduces a 
diverse debate into a harsh us vs. them stance, makes the 
discourse of feminism and feminist literary criticism 
extremely vulnerable to losing the participation of many 
women who, not wishing to be typecast as man-hating bra-
burners, refuse or are unable to access the feminist 
discourse. 
Thus many women playwrights—despite their textual 
representations of the multiple issues surrounding oppression 
and women—refuse to be regarded as feminist writers, a term 
which places an added negative signification on the already 
problematic construction of 'woman' playwright. Keyssar in 
Feminist Theatre writes that: 
Still others argue that feminist drama's 
association with the women's movement makes it 
susceptible to charges of didacticism; just as for 
some, any gathering named feminist or emphasising 
women is automatically seen as lesbian and 
therefore either man-hating or sexually 
'perverse', so theatre overtly associated with 
women is sometimes facilely reduced to 
demonstrations of hostility towards men and 
towards heterosexuality. (19) 
While misrepresentations of feminism and critical hostility 
provided a climate that made it simpler to avoid being 
associated with feminism, some writers argued that their work 
was individual; 
Some deny the existence of a distinct feminine 
sensibility and claim that when they focus on 
women, or reveal gender as a political and social 
issue, they are simply expressing their 
individual, idiosyncratic perspectives. They 
refuse to associate their endeavoxirs with a group, 
a genre or an ideology. (19) 
There are two argximents at work here and they are not 
necessarily dependent upon each other. A writer can choose 
not to believe in a feminine essence, a position argued by 
many feminists, but it does not automatically follow that 
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what writers express is their individual or idiosyncratic 
property. The work may not be essentially feminine but the 
text also is not just theirs, in the sense of the writer as 
also a reader, and to varying degrees participates in the 
intertextual field of discourse as a socially constructed, 
heterogeneous subject involved with many ideological 
positions of history, including patriarchy and feminism. 
This intertextual participation and the serial quality of the 
written text offers a critique of the objective critic as 
well as the monolithic individual author. While it is 
certainly valid for women playwrights to argue against their 
work being categorised into simple genres, or represented as 
didactically preaching one ideology, a radical claim to 
separatism where the writer refuses to acknowledge her social 
association and history is really a literary version of the 
'I'm not a feminist but' position. 
A slightly different perspective on this resistance 
occurs when women writers do speak openly about their 
difficulties as women and writers, but still resist 
acknowledging their debt to feminist critical thought in 
their writing. Wandor writes that; 
.,, theatre editor Ann McFerran interviewed eight 
women playwrights, and almost all were either 
reluctant or very cautious about claiming links in 
their work with feminism. However, thev were 
acutely aware of the difficulties of working as a 
writer and a woman, (emphasis mine; Understudies 
69) 
Despite being aware of their personal difficulties as women 
writers, there is an inability to connect their own 
experiences with what they acknowledge is a problem for a 
large social group, thus pxiblicly denying any affiliation 
with this social group. Faye Crosby has some interesting 
theories about this phenomenon in her book called Relative 
Deprivation and Working Women. I would like to briefly 
mention several factors from her surveys about which she now 
concludes: 
No longer do we marvel at the reluctance of women 
to apply what they know about sex discrimination 
in general to their own personal situations. The 
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wonder now appears to be that anyone could make 
the application at all. (165) 
Several factors she finds important are: 1) women have a 
different notion of deserving about money and status; 2) it 
is cognitively more difficult to process ideas about 
deserving when dealing with real individuals than when 
dealing with classes of individuals; 3) it is difficult to 
perceive any individual personally as simply the embodiment 
of an abstract category and it is even more difficult to 
perceive oneself in such a way; 4) individual suffering, 
unlike group suffering, appears to call for individual 
villains and a situation of perceived powerlessness may make 
this extremely difficult to deal with; and 5) the employed 
woman may separate her perceptions about the plight of women 
in general from her perceptions of her own case because in 
many situations to define onself as a victim is to invite 
denigration (162-165). Acknowledging that there are many 
factors which reinforce "the separation between one's own 
fate and the fate of the group" she says that they all 
contribute to illustrating (165): 
how the step from knowledge of the group's 
situation to an understanding of one's own 
situation, which is guite a small step logically, 
can become a chasm psychologically. (165) 
Crosby also points out that "the lack of communication 
structure among women may also serve to keep each woman 
uninformed about her own position" (165), Here the absence 
of erasure plays an important role in keeping women 
"uninformed". 
The reluctance of women playwrights to associate their 
work with feminism even though they may be aware of their own 
individual problems as women writers, can therefore signify 
several possibilities; that they are still seeing their 
problems as personal inadequacies; that they may ascribe 
some of their difficulties as writers to being women but 
because the critical environment functions as a "group 
villain" so to speak, it is too difficult to fight on an 
individual basis without "inviting denigration"; and finally 
that this critical environment is simply too harsh for them 
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to make the public association. The psychological chasm some 
playwrights personally face when being classified as a 
feminist or woman writer can still be related to the 
identifiable, negative significations that critics' place 
upon terms like 'feminist' or 'woman' writer, as evident in 
this comment by Caryl Churchill in the introduction to Enoch 
Brater's Feminine Focus; The New Women Playwrights: 
I remember way back somebody writing about one of 
my radio plays, and saying that you wouldn't know 
it had been written by a woman. The writer clearly 
meant this as praise, and that gave me pause. Most 
of the time I didn't think about it, but there 
were little moments of realization. If, for 
example, a critic refers to you as one of the best 
women writers, and you feel there's any 
possibility that he thinks of that as a lesser 
category, you resent the use of the term. If it 
means women themselves thinking about things that 
they haven't thought about before, then you feel 
very positive about the idea of being a woman 
writer, and obviously this is attractive and 
powerful, (xiii) 
Despite the presence of negative critical perceptions about 
feminists and women writers, it is likely that the increase 
in women playwrights since the 60s was to a large degree due 
to the more visible presence of explicitly acknowledged 
feminist plays, as Wandor argues; 
Few women writers would see themselves as feminist 
writers yet it is clear, particularly with younger 
women, that they would not be writing so freely 
had it not been for the presence of a more 
explicitly feminist theatre, fUnderstudies 69) 
Thus the presence of acknowledged feminist writers acted as 
a communication vehicle between women and provided a platform 
for group resistance because the plays openly attempted to 
identify the shared existence of women's oppression beyond 
the individual problem. This sharing implicated a larger 
institutionalised ideology and such plays gave more women the 
freedom to break the spiral of silence. However, the 
development of a genre of feminist theatre was a concern not 
only because of problematic and prescriptive definitions but 
for the issue of replacing one authority with another. 
Keyssar notes that in its early stages; 
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many feminist playwrights deliberately resisted 
definition of the genre ... some practitioners 
felt that to define the genre was to place 
inappropriate constraints on a form that aimed at 
diversification. To avoid the simple replacement 
of one elite and compound voice with another, it 
was argued that no individual voice should bear 
the authority of definition. (18) 
In addition, the general acceptance and distribution of 
women's work by its representation as a recognisable genre of 
'feminist theatre' becomes problematic in that it falls prey 
to the further marginalisation as being of interest only to 
women who are feminists, similar to the earlier critical 
practice of labelling a play like Akins' The Old Maid as a 
woman's matinee play. Michael Billington, of the Guardian, 
worried that there would be: "a gender ghetto where men write 
about men successfully and women write about women 
successfully" (qtd. in Understudies 85) . It is debatable 
what is meant by "successfully" but, in any case, the gender 
ghetto was already constituted by the (hu)man discourse long 
before modern feminist theatre. 
Public Tradition; Private Writer 
The public effect of tradition on women writers with 
respect to production, publication, and erasure, is in some 
ways easier to docximent than the private toll of this 
environment, but the latter is equally important to consider, 
even though it can only be written as individual cases of 
specific experiences which might apply to others. The 
anxiety many women writers feel in the struggle to write 
freely, when they are aware of biased critical judgement, is 
part of a fear pattern that produces an excessive 
internalised necessity to be 'right' so as to avoid this 
criticism. In Section Four (A) I will discuss this as part 
of the 'power over' system in the construction and imposition 
of authority by social institutions; wherein this fear and 
anxiety has been normalised in societies organised around 
hierarchy and competition to the extent that it affects most 
people, but is more pronounced in those who have low status 
either because they are very different, or are represented as 
very different and in the minority. In The Madwoman in the 
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Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth Century Literary 
Imagination. Gilbert and Gubar refer to Harold Bloom's theory 
of the "anxiety of influence" that writers are subject to 
from a previous tradition of literature, but they suggest 
that for a female writer it is different: 
Certainly if we acquiesce in the patriarchal 
Bloomian model, we can be sure that the female 
poet does not experience the 'anxiety of 
influence' in the same way that her male 
counterpart would, for the simple reason that she 
must confront precursors who are almost 
exclusively male, and therefore significantly 
different from her ... On the one hand, therefore, 
the woman writer's male precursors symbolize 
authority; on the other hand, despite their 
authority, they fail to define the ways in which 
she experiences her own identity as a writer, 
(emphasis mine; 48) 
Certainly it is difficult to generalise from the individual 
experiences of writers, though larger trends or problems can 
be gleaned. The female artist/writer who has read the 
literary canon is obviously carving out her identity as a 
writer amongst a tradition of male precursors with particular 
standards, while the female writer who does not acquiesce to 
tradition would be faced with writing against representations 
of gender or literary forms which, at best, may contradict 
her own experiences but most often excludes them. The 
anxiety of influence is recoined by Gilbert and Gubar as the 
"anxiety of authorship": 
Thus the 'anxiety of influence': that a male poet 
experiences is felt by a female poet as an even 
more primary 'anxiety of authorship'—a radical 
fear that she cannot create, that because she can 
never become a 'precursor' the act of writing will 
isolate or destroy her. (48-49) 
Such writing renders her vulnerable to marginalisation and 
negative critical reception which, combined with the status 
of being in the literary minority, makes it easy to 
understand that women writers often refer to feeling isolated 
or fearful of critics. 
American playwright Myrna Lamb refers to the "impossible 
position of the female artist", a phrase which not only 
describes the difficulties of negative critical reception and 
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personal fear, but also how the classification as a feminist 
writer sets up the text as part of a separate discourse 
caught between the critical practices of mainstream tradition 
and, at times, the demands of prescriptive feminist 
criticism. Her experience also highlights the ambivalence, 
resentment, and lack of support for a female artist who 
criticises gender construction and other dominant social 
structures—from women who are operating in or are still 
affiliated with those very systems (Woman 134). Monteith 
notes that although feminist criticism has been a project of 
exposing the intersection of gender and patriarchal values 
embedded in discourse through language, literary and social 
texts, it has also been a practice that reproduces a 
traditional notion of criticism with both critic and artist 
subject to environmental pressures: 
like a solar oven, [it] has proved to be the 
mirror that focuses literature and concentrates 
its signifying energy. In accomplishing this it 
has also made clear that despite all claims to the 
contrary, criticism is in one particular the same 
as any construct; it is part of its time and 
environment. Critics are subject to social and 
psychological pressures in the same way writers 
are. (Women's Writing 3) 
To the extent that feminist critical practices in "women's 
studies" mimics the traditional politics of interpretation of 
the (hu)man discourse, then it also mimics the judgment 
strategies that produce the anxiety of authorship. 
Australian playwright Sandra Shotlander is a declared 
feminist playwright, yet she says: 
The women's movement has certainly affected my 
work through books, exchanges, and political 
involvement. There is a danger, however, of having 
feminist or women's movement critics sitting on 
one shoulder and mainstream critics on the other 
while you are writing. Feminists can be extremely 
negative. (emphasis mine; Belles Lettres, 
Sept/Oct, 1986, p 5) 
I find this statement disheartening, and if this is the kind 
of environmental pressure cooker that artists/theorists must 
work within, it surely must signify the necessity to rethink 
and hopefully restructure the purpose and politics of 
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literary criticism. 
Sharman Macdonald expresses her isolation as a writer 
because she lives outside London, and also the problems of 
having her first play When I Was A Girl win a prestigious 
award and become published. She says that she's; 
felt 'under a lot of pressure since the Standard 
award; I've got a new playscript to complete by 
Christmas, and another two novels planned. 
Sometimes I just feel tempted to go and work for 
an actor friend who's a caterer, and chop up 
carrots', (gtd. in Hinds 29) 
The pressure she describes is her own feeling, as she says, 
but it is also indicative of her awareness of a "standard" 
set by her first play, and the anxiety associated with 
critical expectations and reception of any future work. The 
necessity to finish a play by Christmas also implies her new 
status now as a 'professional' playwright, rather than one 
who is seen to be writing merely for her own pleasure. This 
evidently suggests that she must take on the definitions and 
personal reguirements of the professional structures, such as 
writing as paid work, consequentially incorporating time as 
money and as a limiting factor in production deadlines; and 
the ongoing need to continue marketing successful play 
products in the future. Her statement about working for a 
caterer perhaps indicates the desire to escape the 
'pressures' or anxieties she now experiences in writing which 
are heavily weighed with the critical reception mechanisms in 
place for women writers, in addition to the standard 
assximptions of success and professionalism that would apply 
to any writer. Most female writers would be aware to varying 
degrees of the lack of successful women playwrights, hence 
the dominant negative tone of their critical reception sets 
up a fearful expectation that the writer, in a sense, writes 
against in the first instance. Lyssa writes about Pinball. 
which was called a critical success; 
When I had to sit down and write this Afterword 
for Pinball's publication, I was paralysed for 
days while the deadline got closer. It was the old 
problem of not trusting mvself to write anything 
good enough. Back came the terrible fear that the 
critics would get me whatever I did. Hadn't Brian 
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Hoad, when he was reviewing Pinball's first 
production, dismissed the play as 'yet another 
piece of crude and tedious female chauvinist 
piggery'? (emphasis mine; Plays by Women, vol. 4, 
p 157) 
Even in the face of success, there is still an extraordinary 
anxiety to prove themselves again and again against the 
continued negative critical reception which was illustrated 
above in the contemporary reviews of successful women 
playwrights. 
One part of being caught between the mainstream or 
alternative feminist theatres is that what seems to be the 
personal choice of production vehicle actually becomes a 
political strategy for gaining exposure of the woman 
playwright's work, but this choice in itself presents 
problems with the representation and reception of crucial 
issues in the text. In her Afterword to Pinball. Lyssa asks 
the question, "what happens when women put into the 
mainstream, plays that seek to question very deeply the power 
lines of our society, including those in the theatre itself?" 
(157) and describes her experience of Pinball being done at 
the Nimrod; 
The cast were lovely, I liked them very much, but 
I felt that on the whole their interest in the 
concerns of the play came from their desire to put 
on as good a performance as possible, rather than 
from an interest in a radical questioning of 
society and its effect on their own lives. It 
meant for me that my play was given a smile on the 
outside, that its heart was not quite xinderstood. 
(157) 
When Pinball was done by a radical theatre troupe in Adelaide 
which had politics as the "stated stuff of its life" (157), 
Lyssa comments that she didn't need to explain to anyone why 
she was a feminist but; 
[they] got so caught up in the serious message of 
the play that they tried to pretend that it wasn't 
a comedy. They couldn't see that they were 
spoiling it by damping down the belly laughs, or 
that the revolutionaries in the play do actually 
send themselves up. In several places they even 
altered my script or my stage directions to kill a 
laugh or a light-hearted or ironic moment. (157) 
What Lyssa is highlighting here is an interesting problem of 
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incorporating her play into the assximptions of the identity 
of differing companies, but the exercise also suggests that 
the critical reception of her play would be necessarily be 
interrelated with the representations of each theatre 
company. In addition, as Olauson points out, there is a 
different kind of pressure in working with a mainstream 
theatre because; 
To add to the already present difficulties in 
having their works produced, playwrights were 
confronted by the fact that the decision to 
produce a new play often was based on how 
successful a play might be in terms of financial 
return to its backers and producers and not 
necessarily on its artistic merits or its social 
concerns. (159) 
This would also be a problem for any playwright of course, 
but it is amplified in the case of women who have little 
choice of production in the first instance. The choice for 
women writers who have written plays which question the 
status quo, is between the possible greater 'success'—and 
therefore greater audience exposure—of a play produced in a 
mainstream theatre company with the accompanying risk of a 
watered-down script, versus the likelihood of obscurity in an 
'alternative' fringe company. This 'choice' is not merely 
one of personal integrity but, ultimately, one which pivots 
around the politics of representation and critical reception; 
of the text, the writer, and the company. As Case points out 
in Feminism and Theatre; 
The importance of the author's intent gives way to 
the conditions of production and the composition 
of the audience in determining the meaning of the 
theatrical events. This implies that there is no 
aesthetic closxire around the text, separating it 
from the conditions of its production. The 
performance text is constituted by the location of 
the theatre, the price of the ticket, the attitude 
of the ushers and the response of the audience as 
well as by the written dialogue and stage 
directions, (emphasis mine; 116) 
As the intertextual factors of production in a male-dominant 
society impinge upon women playwriters to make their 
^position' as female artists impossible, so do these same 
factors contribute to making possible the position of the 
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male artist; therefore the same conditions which erase women, 
actually promote men. 
Finally, Lamb describes the fear of critical reception 
and the difficulties of being labelled a "feminist" 
playwright in her article "Female Playwright: Female 
Confessions of a Fallen Woman" from Woman as Writer. Though 
her 1970 play. The Mod Donna, was called "the first feminist 
musical" (133), she is an interesting example of the 
denigration and lack of support for a writer who openly 
challenges social institutions and who is also overtly 
publicised as feminist. The Mod Donna "was seen as one of 
the earliest theatrical events of its kind to receive 
significant public attention" (Olauson 128) . Lamb specified 
that the play was "a modernized version of wife-swapping 
founded in the traditional menage a trois situation" and, 
using a soap opera parody, contrasts two couples, the haves 
and the have-nots (gtd. in Olauson 128) . In The Mod Donna 
Lamb represents the limitations of the institution of 
marriage and wrote in the introduction to the published 
version that "marriage is two people becoming one, which 
wasn't really the idea in the first place ... Marriage is a 
fitting punishment for the genuinely obscene reasons for its 
existence" (Mod Donna 7). Her play's critique was received 
by some as "a lucid and stimulating view of modern male-
female relationships" (Olauson 129), but it was also called 
"a puritanical, anti-sex lectxire" which "proceeded by logic 
that was neither masculine nor feminine, 'just dangerous'" 
(Oppenheimer and Brxikenfeld qtd. in Olauson 129) . In 
Brxikenfeld's review called "Off-Off" he seems to get off on 
this "danger" as his text reveals a love/hate relationship 
with Lamb versus her work, characterised with almost sadistic 
sexual overtones; 
My reactions to the ... show are ambivalent, What 
I like are its anger, its coxirage, its wit , .. But 
I find little satisfaction in the story itself ... 
But the strongest part of "Mod Donna" is Miss 
Lamb's gorgeous rage; it puts a vibrant edge on 
many moments. Although I argue with some of its 
ideas, her show provides a controversial and 
instructive evening. Propagandistic, yes. Over-
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simple, definitely. But stimulating, you'd better 
believe it. (emphasis mine; Village Voice. 7 May 
1970, p 53) 
Brxikenfeld is obviously "stimulated" and not by what he sees 
as the ideas in the text but by what he thinks is Ms Lamb's 
"gorgeous rage", taking perhaps a slightly sadistic pleasure 
(oh my, hell hath no fury like a woman scorned) in the 
personal writer rather than the representation of a social 
problem. According to Olauson, Brxikenfeld also saw Lamb's 
play as "allowing a philosophy which saw culture as the only 
determining factor in her characters' lives" and that meant 
to him that "Lamb had done nothing to mitigate the problem 
she posed" (Olauson 129). What he actually says is: 
But in creating her characters she proceeds from 
the outside in. from a philosophy which sees 
culture determining our lives. She rails against 
people's making one another into objects, yet her 
four characters are objects, and their hang up 
isn't cultural but dramatic. (emphasis mine; 
Village 53). 
Brxikenfeld escapes from seriously addressing the implications 
for notions of romance and marriage as social constructs, 
female sexuality as property, and the relationship between 
institutionalised male ownership and masculine 
possessiveness, themes which are represented textually in the 
culturally manipulated lives of the characters. He does this 
by reducing them to simple dramatic flaws. And in his next 
comments addressing Donna's speech where "she shouts to the 
rafters that she will not be a hximan sacrifice to his 
manhood" (53) , he reduces the audience to dramatically 
illiterate, prejudiced objects: 
My sympathy went to neither Donna nor her husband-
-they are paper thin characters—but to the many 
playgoers who broke into wild cheering. They, of 
course, had come loaded for bear, or more 
accurately, straw-manhood. (53) 
Another critic negating audience appreciation. His 
perceptions of the author's writing philosophy shows his own 
belief in an "inside/outside" boundary with respect to 
character, in which the two are impermeable and, further, 
that for him there is a preferable directional flow between 
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the two; namely from inside to outside. He separates the 
personal/social opposition and then presximes he knows Lamb's 
directional intentions. He loves her rage so presximably that 
might have come from the 'inside'. He presximes that Lamb has 
imposed an 'external' philosophy which somehow has nothing to 
do with how people feel on the 'inside' thus rendering them 
objects, "paper-thin" characters in his opinion. However, 
the audience's wild cheering may suggest otherwise, or else 
we have to agree that all the people in the audience are also 
paper-thin. 
Lamb's text poses a social institution i.e. marriage, as 
a problematic cultural power structure which seriously 
affects her characters' lives, thus deliberately blurring the 
inner/outer notions for the construction of character. The 
text also puts into guestion the purity of the individual 
consciousness to remain totally unaffected by culture, 
insisting that the cultural and the personal are 
interrelated. Yet it is Brxikenfeld's review that construes 
the characters as "paper-thin" cultural objects only, as he 
makes a simplistic either/or assximption that the text must 
and is taking one side of a binary argument: either 
individual freedom or cultural object. What he does not 
recognise is Lamb's implicitly optimistic argument that if 
the inner/outer is related, problems recognised and 
attributed to social construction can be solved through 
personal and collective social awareness, responsibility and 
action; whereas problems attributed only to the individual's 
essential biologically defective 'drives' or bad 'natxire' are 
beyond control except through incarceration, institutional 
correction or behavioral measures such as lobotomy and drugs. 
Despite the text's insistent representation of problematic 
links between class and sexuality, the critique of the 
cultxiral construction of individuals by social institutions 
was largely ignored or misunderstood, perhaps due to a 
longstanding emphasis in America on a rhetoric of personal 
freedom. Artists who question this firmly entrenched belief 
system still have problems with critical reception. Laurie 
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Anderson, a contemporary performance artist in New York, 
juxtaposes this American belief in total, conscious 
individual freedom against impinging social forces in her 
piece, Americans on the Move: Parts 1 & 2: 
Female Reader: In our country, you're free and so 
you're born and so they say, 'You're free'. So— 
Happy Birthday! And even if you were born to lose-
-even if you were a complete wreck when you were 
born, you might still grow up to be President. 
Male Reader: Today, you might be an average 
citizen, a civilian, a pedestrian in the street, 
but tomorrow you might get elected to some high 
office, or suddenly sell your novel and become 
famous overnight. Or, you could get run over by a 
truck and your picture could get in the paper that 
way. Because you're free and anything might 
happen. So, Happy Birthday, fDrama Review. T86, p 
58-59) 
Anderson then plays with the interrelatedness of society, 
implying the element of mimicry and therefore mutual 
interrelatedness between government and the people; 
Male Reader; He didn't know what to do so he just 
watched the government. And he saw what the 
government was doing, and then he just kind of 
scaled it down to size and ran his life that way. 
(59) 
Mel Gordon writes that "despite the dense theatricality of 
Anderson's work, her support and renown seem to come almost 
exclusively from the art world" (Drama 51) , and she is 
relatively unknown to those involved in experimental theatre. 
Lamb's work as an artist puts into question the accepted 
gender roles for women, and the public support of a radical 
play becomes relative to what hat a female associate might be 
wearing: revolutionary, financial independent, or employee. 
In Vivian Gornick's Village Voice evaluation of The Mod 
Donna. she apparently rebutted all other reviews of the play 
as inaccurate and missing the point: 
The real driving force and themebehind Lamb's 
presentation ... was woman's imposed and self-
imposed obsession not with sex, but with 
sexuality, the obsession with her own desirability 
that powers all her actions, and her rage at 
having no other means by which to define herself, 
(qtd in Olauson 129) 
Meanwhile, Lamb herself was constituted by Gornick as an 
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embodiment of the feminine. Olauson sximmarises Gornick's 
review as follows: 
Gornick believed that although Lamb was an 
unpredictable writer . . . with only 'partial 
control', her work was stabilized by emotional 
truth and self-awareness, qualities that were only 
just beginning to show themselves in Western 
culture as the true totality of the feminine mind; 
thus, in her view. Lamb was the 'first true artist 
of the feminist consciousness'. (129) 
Basically Gornick is conceding structural failures in the 
text due to the writer's "partial control"—and this might 
please reviewers who see women playwrights as lacking the 
discipline of logical form in the first place. However, she 
then tries to recover a positive definition of the play's 
"stabilising" strength—not in the representations offered in 
the text—but by claiming the writer's own emotional truth 
and awareness as being the feminine totality, which then 
somehow constructs the author as a feminist representative of 
this new totality. But this sliding of Lamb's work into 
another controversial and largely unaccepted discourse then 
pits the feminist playwright against the women who have 
become entrenched within the dominant system of power 
structures. It is Gornick that Lamb refers to when she says: 
Orders to die. A top feminist woman, who has told 
me, weeping, that I am the first artist of the 
feminist consciousness, is compelled to turn her 
back on this work after she has promised support. 
She cannot afford to affiliate with establishment 
failure. (Woman 135) 
Thus burdened with this essentialist label Lamb became in her 
words "the double female" in the "impossible position of the 
female artist" who is "resented for my achievement at the 
same time I am despised for my failure" (Woman 134). Writing 
as a woman she is subjected to all the historically proven 
gender-biased critical practices that, seemingly blind to 
what she has written, can operate to exclude her text, while 
comforting themselves with traditional literary standards. 
But writing as a feminist she is named, organised, and more 
dangerously visible, as she steps out from the silent safety 
of her gender role, probing for space to write where there 
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appears to be no waiting vacuxim, and threatening the 
patriarchal ideology which is an entire way of life. For 
this ideology to survive, the text of the feminist writer, 
like feminism and the discourse of feminist literary 
criticism, must remain isolated, designated as dealing only 
with women's personal problems: 
But I should have understood there was no way to 
beat the system ... And then the routine 
unforgiving backlash. The ordinary co-option. The 
recognition that there is no support system for a 
strong female artist who tells the terrible 
subconscious truth in an almost too-proficient 
manner . . . Unpleasant truths about societally 
indoctrinated and enforced self-hatred . . . Die, 
they say. Stick your head into an oven and achieve 
canonization. (Woman 134) 
She concludes "Female Playwright" with the following 
comments, "and the doors shut in my face. But I didn't die. 
My hunger survived. My curiosity revived. And I am still 
alive. A female playwright" (Woman 136). She will write, but 
the question really becomes: when will she be received? 
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PART FOUR. Conclusion; The Erasure of Erasure, or Towards a 
Hximan Discourse 
Introduction 
'If you find an orange petal floating along the air on a 
sximmer day, what does it bring to mind?' The children would 
clamor to answer that it brought to mind a field daisy. 'Just 
so!' the old woman would exclaim. 'The idea of the entire 
flower exists perfectly in even one petal, as a song 
resonates in the air after the last note is over. That,' she 
would muse, 'is something like the idea of freedom. It lives 
nowhere and everywhere at the same time. It lives in the 
connections'. 
Robin Morgan, The Anatomy of Freedom 
As my conclusion, I would like to sximmarise by asking 
questions and making suggestions. In my research I have 
found that erasure in the (hu)man discourse arises 
predominantly from a (hu)man/woman dichotomy, -where women, 
their plays, and feminism have been represented as dealing 
with "women's issues". This separatism arises from 
philosophical perspectives that are oppositional and 
essentialist, representing male and female as not only 
opposite sex, but opposite people, reflected by a gender 
biased criticism that has excluded women as inferior 
opposites. The dramatic tradition has largely been 
constructed with practices of literary criticism using a 
politics of interpretation, where the authority of experience 
is based on 'real' experience in a discourse that privileges 
the public realm over the private realm. This discoxirse has 
operated with a logic that creates and then strives to 
eliminate opposites as contradictions in the preservation of 
meaning, truth, and identity. Therefore, within the 
masculinist identity of the (hu)man discoxirse, the female 
playwright functions as a site of contradiction because of 
her gender, and because of issues in her plays which 
represent contradictions to dominant social definitions; here 
she and her sxibjects are erased and subjected to 
nonproduction. Because of this, I have argued that the 
erasure of women playwrights is really nonreception— 
sustained negative reception coupled with anthological 
exclusion—in a discourse where prejudice and power have 
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operated beyond institutional standards to exclude the few 
texts of women who have managed to win awards, such that they 
were never published, or were dropped from anthologies very 
early. Thus the politics of erasure as dominance do not only 
emerge from biased standards, but from the prejudiced belief 
systems about the inferiority of women to comply with these 
standards, and from the dislike of difference as represented 
by women. 
My thesis, then, is that erasure has been a tool of 
dominance that produces manufactured absence in the 
intertextual field of discourse, which represses dialogue, 
and leads to the dominance of particular definitions, belief 
systems and worldviews that colonise the imaginations of both 
the female and male. In speculating on the potential erasure 
of erasure, it seems necessary to move away from dominance in 
discourse, to look for different philosophies and 
methodologies of literary criticism that embrace 
contradiction, encourage dialogue, and shift from a politics 
of interpretation based on the authority of experience. In 
addition to changing structures, though, addressing mental 
belief systems of inferiority will also require a change in 
the oppositional way of thinking about difference. I n 
Section (A), "The (De)colonisation of the Imagination", I 
will discuss some of the work that analyses power as 
dominance, suggesting that gender and power need to be 
redefined to go beyond the historical reaction to difference 
as aggression or defensiveness. In Section (B), "Women 
Playwrights as Rebels; The Strategy of Contradiction", I will 
offer a nongendered, nonprescriptive approach to reading 
difference in the plays of women as they relate to the 
intertextual field; where they can be considered as employing 
a strategy of contradiction not to be eliminated, but to be 
included as performing useful cultural work in displacing the 
centrality of dominant definitions. In Section (C) , "The 
Politics of Textuality; A Different Path to Criticism", I 
will ask (juestions about the pxirpose of literary criticism 
with respect to the construction of Knowledge, suggesting 
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that a politics of textuality which acknowledges 
subjectivity, self-reflexivity, cultural relativity and 
historicity, can shift away from the practice of interpreting 
meaning or making good/bad judgements based solely on some 
notion of aesthetics located only in the text. The purpose 
of knowledge can shift from dominance and power to an 
involvement with the constructions of meaning, in what 
Foucault called "a science of interpretations", which is the 
study of reality constructs as they affect the intertextual 
field of discourse. This shift may also change the way we 
practice literary criticism on what Derrida calls "plastic" 
or art texts, embracing imitation rather than interpretation 
of meaning in the text. Finally, in Section (D) , "The 
Quantum Anthology: An Intertextual Matrix, or a Place To 
Dialogue", I have suggested an anthology that can more 
accurately reflect the intertextual field of discourse, and 
thus can also help clarify the elements involved in textual 
production, other than some notion of essential "goodness" or 
"badness" located only within the plays. Here I conceive of 
a mixture of texts that crosses the literary, sociological, 
fiction, and nonfiction boundaries, mixing plays with 
reviews, and social commentaries on the issues represented by 
the plays, so that the way meaning is created in the field of 
discourse can be better appreciated by students and readers. 
In a sense this is a "quantum" anthology, making the leap 
from a monocollection to an intertextual matrix (a womb like 
place that encloses and gives origin to), where the dialogue 
occurs within the borders of the text. As Robin Morgan says 
of freedom, that it "lives in the connections" so, in the 
intertextual anthology, the dialogue can live in the textual 
connections across boundaries. 
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Section (A). The (De)Colonisation of the Imagination 
I have argued that the colonisation of the imagination, 
particularly with respect to gender and power, occurs through 
dominant social definitions constructed by erasure and the 
manufactured absence of difference in the intertextual field 
of discourse. In this section I wish to discuss work that 
suggests transforming the structures and definition of social 
systems that produce dominance to assist in the 
decolonisation of the imagination, thereby enabling a 
different response to difference to emerge beyond 
aggressiveness or defensiveness. This work analyses some of 
the colonising social systems where different perspectives 
have been erased, while some male writers such as Brazier, 
Heath and Reynaud are beginning to address their own 
colonisation with respect to gender, power and masculine 
aggressiveness. Finally, Lichtenberg, using the work of 
Scottish philosopher John MacMurray, deconstructs the 
opposition between victim/oppressor by discussing the 
relationships of equals within power relations as a way of 
empowering victims. 
Cixous points out in "Sorties" that sexual difference 
within gender socialisation is so culturally embedded as a 
framework of logic that it affects the imagination of every 
person; 
To predict what will happen to sexual difference— 
in another time (in two or three hundred years?) 
is impossible. But there should be no 
misunderstanding; men and women are caught up in a 
network of millennial cultural determinations of a 
complexity that is practically unanalyzable: we 
can no more talk about 'woman' than about 'man' 
without getting caught up in an ideological 
theater where the multiplication of 
representations, images, reflections, myths, 
identifications constantly transforms, deforms, 
alters each persons imaginary order and in 
advance, renders all conceptualization null and 
void, (New French 96) 
Similarly, Foucault argues in the Preface to Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia that the acceptance of the 
definition of power as dominance is not only evident at the 
highest political levels: 
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Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic 
adversary is fascism . .. And not only historical 
fascism. . .but also the fascism in us all, in our 
heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism 
that causes us to love power, to desire the very 
thing that dominates and exploits us. (xiii) 
Thus the definitions of gender and power as dominance are 
constructs that encroach upon the everyday thinking and 
behaviour of people. 
Wilhelm Reich explored the construction of mental 
colonisation with respect to gender and power as facilitated 
through social methodologies imposed by family, school and 
state. Reich's argument illustrates that in a critique of the 
social construction of power systems like patriarchy, and the 
role played by the colonisation of the imagination which 
affects both sexes, it is impossible to continue marking this 
problem off as 'domestic' or merely 'women's issues'. In 
such a cultural critique it is, rather, necessary to consider 
the interrelationship of the domestic/public spheres when 
exploring the reproduction of people's continuous acceptance 
of authoritarian practices. 
Reich argued that there were strong links between the 
repression of sexuality, autonomy and creativity while Freud 
saw the suppression of sexuality as necessary to 
civilisation. Reich broke away from Freud because of a 
contradiction in their clinical experiences and fundamental 
assumptions about 'culture', 'nature', and 'the reality 
principle' which Reich criticised as being bound up in a 
"mechanistic concept of the absolute antithesis between 
sexuality and culture" (18). He argued that these 
dichotomies had political consequences: 
This is substantiated by such phrases as that the 
'reality principle' requires the postponement of 
instinctual gratification. The fact that this 
reality principle is itself relative, that it is 
determined by an authoritarian society and serves 
its purposes, this decisive fact goes carefully 
unmentioned; to mention this, they say, is 
'polities', and science has nothing to do with 
politics. They refuse to see the fact that not to 
mention it is also politics. (19) 
Reich maintained that Freud's assximptions about sexuality as 
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defined by the nature/culture dichotomy were rooted in a 
particular kind of culture: 
What is correct in this theory is only that sexual 
suppression forms the mass-psychological basis for 
a certain culture, namely, the patriarchal 
authoritarian one, in all of its forms. (10) 
Reich felt that patriarchal sexual power relations produced 
within the family were largely responsible for creating the 
conditions which made a mass acceptance of authoritarianism 
possible and he argues that "it is a matter, first of all, of 
eliminating the economic enslavement of women and children. 
And their authoritarian enslavement" (29). Sydie agrees with 
Reich and also points out in Natural Women. Cultured Men. 
that hierarchical arrangements of authority and competitive 
power relations are not an invariable form of social 
organization (170) ; 
data have always been available to show that 
egalitarian relations between women and men have 
existed in many cultures, and that if anything, 
they are more 'natural' than the relations of 
dominance and subordination found in stratified 
societies. (Leacock gtd. in Sydie 170) 
Societies where women occupied a more egalitarian position, 
or even a central position, were regarded as 'primitive' 
forms of matriarchy and, thus, as not highly cultured 
according to the male-dominant definitions of civilisation. 
While male sociologists and anthropologists did not dismiss 
the idea of egalitarian sex relations, according to Sydie: 
as a general rule such a state of affairs is 
regarded as pre-social, pre-civilization. Society 
or civilization requires a division of laboxir, and 
the basic, fundamental division of laboxir is 
between the sexes. (170) 
Sydie states that the early social theorists were not sex-
blind, but that on the contrary, sex relations usually formed 
the basis for discussions of social order such that; 
Their partial perspective rested on their 
assximption that without male control of women, 
there could be no society, no culture or 
civilization, but only unorganized hordes of women 
and children confronted by predatory men. (172) 
Thus civilisation came be predominantly defined by stratified 
control rather than a freer social arrangement, where 
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perhaps, women might also have equal power in decision-
making . 
Reich pointed out that though families participate in 
"the authoritarian, superficial and external influencing of 
the children" (240) by repressing sexuality and enforcing 
authoritarian disciplines upon children, the educational 
system reinforces and adds onto the formation of an 
authoritarian structure in the child. He argued that the 
shift from reproducing an authoritarian structure to a self-
regulating one required an education that "would no longer 
produce and cultivate the conflict between nature and 
culture, individual and society, sexuality and sociality" 
(9) . In his opinion, the elimination of coercive social 
practices would allow children to flourish creatively and 
result in people who would resist authoritarianism: 
a child which is inhibited in its motility is 
prone to accept any kind of ideology ... In 
contrast, a child with a completely free motility 
and natural sexuality will spontaneously resist 
the influence of ascetic and authoritarian 
ideologies. (240) 
Christiane Rochefort also argues that the creativity of all 
children is restricted in the demand for conformity, and 
particularly for females: 
In spite of everything, I think creativity is a 
natural activity of hximankind. All babies are born 
with a fantastic potential. But our present-day 
society doesn't need all that. It needs sheep, for 
production and consximption. In terms of potential, 
what is not necessary is not awakened, or it is 
stifled, or it is cut off; this is the enormous 
business of children's oppression. Of all 
children's oppression. This mutilating surgery 
which affects every child goes further for the 
poor, for the oppressed races, and for females,.,, 
(184) 
Thus the socialisation of gender oppression challenges the 
argximent of 'natural' biological differences which can be 
used to sustain divisive gender, class and race hierarchies. 
As Brazier puts it; 
Some argue that biology has something to do with 
it. This may well be true but it almost doesn't 
matter, since it is clear that society and 
cultxire, which are hximan creations, fully capable 
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of change, have an overwhelming influence upon 
us...Masculinity and femininity are not written 
down in tablets of stone or of DNA. And that is a 
message of hope. (5) 
The hope implies a possibility of change, as opposed to the 
conservativeness of a natural order, where Reich argued that 
the notion of biological fact was both reductionist and 
mechanistic: 
This naive mechanistic biologism is so difficult 
to unmask because it serves a definite function in 
our society; that of shifting the problem from the 
sociological to the biological realm where nothing 
can be done about it. (emphasis added; Function, 
17). 
Thus the biological essentialism of patriarchal assximptions 
seem inevitable and hinder the necessity to alter 
institutionalised social structures that have negative 
results. 
Further, the ability to imagine a non-oppositional sex 
difference has been crippled by a reductionist concept that 
polarises difference and represses sameness while 
externalising that which is different as 'other'. Gayle 
Rubin points out that; 
Far from being an expression of natural 
differences, exclusive gender identity is the 
suppression of natural similarities. It requires 
repression: in men, of whatever is the local 
version of 'feminine' traits; in women, of the 
local definition of 'masculine' traits. The 
division of the sexes has the effect of repressing 
some of the personality characteristics of 
virtually everyone, men and women. (Reiter 180) 
But Rubin argues that the exaggerated polarisation of gender 
in the face of greater similarity is related to "an economics 
of sex and gender"; 
Kinship systems rest upon marriage. They therefore 
transform males and females into 'men' and 
'women', each an incomplete half which can only 
find wholeness when united with the other. Men and 
women are, of course, different. But they are not 
as different as day and night, earth and sky, yin 
and yang, life and death. In fact from the 
standpoint of natxire, men and women are closer to 
each other than either is to anything else—for 
instance, mountains, kangaroos, or coconut palms, 
(179) 
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She points out that it is necessary to study the mechanisms 
by which conventions of sexuality are produced and 
maintained, such as marriage; 
Gender is not only an identification with one sex; 
it also entails that sexual desire be directed 
toward the other sex. The sexual division of labor 
is implicated in both aspects of gender—male and 
female it creates them, and it creates them 
heterosexual. The suppression of the homosexual 
component of hximan sexuality, and by corollary, 
the oppression of homosexuals, is therefore a 
product of the same system whose rules and 
relations oppress women. (181) 
As Cixous argues, the alteration of binary opposite gender 
construction demands a new consideration of difference: 
Then 'femininity', 'masculinity', would inscribe 
their effects of difference, their economy, their 
relationships to expenditure, to deficit, to 
giving, quite differently. That which appears as 
'feminine' or 'masculine' today would no longer 
amount to the same thing. The general logic of 
difference would no longer fit into the opposition 
that still dominates. The difference would be a 
crowning display of new differences. (97) 
Thus Cixous theorises a transformation in gender 
socialisation as one which would affect the entire 
organisation of society: 
There is no reason to exclude the possibility of 
radical transformations of behavior, mentalities, 
roles, and political economy. The effects of these 
transformations on the libidinal economy are 
unthinkable today. Let us imagine simultaneously a 
general change in all of the structures of 
formation, education, framework, hence of 
reproduction, of ideological effects, and let us 
imagine a real liberation of sexuality, that is, a 
transformation of our relationship to our body (— 
and to another body) , an approximation of the 
immense material organic sensual universe that we 
are, this not being possible, of coxirse, without 
equally radical political transformations 
(imagine!). (96-97) 
The colonisation of the imaginary takes place throughout the 
intertextual field—over generations. The persistent 
representation of feminism as 'women's issues' where 
liberation consists of equality with men in an unchanged 
system, and the move to restore 'unequal power differentials' 
has resulted in a largely one-way shift. Many women have 
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recognised their social limitations brought upon them by 
excessive domestic obligations and have entered public life 
in large nximbers in a relatively unchanged system. Yet there 
has not been enough significant changes in legislation and 
the structures of work, education, and politics to alter the 
opposition between the public and private sphere such that a 
more egual responsibility between men and women for children, 
domestic work and the work of the public sphere can be 
imagined and put into practice. This imagining of radical 
transformations that Cixous calls for does not only require 
reimagining and redefining feminity, but will also require 
the redefinition of masculinity and that relationship to 
power, thus enlarging the notion of feminism into a serious 
critique that applies to both genders. 
There is also evidence coming from sociology and 
psychology that within the superior/inferior power construct, 
both oppressor and oppressed suffer from the homogeneous 
representations that colonise the imagination and create such 
oppositions. In the New Internationalist's issue on 
masculinity. Brazier argues that men need to see themselves 
as the object for discussion and collectively take 
responsibility for their own contributions to oppression and 
violence, recognising that so-called women's issues are not 
only related to women in the colonisation of the imagination; 
We never talk about what it is actually like to be 
a man. Instead we simply react when forced to by 
the urging of our female partner or a feminist at 
work ... This is xinderstandable but it is time we 
stopped seeing 'women's concerns' as only being 
relevant to us when they smack us in the face. 
Women have enough trouble dealing with their own 
problems in a sexist world without having to take 
all the responsibility for changing men, too. (4) 
The construction of masculinity as it oppresses men—while it 
simultaneously harms women—has yet to be widely discussed in 
a serious way by large nximbers of men. In Holv Virility. 
Emmanuel Reynaud describes patriarchy as "the appropriation 
of women and the struggle for power in a hierarchy between 
men" (8), and it is one of the few books that discusses the 
relations between men, the valorisation of 'virility' and the 
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oppression of women; 
When it comes to abolishing patriarchy the problem 
for men is not for them to create a 'new man', 
but, on the contrary, to destroy that 'man' from 
whom, as males, we have all been created, and who, 
in one way or another, we have all reproduced. It 
is to that process of destruction that I hope to 
contribute by describing men's attitudes to their 
body, their penis, sexualiity and relationships 
with women and other men. (15) 
Brazier asserts that men lose emotionally by the same 
definitions of masculinity that oppress women: 
It's time we stopped relying on their emotional 
strength, their knowledge of relationships and 
built up some of our own. But we can't begin to do 
that until we recognize that masculinity as it is 
currently constructed is oppressive to women . . . 
We earn 90 per cent of the world's income and own 
99 percent of its property. We commit around 90 
per cent of crimes of violence and 100 per cent of 
rapes. (4-5) 
The very frequency of rape indicates the common assximptions 
about female availability inscribed within a patriarchal 
ideology; 
Rape is so common that man almost feels that it 
does not exist ... if man rapes it is because 
woman asks for it, therefore it is not rape . . . 
This mental juggling enables him to embellish 
reality and to disguise the fact that rape, more 
than being a mental game, is the very real 
appropriation of a hximan being through violence 
and under no circximstances can it be described as 
a pleasant experience for its victims. (Jacques 8) 
While Reynaud calls rape the "archetype of masculine 
sexuality" (8), it is more useful to analyse how boys are 
also abused in a 'power over' paradigm, such that the 
patriarchal ideology of power as dominance is expressed by 
men who see women as lower down on the hierarchy of power and 
thus available as sexual objects or property. While the 
dominance of women, whether directly or indirectly violent, 
may be an archetype, it is also not necessarily natural. 
As Arthur Brittan points out in Masculinity and Power. 
there is still an attitude which suggests that men are 
naturally aggressive and 'good' men control this. Brittan 
argues that male dominance is learned and fulfils a function. 
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and that "men will only behave aggressively if they have 
learned it is appropriate to do so" (7) . He quotes Lipman-
Blximen to describe the functions of masculine aggression: 
Even as small boys, males are trained for a world 
of independent aggressive action ... Males learn 
that society's goals are best met by aggression, 
by actively wrestling their accomplishments from 
the environment. Force, power, competition and 
aggression are the means. Achievement, males are 
taught, is measured in productivity, resources, 
and control—all the result of direct action. In 
the Western world, the importance of self reliant, 
individual action is systematically inculcated in 
males. To be masculine reguires not only self 
reliance and self control, but control over other 
people and resources, (emphasis mine; qtd. in 
Brittan 7) 
The crux of the problem for the socially produced dominant 
subject as one who is "in control" is not only to empathise 
with those others that have been termed powerless 
' inferiors', but to recognise their own victimhood within a 
gender socialisation that sanctions the cycle of domination-
oppression. 
Relinquishing the concept of power as dominance and the 
control of other hxuaan beings is a difficult task, because 
those who think they benefit from the power of property, 
money and government may not ever actively choose to make the 
personal and structural changes for shared power which 
seemingly would diminish their own superiority. Heath 
relates that the problem for men in understanding feminist 
theories of power as it relates to their own position in the 
social field is "like a little scenario of the center and the 
margin" (25); 
What is difficult for men aware of feminism is not 
to imagine equality for women but to realize the 
inequality of their own position; the first is 
abstract and does not take me out of my position 
(naturally women should be equal with me); the 
second is concrete and comes down to the fact that 
my equality is the masking term for their 
oppression (women are not equal with me and the 
struggle is not for that equality) . (first 
emphasis mine; 25) 
Therefore the difficult problem for men, or any power 
position operating within an ideological stance of 
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superiority, is to realise their own role of inequality 
within a relationship of domination and oppression. 
In Not for Women Only. Philip Lichtenberg discusses the 
dynamics of domination and oppression, with two main points: 
1) that relations between people are relations of equals; and 
2) that both oppressed and oppressor suffer limitations by 
interacting like less than equals within a relationship based 
on exploitation. From this perspective he argues that the 
meaning of oppression must now be redefined: 
When what we call oppression, domination, or 
exploitation is in effect, the intent is for some 
to gain while others sacrifice. Instead of these 
intentions being realized, the actual circximstance 
is that all participants in a relationship achieve 
lower levels of personal satisfaction 
Oppression introduces indirection, dishonesty, 
self-conquest, and distrust, so that achievements 
necessarily decrease. (108) 
Based on the work of Scottish philosopher John Macmurray, 
Lichtenberg says that "ecjuality reigns even when people 
intend superiority and domination," (108) because both people 
or groups of people actually are contributing equally to the 
dynamic of the relationship, though they may not be acting as 
equals while they interact. With this perspective; 
'oppression' describes hximan relationships that 
are based on assximptions, perceptions, and 
intentions that violate the realities of hximan 
interaction, especially the reality that persons 
in a relationship necessarily act to equalize. 
(108) 
The implications of this approach are that the costs to those 
in the more powerful position are greater than is usually 
assximed; relationships of exploitation lower the quality of 
life for all participants; and the oppressed participate in 
their own oppression (108) . Lichtenberg says that upon 
looking closely, there are comparable limitations for both 
the oppressors and oppressed; 
For example, although the material wealth of the 
managers in an industrial society is obviously 
greater than that of the workers, what about their 
psychological experience, their emotional 
gratifications? One usually just assximes that it 
is greater without looking closely. I have come to 
see it otherwise, to see the oppressors as also 
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being oppressed. (108) 
The traditional gender roles for men and women are just one 
domain where the division of hximan characteristics creates a 
"pattern of decreased gratification" such that both parties 
can be seen to suffer emotional and material limitations 
(108) . 
It is important to address the social belief systems of 
superiors and inferiors which create victim consciousness— 
and that the victims of these structures are not the only 
oppressed: 
By now, this idea is almost conventional wisdom, 
and we must be certain that we are not blaming the 
victim when we make this observation. However, 
this common observation must be put into a 
theoretical framework. That relationships between 
people are always relations of equals is exactly 
the theoretical linkage that is needed. Men gain 
egually when women are liberated and suffer 
equally when they attempt to dominate. (108) 
Lichtenberg acknowledges that some feminists feel women 
suffer more than men in direct relationships between the 
sexes, but he argues that: 
when one looks from the perspective of equality, 
whether it concerns freedom in the external world, 
power in handling finances, or sexual relations, 
one sees different things than when one assumes 
otherwise and views relationships from the 
alternative perspective. It is necessary to look 
for gains and losses of everyone in such 
interactions. (110) 
He points out that the equality of both people represses 
itself and takes on different roles through the mutual 
creation of oppression by the "weak" and the "strong" in what 
he calls the "social-emotional keys to the division of power" 
(110): 
We see the unfolding of fusion between oppressors 
and the oppressed through a combination of 
identification with the aggressor and what we have 
named 'projection on a primed vulnerable other'. 
(110) 
Theoretically the history of this work emerges from Freud, 
Ferenczi, Szasz, Reich, Laing and Cooper who have mapped out 
mutual relationships in the mentality of domination within 
families and other authoritarian relationships. The so-
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called weaker begins to identify with the perceptions of the 
so-called superior or aggressor. The superior also projects 
that which it negates within itself onto the vulnerable 
other, primed by belief systems of inferiority and 
limitation. 
However, precisely because all belief systems are 
constructs, therein lies the power to recover the relations 
of eguals through a personal and/or collective recognition of 
disempowering ideological constructs, and by reclaiming the 
empowerment to act as eguals. An important implication when 
assximing relations of equals, is that power is available for 
all people, and not merely concentrated at the top of 
hierarchical structures, as striking telephone operators can 
demonstrate quite easily. However, while theoretically this 
may be true, an individual's recognition of (and their own 
personal internal power to resist) the propaganda of 
hierarchical social constructs may not be enough for altering 
collective oppression. As Kitzinger puts it in her article 
"Fundamentally Female": 
It seems terribly pedestrian to insist upon an 
examination of the material realities of women's 
oppression, the actual structural and political 
possibilities for transformation. And yet this, I 
believe, is what is necessary ... It is unhelpful 
to disguise the social and political sources of 
power by focusing on internal personal power, 
(emphasis mine; New Internationalist 25) 
As I have tried to show in this section, the opposition 
between social power and personal power cannot be reduced to 
an either/or situation, such that by focusing on the aspect 
of personal power one disguises the institutional construct, 
or by focusing on the social construct one loses the notion 
of a subject's resistance through personal power, since they 
are both interrelated. It is important to discover and 
embrace internal personal power because this is predominantly 
what is disguised in the construction of victimhood. Yet 
Christian discusses the importance of distinguishing self-
empowerment from the desire for power; 
The nature of our context today is such that an 
approach which desires power single-mindedly must 
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of necessity become like that which it wishes to 
destroy. Rather than wanting to change the whole 
model, many of us want to be at the center. It is 
this point of view that writers like June Jordan 
and Audre Lorde continually critique even as they 
call for empowerment, as they emphasize the fear 
of difference among us and our need for leaders 
rather than a reliance on ourselves. For one must 
distinguish the desire for power from the need to 
become empowered—that is, seeing oneself as 
capable of and having the right to determine one's 
life. (Feminist Studies 77) 
It is equally important to understand how institutional 
authority practices like erasure exclude and withhold 
information which isolates individuals from recognising their 
collective relationship to others who also suffer in a 
hierarchical social system that makes it difficult to 
"determine one's life". That isolation is exactly how many 
'victims' continue to see their problems as their own 
personal failure and cannot take back their self-empowerment, 
nor organise as a group. 
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Section (B). Women Playwrights as Rebels: The Strategy of 
Contradiction 
In this section I want to offer a reading of women 
playwrights engaged in the activity of "rebellious" 
resistance through representations of "difference" in their 
plays. I believe a nongendered and nonprescriptive analysis 
can be used that looks at style, form and thematic 
representations as they work intertextually, studying the 
construction of meaning through critical interpretations and 
reception as these relate to textual production in the field, 
not just as located in the play. I will discuss differences 
of style and subject representations in terms of how they 
work counter-discursively to displace the homogeneity of 
dramatic forms or social definitions that contribute to 
dominant notions of universality or reality. In an article 
by Kristin Williamson entitled "A Room of Their Own Can 
Hurt", director Ros Horin makes the following observation 
about women playwrights: 
Women are focusing on interior things and de-
emphasising the plot. They're breaking away from 
realism into a new form, which is more like a 
landscape. I hestitate to make sweeping 
statements, but when we read those 66 playscripts 
we were hit in the face by the similar themes 
coming through. . . If any of the six scripts were 
sent off to a mainstream director now, none of 
them would get a production. (emphasis mine; 
National Times on Sunday, 31) 
This difference can be called the strategy of contradiction, 
not as representations to be eliminated because they 
contradict the dominant identity of the (hu)man discourse, 
but to be included because they perform useful cultural work 
in the intertextual field—if the (hu)man discourse can 
embrace contradiction and difference in the encouragement of 
dialogue and transformation. Transformation is important, 
for, as Daly says, "the Women's Revolution is not merely 
about equality within a patriarchal society (a contradiction 
in terms)" (qtd. in Turner 225). It is also about being a 
rebel, and refusing to obey the system that produces 
inequality and oppression. According to Webster, a rebel has 
two connotations, one negative in relationship to authority, 
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and one positive in relationship to the subject. The rebel 
is one who defies and seeks to overthrow the authority to 
which he is rightfully subject, or one who refuses to obey a 
superior; but it is also defined as one who tries to shake 
off subjection. I would argue that the ideology of power as 
dominance under the guise of 'protecting' those who are 
'naturally' dependent or inferior, is an extension of the 
construction that represses both male and female subjects in 
the tradition inherited from Aristotle's worldview. Plays by 
women that represent problems and violence associated with 
'natural' dominance, thus expose the contradiction that this 
so-called protection is a myth based on repression and force. 
These textual representations of personal, social and 
institutional contradictions work to shift the centrality 
afforded by assximptions of male superiority; displace gender 
as 'natural' opposites; and through collective recognition of 
structural problems, theorise power based on association, a 
definition that challenges power based on isolation and 
dominance. 
Appearance and Style 
In the introduction to playwright Rosalyn Drexler's The 
Line of Least Existence, Gilman comments on the unusual 
appearance and style of Drexler's plays and language, and 
suggests an interaction with the text beyond the 
interpretation of meaning or truth, into an experience of its 
appearance; 
Appearance is everything and style is a way of 
living ... Style is neither instrximent nor 
adornment but actual sxibstance, the thing itself. 
Once you find yourself looking behind the 
appearance of a play, or any work of art, to 
discover what its really about, or thinking of 
style as a means of expressing something besides 
itself, some purported body of truth previously 
holed up somewhere, you may come into all sorts of 
windfalls, but you can be sure they won't be 
aesthetic ones .., Imagination equals style equals 
play; until we learn that this is so, we are going 
to go on hunting like demented ferrets for the 
truth underneath the surfaces of the plays we see 
,,, and never experiencing what is there to be 
experienced, (ix) 
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Rather than a project to define yet another genre which will 
mark, locate and describe the essence of femaleness or 
feminist as only in the plays, it might be less limiting to 
discuss the differences in the appearance or style of women's 
plays, and how these offer structural critiques of dominant 
definitions of good drama, while in the intertextual field 
they perform the cultural work of displacing the centrality 
of homogenising definitions. 
Keyssar argues that most of feminist theatre tended to 
displace 'realism' as an ineffective tool for portraying 
disregarded details of women's lives which were either 
invisible under patriarchal definitions or loaded with 
prescribed significations. She notes that a conflict or 
tension in feminist theatre was to represent the often 
contradictory and different experiences that constituted 
women's reality within the dominant definitions of life under 
a patriarchal social structure; 
they strive for authenticity but often the 
'reality' that is their goal is not a matter of a 
photographic surface image but of a metaphor that 
captures the elusive rather than the manifest 
gesture ... I would now argue, then, that the 
tension I initially perceived is not a matter of 
conflict between realistic and non-realistic 
dramaturgies but a matter of different angles and 
proximities of points of view. (xii) 
Using the paintings of Georgia O'Keefe and Gertrude Stein's 
work, she relates these different perspectives to the 
metaphor of a landscape; 
I would liken the differing perspectives found in 
feminist drama to different approaches to the 
desert. From a distance, in certain lights, and 
especially in the sximmer and winter, the desert 
appears drab, mute and single-hued. But the closer 
one gets, and particularly in the spring, one 
finds not only variations of tone and sound but at 
times such intensity of colour and melody that it 
is difficult to draw away. Both visions of the 
desert are equally true and 'real', just as the 
feminist drama that presents a female character 
wearing the mask of a rat's head is as 'real' as 
one in which a woman lifts her skirt and appears 
to urinate on stage, (xiii) 
Though Keyssar implies that the feminist tendency towards the 
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displacement of realistic theatre is a statement about the 
validity of multiple simultaneous realities, it also operates 
as a dramatic style that crititjues the traditional theory of 
representation with its task of reflecting reality rather 
than its role in producing reality constructions. As pointed 
out earlier, a critical practice and authority based on a 
politics of experience, is ultimately a conservative practice 
that privileges whatever view of reality is normative. Thus 
the feminist critique of an assximed universal reality, along 
with the development of styles that question the methodology 
by which that reality is reproduced, is a radical move to 
displace the dominance of a politics of experience as a way 
of establishing literary and social authority. 
While Keyssar is careful not to make a limited 
definition of feminist drama, she also does not deny the 
possibility of a pattern that might have a strategic effect: 
That the presence or absence of realism is not the 
central issue for feminist drama does not mean 
that all these plays are alike or that there is no 
pattern to feminist dramaturgy. Divisions remain 
between emphases on interiority as opposed to 
exteriority, between works that separate and works 
that conjoin class consciousness and gender 
consciousness, between plays that focus on women's 
autonomy and those that stress community ... More 
important than these distinctions, however, is the 
relentless appearance in these plays of the 
strategy of transformation. the theatrical 
manifestation of metamorphosis of contexts, 
actions and, most crucially, of characters, 
(emphasis mine; xiii) 
Keyssar suggests that such an aesthetics with respect to 
character has quite a different politics. She points out 
that in Aristotelian notions of tragedy, drama depended upon 
the character's self-recognition: 
In his key perception about Greek tragedy, 
Aristotle argued that drama achieved its effect on 
the audience by presenting a character who comes 
to know himself (or herself), and whose moment of 
self-recognition is revealed to others. Drama has 
thus traditionally urged us to know ourselves 
better, to search our histories and to reveal to 
ourselves and others who we 'really' are. (xiv) 
She argues that the tradition of dramatic self-recognition 
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has had conservative effects: 
Drama that pivots on recognition scenes, where the 
goal is to stand still and 'know thyself is 
essentially conservative; it seeks and embraces 
what is and confirms the power of individual 
consciousness. Drama that embraces transformations 
inspires and asserts the possibility for change; 
roles and role-playing, not hidden essences, merit 
attention; we are what we do and what we become, 
and no one, neither woman nor man, is restricted 
from becoming other, (emphasis mine; xiv) 
She points out that "In contrast to most of the drama of the 
last two thousand years, feminist drama does not rely on a 
recognition scene as the pivot of its structure" (xiii): 
In feminist drama, however, the impetus is not 
towards self-recognition and revelation of a 
'true' self but towards recognition of others and 
a concomitant transformation of the self and the 
world ... Even in psychoanalytically oriented 
feminist plays, however, the self is not seen as 
stable and hidden but as shifting, alterable, 
admirably and problematically varied. Nor is the 
world in which characters exist reassuringly 
unified and solid, but fragmented and diverse, 
(emphasis mine; xiv) 
Because the characters are transformed through their 
interaction and recognition of others in shifting realities 
and roles, the kind of feminist recognition that Keyssar 
describes adds another dimension of awareness to the concept 
of the self as multiple selves-in-production, rather than the 
reductionist recognition of a fixed, inner, individual self. 
In line with the 'personal is political' slogan of the time 
that emerged out of the collective recognition of oppression 
upon individuals as a result of the politics of institutions, 
Keyssar observes that the plays of feminist theatre were 
developing an aesthetic or style that also had radical 
political implications: 
The plays created in the context of that 
recognition do not just mirror social change but 
assert a new aesthetic based on the transformation 
rather than the recognition of persons. (1) 
Keyssar feels that the emphasis on transformation in feminist 
drama where the women recognise their situation as individual 
and collective, not only "enriches and clarifies" (xiv) the 
slogan that the personal is political, but affirms the 
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freedom in the possibility for changing social structures 
rather than seeking to conserve institutionalised definitions 
organised around assximed biological essences. 
As mentioned earlier, Keyssar notes the predominant 
technique of transformation which is often characterised by 
constantly shifting scenes and rapid or sudden role changes. 
While this is neither a predominant essence of nor a 
prescription for feminist theatre, it is interesting to 
speculate on the different effects that might be generated by 
such a writing and performance technique, as compared to the 
traditional dramatic narrative with characterisation, plot, 
conflict, climax and resolution centered around the 
revelation and recognition of a 'true' inner self. Richard 
Schechner discusses the effects of this technique in his 
introduction to Megan Terry's Viet Rock and Other Plays, and 
he quotes Peter Feldman who directed the Open Theatre's 
production of Terry's Keep Tightly Closed, for a definition: 
The transformation is adapted from a Second City 
workshop device ... It is an improvisation in 
which the established realities or 'given 
circximstances' (the Method phrase) of the scene 
change several times during the course of the 
action. What may change are character and/or 
situation and/or time and/or objectives. Whatever 
realities are established at the beginning are 
destroyed after a few minutes and replaced by 
others. Then these are in turn destroyed and 
replaced. These changes occur swiftly and almost 
without transition. until the audience's 
dependence upon any fixed reality is called into 
question. (10) 
The shifting of realities and character roles disturbs 
audience expectations of the linear plot and prevents them 
from having any long term identification with any one role. 
While Aristotelian definitions of drama might argue that this 
technique will sxibdue the emotional reaction of the audience, 
it can have the effect of arousing more unexpected feelings 
since there are no usual beginnings, middles and neatly 
solved endings. As Olauson argues, "by viewing her 
'transformations' the audience was forced to watch and 
interpret the action rather than focus on the personalities 
of the actors, characters, or playwright" (121). This shift 
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in emphasis from the individual character or stable reality 
in transformational drama is a vital part of the characters 
discovering empowerment through recognition of their multiple 
roles and relationships to others in a more active, 
associative and collective process amidst a fluid stage of 
shifting sets. This is a significant aesthetic difference 
that emphasises fluidity and change, collective 
relationships, and the continual process of reality 
constructions. This differs markedly from the more 
conservative politics of traditional drama where the hero is 
a unified subject in a neatly ordered plot—or as in the case 
of the Theatre of the Absurd, where the hero/subject is 
alienated from self and from meaningful action in a 
nihilistic, total absence of plot. 
In the introduction to Women in Theatre Malpede 
discusses the quality of women's tragic/comic texts which 
reinscribe the aspect of transformation through ritual and 
the cycles of birth, death and rebirth, rather than the 
traditional oppositional constructs of tragedy as high drama 
and comedy as the recuperation into marriage. According to 
early theatre history, women were the major participants in 
these early life-affirming rituals: 
'It is perhaps worth pointing out that in [the 
seasonal] ceremonies of the type we have been 
discussing a major role is in fact usually played 
bv women.' [emphasis added] Theodore Gaster writes 
in Thespis ^  his study of the origins of drama in 
the Near East ... Gilbert Murray concurs, in his 
introduction to Gaster's Thespis. 'It is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that when we look back to the 
beginnings of Exiropean literatxire we find 
everywhere drama, and always drama derived from a 
religious ritual designed to ensure the rebirth of 
the dead world.' ... In each and every one of 
these life-desiring, life-affirming rituals which 
are the origins of drama, women played major roles 
as characters, performers, and creators, as the 
ones who imagined the content and who wrought the 
form. (4-5) 
Malpede argues that the disappearance of women from these 
rituals coincided with a change in consciousness and a change 
in theatre; 
Women's disappearance from the creation and 
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performance of such rituals marked an apocalyptic 
change in hximan consciousness. Now two separate 
forms, tragedy and comedy, were needed to deal 
with the full range of hximan feeling which once 
had been expressed by the life-cult's cyclic 
emotional continuxim. (5) 
Tragedy based on the heroic saga became the model for 
classical drama that elevated the death of the individual, 
while comedy remained nearer to folk plays and celebrated 
life through marriage: 
In tragedy (called 'most sublime') the focus 
shifted from the rebirth and resurrection of a 
life-spirit to the battle with fate and the 
subsequent fall of the specific heroic man. 
'Tragedy which took its plots, its content from 
the heroic saga, from the lives and struggles of 
individual heroes, ended in death, because in this 
world the hximan individual knows no resurrection. 
Comedy is nearer to the original folk-play and 
finds its consximmation in a revel and a marriage.' 
(Malpede 5) 
This split of more general, life-affirming cycles into 
oppositional structures where death becomes tragedy and life 
becomes marriage, has diminished the representation of power 
through personal transformation that is a vital aspect of 
rebirth in ritual drama. 
Malpede links two other dualistic separations with the 
split of tragedy/comedy: 
The separation of tragedy from comedy (and of 
women from acting in the theatre) coincided with 
another separation; that of god from hximankind. 
Originally, as Jane Ellen Harrison explains 
throughout Themis, what was worshiped was not 
differentiated from the worshippers. (6) 
The result of this division between the worshipper and the 
worshipped developed into the monotheistic god where 
"religious longing would consolidate into the fear/love 
worship of a single, masculine father-creator" (6) . This 
monotheistic idea was organised aroxind another separation 
between spirit from flesh. Malpede claims that the 
spirit/body dichotomy has been one of the most disastrous of 
patriarchal ideology; 
The spirit/body split claimed by monotheistic 
religion has been, quite simply, ecologically and 
morally disastrous. Pillage of the natural world. 
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despisal of women, and self-hatred on the part of 
men who 'fell' from grace have been its results. 
Tragedy has been its most exalted dramatic form. 
(7) 
She argues that a new dramatic action is required to alter 
the dichotomies which traditional drama, as constructed 
through patriarchal ideology, is based upon. She describes 
this new action as the redefining of dramatic conflict: 
The feminist theatre groups and artists 
represented in this section, while all working in 
very different ways, are each redefining the 
nature of dramatic conflict. This mysterious 
essence of the theatre is not, we think, an 
outgrowth of the primitive hunt or tribal war, nor 
a relic of the pagan (and Judeo-Christian, and 
nuclear age) customs of ritual murder, nor a 
memorium of the ancient agon, or battle, between 
the forces of 'good' and 'evil', nor the 
supposedly cathartic violence of the theatre of 
cruelty. Dramatic conflict—or, more accurately, 
dramatic tension or complexity—is the process of 
change in which we as women, and men of nonviolent 
courage, are currently engaged. (233) 
For Malpede then, the process of change or transformation in 
feminist theatre is crucial to the redefinition of drama that 
is life-affirming, and that this rebellion is a return to the 
wholism of life cycles rather than the dualism of tragedy and 
comedy. 
Many plays by women do not employ a traditional dramatic 
plot, with conflict, climax and resolution, but seem more 
diffuse, unresolved or lacking an obvious centre. Keyssar 
and Leavitt have specifically mentioned a predominant quality 
or style in feminist theatre which avoids realistic 
representation. However, realistic drama is also associated 
with the linear narrative plot, and the good dramatic 
requirements of conflict and neat resolution, such that women 
playwrights may not be avoiding "reality" so much as 
questioning the limits of an Aristotelian tradition (art 
imitates natxire) that defined linearity of plot as the best 
representation of reality. A theatre which avoids these 
traditional dramatic forms may be arguing that linear 
narrative is not representative enough of different 
simultaneous realities, or that "nature" is not so simple and 
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linear. The plays that are diffuse, using unusual language 
patterns or images, may therefore be representing a different 
reality rather than a nonreality. 
Of course, from a reception point of view, the avoidance 
of realistic representation could suggest several things such 
as worry over the critical reception of the author's 
authority or, it could indicate a fear that the play's issues 
are too radical and might survive better if couched in more 
difficult, less obvious textual constructs. It may also 
relate to Daly's work on language where feminists 
strategically displace the form of connotations in words by 
dispersing the binary sign and its dominant secondary 
significations for gender through associative disruption, a 
technique which has been called poetic, schizophrenic or bad 
writing. An example of this in imagery is Tina Howe's Birth 
and After Birth^ where the representation of a four year old 
child as a large male adult displaces the sign for child, 
where the secondary signification for child is = small; it 
also shows a mother overwhelmed by the largeness of 
motherhood in a relationship where 'realistically' she is 
expected to be larger and in control. I would call this 
strategy a more associative process, relating to Foucault's 
"murmur of resemblance" which is the persistence of 
perceiving connectivity or interrelatedness between seemingly 
unrelated things. This can also be a valid form of reality 
description, rather than always describing identity strictly 
in terms of logic, oppositions, and difference. When the 
playwright associates a large image of the adult with the 
character of the child it stretches the usual size and power 
significations of that sign, as well as indicating the 
resemblance between adults and small children. The texts 
which work with language and imagery to problematise what is 
real subvert the dominant notions of the well-made sentence 
and the well-ordered binary sign in a radical process which 
allows more free play rather than repressing the anarchy in 
scripts. Rather than see this as faulty writing or bad 
drama, these texts can be discussed as critiquing 
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representation as a model of communication dominated by 
binary structures. They can also be seen as participating in 
theorising alternative models of perception that relate more 
to the concept of process and interrelatedness in a field of 
textual production. 
Strategies of Contradiction 
Though I have noted differences of writing style in the 
plays, this observation is not meant to represent a search 
for meaning located in content and by form but, rather, is an 
attempt to appreciate style for itself, as an appearance of 
a critique of a dominant mode, and capable of generating 
alternatives for discussion. What, for example, does a style 
that critiques the 'real' suggest for notions like objective 
reality, subjective representation, literary criticism, 
structuralism, genre, the canon, and power? Rather than 
merely recuperate these critiques into a prescriptive 
definition of what is feminist in plays by women, I have made 
an attempt to discover the politics behind their 
nonproduction, suggesting that these plays and their 
subjects, operating within representation in a gender biased 
(hu)man discourse have necessarily been marginalised while 
others have been promoted to maintain the status quo 
identity. As subjects for nonproduction, these plays have 
been effectively depoliticised through their removal from the 
collective social arena where awareness of institutionalised 
structures as they interrelate with personal problems could 
be debated. As I have argued, this was done through erasure 
as nonreception, where prejudice has operated within and 
beyond institutionalised standards. This discourse has 
included critical practices of aesthetic judgements and 
prescriptive criticism that seemed either ignorant or 
incapable of reading the representations of powerful social 
critiques in the texts of women playwrights. Further, the 
texts of women, feminism as a social movement, and feminist 
literary criticism have been hegemonically classified as 
pertaining to 'women's issues', with 'liberation' as 
achieving equality within an xinchanged system and, thus, the 
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work has not been taken seriously as a critique of social 
structures and the larger political arena. Perhaps the way 
to repoliticise erased plays, tedcing them out of their sphere 
as 'women's plays' and thus revitalising their collective 
power to share information against the social and political 
background, must necessarily lie beyond discussions of a 
newly recuperated feminine aesthetic or feminist prescriptive 
criticism. Instead it is possible to read them for their 
erasure against an intertextual background^ asking why they 
were erased, and what social, political and economic 
definitions existed and still exist which reguire that these 
particular texts be erased in the preservation of the 
identity of the (hu)man discourse. Since the plays of women 
have functioned as sites of contradiction and thus become 
subjects for nonproduction, one way to read them politically 
is to consider what representations have been erased in order 
to preserve the dominant identity, since these represented 
subjects, if produced, must "logically" also act to 
deconstruct these oppositionally constructed yet naturalised 
ideologies of the (hu)man discourse. What are these key 
subjects and how do they act counter-discursively to perform 
the cultural work of displacing the masculinist centre of the 
(hu)man discourse? 
If we consider the myth of patriarchy as one where the 
male principle occupies the centre and is the superior source 
of life, it places Man in the position of having a natural 
right to dominate in a hierarchical or 'power over' pattern 
that represses self-determination and autonomy in subjects 
who must submit to externally imposed authority. Plays by 
women that work to decenter this myth seem to entail at least 
three things; 
1) shift the metaphor of maleness as naturally 
superior, central, and therefore the rightful wielder of 
social power; 
2) displace the notion of gender as natural opposites 
instead of a social construct based on force and repression; 
3) destabilise the 'knowledge' that power is 
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necessarily dominance over others in a hierarchical structure 
with decision-making centralised at the top. 
The plays of women that represent contradictory images 
to the dominant social and gender definitions of a 
patriarchal system can be seen as performing the cultural 
work of displacing the assximed realities of such a construct 
in various ways. In the first case, shifting the assximption 
of male centrality occurs when plays represent women's 
reality constructs as the dominant emphasis, or represent 
gender role reversals which alter fixed perspectives such as 
Churchill's Cloud Nine or Lamb's But What Have You Done For 
Me Lately which depicts a man pleading for abortion from an 
all female court of judges. Shifting male superiority occurs 
when plays depict women characters who are interested in 
vocations, who are not passive, mentally inferior, nor only 
objects of sex and romance. The play shows images of women 
that are capable of or desire public sphere work, 
independence and leadership—regardless of whether the plot 
shows them becoming autonomous or 'succeeding' by imitating 
a masculinist definition of power in a male-dominant social 
arena. Such characterisations of women also function to 
undermine the second assximption that the feminine gender is 
naturally opposite to the masculine. They represent women as 
people who may have desires, capabilities and goals that are 
similar to those traditionally set aside for males, thus 
eroding the false opposition and emphasising resemblance. 
The beneficence of polarised gender roles is eroded by plays 
that represent the violence arising out of 'normal' gender 
roles such as wife-beating, rape, incest, and child abuse, 
thus exposing the contradiction of 'protected dependents'. 
These images show women struggling as dissatisfied wives, 
mothers, daughters and lovers in conflict with the very 
social institutions designed to 'protect' but which actually 
dominate, repress and brutalise them. 
The third aspect of cultural work is to destabilise the 
definition of power as dominance in hierarchical structures 
that are assximed to occur 'naturally' in gender and social 
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structures. Plays that depict the contradictions and 
negative effects of larger social institutions like the 
industrial-military complex or the state—taking on the world 
so to speak—work to expose the structural problems affecting 
women, children and men as a collective rather than simply as 
individuals. In this sense, the plays address personal 
isolation by offering a critique of organisational structures 
that use power as dominance by representing a collective 
awareness of group problems and the interrelatedness of 
individuals in the public and private spheres. As Crossley 
discussed in her talk on "Women in Science" on ABC radio, 
quantxim physics has changed the central metaphor for 
understanding the world from that of separate building blocks 
in a machine to one where the central metaphor is that of 
relationship. As Keyssar points out, many plays feature 
transformations in character through acknowledgement of their 
relationship to others, while some plays by women use images 
of women working together or using communal celebrations of 
their relatedness. I would suggest that these plays offer a 
different notion of interconnected strength as 'power with' 
versus a competitive 'power over'. Such characterisations 
and images imply a form of organisation that is not based on 
dominance but nurturance and support. As I will suggest in 
Four (D) , by juxtaposing the texts which hold the masculinist 
identity in its central place, along with texts which employ 
the strategy of contradiction that work to decenter this 
myth, an intertextual collection of women's plays can be 
organised with texts from other disciplines that challenge 
masculine superiority or power as dominance. Such a 
structural organisation that mimics the intertextual field 
can more obviously reflect the cultxiral work being done by 
representations in plays that have traditionally been made 
subjects for nonproduction in the intertextual field of 
discourse. 
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Section (C) . The Politics of Textuality; A Different Path to 
Criticism 
In this section I want to ask questions about the 
purpose of literary criticism, such that a politics of 
textuality and a "new purpose of textual study" might point 
the way to a practice of criticism that is less concerned 
with good/bad judgments based on aesthetics or correct 
meanings, and more involved with a practice of criticism that 
is a constant study of social/textual construction and the 
effects of these as "knowledge" in the intertextual field of 
social discourse. 
I have argued that the politics of erasure is based on 
dominance in discourse, excluding some subjects and promoting 
others. Certainly the recuperation of women's texts offers 
the possibility of deconstructing homogeneous representations 
by circulating a broader diversity of experience and feelings 
into the public domain, hopefully to generate dialogue. But 
in the Grip Report James Sosnoski argues that neither a 
separatist form of institutional inclusion, nor simple 
curriculxim integration does enough to challenge the 
definitions behind the value system of the institutional will 
to power: 
We are inescapably imprisoned in institutions and 
to the extent that we keep calling them prisons we 
will inescapably be imprisoned. Terms empower ... 
We can no longer be fooled by the hiring of 
Marxists, Feminists and Deconstructionists as 
token resistors to 'normal' study. Nothing will 
change the traditional 'normal' study that reigns 
until Marxist, Feminist and Deconstructionist 
textbooks are written as introductions to 
literature among other introductions to literature 
and until they are used in classrooms by non-
Marxists, non-Feminists, and non-
Deconstructionists. (52) 
Unless the institutional form is questioned for the political 
effects of its structures, their practices will continue to 
claim a kind of 'natural' authority, instead of acknowledging 
that they do have a theoretical basis to their definitions 
and construction. 
One example is the conservative university that claims 
its canonical teachings are 'normal' while their teachers 
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employed for 'marginal' or 'fringe' studies are seen as 
spouting leftist propaganda—the key being that while they 
are all constructing their own positions, none of which are 
natural—at least the 'marginal' teachers are usually in the 
practice of acknowledging this fact. That is why theory is 
so frightening to institutions for as Sosnoski says; 
Many have locked themselves into a notion that 
theory overpowers practice. This obfuscates the 
power structure in literary study. It is also a 
species of nonsense. When praxis, the generalized 
account of a practice, is xinself-reflexively 
articulated as 'theory free' it makes invisible 
and illegible the conditions of its self-
disclosure and self-enactment. This is a malign 
mode of authorization. (51) 
Thus the deconstruction of the concept of authority and 
dominance in literary criticism, suggests the questioning of 
institutional practices that maintain the power of selection 
by exclusion through criticism based on a politics of 
interpretation and the authority of experience. As Christian 
asks in "The Race for Theory", "for whom are we doing what we 
are doing when we do literary criticism?" (77). 
The struggle in feminist literary criticism reveals that 
one element at stake is the concept of criticism and its 
relationship to power. In order not to mimic the power 
politics represented in the traditional formation of the 
literary canon (which has used erasure to marginalise 
competing interests as inferior or peripheral), the purpose 
of literary criticism needs to be questioned. Is it 
authoritatively to interpret universal knowledge by "powering 
over" and denying the experience or imagination of others, or 
can it be a project of studying textual constructs and their 
effects in the field of discourse? Can it be to participate 
in a politics of textuality that acknowledges 
intertextuality, self-reflexivity of the critic, and 
complicity in the production of meaning in a more open 
acknowledgement of "I like or don't like", (revealing more 
about the critic) rather than a judgement of what is 
essentially good/bad in the text, pretending to appeal to 
some authoritative objective tradition? Is it, as Derrida 
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suggests through his work, a practice that deconstructs the 
structures of the philosophical text in its rigorous attempt 
to establish truth, with a positive aspect of only imitating 
and miming the plastic, or art text? This questioning of the 
purpose of criticism, as it participates in the construction 
of Knowledge and power, might lead to the kind of dialogue 
necessary for a shift to a self-reflexive practice of 
criticism that is more interested in what Foucault called 
"the science of interpretation" and how we construct reality 
in the intertextual field of discourse. 
Perhaps this questioning also points to a new area 
regarding the purpose of textual study. This "new 
understanding" would theorise textual study not as the 
accximulation of knowledge used in a will to power which 
reinforces critical positions that employ ideology as if it 
were a detached objective judgement, but as an ongoing 
critique of the basis for knowledge, and the role of 
criticism and institutions to construct ideological positions 
and power differentials in the textual field. In other 
words, is the purpose of textual study to discuss, 
destabilise and recreate 'knowledge' as a very relative 
process with shifting positions, or is to accximulate 
stability, power and dominance in the textual field? John 
Frow discusses the relationship between knowledge and power 
in "The Social Production of Knowledge and the Discipline of 
English": 
Those who rise to the defense of the hximanities 
have in this sense often been their own worst 
enemies. They have appealed to certain stable and 
unproblematic values, as though these had not been 
the object within the hximanities themselves of an 
intensive critique. Assximing the existence of a 
common culture and a common hximanity, they have 
ignored the unegual distribution of power and the 
radically diverse cultural systems that these 
terms have concealed. They have posited the 
possibility of a disinterested reason, as though 
reason had no complicity in the play of interest 
and power that organises the world. They have 
worked with an essentialist distinction between 
the humanities and the sciences, rather than 
noticing the core of criticality and creativity 
that they share. Most crucially, they have set up 
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the world of culture as a distinct and self-
contained domain, separate from the world of work 
and power and without effects upon it. (7) 
As he goes on to argue, "the problem is most deeply that of 
the possible place of critical thought in a capitalist 
society—that is, in a society which seeks to harness 
knowledge more or less directly to the generation of profit" 
(6). Frow points out that the false separations between 
knowledge, profit, and the social interest function to 
marginalise the politics of such assximptions: 
And it is naive, even dangerously naive, in its 
assximption that social interest is external to 
knowledge. It is rather the case that the goals of 
research are always determined by some vision of 
the social good or of some narrower interest; and 
that knowledge, which is always of potential use, 
is therefore always in a relation to power. This 
is not to argue that it need be directly 
political, but to argue that it is always 
indirectly so. (6) 
A clear example of the indirectly political aspect of 
knowledge is the way that funding for women in the arts has 
been a "project by project" affair, according to Chris 
Westwood in an interview with Sophie Watson, editor of 
Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions. She 
points out that in the arts "there is no policy as to where 
we are going or why", so that there is nothing "which you can 
change to make funds available automatically to women" (220) . 
Funding becomes an ad hoc relationship between the (lobbying) 
artist and the few women who control the purse; 
That almost always has been the case in the 
funding of women and arts—the collaboration of me 
'outside' and a mate 'inside'. It is impossible 
for feminists to attack the arts funding 
bureaucracy from outside with no contacts inside, 
or for new ideas to develop, not just feminism. 
(220) 
Westwood points out that before the Women and Theatre Project 
in 1981 and the Women and Arts Festival in 1982, there had 
been little or no research done on the situation for women in 
the arts, so the relationship between knowledge, power, and 
funding consisted of no knowledge, no clear policy, and no 
obvious pathway to funding. One aim of the festival was to 
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docximent the statistics; 
We insisted there be a research committee to look 
into what was going on, because there had been no 
stats gathering, analysis or research into women 
in the arts . . . Andrea Hull, director of policy 
and planning at the Australia Council, provided 
the funding. I think she just put it into her 
programme and paid for it. I don't know that it 
was officially a grant. It is interesting to note 
that the feminist in a position of power simply 
throws the money quietly sideways when there is no 
policy and therefore no programme to fit in. (221) 
Eventually the research revealed the extent of the problem 
for women which basically was that "of any given theatre 
company, there is usually one male director, one male general 
manager and one male production manager and almost everything 
else in a theatre is done by women" (220) . The docximentation 
led to recommendations for official structures; 
Andrea helped the women writing the report to 
structure recommendations that could reach her 
officially, from which she could then create a 
policy to execute. It was called the Women and 
Arts Strategy. So there is this big glossy report 
followed by a set of recommendations to the 
Australia Council (which is the federal arts 
funding body) to follow up. One of the things the 
Australia Council had to do was create its own 
internal Women and Arts Advisory Committee to 
provide advice to all of the boards which fund 
arts, whatever art form ... This kind of strategy 
was created so that when funding arts, they 
actually took account of women, (emphasis mine; 
221) 
Frow suggests that the value of knowledge, particularly in 
the hximanities, will involve its engagement in a constant 
critique of its own formation: 
I suggest by contrast, that the value of the so-
called hximanities, and more specifically of the 
disciplines of literary studies, can be defended 
only by taking to its radical conclusions the 
critique of the essentialist and foundational 
categories which have governed their formation. 
The more difficult task that this will set for us 
is that of elaborating theoretical categories and 
practices of reading which do not essentialise the 
domain of literatxire or of culture; which can 
account for social and cultural difference and 
inequality of power on a nximber of dimensions; 
which refuse to give specific aesthetic or ethical 
values an absolute status (and which thereby 
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relativise and situate their own position); and 
which can develop a new understanding of the ends 
of textual study. (Frow 7) 
The 'power over' form of institutionalised knowledge has 
utilised essentialist, interpretive criticism to police 
meaning by excluding that which is unauthorised, incorrect or 
voiceless, that which threatens the status quo power 
structures through difference and contradiction. The 
authoritative use of 'knowledge' in the determination of 
curricula within institutions has effectively homogenised the 
intertextual field according to dominant power interests, 
resulting in problems of production for women playwrights and 
others whose texts challenge rather than reinforce the status 
quo reality constructs. However, an altered critical 
practice that engages less in interpretation and the 
determination of correct meaning, and more in the critique of 
the construction of meanings as they relate to the production 
of social values, is a step that may reduce erasure and help 
to create a more diverse textual field that will no doubt be 
of benefit to writers who have been subject to long term 
marginalisation. 
Feminist literary criticism has been working to create 
a less homogeneous textual field, but within the academy 
there is always the danger of mimicking institutionalised 
critical practices that reproduce authoritative positions 
from which to judge and create 'knowledge' that excludes 
difference and otherness as separate from itself. One 
important choice within feminist criticism is either to mimic 
the (hu)man discourse, with its essentialist definitions and 
a politics of interpretation that uses experience for the 
authority to judge others, or to try to transform the 
essentialism underlying traditional criticism's claim to 
'objective' knowledge and power. Hopefully the latter can 
help create a different purpose to textual study using a 
politics of textuality that acknowledges subjectivity, 
relativity and complicity in the construction of meaning, 
such that the purpose of knowledge is not to determine truth 
for the sake of power but is a continual critique of the 
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effects of ideological textual constructs in the intertextual 
field of discourse. Perhaps such a politics of criticism and 
such a purpose to textual study can work towards developing 
a hximan discourse that is unafraid to embrace contradiction 
and encoxirage dialogue across boundaries, valuing feedback 
rather than erasxire. 
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Section (D). The Ouantmn Anthology; An Intertextual Matrix. 
or. a Place to Dialogue 
In this section I will suggest an alternative to the 
usual dramatic anthologies that consist of a collection of 
plays. I would like to create a textual avenue for more 
dialogue by developing what might be called a quantxim 
anthology that is an 'intertextual' matrix. Here plays by 
women can be represented thematically within an intertextual 
web that juxtaposes multiple boundaries in a cross-cultural, 
cross-historical compilation of 'fiction', 'non-fiction', 
'literary' and 'sociological' texts that includes male 
writers. The purpose of such a text would be to create 
intertextual dialogue within the borders of the anthological 
text itself. By juxtaposing texts in the form of plays, 
reviews, newspaper articles, feminist critiques, and other 
social texts in a bricoleur style of collage, it can be shown 
that textual production is a matter of reception and 
textually constructed social values rather than some 
essential 'goodness' or 'badness' located in the playtext. 
For example, the representations of power patterns 
underlying the ideology of social 'normalcy' is disrupted by 
the confrontation with representations of contradiction and 
violence in the plays of women. The intertextual anthology 
can reflect this field relationship by juxtaposing extracts 
from texts that support such definitions of natural 
dominance, with texts that critique the construction of 
authority as a 'power over' pattern of dominance that 
disempowers and represses men, women and children. The 
contrast between dominant social definitions and 
representations in the plays can be highlighted by placing a 
newspaper article that proclaims lesbianism as a sickness 
juxtaposed with several plays where the lesbian characters 
are represented as not sick at all. A newspaper article 
about a woman who has thrown her baby off the roof is an 
example of a serious social problem and can be next to a play 
like De Green's Joss Adams Show, along with a critical review 
that dismisses it as lightweight entertainment not worthy of 
serious consideration. In this way the dominant social 
350 
definitions which are part of a homogeneous, false reality 
constructed through critical practices, reviews, and media 
representation can be exposed as just that—false definitions 
and limiting constructs. Yet it is important to remember 
that these plays are actually offering different perspectives 
about constructions of the 'real', and it is only when they 
are held up against an intertextual field that they take on 
the signification of contradictions in a counter-discursive 
'opposition'. It would be beneficial (due to the continuing 
widespread ignorance of dramatic work by women) to create 
this large, or perhaps serial, anthology of women's plays— 
not as the definitive collection of the best drama by women, 
for women and about women, but as an intertextual anthology 
by women for men and women that represents them in textual 
construct that mimics the intertextual field. 
Women have often been criticised as being capable of 
writing only short or single issue plays. In the 
intertextual field, the individual author is not the only 
representative of collective work, and a large anthology or 
series can therefore represent a broader body of work 
discussing many issues. I would like to make some 
suggestions for organising plays using Bryan Turner's model 
of power where he classifies strategies for dominance as 
involving reproduction, restraint, regulation and 
representation; these areas could delineate a thematic 
organisation for the anthology of women playwrights. In the 
area of reproduction texts could be included that work with 
the construction and reproduction of gender, sexuality, 
motherhood, and marriage. It would be valuable to include 
older plays such as Glaspell's The Verge or Crothers' He and 
She, which represent women who feel suffocated within 
marriage, experience conflict with work, and in Glaspell's 
play, finally commit suicide. These could be juxtaposed with 
modern plays confronting the same issues such as Molinaro's 
The Abstract Wife or Lamb's The Mod Donna. This section 
should also include plays that deal with domestic violence 
and rape, as part of undermining the patriarchal notion of 
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protected dependents. McNeill's unpublished Half Past a Life 
is a savage indictment of incest, a 'father's rights', and 
the resulting trauma of madness. McNamara's unpublished 
play. The Secret Room brings domestic violence to light, De 
Groen's The Joss Adams Show takes a look at marriage 
inequalities and child abuse, while Churchill's Objections to 
Sex and Violence explores pornography. Boucher's The Fairies 
are Thirsty and Arden's Vagina Rex and the Gas Oven are good 
examples of texts that confront the construction of 
femininity, as well as female stereotypes like the madonna, 
wife, and whore—while exploring rape and domestic violence 
within these institutions. Akins' The Old Maid and Crothers' 
A Man's World are older plays that examine illegitimacy and 
the double standard, and could be interesting when compared 
with plays dealing with abortion, such as Lamb's But What 
Have You Done For Me Lately. There are not many published 
plays dealing with lesbianism, but Shotlander's Framework or 
Lyssa's Pinball both challenge the notion that homosexuals 
are unnatural or sick. Several plays could be included that 
challenge the glorification of motherhood, such as Boesing's 
Pimp. Bol's Treadmill. Jellico's The Sport of My Mad Mother, 
and Norman's 'night Mother. 
In the section on dominance as restraint, plays could be 
included that deal with issues around the restraint of mind 
and body through education and religion, representing plays 
that challenge the system or discuss those outside the system 
such as prostitutes, prisoners, or witches. Fornes' play. 
Dr. Kheal takes on the institution of education where the 
teacher is always right, while Hangar's unpublished play. 
Ring the Changelings confronts the violence of 
perfectionistic conditioning for students. Plowman's Get Out 
of Your Cage and Cusack's Morning Sacrifice are older plays 
that explore the frustration of women teachers using fixed 
and censored curriculums. Boucher's The Fairies are Thirsty 
and Kennedy's A Lesson in Dead Language offer critiques of 
the construction of femininity within the Christian religion. 
Churchill's Vinegar Tom challenges the incredible power of 
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the church to destroy women accused as witches. Several 
plays that depict women who are outside of dominant moral 
definitions are Terry's Ex-Miss Copper Queen On a Set of 
Pills and Clarke's Farewell Brisbane Ladies, where both plays 
represent prostitutes as "women like other women" but in the 
social context of difficult family and economic 
circximstances. Shelley's Pick-Up Girl from 1943, is one of 
the early plays I found that explored the related problems of 
poverty and juvenile delinquency. Two plays I would include 
on women and prisons would be Norman's Getting Out and 
Blewett's unpublished play. The First Joanna (1947). Norman 
explores the problems for a woman in prison and after her 
release, while Blewett's play is an interesting 
representation of the connections between generations— 
depicting a modern Joanna that returned to Australia after 
having to sleep with a prison guard in the German army, and 
who is consoled by a diary of the 'first' Joanna who was a 
convict that had to kill the guardian who raped her. 
The third section, regulation, could include plays that 
offer contradictions about the regulation of time and space 
in the form of work, property, and government. Churchill's 
Top Girls is an interesting look at famous women throughout 
history as it explores the notion of women trying to be 
successful within a masculinist model of work. Gray's The 
Torrents and Carroll's Office Interlude are older plays that 
explore the issue of sexual harassment, while Mueller's 
Killings On the Last Line is a contemporary look at women 
working in a nuclear reactor—dealing with harassment, union 
troubles, poisonous chemicals, and the lack of child-care to 
the point where one woman keeps her baby drugged and asleep 
in the women's toilet. Sowerby's Rutherford and Son and 
Treadwell's Machinal are older plays that examine the 
problems of the working class, while Howe's The Art of Dining 
is a modern satire about a woman trying to be independent in 
a business with her husband, but ends up working for him 
anyway. De Green's Vocations is a good play to include 
because it discusses the difference between meaningful work— 
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as in a vocation—and the ideology of jobs. Yankowitz's play 
Boxes explores the many limiting 'boxes' that people have to 
fit into for purposes of safety and security while Terry's 
Home; or Future Soap extends this image into a futuristic 
scenario with an overpopulated society of completely 
controlled people. Flanagan's Can You Hear Their Voices is 
an older but useful dramatisation of the farmer's plight 
during the 30s. Two plays that discuss war and the 
relationship to property are Duncan's Sons of the Morning and 
Millay's Aria da Capo. Lyssa's The Boiling Frog is a useful 
examination of government and property through history, while 
Churchill's Light Shining in Buckinghamshire looks at the 
decimation imposed upon peasants during the movement by the 
monarchy to resume all common land. Terry's Massachusetts 
Trust is an interesting drama of the absurd from the 60s that 
confronts the construction of gender and candidates in U.S. 
election politics. 
The fourth section, dominance by representation, could 
be a section that explores 'absurd' plays which challenge 
dominant notions of reality in language. It could include 
plays like Kennedy's Sun which is more of a poetic play with 
images of man as the sun coming apart, or any of Owen's plays 
which have a great deal of word play like He Wants Shih. An 
older example of a play that features language would be 
Stein's The Mother of Us All. Jardine's play Feminist 
Questions d'apres gynesis is also relevant, as it explores 
feminism and postmodern theories of representation. 
Though women's plays offer representations of 
contradictions in dominant social definitions, they also 
frequently do this with an overwhelming amount of humour, to 
the point where I would call this a dominant characteristic. 
And perhaps this is a technigue of the survivor. There are 
so many published plays by women that any organisation of 
their work into an anthology is a sad reduction; nonetheless, 
this can be seen as a valid activity to counterbalance their 
long term erasure. The intertextual anthology is an attempt 
to illustrate the methodologies of such erasure, while a 
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thematic organisation can expose the wide range of issues 
that concern women playwrights: a suggestion that an 
anthology or series of anthologies might take for making 
plays by women subjects for production. 
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